352 Anglo-Allied Artillery. June 18. RETTBERG'S Hanoverian Foot Battery of six guns. In front of KEMPT'S Brigade stood Major ROGERS's British Foot Battery of six guns. Major LLOYD'S British, and Captain CLEEVES's King's German, Foot Batteries, of six guns each, were with ALTEN's Division. Major KUHLMANN's King's German Horse Battery, and Captain SANDHAM's British Foot Battery, of six guns each, were attached to COOKE'S Division. All the above Batteries were posted in Front Line; as was also Lieutenant Colonel Sir HEW Ross's British Horse Battery (from the Reserve), of six guns, which was posted on the height immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte, and near the intersection of the Wavre road with the Charleroi high road, in which latter two of its guns were stationed. Major SYMPHER's King's German Horse Battery, and Captain BOLTON's British Foot Battery, of six guns each, were attached to CLINTON'S Division. The remaining Horse Batteries were with the Cavalry. They were (exclusive of Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER's already mentioned) Major BULL'S of six howitzers; Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER SMITH'S of six guns; Major WHINYATES'S of six guns, and provided with rockets; Captain MERCER'S of six guns; and Major RAMSAY's of six guns. Captain PETTER's Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery of eight guns, was attached to COLLAERT's Cavalry Division. The DutchBelgian Horse Battery under Captain VAN DER SMISSEN, and Foot Battery under Captain Lux, of eight guns each, were with CHASSE's Division at Braine l'Alleud. The Brunswick Horse Battery, under Captain HEINEMANN; and Foot Battery, under Major MOLL, of eight guns each, were with the Brunswick Corps. The British Horse Battery under Major BEANE, and Foot Battery under Captain SINCLAIR (belonging to the Sixth Division), as also the Hanoverian Foot Battery under Captain BRAUN, all three having six guns cach, were in reserve near Mont St Jean. June 18. A review of Wellington's dispositions. 353 The whole of the Batteries were engaged in the Front Line, more or less, during the course of the Battle. This disposition of WELLINGTON's forces, so completely in accordance with the general features of the ground which he had selected with consummate judgment as the Field on which he was prepared to give battle to his imperial rival in the great art of war, was admirably calculated for either offensive or defensive measures. The opposite line of Heights, which the Enemy would naturally crown with the main Line of his forces, was fully within the effectual range of cannon shot; and no hostile movement could be made against any part of the position, that would remain undiscovered within the range of musketry. The formation of the ground in rear of the ridge, along the brow of which his Front Line was posted, was such as effectually to screen from the Enemy's observation any movements of the Supports and Reserves, preparatory to either a contemplated attack, or to the assembling of the necessary means of resistance at any threatened point. In rear of the main Front Line the ground was practicable for the movements of all Arms, the country was perfectly open, and the two high roads added still further to the facility of communication between the front and rear. The occupation of the Posts of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte presented important advantages in aid alike of offensive and defensive operations. The Right Flank was rendered secure, not only by the position of CLINTON'S Division, commanding the valley skirting the Village of Merbe Braine, but also by the occupation of the Town of Braine l'Alleud, whence CHASSE'S Division could co-operate so as to render any attempt of the Enemy to turn that Flank a most hazardous experiment. Although the Left of the main Front Line rested upon an 151. W.L. Siborne. Z 354 June 18. A review of Wellington's dispositions. open plain or elevated plateau, and was therefore completely en l'air: yet the Village of Smohain, the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte, together with the scattered houses and numerous enclosures on the abrupt slope descending into the valley in front, by being well garnished with Infantry, offered the means of protracted resistance; while Cavalry was at hand, on the high ground, to cover the latter if forced to retire, and to frustrate the complete development of the Enemy's disposition of attack. The latter description of force was also available in maintaining a vigilant look out for any direct flank attack; which, however, was the less to be apprehended in consequence of the preconcerted Prussian co-operation in that quarter. The position also afforded ample security for a retreat. The two broad high roads uniting at a point in rear of the centre, greatly facilitated the retirement of unbroken masses upon Mont St Jean; while the Village itself, and the numerous buildings and inclosures which lined the great road as far as the Forest of Soignies, presented the ready means of securing the further retreat of those masses, which, it may be assumed, would have constituted a main Central Column. On the right, the Villages of Merbe Braine, Le Mesnil, and L'Estraye, connected with Braine l'Alleud and with one another, as also with the Forest, by several cross roads, and intersected by numerous inclosures, were well calculated for the retirement of the extreme Right of the Army, by the advantages which they afforded for covering such retreat with Light Troops. On the left, the ground was more open, but the distance between the position and the Forest was infinitely less, the latter stretching southward to the Village of Verd Cocou ; and the troops retiring in this direction, being much closer June 18. A review of Wellington's dispositions. 355 to the high road, would have their Right in a great measure protected by the well defended retreat of the Central Column. The Forest itself, consisting almost entirely of tall trees, unaccompanied by underwood, was passable for all Arms; it was intersected by numerous roads and lanes in every direction; and its southern extremity, adjoining the high road, was thickly skirted with houses and gardens, adding considerably to its capabilities for a vigorous stand against the further advance of an Enemy. The retrograde march of the detached forces from Tubize and Hal upon Brussels, and their junction with the remainder of the Anglo-Allied Army in the position of Uccle, between that capital and the Forest of Soignies, will readily present itself to the minds of military men studying the dispositions and movements to which a retreat would have probably given rise; but this is a subject which, embracing as it naturally would, the consequent operations of the Prussians, opens a wide field for discussion, into which it is unnecessary to enter. The general direction of the Front Line of the French Army was nearly parallel with that of the Anglo-Allies. The high road from Charleroi to Brussels, which intersected the Allied position near its Centre, also passed through the Centre of the French line. The point of this intersection was La Belle Alliance, a small Farm house and Inn; and the distance from the one position to the other, taken along the high road between these two points, was 1400 yards. About two hundred yards in the French rear of this house is a summit, the altitude of which exceeds, by about thirteen feet, that of any point along the Anglo-Allied 356 French Front Line-Right Wing. June 18. position. A ridge issuing from it, and extending in a north easterly direction towards Frischermont, formed the position of the Right Wing of the Front Line of the French Army. On the west side, a road leading from the summit, descends rather rapidly as a hollow way down into and across the long valley that takes its course towards Hougomont, then ascends until it reaches another ridge, along which it winds round that Post, at a distance varying from 300 to about 440 yards, until it joins the Nivelles chaussée ; and that winding road indicates pretty nearly the ground occupied by the Left Wing of the French Front Line. The Right Wing of this Line consisted of the First Corps d'Armée, commanded by Lieutenant General Count D'ERLON, comprising four Divisions of Infantry, and one of Light Cavalry. Its Left Division, which was the Second, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron DONZELOT, rested its Left upon La Belle Alliance. The First Brigade of this Division, under General Baron SCHMITH, consisted of the 13th Regiment of Light Infantry and the 17th Regiment of the Line; the former comprising three, and the latter, two, Battalions. The Second Brigade, under General AULARD, consisted of the 19th and 51st Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. These Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first. On the right of the Second Division was the First, commanded by Lieutenant General ALIX. Its First Brigade, under General Baron QUIOT, consisted of the 54th and 55th Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. Its Second Brigade under General Baron |