The French Commissioners interview Wellington. 721

former Commissioners; that he could not but consider the Abdication as a deception; and would not feel himself justified in suspending his operations on such a pretext, which was by no means calculated to fulfil the object the Allies had in view. He explained that, besides NAPOLEON, there were his adherents, who were the declared Enemies of the Allies; and stated that before he could agree to any Suspension he "must see some steps taken to re-establish a Government in France which should afford the Allies some chance of peace."

Upon this point his Grace was pressed to give some explanation as to what would satisfy the Allies.

He replied that he had no authority from his own Government, much less from the Allies, to enter upon the subject; and that all he could do was to give them his private opinion, which he should certainly urge upon the Allies with all the influence he might be supposed to possess, unless otherwise instructed by his own Government.

This opinion was a remarkable illustration of the sound judgment, straightforward policy, and unerring foresight which are so pre-eminently characteristic of the career of this great man. Subsequent events proved its correctness to the letter. It was in strict accordance with the design traced out and enforced by the united diplomacy of Europe. It is best expressed in the Duke's own words :—

"I then told them that I conceived the best security for Europe was the Restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other Government than the King's in France must inevitably lead to new and endless Wars; that BUONAPARTE and the Army having overturned the King's Government, the natural and simple measure, after BUONAPARTE was prisoner or out of the way and the Army defeated, was to recall the King to his authority: and that it was a much more dignified proceeding to recall him without Conditions, and to trust to the energy of their Constitutions for any Reforms they wished to make either in 151. W.L. Siborne.

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722 The Policy of the Duke of Wellington.

June 29.

the Government or the Constitution, than now to make Conditions with their Sovereign; and that, above all, it was important that they should recall the King without loss of time, as it would not then appear that the measure had been forced upon them by the Allies.

"The Commissioners professed, individually and collectively, their earnest desire to see the King restored in the manner I had mentioned, which they said was likewise the desire of the Provisional Government. was, however, of opinion that the two Chambers could not be brought to recall the King without Conditions: and he mentioned, as those upon which they would probably insist, and upon which it was desirable the King should give way; the responsibility of the Administration, and the alteration of the Constitution so far as that the Initiative in making the Laws should be vested in the Assemblies and not in the King.

"I told them regarding the first point, that I had every reason to believe that the King had determined to form a Ministry which should be individually and collectively responsible for all the acts of the Government; and that I did not doubt that His Majesty would not oppose himself to the wishes of the French people, if it was desired that the Initiative in framing the Laws should be invested in the Assemblies that, however, I had no authority to speak on this subject; and recommended to them not to look after little points of difference, and if they really wished to restore the Government of their King, to do it at once and without any Conditions.

"In the course of this conversation they stated that the Assemblies had proclaimed NAPOLEON II. as Emperor only to conciliate the Officers and Soldiers of the Army; who had come into Paris in such numbers after the Battle, that they had been apprehensive of a Civil War in Paris if this measure had not been adopted.

"While we were discussing the Conditions to be proposed to the King; and the evils and inconveniences which the mode of making the Laws and the want of Responsibility and Power in the Ministers, had occasioned; I received from Sir CHARLES STUART, the King's Declaration of the 28th, countersigned by M. DE TALLEYRAND: which I immediately communicated to the French Commissioners, and pointed out to them the King's promise to make the alteration in his Administration which they had proposed to be made in the Constitution.

"They objected to certain paragraphs in the Declaration referable to the exclusion of certain persons from the King's presence, to the intention announced to punish some of those concerned in the plot

No hope of peace except Louis XVIII. be recalled. 723

which had brought back BUONAPARTE, and to that of calling together the old Houses of Legislature; upon which, at their desire, I wrote to M. DE TALLEYRAND, a letter, of which Sir CHARLES STUART will probably have sent to England a copy, which I communicated to the Commissioners before I sent it.

"I then told them I could not talk more upon the Suspension of our Operations, which they urged in the most earnest manner in order to give them time to take their measures to recall the King, until I should see Marshal BLÜCHER; to whose Head Quarters I promised to go that evening.

"Before I set off, the Commissioners asked me Whether the appointment of a Regency to conduct the affairs of the Government in the name of NAPOLEON II. was likely to satisfy the Allies, and would be such an arrangement as would induce me to stop my operations? I answered, Certainly not; that I conceived the Allies, after their Declaration, would never treat with NAPOLEON or any of his Family ; that the appointment of NAPOLEON II. was to be attributed to NAPOLEON I., and the acknowledgment of him to the desire to conciliate the Army; and that I should not stop my operations in consequence of such an arrangement.

"They then asked me What would be the case if any other Prince of a Royal House were called to the Throne of France? To which I said It was impossible for me to answer such loose questions; that, as an individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion of what it was best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this opinion or not.

"One of the Commissioners, before I went away, took occasion to tell me That he wished I had given a more positive answer to this last question; and I determined to take another opportunity of doing so before the Commissioners should report this conversation to Paris.

"I left them at Etrées, and went to the Head Quarters at Le Plessis, to give the Orders for the movement of the troops in the morning, and I overtook them again in the night at Louvres. I then told them I had considered their last question since I had last seen them, and that I felt no objection to give them my opinion on it as an individual: That, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any person excepting the King were called to the Throne of France; that any person so called must be considered an Usurper, whatever his rank and quality; that he must act as an Usurper, and must endeavour to turn the attention of the country from the defects of his title towards War and

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June 29.

Foreign Conquests; that the Powers of Europe must, in such a case, guard themselves against this evil, and that I could only assure them that, unless otherwise ordered by my Government, I would exert any influence I might possess over the Allied Sovereigns to induce them to insist upon Securities for the preservation of peace, besides the Treaty itself, if such an arrangement as they had stated were adopted.

"The Commissioners replied that they perfectly understood me, and some of them added-Et vous avez raison.”

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CHAPTER XX.

RINCE BLÜCHER had satisfied himself, by means of the reconnaissances made during the 29th, that very considerable pains had been taken by the Enemy to oppose a serious obstruction to the farther advance of troops marching against the north side of Paris.

He was now desirous of ascertaining Whether the disposition and spirit of the Enemy's troops were at all commensurate with the extent of the Works which he saw before him: and, with this view, he directed BÜLOW to make an attack, in the night of the 29th, with part of his Corps d'Armée, upon Aubervilliers. ZIETEN to support this attack, by raising as much alarm as possible in the Villages of Bondy and Pontin.

He also desired

Before the attack commenced, BLUCHER was joined by WELLINGTON in person, who communicated to him the Proposals which had been made by the French Commissioners. Being already engaged in an important operation, he could not consent to suspend hostilities; and the two Commanders agreed in opinion that, as long as NAPOLEON remained in Paris, they could not arrest their operations without insisting upon his being delivered up to them. Accordingly, the Duke wrote a letter immediately to the Commissioners to this effect.

BLÜCHER Confided the attack upon Aubervilliers General SYDOW, with the Thirteenth Brigade (nine Battalions), together with one Battalion of the Fourteenth