1877. January Term. Fairfax V. City of Alexan'ria The said writ was accordingly issued by the clerk and returned by the marshal, showing the gross amount of sale to be $1,737, which was paid to the clerk by the marshal. The papers and proceedings aforesaid constitute the record of the sentence of condemnation aforesaid, of which an official copy is made a part of the case agreed, after the insertion of which the agreed case proceeds: The said eighty-seven shares of stock mentioned and described in said record are the shares or bonds evidenced by the certificates or bonds which are heretofore set forth, and which form the basis of the present action. Under said sentence of condemnation the said stock was sold by the marshal, and by him the stock so sold was transferred on the books of the auditor of the corporation to the purchasers respectively. Said transfers are in the words and figures following. (They are set out in the case agreed, but need not be here inserted.) The said transfers have been recognized by the defendant as valid transfers of said stock, and the defendant has issued to said confiscation purchasers, or to their assigns, certificates of stock of like tenor and amount, which are still outstanding. The several charters of the town and city of Alexandria, Virginia, and the ordinances of said town and city are made part of this agreed statement, the same as if embodied herein at length. "And it is further agreed, that if from the facts stated above, the law shall be in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall enter judgment for the amount and interest above stated. But if the court shall determine that the law is for the defendant, judgment shall be entered accordingly." The circuit court having determined, as before stated, that the law upon the facts agreed as aforesaid is for the defendant, and rendered judgment accordingly, the plaintiff applied to this court for a writ of error to the said judgment; which was awarded accordingly. Wattles and Johns, for the appellants. Beach and Stuart, for the appellee. MONCURE, P., delivered the opinion of the court. If the district court had no jurisdiction to render the decree of confiscation, relied on as a defence by the defendant in this case, then it is admitted by the counsel on both sides, and is clearly shown by authority, that the said decree is void, and must be so regarded, even in a collateral proceeding such as this is. It is also admitted by the counsel on both sides, and is clearly shown by authority, that as the proceeding in this case is in rem, to give the court jurisdiction of the case, the res must have been brought by seizure within the power and control of the court. Was it so brought? "By the seizure of a thing," said the supreme court in Pelham v. Rose, 9 Wall. U. S. R. 103, 106, is meant the taking of a thing into possession, the manner of which, and whether actual or constructive, depending upon the nature of the thing seized. As applied to subjects capable of manual delivery, the term means caption, the physical taking into custody." "In the case at bar," further said the court, "a visible thing, capable of physical possession, is the subject of the libel. It is the promissory note of Pelham which constitutes the res, against which the proceeding is instituted, and not a 'credit' or debt, which VOL. XXVIII-4 1877. January Fairfax V. City of Alexan'ria Fairfax V. Alexan'ria 1877. the note is supposed by the defendant's counsel to January Term. represent. Whether by any proceedings, under the act of July 1862, the indebtedness of a maker on a negotiable promissory note, before its maturity, could City of be reached without the possession of the note itself, is not a question presented for our consideration. It is sufficient that the object of the present libel is to reach the note itself. This appears at every stage of the proceedings," &c. the act, it was "To effect its seizure, as required by therefore necessary for the marshal to take the note into his actual custody and control." See also Pelham v. Way, 15 Id. 196. That a credit was liable to "seizure," within the meaning of the act of July 17th, 1862, clearly appears, not only from the express language of the act itself, but also from various adjudications upon it by the supreme court of the United States. First, as to the express language of the act. The fifth section enacts: "That to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it shall be the duty of the president of the United States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits: and effects of the persons hereinafter named," &c. And the sixth section makes it the duty of the president "to seize and use as aforesaid all the estate, property, moneys, stocks and credits of persons within any state or territory," &c. Secondly, as to the decisions of the supreme court upon the subject: they are, Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. U. S. R. 268; Brown v. Kennedy, 15 Id. 591. - But as a credit is incapable of being actually seized, it must be constructively seized, if seized at all. How may it be constructively seized? The act of congress does not prescribe the mode, as it might have done; and, if it had done so, no doubt. a seizure in that mode would have been sufficient, and perhaps the only seizure that would have been sufficient. But the act of congress, as we have seen, makes it the duty of the president of the United States to seize, or cause the seizure of, all the estate, property, monies, stocks and credits, &c., as aforesaid; thus, as it seems, making it his especial duty to prescribe rules in regard to seizure where doubt or difficulty might arise on the subject. Accordingly, it is stated in 11 Wall., pp. 273 and 274, that "In order to carry out these acts of August 6th, 1861, and July 17th, 1862, the president charged the attorney general with the superintendence and direction of all proceedings under them, and authorized and required him to give to the district attorneys and marshals such instructions and directions as he might find needful and convenient touching all seizures, proceedings and condemnations under them." Accordingly, on the 8th of January 1863, the attorney general issued general instructions on the subject to district attorneys and marshals. Among these instructions the following were given with regard to the seizure of property: "All seizures will be made by the marshal of the proper district, under written authority to be given him by the district attorney, specifying with reasonable certainty the property to be seized, and the owner whose right is sought to be confiscated. "When the marshal bas seized any property under such authority, he will, without any unnecessary delay, make a true return thereof in writing to the district attorney. "Where the state law directs the method of seizure, it shall be conformed to as nearly as may be consistently with the objects of the acts of congress. If the 1877. January Term. Fairfax V. City of Alexan'ria Fairfax V. 1877. thing to be seized be personal property, it ought to be January Term. actually seized and safely kept; if real estate, the marshal ought to seize all the right, title, interest and estate of the accused party, giving notice in writing of City of the seizure to the tenants in possession, if any; if stocks, or other intangible property, the marshal ought (if there be no specific method prescribed by the state law) to describe the property as plainly as he can in his return, and leave the court to determine the sufficiency of the seizure." Alexan'ria The subject of the proceeding in this case, viewing it most favorably for the defendant, was a "credit." The method of seizure of such a subject, as directed by the state law, is that prescribed by the law in regard to attachments; and where the debtor is a corporation, as in this case, notice of the seizure ought to be given to the person, on whom by law process against the corporation is required to be served. By the state law, Code of 1860, chapter 151, section 7, page 647, it is enacted that an attachment "shall be sufficiently levied in every case by a service of a copy of such attachment on such persons as may be designated by the plaintiff in writing, or be known to the officer to be in possession of effects of, or to be indebted to, the defendant; and as to real estate, by such estate being mentioned and described by endorsement on such attachment." See also sections 12 and 13 of the same chapter, Id. page 648. In regard to the execution of process on a corporation, it is enacted in section 7 of chapter 170, page 707 of the same Code, that "it shall be sufficient to serve any process against, or notice to, a corporation, or its mayor, rector, president, or other chief officer, or in his absence from the county or corporation in which he resides, or in which is the principal office of the corporation against or to which |