same conclusion as the cases of Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. [89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436], supra, and Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., supra, both of which it cites with approval. See, also, Deeny v. Wright & Cobb, etc., Co., 36 N. J. Law J. 121; 1 Bradbury Workmen's Compensation, pp. 50, 52 et seq., cited with approval in the Kennerson Case, supra, 89 Conn. 378, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436, and in the Post Case, supra, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 354 [Aǹn. Cas. 1916B, 158]. "We are of the opinion that the reasoning of the cases above cited from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, is quite applicable to the case at bar; that under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Rhode Island the relation of employer and employee is contractual and the terms of the act are to be read as a part of every contract of service between those subject to its terms; that on principle and in reason, and in view of the purpose, scope, and character of the act, it should be construed and held to include injuries arising out of the state as well as those arising within it; and that the weight of authority upon acts similar to our own gives full support to our conclusion." The New York statute, in the respect we are considering, is not materially different from that of Colorado, and it was held in the case of Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 158, after an extensive review of the authorities, that: "The act, taken as a whole, in view of its humane purpose, should be construed to intend that in every case of employment there is a constructive contract between the employer and employee, general in its terms and unlimited as to territory, that the employer shall pay as provided by the act for a disability or the death of the employee as therein stated. The duty under the statute defines the terms of the contract. "Where, therefore, a resident of this state, employed by a corporation engaged in business in this state, is sent by his employer to perform work in another state away from the plant of the employer but under the employer's express direction, and while engaged therein is injured, he is entitled to compensation when in other respects he comes within the provisions of the law." The difficluties and injustice that may arise in case the law shall be held to apply to accidents occurring within the state only are forcibly stated in the well reasoned case of Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436, where it was said: "The remedy provided by our compensation act is substitutionary in character, furnishing what was purposed to be a more humanitarian and economical system as a substitute for one deemed wasteful to industrial enterprises and commerce, and unfair to employees. Its intent was to afford its protection to all Connecticut employers and employees who might voluntarily choose to make its provision for compensatoin for injury a part of their contracts of employment. It assumed that accident is incident to employment, and purposed to charge its cost, in the case of every injury not caused by the willful and serious misconduct or intoxication of the injured employee, to the industry in which it occurred. It intended that the employee should know what compensation he or his dependents would receive in the event of injury, and that payment should be made speedily by a procedure at once simple and inexpensive. It intended that the employer should know his liability in this regard, and so might include it among the items charged to operation. If our act intends its contracts of employment to include compensation for injuries occurring only within our jurisdiction, it manifestly defeats its own ends. In that case the employer may not charge to the industry the compensation for injuries occurring without the state, and the employee or his dependents may not collect the same. "Neither employer nor employee can know what portion of this period of employment will be subject to the provisions of the act, and no provi sion for insurance of this liability will be practically possible, since it may not ordinarily be known what part of the service will be in and what part out of the state, or in what jurisdiction the service will be performed, in industries and commercial enterprises engaged in intrastate and interstate employment. The state boundary is not the limit of very many businesses. To subject them to the laws of the many jurisdictions in which they may be engaged will be especially burdensome to them, and involve them probably in greater difficulties than under the old system. "Equally hard will it prove to the employee, since he must pursue his remedy in the state of the accident, or the federal court applying that state's law, and thus he may be brought under any one of many different compensation acts, with whose provisions he cannot hope to be familiar; some acts contractual in character, some compulsory, some optional, and some ex delicto; and he may find he has forfeited the benefit of the foreign act through failure to comply with its provisions. A reading of the several acts now in force convinces us that these difficulties are not imaginative, but imminent actualities. "Is it reasonable to infer that our Legislature, inaugurating a new system based upon humanitarian and economical considerations, should intentionally frustrate the object of the new system, and cast a multitude of employers and employees into a maelstrom of trouble, uncertainty, and liability? On the other hand, is it not reasonable to infer that the Legislature, having bottomed the right to compensation upon contract, deemed unimportant the place of injury, since it must be presumed to have known that the contract, and not the place of injury, would govern the recovery. Such a construction of the act would lift insuperable burdens from industry and commerce and workmen, and give to each his course and the ascertained fruits of the contract of his will." Continuing, the court said: "Where as with us, the determination of the award is committed to a board or commission under a specified procedure, there will be serious obstacles to the enforcement of the contract in a foreign jurisdiction. 1 Bradbury's Workmen's Compensation (2d Ed.) p. 52. If it should be necessary to so rule, no hardship would result; the parties in interest would be relegated to the place where they had elected to make their contract and no questions of conflict of laws could arise. At the base of this question is the character of the compensation. Mr. Bradbury, repudiating his earlier view, stoutly maintains that, if the act be contractual, the contracts arising will, unless a contrary intent appears, be found to cover injuries without as well as within the state. We think his later conclusion sound, and one which will prove beneficial alike to employer and employee." Counsel, however, urge that section 5 of the Act of 1915, by the use of the words "for a personal injury sustained within this state," supports the contention that compensation may be allowed for accidents occurring within the state only. The section deals only with negligence cases, not with compensation, and denies the defenses, in such cases, of assumed risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence. The very purpose of the provision is to induce employers to accept the compensation law, in so denying such defenses in negligence cases. Beside, the act should be construed as a whole in the light of its purposes. It was held in the case of Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862, I.. R. A. 1916D, 637, where the compensation statute was seemingly limited to persons, "as shall have received injuries in this state," that it was a construction too narrow, to hold that these words limited the right of compensation to injuries occurring within the state, in view of the objects and purposes of the act. In the case at bar, if we are to determine, in the absence of any provision of the statute to the contrary, that the doctrine of lex loci contractus does not govern, it will be to destroy the very spirit and purpose of the law as it affects the employer, the employee, and the public welfare. If we assume that there are no workmen's compensation laws in the states where the deceased was to perform his services outside of Colorado, then there can be no recovery of compensation, notwithstanding all premiums sufficient to maintain the workers' accident insurance had been fully paid. On the other hand, if we are to assume that a workman's compensation law prevails in each of the seven states of Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico, then the employer must be compelled to comply with each statute and to pay the premiums required by the law of each state for the protection of the one employee, or approximately seven times the amount otherwise required. If this were legally permissible, the expense would make it prohibitive. The result in this case must be that: The employer has paid the full premium demanded by the state to insure his employee against accident; the employee has relied on the pledge of his state for the protection of himself and his dependents; his widow and children discover the whole arrangement to be a delusion and a snare, and find themselves without protection. Thus the employer, the employee, his dependents and the public, have all been deceived and cheated, because forsooth the accident occurred beyond the imaginary line that marks the boundary of the commonwealth, though it happened within the line of employment. We cannot assume that the Legislature ever intended such an injustice and absurdity, in the absence of some clear and express provision in the statute to that effect, which we do not find. The judgment is reversed, with instruction to enter judgment confirming the award of the Industrial Commission theretofore allowed. Judgment reversed. White and Bailey, JJ., dissenting. SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT. HALL J. LA COURCIERE CO. ET AL.* MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT -“ARISING OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT”— FAILURE TO CARE FOR WOUND. Where, when injured workman reported to representative of employer, neither he nor representative thought wound required medical attention, but later condition became worse, so that medical treatment was necessary, injury arose "out of an in course of employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act, and not from his own willful or negligent failure to care for his wound. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 380.) Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; William S. Case, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, c. 138), by John W. Hall, opposed by the J. La Courciere Company employer, and others. Compensation was awarded, and the emp. appeals. No error. Seymour C. Loomis, of New Haven, for appellant. * Decision rendered, July 23, 1918. 104 Atl. Rep. 348. SHUMWAY, J. The compensation commissioner, in a memorandum filed with the award, correctly says that the only question in the case as to which any doubt can be entertained is whether the claimant so far neglected his injury as to affect his claim for compensation. He has found these facts: At the time the claimant received his injury he reported it to the representative of the employer respondent, and the representative concurred in the view that it did not call for medical attention. The claimant was injured on the 4th of June, 1917, and he continued to work until the afternoon of June 8th, when he quit work on account of the injury. On the latter day he had a talk with the respondent's representative, and he advised the claimant to go to any physician he desired to consult, as the respondent was insured. The claimant did not think it was necessary to consult a physician, and so stated at the time, but thereafter he had home treatment by a practical nurse. The claimant's injury was caused by a blow upon the leg, which broke the skin and was followed by infection as a result. At the time of the last conversation with respondent's representative, the leg was swollen and inflamed. The condition of the leg improved, and he returned to his work, and remained working from June 19th to June 23d. On June 25th he tried to work, but could not, and on that day he went in company with his employer to the office of a physician. It did not appear that his condition or his injury was in any way affected by the delay in seeking medical attention, nor that any prejudice resulted from the delay: Upon these facts the commissioner properly held that the claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. It appeared to the employer and claimant that the injury did not require medical aid or attention. Certainly there does not appear to be anything in the conduct of the claimant to indicate that he willfully or negligently failed to care for his wound, and to give it such attention and treatment as it seemed to require. After the event it may seem that it would have been more prudent to have sought a physician's aid sooner; but that does not deprive the claimant of his right to compensation, as his disability was the direct result of the injury, and was not in any way heightened or aggravated by willful misconduct. At the most, under the finding, the claimant erred in the judgment in not properly appreciating the danger of infection in an open wound. There is no error. The other Judges concurred. SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT. FRANKO WILLIAM SCHOLLHORN CO. ET AL. * 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-"LOSS." The word "loss," as used in Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. B, §§ 11, 12, as amended by Pub. Acts 1915, c. 288, providing for compensation in the case of certain named injuries resulting in the loss of a member or function, means deprivation; the compensation being to com* Decision rendered, July 23, 1918. 104 Atl. Rep. 485. pensate employee for handicap of being without the lost member and not for impairment of earning power. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig § 385[4].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Loss.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION— CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. B, § 12, as amended by Pub. Acts 1915, c. 288, providing that compensation for named injuries shall be in "lieu of all other payments," refers to payments for the named injuries, and does not limit the award to compensation provided for the named injury. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 387.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION— AMOUNT OF AWARD. Where employee's finger was lacerated February 7th, totally incapacitating him from working until May 21st, when as a result of the injury two phalanges of the finger were amputated, the compensation awarded the employee for loss of the phalanges of the finger under Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. B, § 12, as amended by Pub. Acts. 1915, c. 288, was not exclusive of compensation for total incapacity under section 11; the loss of the phalanges of the finger and the loss of the use of the finger being separate injuries for each of which compensation is awarded. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 387.) Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; William S. Case, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mariano Franko against William Schollhorn Company and another. Appeal by defendants from an award by the compensation commissioner of the Third district in favor of plaintiff, taken to the superior court for New Haven county and reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors upon all questions of law arising upon the record. Judgment advised dismissing appeal. The claimant and respondent employer were subject to the provisions of part B, c. 138, of the Public Acts of 1913, as amended by chapter 288 of the Public Acts of 1915. The claimant on February 7, 1917, while in the employment of the respondent, suffered a laceration of the first finger of the right hand, which injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The average weekly wage of the claimant, computed in accordance with the terms of the act, was $11. On March 13, 1917, there ⚫ was approved a voluntary agreement to pay claimant on account of the said injury $5.50 per week beginning February 18th, and extending throughout the period of total incapacity. Compensation on account of said injury has been paid at the rate provided in this agreement for about 25 1-3 weeks. Up to may 21st the claimant was totally incapacitated as a result of this injury, and on said day on account of this injury it became necessary to amputate two phalanges of this finger. The claimant claimed: First, that he was totally incapacitated from February 7th until May 21st, and that during that time he was entitled to compensation under section 11 as amended, as "compensation for total incapacity." Second, on May 21st two phalanges of the index finger were removed, and tha that date he was entitled to 25 1-3 weeks additional compensation section 12 as amended, as "compensation for partial incapacity." The respondent claimed that the compensation that could be awarded was that for 25 1-3 weeks, on the ground that the compensation for the loss Vol. II-Comp. 51. |