LESSONS IN MORAL SCIENCE.

such a power exists, or that it is at all necessary to free moral agency, or that the possession of such a power would be valuable or desirable.

All that is wanted is, to make the man the master of his own actions, and this is completely effected by giving him the power to will and to act in accordance with his own inclinations. Certainly a man is not the less accountable for his actions Every because they are in accordance with his desires. rational being acts with a view to some end, and his regard or affection for that end is the motive which governs his will and

influences his conduct.

It cannot justly be denied, and is generally admitted, that in most cases the determinations of the will are influenced by strong desires; and when such desires exist, and there are none leading in a contrary way, the decisions of the will are Now if in fact determined by the previous state of the mind. the prevalence of these desires in such cases is not found to interfere with free agency, there is no reason to think that the belief that the will is invariably determined by the strongest existing desire will lead to any conclusion unfavourable to liberty. If the self-determining power in question is exerted only in trivial cases where motives to action are weak, or when there is an equipoise of motives, it cannot be a power of any great consequence, since most of our moral acts are performed

without its aid.

Let us first take an impartial view of the acts of a man in the exercise of the power which all admit he possesses, and then of this imaginary power which some think essential to moral agency.

In the first case the man exercising his reason, apprehends objects which appear to him, on some account, good and desirable. These objects he desires to obtain, and puts forth those volitions which produce the actions requisite to the accomplishment of his object.

has power to determine in opposition to all existing motives, the weakest. Surely such a power is irrational and dangerous and where there is a competition can act in conformity with in the extreme, and has no tendency to increase that freedom which is requisite to a moral agent.

OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIFORM INFLUENCE OF
MOTIVES.

One of the most plausible objections to the uniform influence
of motives on the will is, the intimate conviction every man
has, when he has done what he regrets, that he could have
done otherwise; whereas, upon the hypothesis laid down
And it is alleged
above, the man could not possibly, with the same motives,
have acted differently from what he did.
that no man ever would or could repent of his most criminal
conduct, were he persuaded that he could not have willed
and acted differently from what he did.

This objection brings out the true issue in this inquiry. The real question in dispute in regard to the will is, whether, That is, all things external and internal being the same to any voluntary agent, the volitions will be the same. whether a man in the same state of mind and under the influence of the same desires and motives, in kind and degree, will not always will and act in the same way. This we affirm; and the advocates of the self-determining power of the will, deny.

It is admitted that when a man has done wrong and is convinced of his error, he is deeply conscious that he might and should have acted differently. But when this conviction is analysed, it is found to be, not that he might have willed and acted differently with the same feelings that influenced him at the moment of doing wrong, but that he might and should have had a different state of feeling, or a more considerate attention to those things which were forgotten, but that which he now regrets. which if recollected would have prevented him from doing

In the second case the man feels an inclination leading him Take a case. A man in an hour of levity, and under the with more or less force to a certain object; but he has a power which he can at any time exert to arrest his action in the line of his inclinations, and by exerting this power of willing influence of a degree of envy, speaks disrespectfully of a Or person whose character is worthy of esteem, and to whom he he can counteract any desire, and act in opposition to it. if two desires exist, he can by this power give the prevalence is under special obligation. Upon reflection he is truly sorry to that which is the weaker. The best way to bring this for what he said, candidly confesses his fault, and says that matter to the test of experience is to suppose a case in were he again placed in similar circumstances, he would not which such a power is exerted. Suppose the case of a man in be guilty of the same fault. But suppose he should be asked whom, by habit and indulgence, the appetite for intoxicating whether, if the same degree of inattention, and the same drink is strong; but he is induced by weighty reasons derived envious feeling should again exist which characterised the from a sense of duty and a regard to his health, reputation, state of his mind when he spoke unadvisedly, and no considefamily, and temporal prosperity, to determine not to expose rations should occur which were not then present to his mind, himself to temptation. An old companion calls and solicits he is of opinion that he would act differently from what he When we feel that we him to go with him to a convivial meeting. His appetite did? Under such a view of the matter, few persons dare strongly pleads for indulgence, if only for this one time; but profess that they would act differently when placed in conscience remonstrates, and a regard to health, reputation, precisely the same circumstances. and the like, operates strongly on the other side. Suppose would and could act differently from what we have done in the influence felt from these two opposite sources to be almost certain and specified circumstances, it is always on the suppoequally balanced; suppose even a perfect equipoise. Such a sition that our views and feelings should be different. If the state of mind, though possible and frequently experienced, can person speaking disrespectfully of a friend is asked what never last long, for the states of the mind change in some would induce him to act differently, if the thing were to be respects every moment, and the least difference in the views done again, the natural and reasonable answer is, "I should of the subject would destroy the balance. But now is the think of the impropriety of the thing, and should recollect my time for the exercise of the power which determines without obligations to the person; and other the like considerations." regard to motive. Suppose, while the scales are thus in equi- This shows that men feel accountable, not only for their poise, this power to be exerted, and the man determines in volitions and actions, but for the views and feelings which favour of self-denial. Why he did thus determine, seems to precede volition. Indeed if there is one point above all others be a reasonable inquiry; but if this power exists, such a ques-on which responsibility rests, it is on the motive, that is, the There was, according to the active desires or affections of the mind from which volition tion is entirely irrelative. reason or motive which influenced the proceeds, and by which it is governed. The murderer could supposition, no determination. Here then is a case for our consideration: Is easily abstain from murder, if he would repress his malignant an action prompted by no motive, and performed without a feelings; but with the same spirit of malice and revenge view to any end, an accountable moral act? If this self-deter- which induced him to shed his brother's blood, and with the mining power exists, it may be exerted in opposition to the same absence of all other views and feelings than those which highest and best motives, and neither the person himself nor he had at the time, there is a moral certainty that he would any body else can tell why it was exerted. If a man under commit the same crime again. Nor has this certainty, that the influence of love to his Creator, should be about to engage unrestrained malice and revenge would again lead to the perin the performance of some plain and important duty, the petration of the same horrid crime, the slightest tendency to exertion of this power at the most unseasonable time might alleviate the guilt of the murderer. The true ground of his arrest his action and lead him to a contrary determination. culpability lies in his having and indulging such malignant Why would he exert such a power at such a time? That, tempers, and in voluntarily turning away his mind from all indeed, is the question. But if any reason of any kind could considerations of piety and humanity, which would restrain be given it would destroy the hypothesis, which is that a man him from the cruel act. And here a question might arise

respecting a man's desires and affections, and the power which he has over them; but this is not the proper place for a discussion of that point.

Another objection which has been repeatedly urged, and which by many is considered unanswerable, is, that according to this hypothesis, when two things exactly equal, and viewed to be so, are presented to the choice of a rational being, it would be impossible to choose either. But every man (says the objectors) feels that he has the power, if two loaves of bread or two eggs exactly alike be presented, of choosing between them; and as there exists confessedly no motive for preferring one loaf or one egg to the other, therefore it is possible for the will to determine without a motive.

any other human being can tell. But do we, because of this ignorance, doubt whether indeed we live? Not in the least. We know that we are free precisely in the same manner that we know that we are living beings, and no plausible reasonings should disturb us in the one case more than in the other. Again, if in attempting to explain what is essential to free agency, we should fall into any mistake, or conclude that something does not belong to it, which does, let it not be said that we deny the freedom of man; for while we may err in regard to our conception of its nature, we know that we cannot err in regard to the actual existence of freedom.

We are willing to attribute to man every kind and degree of liberty which can properly belong to a dependent creature To this plausible objection it may be answered, that if the and a rational being; and if we deny what some think essenself-determining power of the will, independently of motives, tial to free agency, it is because in our view it would be no be confined to cases in which there are no motives to turn the real privilege to possess such a power, as not being compatible balance, it is a power of very little importance, and not worth with the laws by which rational creatures are governed. disputing about. Let it be admitted that in such an equiIt is admitted that man has power to govern his own volipoise of motives, the mind can determine in favour of either of the objects. But perhaps this will admit of a different solutions, and does govern them, according to his own desire. He tion, and one in accordance with the theory maintained. And has the liberty, within the limits of his power, to act as he let it be remarked, that it is not the similarity of external pleases; and greater liberty, in our judgment, is inconceivable. objects which should here be considered, but the view which the mind takes of them. We know how a fertile imagination may cast a grain into one of the balanced scales, and cause it to preponderate. But further, the state of mind supposed to be produced by objects of equal value is really felt for a moment. Between two things we hesitate, not being able to come to a decision; but this indecision arises not from a belief that the objects proposed are equal, but from a doubt which is preferable. When we are sure there is no difference, this hesitation is not experienced. The explanation which seems correct is the following: two guineas are laid before a poor man, and he is told to take which one he pleases. It cannot be necessary that he should think one better than the other. If such a preference were necessary, he would be unable to take either, and his situation would be comparable to the ass of the old Greek sophists, held immovable between two bundles of hay.

The difficulty supposed to exist in the case of two equal objects proposed for our choice, is perfectly imaginary; no difficulty or perplexity is ever experienced, when the things presented to our choice are known to be equal. It is only when we apprehend that there may be a difference between the objects offered that we hesitate. As if a person should offer to our choice two caskets, the contents of which are unknown; we find it difficult to choose, for the very reason that we suspect the one to be more valuable than the other, but are ignorant to which the greatest value attaches. And if we should be informed that one contained jewels of great price and the other nothing but baubles, our hesitancy would be accompanied with solicitude. But when we are certain that the things proposed to our choice are perfectly alike, in all respects, we experience no difficulty whatever. Suppose it to be first a single guinea which is offered to a needy beggar; he is moved by his feeling of want to take it. If instead of one, two guineas are offered, he experiences no difficulty in choosing, knowing them to be alike. But this furnishes no example of an action produced without a motive The question is, whether the man shall act or not; and the motive for action is strong, namely, the desire of relief. As he is at liberty to take but one, and there is no difference between them, he seizes that, which from one or more of a thousand slight reasons of nearness or convenience, it happens to him to choose, without any preference properly so called.

SUMMARY VIEW OF LIBERTY.

Man is conscious of liberty, and nothing can add to the certainty which he has, that he is a free agent. Objections to self-evident principles, however plausible, should not be regarded; for, in the nature of things, no reasonings can overthrow plain intuitive truths, as no reasonings can be founded on principles more certain. Though we may not be able to understand or explain with precision wherein freedom consists, yet this ignorance of its nature should not disturb our minds. We experience the same difficulty in regard to other truths of this class without any diminution of our assurance. We are conscious that we have a life-but what is life? neither we nor

To suppose, in addition to this, a power to act independen ly of all reasons and motives, would be to confer on him a power for the exercise of which he could never be accountable. It would be a faculty which would completely disqualify him from being the subject of moral government. In the nature of things, it would be impossible that a creature possessed of such a power could be so governed that his actions could be directed to any end.

One hypothesis makes man the master of his own actions, still a creature governed by understanding and choice. He may be misled by false appearances, and influenced by wrong motives, but is always governed by some reasons or motives. On the other hypothesis, a man may and does act without any inducement, and without being influenced by any reasons, to do what is contrary to all his inclinations and feeling. We cannot but think that, after all, the abettors of this scheme retain in their minds a certain obscure but lingering persuasion that the free agent feels some reason for acting as he does; and if so, the dispute is at an end, for whatever may be the consideration which induces a man to act in opposition to strong desire, it must be something which is felt by the mind to have force, and to be such a consideration as ought to influ ence a rational being.

Let us for still further elucidation again suppose a case in which this self-determining power is exerted.

A young man entrusted with the property of his employer, has by undue indulgence in amusements contracted debts which he is unable to pay. He sees a way by which he can appropriate to his own use some of the money in his hands his reputation is at stake, and he feels himself imp lled by a without the possibility of discovery. His wants are urgent, powerful motive to the deed; and there are no motives to draw him in an opposite course but such as are derived from conscience and the fear of God. At the moment when about to perpetrate the felonious act, he pauses and resolves that he will not do it. The question is, has he not power to act thus? Is he not the arbiter of his own acts of will? Are we not all conscious that we possess such a power? There is no dispute about the power, if it only pleases the agent to exercise it. He is as free to abstain from embezzling what belongs to another, as to do it. The only question is, will he do it unless some reason, motive, or moral feeling influence him? If so, then indeed it would be the exemplification of the power in question. But when we examine the case carefully, we shall be satisfied that where there is a powerful motive on one side, there must be a preponderating motive on the other to prevent a volition in accordance with the first. Suppose the young man under the temptation mentioned to have his mind free from all moral considerations, and to have no fear of injuring his reputation, what would restrain him? Or, if without any moral influence, or any other consideration, he should abstain, would there be any virtue in the act? To know whether an act is virtuous, we properly ask, why was it done? what was the motive of the agent? But here there is none, and consequently the act can have no moral character. And if we suppose some faint remonstrance of conscience and

some slight fear of discovery, even these would not prevent the act where the contrary motives were urgent.

But suppose, now, this young man to have had a religious education, and to have been brought up to regard his reputation, and when the temptation is most powerful and he is in danger of yielding, conseience should utter her voice with power, and dictate imperatively that this is a deed which should not be done; and at the same time, a lively apprehension of disgrace should operate with a combined influence on his mind, would the operation of these motives in preventing the crime be less rational or less virtuous than if he should act without a motive?

LESSONS IN GREEK.-No. LI.

By JOHN R. BEARD, D.D.

THE VOICES OF THE VERB.

In the first instance the verb is transitive as well as active, because the action passes from the subject to an object. In the second instance the verb is intransitive, since it has no object, but the action limits itself to the subject; the forms of the verbs show that they are both in the active voice.

Generally every verb has either a transitive or an intransiTHE subject is most intimately connected with the verb. How tive signification. But many verbs combine the two meanintimately the subject is connected with the verb may be in-ings, being sometimes transitive and sometimes intransitive. ferred from the fact, that so far as the unemphatic pronoun is When the two imports unite in one verb, either the two run considered, the subject and the verb blend together and be-through all the forms, or they are limited, so that one significome one word. The subject, indeed, is the vehicle of the cation belongs to this form, the other signification belongs to action of the verb. The verb declares something, and that that form. In treating of the forms of the verb we have given something is declared of the subject, which is thus seen to be an abundance of instances. the medium or channel for conveying the statement made by the verb. In the verb action appears, not in an abstract form, but a concrete form, that is, as limited to the particular subject employed. Only in the infinitive mood is an abstract affirmation made.

From the subject of the affirmation we, therefore, naturally pass to that which is affirmed, for every affirmation consists of two parts, namely, what is said, and the person or thing of which it is said. Thus, I eat, 18 an affirmation, and into this affirmation two elements enter, namely, I, the subject, and eat, the verb. Now, in considering the verb of a simple sentence, we must ask how a verb may be modified, or under what forms it may appear. If we consider the subject as merely the channel of the affirmation, we have the verb in what is called the active voice. If we consider the subject as re-acted upon, we find that such refex action may take place in two ways, either with an object or without an object. If the reflex action takes place with an object, then the verb is said to be in the passive voice. If the reflex action takes place without an object, then the verb is said to be in the middle voice. I put together examples of the

The student is prepared to find, as here, the form for the passive the same as the form for the middle voice of the present tense. The simple fact is, that the Greek verb is richer in meaning than it is in form, though in form it is very rich.

The voices of the Greek verb bring under our consideration, the verb in regard to its kinds or sorts. Viewed in the rerelations which it bears to its subject, the Greek verb is of three kinds, or has three voices-the active, the passive, the middle.

But every affirmation has respect to time-the time when the declared fact took place. But time is grammatically expressed by tense. Accordingly we must consider the Greek verb in its tenses.

Further, declarations or affirmations may be made in different ways. I may declare a act simply and independently, and I may declare one fact in relation to another. Hence the manner in which affirmations are made demands attention, and so we are led to study the verb in its moods.

Of the verbs, however, in which the two, namely, the transi tive and the intransitive import, run through all the tenses; take as examples, Exe, to hold; apporrey, to adapt; kλivei, to lean; orpeper, to turn; òpμãv, to set in motion; Teiver, to stretch; and parrew, to do.

Many transitive verbs become intransitive by combination with prepositions, as роçkрovεiv, to dash against; añaλAarre, to depart; peraẞaλλe, to change; poгßaλλe, to add to; Emididovai, to increase; ovμμyvvvai, to mingle. Many verbs which have only a transitive meaning become intransitive by the omission of an easily understood object; e.g.-TEλεurav (scil. rov Biov), to end (life), to die; eкẞаλλεiv and εξιέναι (scil. το ύδωρ), to flow out, fall into ; so with την orpariav understood, to invade eλavver with To àoua (a chariot), Tov inоv (a horse), understood, to march, to advance; προςέχειν, understanding τον νουν oι την γνωμην, to attend to, literally, to apply (one's mind) to..

The ensuing are the forms to which the intransitive meaning chiefly belongs; namely, the second perfect and its derivative the second pluperfect, which are intransitive not merely in the verbs which in the present have both significations, but also in other verbs which in the other tenses are employed only transitively. Of the first kind take as examples, Eжpaya, I have found myself, I am; πεpnya, I have appeared, I prove; avεyya, I am open; ɛaya, I am broken. As examples of the second sort take-eyonyopa, I am awakened, I watch; peμnva, I rage; eppwya, I am broken, torn; wɛñoia, I trust; mεnnya, I am fastened, I am firm; σεσηπα, I am rotten, τέτηκα, Ι αλ melted.

The intransitive import attaches also to the second aorist, the perfect and the pluperfect of iornu, I place; dvw, I enclose; pvw, I beget; which in the tenses mentioned signify I stand, I enter, I arise.

If, with intransitive verbs, the object is named by which the condition expressed in the verb is occasioned, then, as in the passive, that object is put in the genitive with the preposition ύπο ; as

Intrans., with an object Toλλa kaka eжAboμev vπо Twv \ŋorшv
we have suffered many things from robbers.
In the passive voice the object is in the genitive with vπo, as
Passive, with an object Έκτωρ αποκτείνεται ὑπὸ του Αχιλλέως
Hector is slain by Achilles.

Ву væо (Lat. sub), which signifies under, the subject is represented as suffering or undergoing something at the hands of the object, as if the subject were locally under that object. If, instead of this relation, you intend merely to mention the occasion through which an influence is exerted then you

τερος αρχειν ην αξιώτατος, ὡς παρα παντων ὁμολογεῖται. δε Αντισθένους το διεῤῥωγος τοῦ τρίβωνος εις τουμφανες, ὁρῶ Νοσῳ εφθαρμένοι εἰσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Απαντα ταύτα πεπρακται σου, εφη, δια τοῦ τρίβωνος την κενοδοξίαν. Ὁρῶν ὁ Σωκρατης τοις εμου ψηφισμασι. Διοικοῦνται αἱ μεν τυραννίδες και ολι- τον Αλκιβιάδην τετυφωμένον επι τῳ πλουτῳ και μεγα φρονοῦντα γαρχίαι τους τροποις των εφεστηκότων, αἱ δε δημοκρατιαι τοῖς επι τοῖς αγροῖς, ηγαγεν αυτόν επι τινα τοπον, ενθα ανέκειτο νόμοις τοις κειμένοις. Οἱ Κορινθιοι χρημασι δυνατοι ησαν, ὡς πινακιον εχον γῆς περιοδον, και προςέταξε την Αττικην ενταῦθα καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδηλωται. Των νοσηματων πολλαι αναζητειν. Ως δε εύρε, προςέταξε τους αγρούς τους ιδιους θεραπεῖαι τοις ιατροις εύρηνται. Ταληθες ανθρωποις ουκ διαθρῆσαι του δε είποντος, αλλ' ουδαμου γεγραμμενοι εισι επι εὑρισκεται. Ειρηνης επιθυμετεον εστιν ανθρωποις. Ασκητεον τουτοις, είπε, μεγα φρονεῖς, οἱπερ ουδέν μέρος τὴν γῆς εἰσιν. εστι σοι την αρετην. Ασκητεα εστι σοι ἡ αρετη. Διδασκουσι Ελεγεν ή Ξανθιππη ὡς, μυρίων μεταβολῶν την πολιν κατασχουτους παῖδας τας τέχνας. Ὁ παις διδάσκεται τας τεχνας. Παιδεύω σῶν, εν πάσαις ὁμοιον ἦν το Σωκρατους προςωπον, και προϊοντος τον Σωκρατη την μουσικην. Σωκρατης μουσικήν μεν επαιδεύθη εκ της οικίας και επανιόντος αει θεάσθαι. Ηρμοστο γαρ προς ύπο Λαμπρου, ῥητορικήν δε ὑπ ̓ Αντιφωντος. Αφαιρούνται παντα επιεικώς, και ην ίλεως αει την διανοιαν και λυπης ὑπεράνω Κροῖσον την αρχην. Κροῖσος αφαιρεθεις την αρχην, διέτριβε πασης και φόβου κρειττων παντος ων. παρα τῳ Κυρῳ. Πειθω σε ταῦτα. Εγω επεισθην ταῦτα ὑπο σου. Επιτρέπω σοι την φυλακην. Οι επιτετραμμενοι την φυλακην απεκτειναν τους εχθρους. Οἱ λησται αναχθεντες προς βασιλεα απετμήθησαν τας κεφαλας. Αποτέμνω σοι την κεφαλήν. Επιτάττω σοι τούτο. Ει ξυγχωρήσετε, και αλλο τι μεῖζον ευθυς επιταχθήσεσθε. Μεγαν κινδυνευεις κινδυνον. Ασεβοῦσι ασεβημα οὗτοι οἱ ανθρωποι. Ασεβημα ασεβεῖται. Τα κινδυνευθέντα σε σφαλλει. Ουκετι απειλοῦμαι, αλλ' ηδη απειλω αλλοις. Τῳ στρατηγῳ οἱ στρατιωται επιβουλεύουσι. Πολλοι δια τον πλοῦτον επιβουλευόμενοι απολλυνται. Κρεῖττον εστι πιστευεσθαι Ασκείται το αει τιμῶμενον, ύπο της πατρίδος, η απιστεῖσθαι. αμελεῖται δε το ατιμαζόμενον. Οἱ πονηροι μονοι επαινοῦσι έαυτους. Ερυψάμην την κεφαλην. Ὁ πατηρ τους παιδας εδιδαξεν. Ο πατήρ τους παιδας εδιδάξατο. Αργεῖοι ἑαυτων εικονας ποιηανέθεσαν Καταφρονῶ των φενάκων. εις Δελφους. σαμενοι Καταφρονεῖται ὑπ' εμου ὁ λοιδορῶν.

VOCABULARY AND REMARKS,

Εφυγεν, was banished, from φευγω, I fee.
Εξέπεσον (εξ and πιπτω), were driven out.
Είρκτη, ης, ή, an inclosure. a prison.

Εξωμιδοποιία, ας, ή, the making of the garmen ts called
εξωμίδες, a species of frock or cloak worn by males.
Βαναυσος μου, a mechanic or smith, a land-labourer.

Διοικεω, I live apart, I govern, manage (δια and οικος), των εφεστηκ, of their governors ; τοις κειμεν., the established laws. Ξυγχωρέω (συγχωρεω), I go with, agree, yield.

ENGLISH-GREEK.

Cicero

Good men

VOCABULARY, ETC.

Συμπεριφέρω, Ι form a com-
panionship with, I am fa-
miliar with.
Φαῦλος, bad, low.

Θαῤῥέω, I am strong, bold;
θαρρει, take courage!

Διδούς αιθανομαι, is one of the |
verbs that take a participle
after them instead of an in-
fin.ve.

Βαθυτατα γηρῶν, having be-
come a very old man; προς
αμφότερα, in regard to both
(life and death).

| Ζηλωτης, οὔ, ὁ, an admirer.
Το διεῤῥωγος (from διαῤῥηγο
νυμι), the rent; τρίβων,
ωνος, ὁ, an old bare cloak;
το εμφανες; σου depends on
κενοδοξίαν, vainglory, pride.
Τυφοω (our typhus), I puff up ;
πινακιον, ου, το, a tablet, .
here a map; διαθρεω (com-
pare θηρεύω), I seek out.
'Αρμόζω, I fit, adapt, accom-

modate, hence our harmony.

Present Gerund: valendo, Past Gerund: avendo valuto, being worth

Past Participle valuto, been

worth

Present.

having been worth

INDICATIVE MOOD.

The soldiers were slain (died) by the citizens. (Κικέρων) was banished by the people. That bad man was cast into prison by the judges. A good man is not hated by a good man. A city has been given to me from the king. These things are enjoined on you by your parents. Hand-workers are despised by the foolish. Socrates is allowed (confessed) by all to have been a very wise man. They have had their heads cut off. The bad man despises the good man. are despised by bad men. The youths wash themselves. The girls are taught music by me. I teach the girls music. Wisdom Vaglio or válgo, I am worth i to be des red by all. All wise men desire wisdom. Wisdom vali, thou art worth is desired by me. They acquire wealth. They possess wealth. vale or val, he is worth Wealth is taken from vagliamo or valiámo, we are I take wealth from that bad man. worth foolish youths. My father persuades me to learn music. I am persuaded to teach my children. I shall cause my children to be taught. He caused his children to be taught

music.

HISTORICAL ANECDOTES.

|

valéte, you are worth

válse, he was worth valémmo, we were worth valéste, you were worth valsero, they were worth Future.

Varrò, I shall or will be worth varrái, thou wilt be worth

vagliono or valgono, they are varrà, he will be worth

worth

varrémo, we will be worth varréte, you will be worth varranno, they will be worth

Conditional Present, Varrei, I should or would be worth

varrésti, thou wouldst be worth

valerano or valiano, they were arrebe, he would be worth

Σωκράτης καλεσας επι δεῖπνον πλουσίους, και της Ξανθιππης αιδούμενης, εφη, θαῤῥει ει μεν γαρ ειεν μετριοι, συμπεριενεχθειεν αν' είδε φαύλοι, ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ουδεν μελήσει. Αισχίνου δε ειποντος, πενης ειμι και αλλο μεν ουδεν έχω, διδωμι δε σοι έμαυτον ἄρ' ουν, ειπεν, ουκ αισθανη τα μεγιστα μοι διδους; Σωκρατης βαθυτατα γηρῶν, είτα νοσῳ περιπεσών, έπει τις αυτον ηρώτησε, πῶς ἔχει; καλῶς, εἶπε, προς αμφότερα εαν μεν γαρ ζῶ. ζηλωτας | Palsi, I was worth έξω πλείονας· εαν δε αποθάνω, επαινετας πλείονας. Στρέψαντος | valesti, thou wast worth

worth

Indeterminate Preterite.

varrémmo, we would be worth varréste, you would be worth varrebbero, they would be

worth