Fortier v. New Orleans Nat. Bank. New Orleans Nat. Bank v. Fortier. fraud of the law, and he cannot shield himself under the authorization of the judge. This sum, with the interest thereon, was properly deducted from the amount due on the note and mortgage. The $1,200 paid by Godchaux to the notary, by the direction of Mrs. Fortier, to clear off taxes, with the interest and costs, which were a lien upon that property mortgaged by her, was applied for her separate benefit and advantage, and she cannot escape liability for it. As to the $5,975, the residue of the loan, we are of the opinion that the defendant has not made it appear affirmatively by preponderance of proof, as she was bound to do, that the money was borrowed by her with the knowledge or connivance of Godchaux to pay off the debts, or for the use of her husband. Godchaux therefore having handed to the defendant a check, payable to her own order, for the residue of the loan, his duty ceased. Under the act of 1855 he was not, as we have seen, bound at his peril to take care that she applied the money to her own separate benefit and advantage. So far therefore as the defense to the enforcement of the money paid by the check rested in the averment that the money borrowed of Godchaux was with his complicity borrowed for the use of the husband, and not for separate advantage of the wife, it must fail.

Complaint is made in behalf of Mr. Fortier that the court erred in enforcing by its decree a loan of money made by a National bank on the security of a mortgage; the contention being that the loan on such a security was unauthorized by the National Banking Act, and was therefore void. In the cases of National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 12, and National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. point is expressly decided against the contention of the defendant, and in the latter case it was also held that an objection to the taking by the bank of a mortgage lien as security for future advances could only be made by the United States.

99; ante 5, this

It follows from the views we have expressed that the decree of the Circuit Court was right, and should be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

National bank shares may not be subjected to State taxation, where a very material relative part of other moneyed capital in the hands of individ ual citizens within the same jurisdiction or taxing district is exempted from such taxation.

Capital invested in National bank shares was intended by Congress to be placed upon the same footing of substantial equality in respect of taxation by State authority as the State establishes for other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, however invested, whether in State bank shares or otherwise.

N error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.

IN

Charles W. Wells, for plaintiff in error.

W. J. Whitehouse, for defendant in error.

HARLAN, J. The plaintiff in error brought this suit in a State court of Pennsylvania for an injunction restraining the commissioners of Schuylkill county from levying a county tax for the year 1883 upon certain shares in the Pennsylvania National Bank an association organized under the National Banking Act. The suit proceeds upon the ground that such levy violates the act of Congress prescribing conditions upon State taxation of National bank shares, in this: that "other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens" of that county is exempted, by the laws of Pennsylvania, from such taxation. A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the suit was dismissed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that judgment was affirmed on the ground that the laws of the State under which the defendants sought to justify the taxation were not repugnant to the act of Congress.

State taxation of National bank shares was permitted by the forty-first section of the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, subject to the restriction that it should not be at a greater rate

Boyer v. Boyer.

than that imposed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the same State. 13 Stat., chap. 106, § 41. But that section contained a proviso to the effect "that the tax so imposed, under the laws of any State, upon shares of any of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under the authority of the State where such association is located." The case of Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 469; 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 41, arose under that act. The question there was whether shares in a National bank were exempt from State taxation merely because two State banks of issue, organized before the National Banking Act was passed, and which held a very inconsiderable portion of the banking capital of the State, had by their charter the right to pay a certain per cent on the amount of their capital stock in full of all State bonus and taxes an amount less than that imposed upon National bank shares. The shares of other associations in the State having the privileges of banking, except the power to enit bills, were taxed like the shares in National banks. It was held that Congress meant, by reference in the act of 1864 to taxation of State bank shares, to require, as a condition to taxation by the State of shares in National banks, that she should, unless restrained by valid contract, tax in like manner the shares of banks of issue of her own creation. There was no question in that case of discrimination against capital invested in National bank shares in favor of moneyed capital, which was invested otherwise than in bank stock.

But the act of 1864 was so far modified by that of February 10, 1868 (15 Stat., chap. 7), that the validity of such State taxation was thereafter to be determined by the inquiry whether it was a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, and not necessarily by a comparison with the particular rate imposed upon shares in State banks. The effect, if not the object of the latter act, was to preclude the possibility of any such interpretation of the act of Congress as would justify States, while imposing the same taxation upon National bank shares as upon shares in State banks, from discriminating against National bank shares, in favor of moneyed capital not invested in State bank stock. At any rate the acts of

Boyer v. Boyer.

Congress do not now permit any such discrimination. Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes, is as follows:

"Nothing herein (the National Banking Act) shall prevent all the shares in any association from being included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the State within which such association is located, but the legislature of each State may determine and direct the manner and place of taxing all the shares of National banking associations located within the State, subject only to two restrictions: that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State, and that the shares of any National banking association, owned by nonresidents of any State, shall be taxed in the city or county where the bank is located, and not elsewhere. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from either State, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value as other real property is taxed."

Whether the proposed taxation for county purposes of the plaintiff's shares of National bank stock is at a greater rate than is assessed for like purposes on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, is the single question upon which depends the affirmance or reversal of the judgment.

Before examining the statutes of Pennsylvania upon the subject of taxation, it will be well to ascertain how far the decisions of this court have fixed the true meaning of the words "at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is of opinion that the commissioners are fully sustained by the decision in Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480; 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 113. In that case the question was whether the owner of National bank shares residing in Cumberland county, Pennsylvania, was exempt from a local tax by reason of a statutory exemption from all taxation in that county, except for State purposes, of "mortgages, judgments, recognizances and money owing upon articles of agreement for the sale of real estate," except mortgages, judgments and articles of agreement given by corporations. Laws Penn. 1868, p. 61. The value of such securities (if they could all be properly so described) as compared with other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens in that locality, did not appear in that case. What the court had to decide, and all that it did decide, was whether the exemption from local taxation of mortgages, judgments, recognizances and money due upon agreeVOL. III-20.

Boyer v. Boyer.

ments for the sale of real estate in the hands of individuals, was a partial exemption only; that is, whether it was so substantial in its nature and operation as to affect the integrity of the general assessment for local purposes. The court, after observing that money at interest was not the only moneyed capital to which the National Banking Act had reference, and that the words "other moneyed capital " included investments in bank shares and other stocks and securities, said: "This is a partial exemption only. It was evidently intended to prevent a double burden by the taxation both of property and debts secured upon it. Necessarily, there may be other moneyed capital in the locality than such as is not exempt. Some part of it only is. It could not have been the intention of Congress to exempt bank shares from taxation because some moneyed capital was exempt." That case is authority for the proposition that a partial exemption by a State, for local purposes, of moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, does not of itself and without reference to the aggregate amount of moneyed capital not so exempted, establish the right to a similar exemption in favor of National bank shares held by persons within the same jurisdiction. But it is by no means an authority for the broad proposition that National bank shares may be subjected to local taxation where a very material part, relatively, of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens within. the same jurisdiction or taxing district is exempted from such taxation. Indeed, such an interpretation of the statutes might entirely defeat the purpose that induced Congress to confine State taxation of National bank shares within the limit of equality with other moneyed capital; for it would enable the States to impose upon capital invested in such shares materially greater burdens than those to which other moneyed capital in individual hands is subjected.

The case of Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 148, is also relied upon to support the judgment below. The question there raised was whether an alleged exemption from municipal taxation, under an ordinance of a city, of its interest-bearing bonds, operated to exempt from like taxation the shares of a National bank located in the same city. The court held that as the ordinance had been abrogated by subsequent legislation of the State, no such ex