Corn Exchange Bank v. Blye. notes, shall be utterly null and void; and no attachment, injunction or execution shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action or proceeding, in any State, county or municipal court." Wm. Vanamee, for appellant. L. A. Gould, for respondent. FINCH, J. The sole question in this case is, whether section 5242 of the United States Revised Statutes prohibits the requisition issued to the sheriff, and protects the receiver in his possession. The Bank of Middletown became insolvent, and the defendant was appointed its receiver under the Federal law. That appointment vested in him all the assets of the bank to be converted into money and distributed among the creditors. The object sought to be accomplished is the distribution of those assets fairly and without preferences, and that has been held to be the aim and purpose of the section in question. Robinson v. Bank of Newberne, 81 N. Y. 385; 2 Nat. Bank Cas. 307; Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462; ante 32. It specifically prohibits all transfers of the corporate property made with a view to preferences, and so protects the creditors from any voluntary act of the bank, which selects out favored individuals for payment. But the bank may be passive, and such individuals gain a preference by a suit against the corporation preceded or accompanied by an attachment or injunction, or, after judgment, enforced by an execution. These three things therefore were specifically prohibited by name; each being process well known and accurately defined in the law; and without any general words to carry the prohibition beyond them. The receiver, by his appointment, acquires no right to property in the custody of the bank which the latter does not own as against the real owner; and the section in question was plainly not intended to protect the receiver's custody as against such owner. It aims to protect the property of the bank in his hands, and not to give him arbitrary control of what the bank does not own. If the latter should be held, its injustice is well suggested by the General Term in its application to special deposits of customers left merely for safe-keeping. It does not alter the case In re McMahon v. Palmer. that there is here a dispute about the title and the receiver claims to be owner. He might make such claim in any case. No law makes him the inevitable stakeholder pending the litigation. He may become so by giving the needed security, and we can see no just reason why he should be exempted from that obligation which falls upon others. The plaintiff is required to give such security as the condition of his writ, and the receiver need run no risk in the performance of his duty. It is said the word "attachment" is used, not in the local sense affixed by State enactment, but in a broader sense, and the definition of Bouvier is cited. But by that definition and in every use of the term, it always assumes title in the person against whom the writ issues, and seeks to hold possession of his property, and on the ground and for the reason that it is his. No nomenclature has ever made it the equivalent of a writ of replevin, which issues upon a theory exactly the reverse. There is no collision of jurisdictions. The authority of the Federal courts over the assets, and the right of its officer to hold them is not questioned or invaded. No property over which those courts have obtained jurisdiction is interfered with. What is sought to be recovered is property over which they have obtained no jurisdiction, and as to which they have conferred no right upon him. The order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except MILLER, J., absent. Taxation IN RE MCMAHON V. PALMER. (102 N. Y. 176.) assessment — bank shares-constitutionality. Section 7 of chapter 302 of the Laws of 1859, requiring the deputy tax commissioners to personally examine "each and every house, building lot, pier and other accessible property," and furnish the commissioners of taxes a detailed statement of the same, etc., as such commissioners may require, etc., refers only to real property. In re McMahon v. Palmer. The oath required by the act to be made by the deputy to the statement returned to the commissioners may be taken at any time after examination of the property and before the filing of the statement on the second Monday of January thereafter. The entry of assessments for National bank shares upon a list or book separate from other assessments for personal property against individuals in the city of New York does not render the assessment void; and does not violate section 5219, U. S. R. S. The assessment and collection of taxes constitute que process of law within the meaning of the Constitution. A PPEAL from an order in a special proceeding under chapter 230, Laws 1843, committing the appellant to the jail of the city and county of New York for neglect to pay alleged personal taxes upon certain National bank stock. Wm. H. Field, for appellant. D. J. Dean, for respondent. RUGER, C. J. Upon an application by the receiver of taxes of New York to the Court of Common Pleas of that county theappellant was adjudged guilty of misconduct in refusing to pay the tax assessed upon his personal property for the year 1881, and a fine was imposed upon him therefor. The proceeding was had under the provisions of chapter 230, Laws 1843, and was conducted in conformity therewith. The tax in question was predicated upon the customary annual assessment of property liable to taxation under the general laws of the State, but was in this instance based upon an assessment of the value of National bank shares owned by the appellant. The number of shares so owned by the defendant and the estimated value thereof was furnished by him to the assessment officers, and upon the information thus obtained with that derived from other sources said shares were appraised at their actual value and placed in the assessment lists provided for the enrollment of property of that de. scription. Certain irregularities are alleged to have occurred in the proceedings for the assessment of the property which it is claimed were jurisdictional in character and ought to render such assessment invalid and the tax levied thereon void. In re McMahon v. Palmer. It is quite true if any act which was required by law to be performed by the assessment officers and which is made thereby the condition of a valid assessment has been omitted by them, it will render the assessment void. We have been unable however to find any such irregularity in the proceedings. Those claimed to exist are the following: That the deputy tax commissioners failed to comply with section 7 of chapter 302 of the Laws of 1859, which required them personally to examine "each and every house, building lot, pier or other assessable property," and furnish under oath to the commissioners of taxes and assessments a detailed statement of such property, with the name of the owner or occupant, "with such other information in detail relative to personal property," as said commissioners may from time to time require. This provision very obviously refers only to real property except in the clause expressly referring to personal property, and there is no claim that that requirement has been omitted. This view of the statute was assumed by this court in Brevoort v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 128, and seems to be required by the plain inapplicability of the provision to assessments of personal property. It is also claimed that the oath required to be made to the statement directed to be returned by the deputy to the commissioners of taxes and assessments was improperly made, in that it was sworn to on the 8th, instead of the second Monday of January, being the 10th. There is no provision requiring such oath to be made on any particular day, and the whole object and intent of the statute in respect thereto is complied with, provided it be taken after the examination of property is made by the deputy commissioner and before the statement is filed with the commissioners on the second Monday of January thereafter. It is also claimed that the entry of the assessments for National bank shares upon a list or book separate from other assessments for personal property against individuals in the city renders such assessment void. It is provided by section 3, chapter 596, Laws of 1880, that "such shares shall be included in the valuation of the personal property of such stockholders in the assessment of taxes at the place, city, town or ward where such bank, banking association or trust company is located and not elsewhere, whether In re McMahon v. Palmer. the stockholder resides in said place, city, town or ward or not." Sections 4 and 5 of chapter 410 of the Laws of 1867 provide for the assessment of personal property in the city of New York, upon separate rolls from that of real estate. In the general laws of the State, the personal property of an individual is required to be assessed against him in the place of his residence, and assessments of real estate follow the location of such property. It must follow as the necessary consequence of these requirements when the individual assessed does not live in the same ward in which the bank is located in which he owns shares, and does not own real estate therein, that his assessment for bank shares must be made upon lists especially prepared for that purpose, in the ward where it is located, or the property must altogether escape assessment and taxation. The familiar rule that a statute must be so construed as to give it effect and to avoid a result which would render it inoperative, if it be reasonably susceptible of such an interpretation, would seem to require us to sanction the only mode of assessment which seems capable of securing the benefits designed by the statute. It is also clear that the tax payer has not been deprived of any substantial benefit by the mode thus pursued. The statute gives information to him of the place where the roll is to be deposited for examination and the length of time during which it is to be there kept for inspection, and of his opportunity during such time to apply to the proper officers for the correction of any errors which he may find in his assessment. Not only this, but the commissioners of taxes and assessments are also required to advertise the fact of the completion of the annual record containing all assessments upon property in the city of New York, and the time when the same shall be ready for inspection by tax payers, and to keep the same in the tax commissioners' office open for that purpose from the second Monday in January to the 30th day of April thereafter. There is no complaint but that these requirements were complied with, or but that the appellant had actual notice of the assessment in question in ample time to procure its correction if any error existed therein; in fact it affirmatively appears that the relator did appear before the commissioners of taxes on the 12th day of April, 1881, and made affidavit upon which he pro |