failed in his appearance, he was ordered to be committed. In debating the legality of this order, it was insisted, in support of it, that every man, by the law of nature, and every body of men, possesses the right of self-defence; that all public functionaries are essentially invested with the powers of selfpreservation; that they have an inherent right to do all acts necessary to keep themselves in a condition to discharge the trusts confided to them; that whenever authorities are given, the means of carrying them into execution are given by necessary implication; that thus we see the British Parliament exercise the right of punishing contempts; all the State Legislatures exercise the same power, and every court does the same; that, if we have it not, we sit at the mercy of every intruder who may enter our doors or gallery, and, by noise and tumult, render proceeding in business impracticable; that if our tranquillity is to be perpetually disturbed by newspaper defamation, it will not be possible to exercise our functions with the requisite coolness and deliberation; and that we must, therefore, have a power to punish these disturbers of our peace and proceedings. To this it was answered, that the Parliament and courts of England have cognizance of contempts by the express provisions of their law; that the State Legislatures have equal authority, because their powers are plenary; they represent their constituents completely, and possess all their powers, except such as their Constitutions have expressly denied them; that the courts of the several States have the same powers by the laws of their States, and those of the Federal Government by the same State laws adopted in each State, by a law of Congress; that none of these bodies, therefore, derive those powers from natural or necessary right, but from express aw; that Congress have no such natural or necessary power, nor any powers but such as are given them by the Constitution; that that has given them, directly, exemption from personal arrest, exemption from question elsewhere for what is said in their House, and power over their own members and proceedings; for these no further law is necessary, the Constitution being the law; that, moreover, by that article of the Constitution which authorizes them "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power vested by the Constitution in them," they may provide by law for an undisturbed exercise of their functions, e. g., for the punishment of contempt, of affrays or tumult in their presence, etc., but, till the law be made, it does not exist; and does not exist, from their own neglect; that in the mean time, however, they are not unprotected, the ordinary magistrates and courts of law being open and competent to punish all unjustifiable disturbances or defamations, and even their own sergeant, who may appoint deputies ad libitum to aid him, 3 Grey, 59, 147, 255, is equal to small disturbances; that in requiring a previous law, the Constitution had regard to the inviolabitity of the citizen, as well as of the member; as, should one House, in the regular form of a bill, aim at too broad privileges, it may be checked by the other, and both by the President; and also as, the law being promulgated, the citizen will know how to avoid offense. But if one branch may assume its own privileges without control; if it may do it on the spur of the occasion, conceal the law in its own breast, and after the fact committed, make its sentence both the law and the judgment on that fact, if the offense is to be kept undefined, and to be declared only ex re nata, and according to the passion of the moment, and there be no limitation either in the manner or measure of the punishment, the condition of the citizen will be perilous indeed. Which of these doctrines is to prevail, time will decide. Where there is no fixed law, the judgment on any particular case, is the law of that single case only, and dies with it. When a new and even similar case arises, the judgment which is to make and at the same time apply the law, is open to question and consideration, as are all new laws. Perhaps Congress, in the mean time, in their care for the safety of the citizen as well as that for their own protection, may declare by law what is necessary and proper to enable them to carry into exoention the powers vested in them, and thereby hang up a rule for the inspection of all, which may direct the conduct of the citizen, and at the same ime test the judgments they shall themselves pronounce in their own case.] Privilege from arrest takes place by force of the election; and before a reurn be made a member elected may be named of a committee, and is to every extent a member, except that he cannot vote until he is sworn. Memor, 107, 108. D'Ewes, 642, col. 2; 643, col. 1. Pet. Miscel. Parl., 119. Lex Parl., c. 23. 2 Hats., 22, 62. Every man must, at his peril, take notice who are members of either House returned of record. Lex Parl., 23; 4 Inst., 24. On complaint of a breach of privilege, the party may either be summoned or sent for in custody of the sergeant. Grey, 88, 95. The privilege of a member is the privilege of the House. If the member waive it without leave, it is a ground for punishing him, but cannot in effect waive the privilege of the House. 3 Grey, 140, 222. For any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. Const. U. S., I, 6, S. P. Protest of the Commons to James I., 162; 2 Rapin, No. 54, pp. 211, 212. But this is restrained to things done in the House in a parliamentary course. 1 Rush., 663. For he is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarum, to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty. Com. p. If an offense be committed by a member of the House, of which the House has cognizance, it is an infringement of their right for any person or court to take notice of it, till the House has punished the offender, or referred him to a due course. Lex Parl., 63. Privilege is in the power of the House, and is a restraint to proceedings of inferior courts, but not of the House itself. 2 Nalson, 450; 2 Grey, 399. For whatever is spoken in the House is subject to the censure of the House: and offenses of this kind have been severely punished by calling the person to the bar to make submission, committing him to the tower, expelling the House, etc. Scob., 72; L. Parl., c. 22. It is a breach of order for the Speaker to refuse to put a question which is in order. 2 Hats., 175-6; 5 Grey, 133. And even in cases of treason, felony, and breach of the peace, to which privilege does not extend as to substance, yet in Parliament a member is privileged as to the mode of proceeding. The case is first to be laid before the House, that it may judge of the fact and of the grounds of the accusation, and how far forth the manner of the trial may concern their privilege; otherwise it would be in the power of the other branches of government, and even of every private man, under pretense of treason, etc.. to take any man from his service in the House, and so as many, one after another, as would make the House what he pleaseth. Dec. of Com. on the King's declaring Sir John Hotham a traitor. 4 Rushw., 586. So when a member stood indicted for felony, it was adjudged that he ought to remain of the House till conviction: for it may be any man's case who is guiltless, to be accused and indicted of felony or the like crime. 23 El. 1580; D'Ewes, 283 col. 1; Lex Parl., 133. When it is found necessary for the public service to put a member under arrest, or when on any public inquiry, matter comes out which may lead to affect the person of a member, it is the practice immediately to acquaint the House, that they may know the reasons for such a proceeding, and take such steps as they think proper. 2 Hats., 259. Of which see many examples. Ib., 256,257,258. But the communication is subsequent to the arrest. 1 Blackst., 167. It is highly expedient, says Hatsel, for the due preservation of the privileges of the separate branches of the Legislature, that neither should encroach on the other or interfere in any matter depending before them, so as to preclude, or even influence that freedom of debate, which is essential to a free council. They are therefore not to take notice of any bills or other matters depending or of votes that have been given, or of speeches which have been held, by the members of either of the other branches of the Legislature, until the same have been communicated to them in the usual parliamentary manner. 2 Hats., 252. 4 Inst., 15. Seld. Jud., 53. Thus the King's taking notice of the bill for suppressing soldiers, depending before the House; his proposing a provisional clause for a bill before it was presented to him by the two Houses; his expressing displeasure against some persons for matters moved in parliament during the debate and preparation of a bill, were breaches of privilege; 2 Nalson, 347; and in 1783, December 17, it was declared a breach of fundamental privileges, etc., to report any opinion or pretended opinion of the King on any bill or proceeding depending in either House of Parliament, with a view to influence the votes of the members. 2 Hats., 251, 6. SECTION IV. ELECTIONS. [The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators. Const. I, 4.] [Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. Const. I, 5.] SECTION V. QUALIFICATIONS. [The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.] [Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the end of the second year; of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year; so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of the State, any Executive thereof may make temporary appointments, until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.] [No person shall be a Senator, who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. Const. I, 3.] [The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors of each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.] [No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.] [Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers; which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons; including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative. Constitution of the United States, I, 2.] The provisional apportionments of Representatives made in the Constitution in 1787, and afterwards by Congress, were as follows: 1787117902 19003 18101 18205 1830 18407 18505 1880 187010 STATES. Maine New Hampshire Rhode Island New York.. New Jersey 12 Virginia North Carolina. 13Tennessee. 15Louisiana 16 Indiana 20 Wisconsin 21California. 4 10 2 2 4 15 14 20 20 00 20 20 14 20 AVROUE& 2 As per act of April 14, 1792, one representative for 30,000, first census. 3 As per act of January 14, 1802, one representative for 33,000, second census. 4 As per act of December 21, 1811, one representative for 35,000, third census. 5 As per act of March 7, 1922, one representative for 40,000, fourth census. 6 As per act of May 22, 18332, one representative for 47,700, fifth census. 7 As per act of June 25, 1812, one representative for 70,680, sixth census. 9 By act of Congress of May 23, 1850, it was enacted that the number of Representatives in Congress should be 233; that the representative population deter nined by the census of that year and thereafter should be divided by said number 233; and the quotient so found should be the ratio of representation for the several States. The ratio thus ascertained under the census of 1860 was 126,823, and upon this basis the 233 Representatives were apportioned among the several States, one Representative for every district containing that number of persons; giving to each State at least one Representative. Subsequently, by the act of March 4, 1862 the ratio was changed, and the number of representatives from and after March 3, 1863, was increased from 233 to 241, by allowing one additional Representative to each of the following States, viz: Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont; and this number was increased by the admission of Nevada and Nebraska, with one Representative each, to 243. 10 As per apportionment bill passed February 2, 1872, and supplemental apportion. ment bill passed May 30, 1872. 11 Previous to the 3d of March, 1820, Maine formed part of Massachusetts, and |