upon it. We can imagine no case where the injunctive or preventive function of courts of equity could the more justly or appropriately be called into action than in a case where, as here, there was about to be consummated a proceeding, bearing upon its face the insignia of judicial authority, which would, if carried out, involve the validity of a person's title to land in doubt. Certainly it would be a very weak system of remedial justice that would require the owner of the land. to stand helpless and mute until after the threatened mischief to his title had been committed, and we know of no other remedy afforded either by the law or by the equity courts than that of the writ of injunction which would prevent the commission of so grievous a mischief upon and against the title to real property.

It is perfectly clear that there is no other possible alternative open to this court but to affirm the judgment, although we are frank to say that, so far as we are informed by the record before us of the facts of the controversy giving rise to this litigation, the appellant is entitled to receive assistance from her parents, if they are financially able to render such. assistance, in the matter of her maintenance and support. Indeed, such assistance should be provided, not as the result of the coercive power of the law, as it has been written by man, but in ready response to the dictates of the very first and commonest principles of humanity. It is, of course, the legal duty of S. S. Murphy to support the appellant, if for any substantial reason she is unable to support herself and he has ample means for doing so, but, above all, is that natural duty intrinsically reciprocal as between parent and child, involving obligations which should be held none the less sacred and morally binding' because in some measure formally recognized by positive law. It is to be deprecated that some substantial relief cannot be afforded the appellant through the processes of the courts, if it be true that under the circumstances of her case no such relief be available to her, assuming, of course, that she is for any reason without ability to maintain herself and that her father is. But the law, both substantive and remedial, must be applied according to a well-defined plan to secure that uniformity of operation so necessary to a well-poised system of jurisprudence, and the courts can do no more or no less than to administer the first

1

in the manner prescribed by the latter. Thus we speak, not alone because we see justness in the claim of the appellant that she is entitled to assistance from her parents, but also because, although not a licensed practitioner of the law and undoubtedly without training therein, it appears that she has been required, probably from paucity of means to employ the services of an attorney, to appear in this cause before this court in propria persona and so present her own side of this controversy. She has filed herein a voluminous brief, prepared, as we are informed, by herself, unaided by a lawyer, and while therein, for one who has not been an habitual student of the law, she has presented her side of this case with singular clearness and force, it is plainly manifest that (as above declared), so far as this particular case is concerned, the law is against her, and, therefore, her appeal cannot be sustained.

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Chipman, P. J., and Burnett, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on April 17, 1919.

All the Justices concurred.

[Civ. No. 2490. Second Appellate District, Division One.-February 18, 1919.]

J. W. COOMBS, Appellant, v. JAMES H. BURK, Respondent.

[1] CONTRACT-VOID AGREEMENT-SALE OF GAS APPLIANCES-FURNISHING GAS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PUBLIC POLICY.-A contract, under which a gas corporation, furnishing gas to a city and its inhabitants, agreed to install for a private consumer certain appliances and piping, in consideration of which the consumer agreed to purchase from the gas corporation all gas which he might use, and in case of his failure to do so, and the purchase by him of gas from any other company, to pay to the contracting company a fixed sum in settlement for the articles installed, was illegal and contrary to public policy, as it was not only in restraint of trade, but if upheld

would tend to stifle competition and give the contracting gas company a monopoly of the business of furnishing a supply of gas in the city, and hence be detrimental to the public welfare.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Edgar G. Pratt, Judge pro tem. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

H. C. Beach and S. W. Guthrie for Appellant.
Hibbard & Kleindienst for Respondent.

SHAW, J.-Action by plaintiff, as assignee of Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corporation, to recover money upon a contract. At the trial defendant interposed an objection to the reception of any evidence on the part of plaintiff upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it appeared therefrom that the contract made the basis of the action was illegal and contrary to public policy. This objection was sustained and judgment entered for defendant, from which plaintiff appeals.

[1] It appears from the complaint, wherein the document is set out in full, that on June 1, 1916, the Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corporation (hereinafter designated the Gas Corporation), then engaged in furnishing a supply of gas to the city of Los Angeles and its inhabitants, entered into a contract with defendant whereby, for one dollar and the covenants therein contained on the part of defendant, it agreed to furnish and install for his use in said city, three No. 124 waffle irons, three three-burner hot plates, one Eclipse hotel range, three three-burner arcs, four single reflex lights, and 266 feet of pipe; in consideration of which defendant, during the life of the agreement, agreed to purchase from said Gas Corporation all gas which defendant might use, for any purpose at the place where said articles were installed, and in case of his failure so to do and the purchase of gas from any other person, concern, or corporation, he would pay to the Gas Corporation $330 in settlement for the articles so installed; provided, however, that if he ceased to occupy the premises or permanently discontinued the use of gas at said address, the agreement should terminate upon his returning the property (title to which until paid for should remain in

the vendor), so installed, in good repair and condition, reasonable wear excepted. The contract further provided that upon defendant's failure to purchase his supply of gas from the Gas Corporation, the $330 should become immediately due and payable. It is alleged that on the fourth day of August, 1916, defendant, without any fault on the part of the Gas Corporation, discontinued using the gas of said corporation and purchased gas from another company supplying gas in said city of Los Angeles, in violation of said agreement. "Whatever tends to prevent competition in business impressed with a public character is opposed to public policy and is therefore unlawful." (Greenhood on Public Policy, p. 180.) Where a contract affects such character of business, since no restraint, however partial, can be tolerated, the court will not inquire into or consider the extent of the restriction imposed. (Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, [32 L. Ed. 979, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes]; West Virginia T. Co. v. Ohio R. P. L. Co., 22 W. Va. 600, [46 Am. Rep. 527]; Gwynn v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 69 S. C. 434, [104 Am. St. Rep. 819, 67 L. R. A. 111, 48 S. E. 460]; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 672.) As to private business, the conduct of which does not affect the public welfare, and hence involves no question of public policy, a different rule applies, under which contracts, if reasonable in their terms, will be enforced. Concededly in the instant case the Gas Corporation was engaged in a business impressed with a public character (Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra), and from a reading of the contract it is apparent that its purpose in making the same was to prevent defendant from discontinuing the use of gas furnished by it and, in lieu thereof, obtaining a supply from another company engaged in supplying gas to the inhabitants of the city. That the contract was not only in restraint of trade, but if upheld would tend to stifle competition and give plaintiff's assignor a monopoly of the business of furnishing a supply of gas in the city, and hence be detrimental to the public welfare, admits of no controversy.

The judgment is affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2620. Second Appellate District, Division One.-February 19,

1919.]

A. L. ABRAHAMS, Appellant, v. W. A. HAMMEL, as Sheriff, etc., et al., Respondents.

[1] SALE-CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT-TRANSFER BY VENDEE WITHOUT IMMEDIATE DELIVERY-VOID AS TO ATTACHING CREDITOR OF ORIGINAL VENDEE.—Where the vendee in possession of personal property under a conditional contract of sale assigned the contract with the consent of the original vendor to a third person, who assumed the payments specified in the contract, and without ever having taken the property into his possession made the specified payments to the original vendor and received a bill of sale from the vendor, but made an arrangement with his assignor under which the latter retained possession of the property, the sale and purported transfer from the original vendee and the conditional contract to his assignee was as to an attaching creditor of the former to be deemed fraudulent and void under section 3440 of the Civil Code, and a bill of sale from such assignee was ineffectual as a transfer of the property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Paul J. McCormick, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Tyrrell, Abrahams & Brown and Chas. W. Fricke for Appellant.

Strong & McCormick for Respondents.

SHAW, J.-Under a writ of attachment, issued in an action wherein F. W. Cole was plaintiff and G. G. Gillette was defendant, W. A. Hammel, as sheriff, levied upon and took possession of a certain automobile, title to which the plaintiff claimed was vested in Gillette. Thereupon plaintiff in this action filed a third-party claim with the sheriff and demanded delivery of possession of the property, which was refused.

This action for conversion followed, and judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict of a jury in favor of defendants.

The appeal is from the judgment and an order of court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.