SLOANE, J.-This is an appeal of the defendant Bosworth, Inc., from a judgment foreclosing upon said defendant's real property a mechanic's lien for materials alleged to have been furnished to and used by the contractor in the construction of buildings on said premises. Appellant asks that the judgment be reversed on the following grounds: 1. That the claim of lien was not filed in time. 2. That there is a fatal variance between the lien claim and the proof as to the terms of the contract of sale. 3. That the lumber used for forms for pouring cement for the buildings is not the basis of a valid lien. 4. That the proof fails to show that the materials furnished were expressly contracted for the buildings in question. 5. That the finding as to the date of filing claim of lien is indefinite and insufficient. 6. That the complaint alleges, and the court finds, that the buildings in question were erected by virtue of an agreement, whereas the proof shows that the buildings were erected under three separate agreements. 7. That items of charges sought to be recovered are not covered by the claim of lien. 1. We will consider the first and fifth alleged grounds of error together, as both are directed to the time of filing claim of lien. The court finds that notice of completion of these buildings was filed "on or about" the twenty-seventh day of August, 1914, and that thereafter, and "on or about" the twenty-first day of September, 1914, the claim of lien was filed. It is alleged in the complaint, and not denied in the answer, that the claim of lien was recorded, "on" September 21, 1914. The proof showed that the notice of completion was filed "on" the twenty-seventh day of August, and the claim of lien "on" the twenty-first day of September. It also appeared in evidence that the buildings were actually completed and accepted on the twenty-first day of August. [1] Appellant argues that the time for filing claim of lien began to run from the date of completion, and that more than thirty days elapsed before the filing of the lien claim, if it was filed September 21st; and that, in any event, the finding is too indefinite in fixing the time "on or about" the dates mentioned. Whatever merit this contention might have if under the facts the last day for filing the claim had been on the 20th or 21st of September, it is without force under the recent decisions that a lien claimant for materials furnished a contractor may make his filing within thirty days after the date of filing notice by the owner of completion of the contract. (Hughes Mfg. & L. Co. v. Hathaway, 174 Cal. 44, [161 Pac. 1159]; Pioneer Paper Co. v. Hathaway, 39 Cal. App. 405, [179 Pac. 227].) [2] In this case the claimant had several days remaining after September 21st, in which he might file his claim of lien, and with this margin of time a finding that the notice of completion was filed "on or about" the 27th of August, and the notice of lien "on or about" the 21st of September, is probably suffi ciently definite as a finding that the lien claim was made within a period of thirty days; particularly as there is no question under the evidence as to that fact. If we were to concede that, as to this question, appellant's position were well taken, nevertheless, since we could not say upon this record that it was made to appear that justice had miscarried, it would be a proper case for the application of section 41% of article VI of the constitution. 2. There is more room for dispute on appellant's second proposition. The complaint alleges, and it is set forth in the claim of lien, as follows: "That all of said materials were sold and delivered from time to time upon open account, commencing on the twenty-eighth day of April, 1914, and ending on the twenty-ninth day of July, 1914; that there was no express agreement as to the price to be paid for said materials, nor was there any time expressly agreed upon for the payment thereof; but that said materials, at the time of the sale and delivery thereof, were of the reasonable market value of fourteen hundred fifty-eight dollars ($1458), upon which said sum has been paid two hundred fifty dollars ($250), and no more. [3] It is appellant's contention that the proof shows a specific agreement between Dowell, the contractor, and respondent as to the price for which this lumber was sold and deliv ered-namely, a fixed and agreed rate per thousand feet. if the record shows, as contended, that a specific sum of money, distinguishable from and independent of the market price, was agreed upon between the parties as the consideration of this sale, there can be no question, under the repeated rulings of the supreme court, that such fact would establish a fatal variance between the lien claim and the proof. (Reed v. Norton, 90 Cal. 590, [26 Pac. 767, 27 Pac. 426]; Wagner v. Hansen, 103 Cal. 104, [37 Pac. 195]; Wilson v. Nugent, 125 Cal. 280, [57 Pac. 1008]; Robinett v. Brown, 167 Cal. 735, [141 Pac. 368]; Buell & Co. v. Brown, 131 Cal. 158, [63 Pac. 167].) In the case last cited the contract was the same as here claimed by appellant. The court there says: "The court found that the claim of lien set forth a contract to deliver the material at the reasonable market rate, but that the contract was an express one, to wit, $26.50 per thousand for lumber, and $2.50 per thousand for shingles. This was a fatal variance, and prevents a recovery by plaintiff." The substance of the evidence given on this point in the case at bar is as follows: "They were to furnish lumber for certain prices per thousand, and they furnished that lumber. I would say that the price that was paid for the lumber was the market price at that time. There was an agreement to a certain amount. It was practically the market price at that time. It was a certain amount per thousand; it was not a lump sum. There was an amount fixed and agreed upon for each class of lumber per thousand feet, on the first order. We had our understanding as to the price per thousand feet when we first went there. Q. And they agreed that they would furnish you certain lumber at so much a thousand feet? A. For that list of lumber that I submitted to them for prices. After that I simply sent in orders for additional lumber, and they furnished it. Q. And at the same prices which you had previously agreed upon? A. I couldn't say they charged the same prices in each case. I think they did. I do not remember that they deviated from the prices they had agreed upon. My understanding at the start was that the plaintiff would sell the lumber at so much per thousand feet for certain classes of lumber; and afterwards I sent in orders for more lumber, and it was furnished, and they charged on their bills the same prices originally agreed upon. The prices would run from $14 to $20, or some intermediate sum fixed on the first order which I submitted to them for a price. Q. I understand you to say that there was an agreement as to the price of the lumber. Did you have a contract? A. I had no contract; the agreement was the market price. It was listed off to me at the market price. I went to the representative of the Lumber Company, and I asked him for the prices on this material. He said it would be the market prices, and he gave me a list of the market prices." The evidence further shows that on the occasion of entering into the agreement for this lumber only a small quantity of the lumber ultimately required was ordered. The deliveries covered a period of three or four months, and are evidenced by orders consisting of thirty-seven separate sheets. The aggregate amount of lumber purchased under these orders was 78,898 feet, and the price as charged to the contractor was a total of $1,458. The evidence, we think, fairly shows that the prices charged by the Lumber Company were the fair market price, as well as the amount that would be arrived at from the prices per thousand feet as shown by the price list referred to by the parties when the first order was made. The construction of the agreement then entered into depends upon whether the price list referred to was used and accepted by the parties as determining the price of all the lumber to be ordered on this contract, or merely as fixing the market price on the order for that date, to be subject to any fluctuation in the market that might occur during the period covered by the subsequent orders. There can be no question under the evidence that the contractor was offered what lumber he wanted at the market price, and was then shown a list purporting to contain the market price at that date. Had he ordered all his lumber at that time, it could conclusively be said that the list bound the parties to a fixed and definite price per thousand for the various sorts of lumber. But the contractor did not order his full bill of lumber; he only ordered a thousand or two feet. Nothing appears in the record to show that he was in any way obligated to buy another foot of material from this company. Was the company, then, under any agreement to continue this list price in the event there should be an advance in the market price of lumber, or could it say: "We will still furnish you lumber at the market price, but here is a new list showing the advanced price in the market?" If it had such right, then the rates per thousand were not fixed, and the mere fact that there was no change in the market during the period covered by the purchases would not alter the relations of the parties, or make the contract one for a fixed and unalterable price. Under an interpretation of the evidence as last indicated the facts would distinguish this case from the supreme court citations above given. There has been a growing tendency in the decisions to as much liberality in the construction of the more technical requirements of the mechanic's lien law as is consistent with just regard for the rights of property owners. (Corbett v. Chambers, 109 Cal. 178, [41 Pac. 873]; McGinty v. Morgan, 122 Cal. 103, [54 Pac. 392].) And it has been repeatedly held that where the price named and the reasonable market price are the same, a variance between the lien claim and the proof in this particular is not fatal. (Acme Lumber Co. v. Wessling, 19 Cal. App. 406, [126 Pac. 167]; Lucas v. Gobbi, 10 Cal. App. 648, [103 Pac. 167]; Star Mill & Lumber Co. v. Porter, 4 Cal. App. 470, [88 Pac. 497]; Blanck v. Commonwealth Amusement Corp., 19 Cal. App. 720, [127 Pac. 805].) The following language from the opinion in California-Portland Cement Co. v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 16 Cal. App. 692, 709, [118 Pac. 103, 110], is very applicable to the suggested construction of the evidence as to the terms in this case: "The appellant contends that the evidence does not sustain the findings of the court. Considered as a whole, the evidence received in support of this claim in our opinion does sustain the finding of the court. One of the witnesses testified that the price of $9 per ton was quoted at the time some of the plastering material was ordered, and that this price was accepted; but it also reasonably appears from the evidence that it was contemplated by the parties that this material should be ordered from time to time as needed, and that the price to be paid therefor was not necessarily a uniform price of $9 per ton, but such price as might be indicated by the state of the market at the particular time the merchandise was ordered." Here, as in the case cited, the trial court found in accordance with the declarations of the claim of lien, and we think the finding was warranted by the evidence. [4] 3. The next point presented is as to the application of the lien law to lumber furnished to the contractor by respondent and used in making forms for concrete work in the buildings. This matter was argued on the apparent assumption that no case in point has been decided in the appellate courts of California. This was true at the time of filing the briefs, but the question has since been definitely passed upon in a wellconsidered opinion by Mr. Presiding Justice Chipman of the third appellate district, in the case of Olson-Mahoney L. Co. v. |