and on the security of the policy, a sum equal to the cash value of the policy at the end of the current year, and it is provided that failure to repay such loan with interest

"shall not avoid this policy unless the total indebtedness hereon to the company shall equal or exceed such loan value at the time of such failure and until 31 days after notice shall have been mailed by the company to the last known address of the insured."

We find nothing in the wording of the policy indicating an intention in case of default after granting a loan to apply the proceeds of the policy to the payment of the indebtedness. The only provision referring to the effect of failure to pay having a bearing on the question is that failure to repay shall not avoid the policy

"unless the total indebtedness to the company shall equal or exceed such loan value at the time of such failure and until 31 days after notice shall have been mailed by the company to the last known address of the insured."

That the indebtedness of the insured equaled or exceeded the loan value is conceded, and defendant's right to forfeit the policy for that reason cannot be denied. Before doing so, however, something more than mere equality of indebtedness and cash value of the policy is required. Affirmative action on the part of the company must be taken by giving 31 days' notice of intention to avoid the policy by reason of nonpayment of the loan. In absence of such notice, forfeiture does not occur, and there is nothing to prevent the operation of the provision for extended insurance, whereby the policy remains in force for the full period of the extended insurance. Had the insurer intended that, in case of default, the cash value of the policy should be applied to cancel the indebtedness, and the policy thereby terminate if the latter equaled the former, it would have been a simple matter to have said so. In absence of such provision, the court will not read into the policy a requirement it does not contain.

[2] That an existing doubt as to the construction of the different parts of a policy of insurance must be resolved in favor of the insured is familiar law, and under this rule the action of the court below in entering judgment for plaintiff non obstante veredicto was proper, and fully supported by the decision of this court in Francis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 243 Pa. 380, 90 Atl. 205, where a question arose as to whether an existing indebtedness of the policy holder to the company should be deducted from the cash value of the policy, so as to reduce the term of extended insurance under a provision whereby a forfeited policy should become a paid

up policy for a certain term, without action on the part of the insured, and in absence of an election by him to the contrary. We there said (243 Pa. 390, 90 Atl. 208):

"We cannot agree that the term of extended insurance is affected by the loan provisions of the policy, which do not in terms, nor as we view it by necessary implication, have reference to the table of extended insurance. If appellant [the insurance company] intended to reduce the term of extended insurance on account of loans to the insured, it would have been an easy matter to have so provided in the policy, and the inference from its failure to do so is that it did not so intend. The policy is in the language of the insurance company, and the presumption is that its express provisions contain all the conditions intended to be imposed. Certainly the insured had the right to assume that the policy meant what it said, and that conditions not expressed did not exist. As to the loans, appellant safeguarded its interests by provisions for forfeiture and for the deduction of indebtedness, together with interest accumulated and accrued upon payment of the amount otherwise due the insured under the terms of the policy. There is no provision in the policy for the reduction of the term of extended insurance on account of indebtedness to the insurer, and, in absence of such a provision, courts are not at liberty to read into the contract what it does not contain. Again, the rule that insurance contracts shall be taken most strongly against the inloans are read in the light of this rule the arsurer applies, and when the provisions as to gument of appellant on this branch of the case

fails."

In the case in hand no formal notice of intent to cancel was sent the insured, and the policy, consequently, remained in force, subject to the assignment to the company as collateral for repayment of the loan. Salig v. United States Life Ins. Co., 236 Pa. 460, 84 Atl. 826, cited by appellant, is distinguishable from the present case, in that the policy there contained an express provision whereby it became void in case of nonpayment of the loan when due. In that case notices were sent the insured, calling his attention to the terms under which the loan was made, and advising him the policy would be forfeited unless payments were forthcoming on or before a time stated. The case of McDon. ald v. Columbia N. L. Ins. Co., 253 Pa. 239, 97 Atl. 1086, L. R. A. 1916F, 1244, also differs from the present, since there the state law provided automatically for a paid-up life insurance policy for a certain amount in case of forfeiture for nonpayment of premium, without action by either of the parties, and the effort of the insured there was to have the policy reinstated under an option clause he had failed to exercise.

The judgment is affirmed.

It clearly appears, and in fact is undisputed, that, beginning about two years after going to Hebron, the plaintiff engaged in poultry raising on a large scale; that she had the assistance of Mr. Keene's hired man

to do the rough work; that she regularly devoted a portion of her time each day to caring for her hens and chickens; that she had the entire proceeds of this industry.

Two witnesses, apparently disinterested, testify to conversations with the plaintiff at different times, in which she said in substance that she was to have what her hens brought her in to pay for her work in the house; another witness, likewise apparently disinterested, testified to a statement made by Mr. Keene in Mrs. Gordon's presence to the effect that he had writings to show that she was to work there without wages for a chance to keep her hens; to this statement, when made by Mr. Keene, she made no reply, according to the witness. This testimony impresses us very strongly in favor of the defendant's contention; the witnesses, so far as we can discover, had no motive or opportunity to frame their testimony in corroboration of each other. Yet the jury saw and heard the witnesses, and had better opportunity than we have to judge of the weight to be given to their testimony; and might hesitate to disturb the verdict, had not the plaintiff furnished convincing evidence in corroboration.

we

It appears that the plaintiff kept a book showing her transactions in poultry raising. This book was put in evidence. It begins January 2, 1911; the last entries are October 1, 1917. The book is kept month by month; on the right-hand page, in Mrs. Gordon's handwriting, the receipts are entered; on the left-hand page, usually in Mr. Keene's handwriting, are the charges for grain and feed furnished by Mr. Keene, items of other expense, and sometimes checks given by Mr. Keene to her for use in paying her bills. That these accounts were invariably settled every month is conceded; Mrs. Gordon paying Mr. Keene for his charges against her during the month. So unfailing was this course of business that on October 2, 1917, 11 days before he died, Mr. Keene, unable to be fully dressed, sat up at the table, and settled the September account, and receipted it upon the book.

cluded in the monthly settlements. We find the 13 checks so identified by her entered upon the book; we also find twelve other checks, indorsed by A. W. Harvey, which we have been unable to identify with entries on the book. Two checks indorsed by Fred Hodgdon, and one check indorsed by Ray Hodgdon, were for eggs received from them, and are charged on the book; the check of September 29, 1916, indorsed by A. M. Fogg, and the check of January 9, 1917, indorsed by H. E. Eastman, relate to similar transactions, and are charged on the book. We find 6 other checks, indorsed by A. M. Fogg, which we have been unable to identify with entries on the book. The check of February 13, 1914, to Hester R. Oldham, was to pay car fare of Mrs. Gordon's sister, who was coming to help in the house; it is charged in the book. In March, 1914, we find a check to A. G. Atkinson charged, evidently We find three the check of March 9, 1914. other checks, indorsed by A. G. Atkinson, which we have been unable to identify with entries on the book. It must be remembered that all these checks were drawn payable to Mrs. Gordon and by her indorsed. There are other charges of checks on the book which we have been unable to identify with checks produced. In all, we are able to identify 45 checks charged to the plaintiff.

Another class of checks is more significant -a check for $9.62, dated June 12, 1912, indorsed to A. N. Despins Company, appears, as to which Mrs. Gordon says:

"Q. I call your attention to two checks, one dated June 12, 1912, $9.62, indorsed by yourself and A. N. Despins Company. Can you explain that? A. Well, Mr. Despins' checks were for boots for Mr. Keene and myself.

"Q. And did that represent money which Mr.

Keene paid you? A. Yes; he gave me checks to get boots at different times for himself, and my own boots I paid for."

We do not find any charge corresponding to this check, nor to a previous check, dated November 1, 1911, for $10.90, also indorsed to A. N. Despins Company; but under date of December 6, 1912, is a charge, "CashBoots, $3.50," and a check appears of that date and amount indorsed to A. N. Despins Company; and under date of February 8, 1917, is a charge of "Check to A. N. Despins, $2.25," and a corresponding check is found. This, Mrs. Gordon says, was for a pair of slippers for herself. A check for $5, dated November 10, 1913, collected through the Livermore Falls Trust & Banking Company, is explained as follows:

"That was for our fare. Mr. Keene and I visited my nephew at Livermore Falls, and that was for our fares and my hat that I got there at that time."

A check for $2, dated April 30, 1914, indorsed by W. H. Berry, and another for $5, dated May 1, 1914, indorsed by E. M. Swift and W. H. Berry, are produced; the latter was Mrs. Gordon's contribution to the church; the former her contribution towards a church organ; both are charged to her in her own handwriting.

Is it probable that, if Mr. Keene was owing Mrs. Gordon for services, she would have included in her accounts, not only charges for poultry feed and eggs, but also charges for checks furnished for her clothing, church contributions, and vacation expenses, and would have paid such charges to Mr. Keene month after month, during the whole six years? That she did make these monthly settlements and pay him is the positive testimony of the plaintiff and her sister, Mrs. Aubin. Such a course of dealing is not consistent with the ordinary conduct of persons standing in the continuing relation of debtor and creditor.

[2] Without further extending this opinion, it is sufficient to say that after a careful examination of the whole record the court is of the opinion that the verdict upon the first count is unmistakably wrong; that the monthly settlements embraced all outstanding claims between the parties, except when evidenced by notes or other writings; that the plaintiff did not expect to receive, nor defendant's intestate to pay, further compensation. The jury must have failed to apply the rules of law to the undisputed facts of the case.

[3] In support of the second count the plaintiff introduced a check payable to her for $260.50, dated November 4, 1913, signed by Mr. Keene, which Mrs. Gordon said was not presented for payment either before or after his death; but in this she was mistaken. The bank clerk testified that she did present it for payment after Mr. Keene's death, and payment was refused for that reason. Without further evidence, this check would not support a claim for money loaned. But Mrs. Gordon testified on cross-examination and on redirect examination that this check was given to her for money borrowed for apple picking. She added:

[5] The defendant has four exceptions to rulings of the presiding justice admitting answers given by the plaintiff to questions propounded by her counsel. It appears that the defendant testified in his own behalf to certain facts happening before Mr. Keene's death, admissible upon the rules of evidence. He was then cross-examined; the cross-examination was not confined to the facts as to which he had testified on direct examination, but took a wider range; but no exceptions were taken to this method of crossexamination. The plaintiff was called in rebuttal and asked the questions upon which | the exceptions are based. Without expressing an opinion upon the questions of law propounded by defendant's counsel, we think that the questions and answers were not prejudicial to the excepting party. How was it material to the issue, whether or not Mrs. Gordon had any experience in raising hens in 1904, or had kept a boarding house prior to going to Mr. Keene's (a fact which had already appeared), or how many calves she raised while at Mr. Keene's, or whether she furnished eggs for the cooking and table? In their zeal to leave no facts unpresented, the counsel, as frequently happens, seem to have drifted away from the main issue. If exceptions had been presented to the method of cross-examination adopted with defendant, an important question would have been presented.

An exception to the refusal to give a requested instruction is presented. The requested instruction seems to have been taken verbatim from the opinion in Spring v. Hulett, 104 Mass. 592, withdrawn from the context. The jury had been fully instructed as to the law of implied contracts; we think that the requested instruction was properly refused. Lunge v. Abbott, 114 Me. 177, 182, 95 Atl. 942.

[4] Although her delay in presenting the check is not satisfactorily explained, as Mr. Keene had nearly $1,300 on deposit when the check was given, and not less than $589 at any time during that month of November,

after this rescript is received by the clerk in Androscoggin county, plaintiff formally remits all of the verdict above the amount due on the note dated December 7, 1916, and the amount of the check for $260.50, with interest on the latter from date of writ, in which case judgment shall be entered accordingly.

ELMS v. CRANE. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Oct. 7, 1919.)

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER

7(1)—WORDS IMPORTING CRIMINAL CHARGE ACTIONABLE. If the defamatory words taken in their natural and ordinary signification fairly import a criminal charge, it is sufficient to render them actionable.

2. LIBEL AND SLANDER 7(13) LETTERS WRITTEN BY DEFENDANT IMPORTING CHARGE OF LARCENY.

In action for libel, language of letters written by defendant to plaintiff's fellow boarder held to import charge of larceny.

3. LIBEL AND SLANDER 43, 50, 51(4)

WHEN ACCUSATION OF CRIME PRIVILEGED. Communications accusing person of crime, to be privileged upon ground that they were made for the purpose of aiding in the investigation and punishment of crime, must have been made in good faith and without actual malice, upon reasonable or probable cause, after a reasonably careful inquiry, and for the public purpose of detecting and bringing a criminal to punishment.

4. LIBEL AND SLANDER 51 (1)—CHarge of CRIME MALICIOUS AND NOT PRIVILEGED IF MADE WANTONLY.

Although "malice," in its popular sense of rancor, personal animosity, or ill will, is not shown, the courts construe the word more broadly; and a charge of crime is malicious, and therefore not privileged, if made wantonly and recklessly, out of an entire disregard of the rights of the person accused.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Malice.]

5. LIBEL AND SLANDER 51(4) LETTERS

-

CRIME ON GROUNDLESS SUSPICION NOT PRIVILEGED.

was a woman of high social standing, whose accusation would carry weight, held, that plain

8. LIBEL AND SLANDER 43-LETTER CHARGING LARCENY WITH MOTIVE ΤΟ RECOVER

STOLEN PROPERTY NOT PRIVILEGED. Writer of letter charging larceny, to a private person having no duty and responsibility in the premises, whose motive in writing letter was not the public motive of vindicating the

$750.