92(1) (Vt.) In an action against a director as a signer of a corporate note, a finding that the director received no direct benefit or value for signing the note except such as she received as stockholder or director does not imply a consideration, the presumption being if, as director, she received anything, it was only by way of compensation for services rendered, and there being no presumption that the directors receivor acted fraudulently.-Wetmore & Morse Granite Co. v. Ryle, 107 A. 109. ed more BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE. 12 (R.I.) If defendant promises to marry plaintiff on a certain date, she being ready and willing to marry him on such date, she can maintain an action, although plaintiff did not request defendant to marry her.-Parkinson v. Murphy, 107 A. 235. BRIDGES. See Commerce, 10; Death, 103. 14 (N.H.) By "confirming," in 1797, the proprietors of Cornish bridge in rights grante by New Hampshire Legislature in 1795 (6 N. E. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353), Vermont Legislature did not create a second corporation, but gave New Hampshire corporation a legal existence and domicile in Vermont.-Proprietors of Cornish Bridge v. Fitts, 107 A. 626. By "confirming" the rights of proprietors of Cornish bridge granted by New Hampshire Legislature in 1795 (6 N. H. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353), Vermont Legislature made such bridge company a Vermont corporation, so far as it is a corporation in that state at all; and the statutes of Vermont relating to foreign corporations have no application, even though it be conceded that such bridge company has been deprived of its corporate character and existence by reason of an irregular method of holding meetings. Id. 15 (N.H.) The construction of a grant of rights to proprietors of a toll bridge, or other grant by the Legislature, is to be arrived at by ascertaining the fair meaning of the language to those who used it, and the rule of taking a grant of a franchise strongly against the grantee is not to be magnified so as to deprive him of everything save what is within the strict letter of the grant.-Proprietors of Cornish Bridge v. Fitts, 107 A. 626. 30 (N.H.) The provision in the charter of the Cornish bridge, relating to a revision by the court of toll charges, was superseded by Laws 1911, c. 164, establishing the Public Service Commission.-Proprietors of Cornish Bridge v. Fitts, 107 A. 626. 33 (N.H.) If the present day development of means of travel by automobile were outside the purview of 6 N. H. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353, the charter of the Cornish bridge, it should also be held to be equally outside the intent of the proprietors, and a dedication of the structure to public travel as then known would not be a dedication of it to unknown future modes of travel, to which there was no grant of toll, and the proprietors of the bridge owe no public duty as to automobiles, and can collect tolls for automobiles according to special contract, or a reasonable sum if no amount is agreed upon.Proprietors of Cornish Bridge v. Fitts, 107 A. 626. When new modes of travel come into vogue, and it is evident that a prior legislative grant to a toll bridge was intended to cover all travel, there is authority to collect therefor on a basis commensurate with the established rates.-Id. The term "four-wheel carriage for passengers," used in the charter granted in 1795 (6 N. H. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353), to the Cornish bridge in reference to toll charges, must be held to include an automobile.-Id. A charge for the passage of an automobile 23 (R.I.) In action for breach of marriage equal to that fixed for a carriage drawn by two promise, evidence held to show that plaintiff re- horses cannot be said to be in excess of the quested defendant to marry her after a reason-charge granted by the Legislature in 1795 (6 able time had elapsed after defendant's promise.-Parkinson v. Murphy, 107 A. 235. In a suit for breach of marriage promise, evidence held to sustain jury's finding that defendant had served notice on plaintiff that he would not marry her.-Id. 34 (R.I.) In a suit for breach of marriage promise, whether or not testimony by plaintiff that she and defendant had a quarrel and that defendant told her to get out and that he would not have anything more to do with her was true held a question for the jury.-Parkinson v. Murphy, 107 A. 235. N. H. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353) to the Cornish bridge; such charter fixing different charges for "carriages for burthen drawn by two beasts" and carriages "drawn by four beasts," etc., the number of beasts being used only as a convenient measure for the amount of the toll, weight being the real measure.-Id. The New Hampshire Legislature having given the Cornish bridge a charter (6 N. H. Laws, pp. 230, 328, 353), and the Vermont Legislature having granted such bridge "the same rates of toll which are granted to them by the acts of the Legislature of the state of New Hampshire," For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER | 9 (Del.Ch.) Holders of full-paid or investment stock of building and loan association who paid lump sum for stock at time of purchase, with right to be paid fixed amount at fixed time, at fixed rate of interest, with no right to parSince the Public Service Commission's order ticipate in profits or in management of assoNo. 15 did not call for an oath, a schedule of ciation, though called stockholders, were in lerates filed with the commission by the proprie- gal effect creditors.-In re National Bldg., tors of the Cornish bridge was legally promul- Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. gated, although not sworn to, in view of Laws 14(1) (Del.Ch.) The power of members of 1911, c. 164, § 8(a).-Id. It cannot be said that schedules filed by the treasurer of the Cornish bridge company, after informal consultation with directors, who delegated the task to him, were not legally established.-Id. BRIEFS. See Appeal and Error, 756-773. BROKERS. See Appeal and Error, 1050; Factors; II. EMPLOYMENT AND AUTHORITY. III. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES building and loan associations to withdraw before the accumulation of dues and interest is such that each share reaches a fixed sum, is a privilege or concession given for expedience, and is a variation of the general plan of such associations.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. 14(2) (Del.Ch.) Member of building and loan association cannot withdraw from association without complying with the conditions of withdrawal imposed by statutes or by-laws.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. 41(2) (Del.Ch.) Privilege of withdrawal from building and loan association given member by by-laws is a right enforceable by an action at law. In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. 42(11) (Del.Ch.) In suit against building and loan association on withdrawal certificate, insolvency of association would be a bar to a recovery in full, for the mutuality involved in the scheme of the organization requires that each member should bear his share of the losses.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. 42(18) (Del.Ch.) Judgment liens on real estate of building and loan association acquired before receivership were properly transferred to the proceeds of the sale of the real estate on TO sale by receiver.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. obtains judgment against building and loan 42(20) (Del.Ch.) Withdrawing member who association for amount due him becomes a creditor of the association, and is entitled to payment in preference to the members, though at association was insolvent and its affairs were time of notice of withdrawal and thereafter the afterwards wound up by a receiver.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 38(4) (Md.) In a suit for breach of a contract to sell stock for plaintiff corporation, evidence as to the amendments made in plaintiff's charter would be admissible if followed up by other essential evidence showing that plaintiff was required to go elsewhere to obtain money and the actual cost to it in securing such money because of the breach by defendant.-Middendorf, Williams & Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 107 A. 7. 453. BULK SALES. 38(6) (Md.) In a suit for breach of a contract to sell stock for plaintiff corporation, re- See Bankruptcy, fusal of requested instruction treating the transaction between the parties as a sale held properly refused.-Middendorf, Williams & Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 107 A. 7. 303; Executors and Administrators, 431, 437; Fraudulent Conveyances, 47, 214, 241. BURGLARY. Instruction asked for by defendant in suit for breach of contract that there was no evidence sufficient to establish the making of the contract See Criminal Law, 829. alleged in plaintiff's declaration and that there was a vital variance between the declaration and the evidence held properly refused, the evidence being sufficient, and there being no variance.-Id. 38(7) (Pa.) Where stockbrokers illegally sell stock carried for a customer on a margin without notice, they are liable for the highest price of the stock between the conversion and the trial. -In re Berberich's Estate, 107 A. 813. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA- See Banks and Banking, 2; Judgment, (Del.Ch.) The theory of a building and loan association is that all the members pay in money in installments, together with dues, and that some, at least, borrow money from the association, and that the payment of dues and interest continue until the accumulation is such that each share reaches a fixed sum.-In re National Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 107 A. 453. BURYING GROUNDS. See Cemeteries. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES. 4 (N.J.Ch.) An equity court has jurisdiction to cancel a land purchase contract procured through fraud, require the vendor to return a purchase price installment received and enjoin actions to collect balance of purchase price.Erdmann v. Gregg, 107 A. 479. 27 (Pa.) Only a party in interest can invoke the equity powers of a court to procure the cancellation of a deed, and the fact that a bill in equity for cancellation of a deed was brought for benefit of plaintiff and for all other persons interested was immaterial.-Craig v. Craig, 107 A. 719. cover as to claims disallowed by the commission. -Id. 196 (Pa.) Plaintiff's agreement with defendant railroad, as to compensation for switching of cars engaged in state traffic, that a dispute in rates should be adjusted by Interstate Commerce Commission, did not oust the jurisdiction of the state courts, and recovery might be had against plaintiff on a quantum meruit, as to such cars, where it had made payments at scheduled rates which were less than actual cost of service.-Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co. v. South Shore R. Co., 107 A. 680. In assumpsit by plaintiff railroad, defendant railroad, a plant facility, switching cars for plaintiff, might set off the difference, if any, between the actual cost of service rendered in state traffic, and amount received on account prior to Jan. 1, 1914, when Public Service Act, Pa., became effective, but the allowance of a set-off for services thereafter rendered, and for services in interstate traffic would require a new trial.-Id. IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (D) Personal Injuries. 18(2) (R.I.) Where the Public Utilities Commission approved a schedule of increased passenger rates proposed by a railroad company, and various municipalities appealed, held that, where the company petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Court, which was then 280(1) (Pa.) On grounds of public policy a not in session, for an order directing that the carrier for hire owes to passengers the duty appeal should not operate as a stay, which of the greatest care.-Cody v. Venzie, 107 A. would be its ordinary effect under Public Utili- 383. ties Act, § 35, the municipalities are entitled to notice of hearing on the petition.-Public Utilities Commission v. Rhode Island Co., 107 A. 871. On a gratuitous carriage for the sole benefit of the guest, the law requires only slight diligence and makes the carrier liable for only gross neglect, and if carriage is for sole purpose of carrier the law requires great diligence and makes carrier responsible for slight neglect, and if it is for benefit or pleasure of both the law makes carrier responsible for ordinary neglect.-Id. As a single justice of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Public Utilities Act, § 35, of a petition by a railroad company to prevent appeals by municipalities from staying the effect of an order of the Public Service Commission, the order of a single justice, though erro-280(7) (Pa.) The measure of liability of neous for lack of notice to the municipalities, one who undertakes to carry gratis is the same is not void, and must be treated as valid until as that of one who undertakes to keep gratis. set aside.-Id. -Cody v. Venzie, 107 A. 383. (B) Interstate and International Trans portation. 30 (Pa.) Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended June 29, 1906, § 2 (Comp. St. 8569), an interstate carrier can neither recover freight charges nor pay the owner any allowance for services in connection with transportation, except as provided in schedules previously filed.-Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co. v. South Shore R. Co., 107 A. 680. On a gratuitous carriage for the sole benefit of the guest, the law requires only slight diligence and makes the carrier liable for only gross neglect.-Id. Where plaintiffs were being gratuitously carried in defendant's automobile for the benefit or pleasure of both parties, a holding that plaintiff could not recover for personal inju ries when automobile driven by defendant upset, except upon proof of "wanton and willful" negligence, was erroneous.-Id. A railroad company owning a short line oper-316(7) (Pa.) When an accident is caused by ated as a facility to a large steel plant, and engaged in switching and placing cars received from plaintiff, an interstate carrier, could not recover compensation from plaintiff, where no schedule of rates had been filed by plaintiff, as provided by Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Act of June 29, 1906, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8569).-Id. II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. (J) Charges and Liens. defective appliances, or lack of appliances, or something pertaining to the means of transportation, a presumption of negligence arises, and it is incumbent upon carrier to show that it used every precaution which human skill, care, and foresight could provide.-De Marchi v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 107 A. 703. 318(8) (N.J.) In action for injury sustained while attempting to board moving jitney car, held, that there was some evidence to sustain judgment for plaintiff.-Tansey v. Tedesco, 107 A. 419. 192 (Pa.) Where the exchange point was 320(1) (N.J.) In action in New Jersey by the terminus of a route, it was competent for widow and administratrix for damages for plaintiff railroad and defendant, a plant facil- death of plaintiff's husband killed while a pasity, except as restrained by statute, to contract senger on a train in Pennsylvania, held, on the that line freight rate should include service of evidence as to the Pennsylvania law, that the moving cars in and about the plant, as required, question of negligence was properly submitted which work plaintiff might perform with its to the jury.-Giardini v. McAdoo, 107 A. 437. own equipment, or employ defendant railroad 320(11) (Pa.) Where a passenger, injured to do it.-Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co. v. South by an iron washer coming through a car winShore R. Co., 107 A. 680. dow, testified that it came from a passing engine marked with defendant's name, and where it was identified by a qualified witness as being the type used on the company's engines, and likely to fly off, whether the injury resulted from defendant's negligence as to a break in an appliance connected with the operation of its road was for the jury.-De Bouvier v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 107 A. 775. If a railroad, operating only as a switching facility at a plant, applies to state Public Service Commission to annul cancellation of an agreement by plaintiff, a mine carrier, as to compensation and for the allowance of a fair compensation for services in intrastate commerce, after Public Service Act, Pa., became effective, which application was pending at trial of plaintiff's action against switching company, 320(15) (Pa.) In an action by husband and involving the charges, defendant could not re- wife for injuries to wife by the upsetting of For cases in Dec,Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER an automobile driven by defendant and in which they were being gratuitously carried, held, on the evidence, that defendant's want of ordinary care was for the jury.-Cody v. Venzie, 107 A. 383. public duty.-Hartley v. County Board of Elections of Passaic County, 107 A. 817. 17 (R.I.) Where, in action on book account and on the common counts, an auditor was appointed by the parties by agreement, decision of superior courts confirming report of auditor is not subject to review by Supreme Court in view of Gen. Laws 1909, c. 293, §§ 10-18, and petition for certiorari will be denied.-Broley v. Superior Court, 107 A. 104. 320(19) (Pa.) In action for death of plaintiff's husband, who was thrown from open platform of a car while going forward to a smoking car, when a fast train without diminution of speed was rounding a curve, held that whether jerk of car was an unusual one, caused by con-28(1) (R.I.) The primary office of a writ of dition of roadbed, which carrier with knowledge "certiorari," unless enlarged by statute, is to of tracks should have guarded against, was for review the action of an inferior tribunal taken jury.-De Marchi v. Central R. Co. of New without jurisdiction, or in excess of the jurisJersey, 107 A. 703. diction given to it; and such writ ordinarily does not lie to correct error in the exercise of (E) Contributory Negligence of Person jurisdiction.-Broley v. Superior Court, 107 A. 104. Injured. 333(5) (N.J.Sup.) Passenger on railroad 33(3) (N.J.Sup.) A private citizen of Jersey operated under General Railroad Act, who City has the right to question by direct attack when train slowed down and when trainmen on certiorari the validity of an illegal license iscalled "Park Place, last stop, Newark," walked sued by the commissioners of the city to sell to front of car following another passenger and spirituous and malt liquors from June 30, 1919, finding door open stepped off moving train mis- to July 1, 1920, which may stand in the way takenly believing that it had stopped, could not of a prosecution for crime, violation of the fedrecover for injury, as no act or direction of eral Wartime Prohibition Act or the prohibition trainmen interfered with her free agency or amendment to the federal Constitution.-Wilson diverted her attention.-Zelman v. Pennsylva- v. Commissioners of Jersey City, 107 A. 797. nia R. Co., 107 A. 442. See Equity. CHANCERY. CHARGE. 344 (N.J.Sup.) In view of General Railroad Law, § 55, the boarding or alighting from moving railroad train is presumably a negligent act per se, to rebut which and justify a recovery some act of carrier must put passenger to election between alternative dangers, some direction given by trainmen or some sit- See Commerce, -85. uation created calculated to divert passenger's attention from danger and create a confidence. -Zelman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 A. 442. Wills, 16. CHARITIES. I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND VA- 347(6) (Pa.) In action for death of plain- See Charities, 36; Perpetuities, 8; tiff's husband, who was thrown from open platform of a car while going forward to a smoking car, when a fast train without diminution of speed was rounding a curve, held, whether deceased, being ignorant of condition of roadbed, (Pa.) A "charity," in the legal sense, is was required to anticipate an unusual jerk caused by condition, was for jury.-De Marchi v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 107 A. 703. 347(9) (Pa.) It is not negligence per se for a passenger to go on open platform of a car in going forward to a smoking car, as he might assume that carrier had performed its duty in providing safe passageway, in the absence of notice of defects complained of.-De Marchi v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 107 A. 703. CAVEATS. See Malicious Prosecution, 12. CEMETERIES. a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either through education or religion, or by relieving them from disease, suffering, or constraint, or by assisting them to establish themselves in life. In re Lawson's Estate, 107 A. 376. 4 (N.J.Ch.) The determination of whether a gift is a valid charity depends upon the intention of testatrix, as expressed in the will, and, if it is not found there, the contrivances of trustees cannot supply the deficiency.-Smith v. Pond, 107 A. 800. 8 (Pa.) A bequest to an association whose benevolence is restricted to its members is not "public charity," but, if its benevolence extends to an indefinite number of nonmembers, it may be regarded as a public charity, and the mere fact that its members also share in its general benevolence will not necessarily de5 (N.J.Ch.) Cemetery corporations are in feat the charity.-In re Lawson's Estate, 107 A. 376. sense quasi public service corporations. (N.H.) A bequest of property to Masonic Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n, 107 A. 594. See Appeal and Error, 1194; Receivers, 119, 147, 154; Vendor and Purchaser, 250, 266. a CERTIFICATE. See Appeal and Error, 842. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT. See Negligence, 2. CERTIORARI. See Municipal Corporations, 689. I. NATURE AND GROUNDS. 4 (N.J.Sup.) Certiorari, and not quo warranto, against a county board of elections is the appropriate remedy for a district election officer to remove an alleged illegal resolution of the board impeding him in the performance of his lodge, "to be used by it as it shall determine best in each case for the benefit of its members who may be in want or distress from any cause whatever, physical or financial," is for a legal purpose.-Roberts v. Corson, 107 A. 625. 20(1) (N.H.) One who establishes a charitable trust may entrust its administration to a corporation, or to a voluntary association.Roberts v. Corson, 107 A. 625. A Masonic lodge to which a bequest is made for charitable purposes is entitled to receive the trust property unless administering the trust is inconsistent with the purpose for which the lodge was established, in which case the executor will turn over the property to whoever the probate court appoints to administer it.-Id. 21(3) (N.H.) A bequest of property to Masonic lodge, "to be used by it as it shall determine best in each case for the benefit of its members who may be in want or distress from any cause whatever, physical or financial," is | for a legal purpose, and sufficiently definite to constitute a valid and enforceable charitable or public trust for the benefit of those who were or might become members.-Roberts v. Corson, 107 A. 625. 22(2) (N.J.Ch.) Trust to use "for support of the church or such benevolent purposes as the trustees of said church shall direct" held uncertain, and hence void; it being discretionary with trustees as to whether trust shall be used for charitable or noncharitable purposes, and "benevolent purposes" not necessarily being strictly charitable purposes.-Smith v. Pond, 107 A. 800. A gift to objects charitable in their nature, or to charity generally, to be appointed at the discretion of trustees, is sufficiently certain, and will be enforced in equity.-Id. II. CONSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRA- 36 (N.J.Ch.) Will creating trust fund, to be held by trustees of a church to use "for support of the church or such benevolent purposes as the trustees of said church shall direct," did not, in view of word "or," limit trustees in the use of the income to such charitable benevolences as the church under its regulations is called upon to support, notwithstanding Religious Society Act, 3.-Smith v. Pond, 107 A. 800. chattel mortgage should be read together to ascertain whether there is a sufficient compliance with 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 463, par. 4, relating to affidavits.-Id. The affidavit and recitals in a chattel mortgage must show how relation of creditor and debtor arose between mortgagor and mortgagee, not merely what evidence has been given of the debt, but the cause of the indebtedness, and how it came into existence, as a loan of money and the like.-Id. Without fraud, and where there is a substantial compliance with 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 463, par. 4, a chattel mortgage will not be open to attack of other creditors merely because the affidavit is inartificially drawn.-Id. II. FILING, RECORDING, AND REGIS- CITIES. 40 (Pa.) That a benevolent society, after the death of testator, made changes in its bylaws, enlarging its social features at the expense of its charitable purposes, could not be See Municipal Corporations. considered in determining whether testator made a bequest to a charitable use, as it could not change its organic law or prime purpose so CITIZENS. as to divert charitable funds to other uses.-In See Treaties, 7. re Lawson's Estate, 107 A. 376. 43 (N.J.Ch.) Where gift is to objects char itable in their nature, or to charity generally, CIVIL SERVICE. rations, 158. to be appointed at the discretion of trustees, See Clerks of Courts, 8; Municipal Corpoequity will compel trustees to exercise their discretion, or, upon their failure to act, will itself administer the trust, supplying the trustee and defining the objects, and, when necessary, will administer it according to the doctrine of cy8 (N.J.Sup.) Under the seventh section of pres.-Smith v. Pond, 107 A. 800. Equity is powerless to compel trustee to exercise his discretion favorable to lawful use as against the direction of the donor that he may exercise it in an unlawful use.-Id. CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See Corporations, 568; Receivers, 77. CLERKS OF COURTS. the District Court Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1955), providing for the appointment of a clerk to said court, the clerk so appointed serves without any fixed tenure of office, and is therefore subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Act, and is removable only in accordance with the provisions of that legislation.Wilson v. District Court of First Judicial Dist. of Monmouth County, 107 A. 589. CLOSE JAIL CERTIFICATE.' See Appeal and Error, 842; Execution, ≈ 448. COASTING. 7 (N.J.Ch.) Where all purported rental installments were paid on a lease of an automobile truck, providing for its sale to lessee at expiration of lease for $1, and it was taken from lessee's possession by an officer at lessor's in- See Municipal Corporations, 705. stance for a claim under the garage lien law, and a new lease was then executed fixing aggregate rentals by amount due lessor for repairs. etc., on other cars as well as that leased, and See Carriers, 30, 196; Evidence, 47; an additional sum was arbitrarily added by les- Master and Servant, 265, 365, 416, 417. sor, and truck was then returned to lessee, transaction was really a chattel mortgage.-Rapoport I. POWER TO REGULATE IN GENv. Rapoport Express Co., 107 A. 822. (C) Execution and Delivery. 63 (N.J.Sup.) Affidavit annexed to chattel mortgage, whereby D., the mortgagee named, averred that true consideration of mortgage was money loaned to said F., evidenced by his certain note of a certain date, and that there was due on mortgage a certain sum with lawful interest, read with recitals in body of mortgage of security for note to D. as mortgagee, was a sufficient compliance with 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 463, par. 4.-Shupe v. Taggart, 107 A. 50. The affidavit and recitals in the body of COMMERCE. ERAL. 8(6) (N.J.) The state court has no jurisdiction of a workmen's compensation case arising from the death of a railroad's employé killed by its train containing cars engaged in interstate commerce, the employé at the time having been himself so engaged, the federal statute applying and being exclusive.-Talmadge v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 107 A. 411. 10 (N.H.) The states have power to grant charters to and regulate toll charges on bridges between states, where Congress has not seen fit to act regarding the same.-Proprietors of Coranish Bridge v. Fitts, 107 A. 626. |