For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER port the allegation of deception, whether plain- | could not defeat recovery for refusal to accept tiff was in fact deceived by the representations their part of the other car, on the ground that was for the jury.-Williams v. Beltz, 107 A. the contract was within the statute of frauds. 298. -S. Landow & Co. v. Gurian, 107 A. 517. VIII. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIEN- 65(4) (Conn.) In action by the purchaser of a retail liquor business for fraudulent misrepresentations that the license held by defendant seller would be transferred, instructions as to 106 (1) (R.I.) Under the Statute of Frauds, plaintiff's right to recover if he was not equal- § 6, a memorandum which sets out who are ly in the wrong with defendant in respect to the seller and the buyer of land, their respecthe sale and transfer, etc., held not erroneous, tive intention to sell or purchase, with such though failing to state that plaintiff must be description as may be applied to a particular presumed to know the law required him to have a license, and that he was bound to know the property, and terms of payment, signed by the party to be charged or his agent, is sufficient. fact.-Stacy v. Brothers, 107 A. 613. -Sholovitz v. Noorigian, 107 A. 94. 473. 106(2) (Pa.) An ordinary will advising land alleged to be pursuant to an oral agreement, but which makes no reference to the alleged agreement, and which is subject to revocation at any time before testator's decease, does not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds as written memoranda.-Sorber v. Masters, 107 A. 892. 106 (2) (R.I.) Under the Statute of Frauds, § 6, a memorandum reciting the receipt of $25 to bind a bargain for the sale of land, signed by the seller's agent, held sufficient though not specifically reciting an agreement on the part of the buyer to purchase.-Sholovitz v. Noorigian, 107 A. 94. 110(1) (Pa.) Even if it could be assumed that an agreement or receipt of part payment for sale of realty referred to property in South Bethlehem, Pa., and that "3 & Spruce," as used therein, meant Third and Spruce streets in that city, the statute of frauds applied, where the receipt did not specify size of property, or whether it was at corner of "3 & Spruce," and, if so, at which corner.-Weisenberger v. Huebner, 107 A. 763. 58(2) (N.J.Sup.) An oral agreement to make a lease for one year with an option for renewal for two years more was a contract concerning an interest in lands for which a memorandum in writing was required by 2110(3) (R.I.) A memorandum reciting reComp. St. 1910, p. 2612, § 5.-Cooper v. Aiello, 107 A. 473. 60(1) (R.I.) Under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 283, § 6, and chapter 253, § 2, forbidding establishment of easement by parol testimony, or where the seller of lots exhibited to a purchaser a plan or plat, and made oral statements as to restrictions, which were embodied in the purchaser's deed, and subsequently other lots were conveyed or agreed to be conveyed free from restrictions, the successor of the purchaser of the restricted lot could not enforce against the seller its agreement to restrict the other lots by enjoining it from conveying lots free from restrictions and compelling the removal of buildings located within street lines shown on the plat.-Ham v. Massasoit Real Estate Co., 107 A. 205. VII. SALES OF GOODS. (A) Contracts Within Statute. 84 (Conn.) Where plaintiff and defendants agreed to purchase two carloads of peaches in common, and plaintiff alone had credit for the transaction, held, that the relation between the parties was that of principal and agent, and, regardless of the statute of frauds, plaintiff can recover from defendants moneys which it expended on defendants' behalf.-S. Landow & Co. v. Gurian, 107 A. 517. (B) Acceptance of Part of Goods. 90(4) (Conn.) A contract for sale and delivery of 35 barrels of sugar is taken out of the statute of frauds (Gen. St. 1918, § 6131), by the buyer accepting and receiving 5 barrels as a part thereof, allowing the buyer to recover for nondelivery of the remainder.-Morris Spirt & Co. v. Prior, 107 A. 513. ceipt of $25 to bind the bargain for the sale of vendor's "brick store and land at 46 Blackstone street," without specifying dimensions of the lot or the town, held sufficient under the Statute of Frauds, § 6, for from the data given and by the aid of parol evidence the premises they were located in the town where the memcould be identified; the presumption being that orandum was made and the parties resided.— Sholovitz v. Noorigian, 107 A. 94. 116(3, 4) (Pa.) Though the owner's deed was executed and delivered to his attorney, who was a dry trustee, the owner's order to make a conveyance to plaintiff had to be in writing signed by owner, or it would not bind him. Weisenberger v. Huebner, 107 A. 763. 116(5) (R.I.) Under the Statute of Frauds, § 6, a memorandum for the sale of land may be signed by a real estate broker engaged to sell the land, though he was not authorized in writing. Sholovitz v. Noorigian, 107 A. 94. 118(1) (Pa.) The facts requisite to an agreement, etc., under the statute of frauds, in case of sale of realty, may appear in two or more papers, as in a receipt or agreement to sell and in deed from owner to his attorney, if from any or either of such writings it is shown that they together were intended to be the contract of sale.-Weisenberger v. Huebner, 107 A. 763. The statute of frauds was not overcome by fact that owner's attorney and grantee, as a dry trustee, executed a deed to plaintiff, but would not deliver it because owner objected, where there was no evidence connecting deed to plaintiff with receipt for part of purchase money, and where such deed and another conveying property back to owner were found among attorney's papers after his death.-Id. IX. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF 90(4) (Conn.) Where plaintiff and defendants agreed to purchase two carloads of peaches in common, and plaintiff alone had credit for such transaction, held that, after acceptance and division of one carload of peaches, there 129(3) (R.I.) The equitable rule that part was such a part performance that defendants performance will take an oral contract out of a gift thereof to his daughter.-Washington | 30(1) (Vt.) The writ of habeas corpus canTrust Co. v. Thomas, 107 A. 203. not be given the effect of a writ for correction of errors or irregularities.-Ex parte Dexter, 107 A. 134. See Injunction, 132. GOOD WILL. 33 (Vt.) Where one acquitted of murder 223; Landlord and Tenant, was at large on bail, and upon reversal of the case by the Supreme Court the county court denied bail as a matter of law, such ruling cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings. GOVERNMENT OPERATION OF RAIL-Ex parte Dexter, 107 A. 134. ROADS. See Railroads, 52. GRAND JURY. See Witnesses, 52. GUARANTY. See Indemnity; Usury, 149. GUARDIAN AND WARD. See Contribution, 9; Damages, 69; Infants, 80; Insane Persons. 40; Pleading, 8, 34. V. ACTIONS. 117 (Me.) Action of indebitatus assumpsit against a guardian cannot be maintained before his accounts are settled in probate court.-Hopkins v. Erskine, 107 A. 829. VI. ACCOUNTING AND SETTLEMENT. 151 (N.J.Prerog.) Where guardians invested in securities on which interest had accrued, commissions were improperly allowed on the collection of the interest as "income," as it was simply the return of the principal of the estate advanced for interest.-In re Cook's Guardianship, 107 A. 818. II. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, 110 (Vt.) In view of Const. c. 2, § 32, relating to bail, and G. L. 2236, relating to habeas corpus, one acquitted of murder, and at large on bail pending state's appeal upon reversal, was not accorded the county court's discretion as to bail, where it was decided as a matter of law, and will be admitted to bail.-Ex parte Dexter, 107 A. 134. HARMLESS ERROR. See Appeal and Error, Law, 1169–11701⁄2. 1031–1068; Criminal HEALTH. See Constitutional Law, 81; Counties, 112, 128; Insurance, 668. II. REGULATIONS AND OFFENSES. 34 (R.I.) Persons who have received for the state board of health certificates to practice osteopathy, under Pub. Laws 1914, c. 1058, and who have registered, under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 193, in the town clerk's office their authority so to practice, are credited to sign death certificates, where not in attendance on deceased, as "physicians registered to practice," within Gen. Laws 1909, c. 121, § 7, as amended by Pub. Laws 1910, c. 575, § 2. Where the income received by a guardian from the ward's estate exceeded the ward's require--In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 102. ments, and the excess was carried to the principal of the estate, and invested, commissions were properly calculated on the income, but improperly allowed again on the excess as principal. See Negligence, 5. --Id. Under 3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3861, § 131, stipulating the commission of guardians, where, when two guardians turned over the estate to their ward on her majority, there had accrued on the securities composing it interest aggregating a certain amount, commission was improperly allowed the guardians on such interest, which never came to their hands.-Id. 159 (N.J.Prerog.) Where the sum allowed guardians as commission was within the limits of 3 Comp. St. p. 3861, § 131, in the absence of a timely appeal directly attacking the amount, it must be assumed to have been arrived at by the orphans' court after due consideration.-In re Cook's Guardianship, 107 A. 818. HEATING PLANT. HIGHWAYS. See Animals, 53; Boundaries, ~~20; Bridges; Easements, 17; Eminent Domain, 152; Equity, 269; Indemnity, 11; Municipal Corporations, 657, 671, 705, 796, 805; Railroads, 114, 304; Street Railroads, 22, 24, 28. I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION, AND DISCONTINUANCE. (D) Title to Fee and Rights of Abutting Owners. 80 (Me.) At common law the abutting ownowned soil to the center of highway.-Dyer v. Mudgett, 107 A. 831. er 161 (N.J.Prerog.) The rate of commission of guardians being fixed by an order of the or- 83 (Me.) At common law the abutting ownphans' court, and the sum of percentage allowed er owned soil to the center of highway, and, subby the decree confirming their account, the rem-ject to the right of public travel, had the right edy of the ward was by appeal, either from the to cultivate the soil and to the herbage growing order or from the decree, within the six months thercon.-Dyer v. Mudgett, 107 A. 831. limited by 3 Comp. St. p. 3889, § 204.-In re Cook's Guardianship, 107 A. 818. HABEAS CORPUS. I. NATURE AND GRounds of 27 (Vt.) Where an exception was not challenged upon appeal of the criminal action against petitioner as one not permitted to the state, under G. L. 2598, but was argued on the merits by both sides, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction by hearing and deciding the question, which jurisdiction will be presumed and is not open to collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Dexter, 107 A. 134. V. REGULATION AND USE FOR TRAVEL. (A) Obstructions and Encroachments. 159(2) (R.I.) Allegations of bill by the state to enjoin respondents from obstructing and interfering with public travel on a certain shore road in a town held sufficient to maintain it on the ground of estoppel in pais, and on the principle of dedication.-State v. Frank W. Coy Real Estate Co., 107 A. 82. (B) Use of Highway and Law of the Road. 175(1) (Me.) Plaintiff, with whose automobile, as he was about to reach a sharp curve For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in a narrow road, defendant's automobile, coming from around the curve, .both moving at a good speed, collided, held barred from recovery; his automobile being in the middle of the traveled way, and the hind wheels never having left the frozen ruts marking the same. -Ricker v. Gray, 107 A. 295. HOMESTEAD. II. TRANSFER OR INCUMBRANCE. 125 (Vt.) Although wife was not named in deed from husband, yet if the premises de scribed consisted in part of real estate outside of the homestead, such real estate passed to the grantee.-Bennett v. Bennett, 107 A. 304. HOMICIDE. See Criminal Law, 275, 338, 366, 407, 561, 572, 636, 655, 739. 761, 790, 806, 814, 823, 829, 858, 8762, 1186; Habeas Corpus, 33, 110; Witnesses, 217. VII. EVIDENCE. (A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof. 151(2) (Pa.) In trial for murder, wherein defense was insanity, burden was on defendant to prove by a fair preponderance of evidence that he was insane when he killed deceased, and such burden rested on him throughout the trial, and he was bound, not only to adduce evidence as to his own insanity, but also such corroborating proofs as he desired to submit.-Com monwealth v. Dale, 107 A. 743. 151(3) (R.I.) Defendant, in a homicide case, who admitted the killing but urged self-defense, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing was justifiable; that is, that he was in danger of losing his own life or suffering serious bodily injury, or that he might reasonably have so believed under the circumstances.-State v. Mellow, 107 A. 871. 152 (Pa.) A charge that the presumption is that one who commits an illegal homicide is guilty of murder in the second degree, and that the burden is on the commonwealth to show such facts and circumstances as will raise the offense to murder in the first degree, was correct.Commonwealth v. Bednorciki, 107 A. 666. (B) Admissibility in General. 158(1) (Pa.) In a trial for murder, evidence that defendant employed as a miner by deceased, while on a strike, threatened shortly before the killing to "fix the clock" of the deceased, and made threats against deceased and others who were working in his mine, was admissible to show malice, hatred, and ill will toward deceased. Commonwealth v. Moon, 107 A. 389. die and was without hope of recovery; the rule being the same as to whether such declarations were offered for or against the accused.-Commonwealth v. Bednorciki, 107 A. 666. VIII. TRIAL. (C) Instructions. 301 (N.J.Sup.) In prosecution for manslaughter, held that, while court's instruction correctly limited rights of defendant wife in acting in defense of her husband to those which husband had, it stated the rights of the husband too narrowly, in that it left out of account a situation where the husband was not in fact in serious danger, but where force used in defense "reasonably appeared" in the heat of the trouble to be necessary to preserve husband's life.-State v. Lionetti, 107 A. 47. In prosecution for manslaughter in which defendant's defense was that she acted in defense of her husband, the court erred when stating the duty of the husband to retreat in omitting necessary qualification that he might retreat with safety.-Id. 308(2) (N.J.) As homicide while engaged in perpetrating a robbery is, by statute, made murder in the first degree, jury were properly charged that on such a state of facts the verdict should be murder in the first degree or an acquittal.-State v. Palmieri, 107 A. 407. 311 (N.J.) An instruction that under P. L. 1916, p. 576, the jury in rendering a verdict of murder in the first degree might recommend punishment by life imprisonment, substantially states the effect of that statute.-State v. Palmieri, 107 A. 407. HOSPITALS. See Certiorari, 33; Counties, 113, 182; HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Appeal and Error, 1012, 1178; Carriers, 320; Criminal Law, 761, 823; Death, 35, 99; Divorce; Dower; Evidence, 159, 171, 423; Executors and Administrators, 193; Fraudulent Conveyances, 259, 260; Gifts, 49; Homestead, 125; Homicide, 301; Marriage; Master and Servant, 393; Partition, 12; Perjury, 11, 32; Process, 64, 149; Wills, 825, 826; Witnesses, 32, 158. II. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. 29(9) (Pa.) A man may make a valid gift of real or personal property to the woman he proposes to marry.-Besterman v. Besterman, 107 A. 323. III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND HUSBAND AND WIFE. 178(3) (Pa.) Defendant's offer to prove that some four months before the homicide another man had threatened to fix the deceased and was seen in a place near defendant's farm on the Friday before the homicide was inadmissible, where there was nothing to connect him with 492 (1) (Pa.) A man may make a valid gift the offense.-Commonwealth v. Bednorciki, 107 of real or personal property to his wife or to A. 666. the woman he proposes to marry.-Besterman v. Besterman, 107 A. 323. 179 (Pa.) In a trial for murder, wherein accused set up the defense of insanity, testi-492 (5) (Pa.) In the absence of a trust mony of his father to his own insanity, or such imposed or circumstances indicating fraud or acts from which it might be inferred, was in- deceit, the wife's title and ownership in real admissible. Commonwealth v. Dale, 107 A. 743. or personal property given to her by her husband are good and cannot be disturbed.-Besterman v. Besterman, 107 A. 323. 180 (N.J.Sup.) In a prosecution for manslaughter by reckless driving of an automobile while drunk, the state was properly allowed to prove the condition of all the occupants of the car as to sobriety.-State v. Snook, 107 A. 62, (C) Dying Declarations. 203(1) (Pa.) Declarations of deceased, made to his wife shortly before his death and while he was in a hospital, were inadmissible, without evidence that he realized that he was about to 107 A.-60 V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. (C) Liabilities and Charges. 171 (12) (N.J.) Where a married woman, with full knowledge of facts and under advice of counsel, joined her husband in executing a mortgage on land on which she had built a house with her own funds, though she claimed her husband had verbally given the land to her, held, under the circumstances, that, the mortgagee whose mortgage was subject to a prior lien was entitled to take, over any claim of the woman to an equitable title.-Neslor v. Grove, 107 A. 281. VI. ACTIONS. 232(1) (Vt.) In an action upon a corporation's note against a woman who, with her husband, signed on the back of the note, the burden rests upon her to prove that her obligation was only as surety for her husband.— Wetmore & Morse Granite Co. v. Ryle, 107 A. 109. ed against him, greater particularity must be used.-State v. O'Brien, 107 A. 520. IX. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE. 171 (N.J.Sup.) Defendant in a criminal case is entitled to acquittal, unless the proof submitted satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the specific violation of law charged in the indictment.-State v. Lentz, 107 A. 791. XI. WAIVER OF DEFECTS AND OB- Where a married woman, director of a corpo-202(5) (Conn.) Imperfectly stated averment ration, signed her name in blank on the back of is cured by a verdict, but defect consisting of a note of the corporation, she became prima failure of averment, and not merely imperfect facie liable as maker, and, although her name statement thereof, is not cured.-State v. O'Briappears there with that of her husband, the en, 107 A. 520. presumption is the same.-Id. ICE. 203 (N.J.Sup.) A judgment upon a general verdict of guilty will not be reversed because of a bad count in an indictment, where the in1064; Municipal imposed is authorized by law for conviction updictment contains a good count, and the penalty on the good count.-State v. Matarazza, 107 A. 266. INFANTS. See Appeal and Error, IMPROVEMENTS. 115; See Injunction, 26, 113; Insurance, Municipal Corporations, 271-495; Partition, 40, 69, 85. INCOME TAX. See Street Railroads, 49. INDEMNITY. See Insurance, 512, 612, 615; Statutes, 123. (N.J.) Where B. contracted to build a road, which was accepted by county subject to his obligation to maintain and repair it, for which 5 per cent. of contract price was retained, and contract and retained percentage was assigned through another to plaintiff, and his assignor and defendant executed a bond to plaintiff to indemnify from loss to which he might be put by assignor's failure to repair, and where county retained $1,500, which it would cost to make repairs, plaintiff was "put to loss," and was entitled to recover that amount on bond.-Newton v. Globe Indemnity Co., 107 A. 273. See Evidence, 121; Guardian and Ward; 282. VII. ACTIONS. ~80(1)(Conn.) Where an attorney had been appointed guardian ad litem for various children and represented them in opposing an allowance to trustees under a will, action of probate court in recognizing him as guardian ad litem constituted, as to other contestants, an appointment as guardian ad litem for the particular matter before the court.-Johnston v. Moeller, 107 A. 566. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. See Statutes, 351⁄2. INJUNCTION. 954; 621, See Action, 6; Appeal and Error, INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. See Criminal Law, 86, 97, 406, 824, 1149; Intoxicating Liquors, 213, 221, 223; Municipal Corporations, 689; Usury, II. SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND 149. I. NECESSITY OF INDICTMENT OR RELIEF. (A) Actions and Other Legal Proceedings. 26(1) (N.J.Ch.) An equity court has juris~2(4) (N.J.) Keeping in view that the main- cured through fraud, require the vendor to rediction to cancel a land purchase contract protenance of a disorderly house was a crime at common law, punishable and abatable in courts enjoin actions to collect balance of purchase turn a purchase price installment received, and of criminal jurisdiction only, the effect of mak- price.-Erdmann v. Gregg, 107 A. 479. ing such a crime punishable and abatable in the 26(9) (Conn.) A sublessee who had expendCourt of Chancery is to deprive a defendant of his constitutional right (Const. art. 1. § 9) to have an indictment preferred against him by a grand jury of the county in which such nuisance is alleged to exist.-Hedden v. Hand, 107 A. 285; Randal v. Hillside Pleasure Park Co., Id. 587. V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY ed a large sum in making permanent improvements is entitled to injunction to restrain suit of the sublease, her legal remedy being inadefor eviction after wrongful refusal of renewal quate.-Winestine v. Rose Cloak & Suit Co., 107 A. 500. (B) Property, Conveyances, and Incumbrances. 34 (N.J.Ch.) Chancery has jurisdiction, 110(4) (Conn.) Ordinarily statutory offense where the remedy at law is wholly inadequate, • may be charged in words of statute; but when to entertain a bill to protect possession of land, words of statute may embrace cases falling although there are no equitable rights involved. within its literal terms, but not within its McGann v. La Brecque Co., 107 A. 175. meaning and spirit, or where from nature of of- 37 (Pa.) Equity has jurisdiction to restrain fense the words of the statute do not clearly and a continuing trespass by mining in and under definitely apprise accused of the offense charg-property which defendant's predecessor in title TORY INJUNCTIONS. For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER disclaimed, and by contemplated removal of sur- IV. PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUface support, and which threatens the immediate and serious settling of land, renders it useless for building and farm purposes, though plaintiffs had not first established a paramount title in an action at law.-McClure v. Monongahela Southern Land Co., 107 A. 386. (C) Contracts. 58 (N.J.Ch.) When the right to relief is doubtful or when the meaning of a building restriction is vague or uncertain, an injunction will not lie to enforce it.-Union Inv. Co. of New Jersey v. Fiske, 107 A. 65. 61(2) (Pa.) The mere fact that a contract of employment provided a penalty of $500 in case plaintiff's employé, within one year after termination of employment, should engage in, or be employed in a similar business, did not oust the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce the contract.-Srolowitz v. Roseman, 107 A. 322. III. ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS. 113 (N.J.Ch.) Where an adjoining owner observed the construction of improvements in violation of a restrictive covenant, when they were two-thirds completed, but made no protest and instituted no proceedings until after the work had been fully completed, his delay bars his right to a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of the improvements.O'Connell v. Holton, 107 A. 37. 118(4) (Md.) An allegation in a bill for injunction that irreparable damage will ensue is insufficient, unless the facts stated satisfy the court that the apprehension of irreparable damage is well-founded.-City of Baltimore v. Sackett, 107 A. 557. 118(5) (Md.) In a suit to restrain the proposed disposal of garbage by the establishment of a pig farm adjacent to the farms of plaintiffs, a prayer for relief, asking that defendants be restrained from hauling the garbage to the farm, reducing it thereon, establishing the piggery, and from erecting a temporary reduction plant, is too broad and general.-City of Baltimore v. Sackett, 107 A. 557. (A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure. 157 (N.J.Ch.) Where a bill seeks to cancel a land purchase contract and restrain defendant from suing for the purchase price, the injunc tion pending final hearing will be restricted to prohibiting trial of law action, in order that defendants may institute legal action and procure a favorable place upen the trial calendar.Erdmann v. Gregg, 107 A. 479. VII. VIOLATION AND PUNISHMENT. 223(1) (N.J.) Test of a violation of injunction against using in clothing business the name of "Hilton," alone or so as to lead public to believe that defendant's goods or business are complainant's, is whether defendant's use of words in dispute is likely to deceive ordinary purchasers; and neither actual confusion nor actual fraudulent intent need be shown where necessary and probable tendency of defendant's conduct is to deceive public and pass off his goods or business as that of complainant; similarity, not necessarily identity, of name being recognized as basis for relief.-Hilton v. Hilton, 107 A. 263. chased Joseph Hilton's interest in business, Where complainant, Philip Hilton, had purname, and good will of clothing business of "The Hilton Company," built up by both, and defendant was enjoined from thereafter using name "Hilton" alone, or so as to lead public to believe that his goods or business were those of complainant, he was properly adjudged guilty of contempt, where his competing stores were near complainant's and where he adopted trade name "Joseph Hilton & Co."-Id. 227 (N.J.Ch.) Where, after receiver had been appointed for a corporation and the directors and officers had been enjoined from further acting, such directors and officers on advice of counsel acted, etc., they are, notwithstanding such advice, guilty of contempt.-Cavagnaro v. Indian Tire & Rubber Co., 107 A. 643. 228 (N.J.Ch.) After the issuance of an injunction under the statute enjoining a corporation, its directors and officers, from exercising any of its privileges and franchises, directors who meet and pass a resolution authorizing the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and officers who execute such a petition are guilty of contempt.-Cavagnaro v. Indian Tire & Rubber Co., 107 A. 643. 230(1) (N.J.) When a defendant has been enjoined from using in clothing business the name "Hilton" alone or in such a way as to lead public to believe that his goods are complainant's goods, or his business is complainant's business, the question whether he has violated that injunction is one of fact.-Hilton v. Hilton, 107 A. 263. INNKEEPERS. INSANE PERSONS. 128 (Conn.) In suit to enjoin the eviction of a sublessee who claimed right to renewal See Covenants, 103. of the lease, evidence held sufficient to sustain the court's findings that the taking of the original lease in the name of the president and principal stockholder of the lessee corporation was for the purpose of defeating plaintiff's right to a renewal of the sublease.-Winestine v. Rose Cloak & Suit Co., 107 A. 500. 129(1) (Md.) In a suit to restrain the proposed disposal of garbage by the establishment of a pig farm adjacent to the farms of plaintiffs, a prayer for relief, asking that defendants be restrained from hauling the garbage to the farm, reducing it thereon, establishing the piggery, and from erecting a temporary reduction plant, is too broad and general, and the bill should be dismissed without prejudice to a future application if the proposed use of the property results in damage.-City of Baltimore v. Sackett, 107 A. 557. See Constitutional Law, 121, 190; Coun- III. GUARDIANSHIP. 40 (N.J.Sup.) The guardian of an insane person committed to a state hospital, appointed under P. L. 1916, p. 196, § 24, has no power to contract obligations generally on behalf of the lunatic, nor is he liable on the contracts of the lunatic, even for necessaries, but his function is limited to the conservation of the ward's estate and its application to the maintenance of |