res gesta and secondly because it involves a matter of pedigree. (Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546; Eisenlord v. Clum, 126 id. 552; People v. Miller, 30 Misc. Rep. 355.)

Claimant intimates that it is forbidden by section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to testimony regarding transactions with deceased persons. To this objection the answer is that the objection made to the testimony was that "It is incompetent and immaterial." The objection was insufficient to raise the question of the competency of the witness, being as it was addressed to the competency of the testimony. A general objection to evidence is not an objection to a witness, and an objection under the section quoted must be directed against the witness and stating the particular grounds. (Hickok v. Bunting, 67 App. Div. 560; Russell v. Hitchcock, 105 id. 315; Morgan v. Foran, 120 id. 185.)

Having arrived at the conclusion that there was no marriage between the deceased and the claimant's assignor, the decision makes it unnecessary to decide the question of the validity or invalidity of that assignment, since the assignment carried nothing with it of concern to the administrators, but in view of the novelty of the question, arising as it does soon after an amendment to the law relative to the powers of the surrogate whereby surrogates are given a broadened jurisdiction under section 2510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in view further of the fact that the issue was raised by an administrator whose duties partake of the nature of a trust, it may not be barren speculation to dwell on the question of the authority of the administrators to interpose to the claim the defense that this assignment to the claimant was illegal because of fraud and inadequacy of consideration. The administrators were not permitted to interpose this defense, but in their brief they ask its consideration, inasmuch as by mutual consent and by the necessary examination of the assignor on her motives and credibility

practically the complete transaction relative to the assignment has found its way into the record.

There is little doubt that, even previous to the recent amendment enlarging the scope of the surrogates' jurisdiction, this court had the power to decide the validity of marriage as well as the validity of assignments of legacy or of distributive share. (Matter of Thornburgh, 72 Misc. Rep. 619; Matter of Dollard, 74 id. 312.)

Matter of Grant (37 Misc. Rep. 151), cited by claimant, is obsolete, as it was decided before the amendment of 1910, known as section 2472a of the Code of Civil Procedure, and likewise previous to the amendment of 1914, further enlarging the surrogates' powers by section 2510.

This power of the surrogate is exercised only when the question is raised by the party concerned, and while surrogates are given a wide range of power to decide "Questions legal or equitable arising between any or all parties to any proceeding," etc., there is nothing in the section to indicate so wide a departure from the ordinary principles of jurisprudence as to read into that section the authority of the surrogate to decide and the right of an administrator to raise questions that have never otherwise arisen and that concern neither the court nor the administrators, since one is not in privity with the person whose rights have been invaded and the other has no prerogative authorizing the determination of a purely personal right when that right is not asserted by the only person concerned. It is a well settled rule of law that when a court is awarded general equitable jurisdiction it takes its authority subject to the limitations and precedents that accompany the same power in other courts exercising the same. Therefore, the authorities of the Supreme Court are binding on this phase of the case. These authorities satisfy me that the administrators could not interpose the objection of fraud and inadequacy of consideration,

and consequently that the surrogate could not determine that issue.

It is well settled that an obligor's duty is to pay the one who holds the legal title to the obligation. He has no business to inquire into the adequacy of the consideration of an assignment; he has no duty to inquire into the good faith of the assignment; he only can insist that the holder of the obligation has the legal title, and, except in cases of equitable assignment, he is protected and can only insist that he will be protected in making the payment. (Matter of Pruyn, 141 N. Y. 544; Matter of Wagner, 119 id. 28.)

While the administrator's office has the characteristics of trust, once he has collected the assets, paid the debts and is ready to account, he has no greater duty to the next of kin than a debtor owes to the owner of a debt, to wit, to pay. The office of an administrator is not paternal to the extent of taking up cudgels for beneficiaries who make no claim or contest and who by their silence ratify the assignment of their interest. The administrators cited claimant's assigner. She made no contest and specifically stated that she wanted nothing out of the estate. The administrators' duties were complete when they brought her in, and as between paying her or her assignee they can only be guided by the ordinary principles applying to debtors and trustees alike.

It is argued that the administrators represented the next of kin, which may be true, but it is equally true that they do not represent the next of kin in the private affairs of the latter, such as sale of their interests in property of any kind. Only the assignor or persons claiming under her could attack the assignment for fraud or inadequacy of consideration. The assignment was valid on its face, the assignor did not appear or attempt to appear in accordance with the ordinary rules for doing so, and the administrators are mere volunteers when they attempt to attack the assignment. (Sheridan v. Mayor, 68 N.

Y. 30; Allen v. Brown, 44 id. 228; Graser v. Stellwagen, 25 id. 315; Guy v. Craighead, 6 App. Div. 463.)

The administrators have sought to raise these identical issues by saying that the assignee was not a party to the proceedings. That is only another way to attack the assignment and is met by the same arguments that answer the direct attack on the assignment. Any person is properly a party who holds an assignment valid on its face, sufficient as the ordinary assignment, both under the common law and all statutes bearing on the subject, and properly authenticated and recorded. Under those circumstances, no assignment could be void so as to preclude the appearance of the party claiming under it.

Decreed accordingly.

Matter of the Transfer Tax Upon the Estate of JOEL NEWMAN, Deceased.

(Surrogate's Court, Bronx County, June, 1915.)

TAXES-TRANSFER TAX-ARRIVING AT VALUE OF UNLISTED STOCK FOR TRANSFER TAX PURPOSES EVIDENCE.

In arriving at the value of an unlisted stock for transfer tax purposes, direct evidence of sales at or about the time of death will outweigh an unverified report of an investors' agency based upon offers claimed to have been made by various unnamed brokers, and upon quotations in a financial publication, nothing being shown as to the weight to be given such publication.

APPEAL from order fixing transfer tax.

Ira Bliss Stewart, for executors, appellants.

John Boyle, Jr., for comptroller, respondent.

SCHULZ, S.- At the time of the death of the testator, which occurred on the 5th day of May, 1914, there were due to him certain debts more particularly set forth in the report of the appraiser, as to which the latter suspended appraisal. The decedent also owned 384 shares of stock of a corporation having a part value of $100 each, which the appraiser valued for purposes of taxation at $300 each.

The executors appeal from the order of the surrogate entered upon the report of the appraiser, and the grounds of the said appeal are stated to be that the appraiser erred (1) in failing to find that the claims referred to were without value, and (2) in valuing the shares of stock aforesaid at $300 each instead of at their real value, which they claim did not exceed $250 per share. Upon the argument of the appeal, the first ground stated was not insisted upon and is not now urged, so that there remains only the question whether the appraisal of the stock at $300 per share is correct. No witnesses were examined by the appraiser, the proof being taken in the form of affidavits. Upon behalf of the executors there were submitted to the appraiser affidavits of the manager of the New York store of the corporation. These affidavits set forth that the affiant has been connected with the corporation in an executive capacity since its incorporation, many years ago; that the stock was not listed; that at the date of death of the testator, May 5, 1914, the book value thereof was $130 per share; that the book value thereof in February, 1915, was $150; that for several years last past the company has paid annual dividends of ten per cent and two and one-half per cent; that deponent knew of a sale of 100 shares of stock made prior to February 10, 1915, and, near that date, at $275 per share, and that he, as one of the executors of the will of the decedent, about the tenth day of February, sold thirty-four shares of stock to one person and fifty shares to another at $275 a share; that most of the sales of stock were to employees of the company in small lots, said sales being made