and mortgage and in the certificate of deposit, however, was the delicatessen business on Forty-sixth street. It appears that the decedent handled the money, collected the interest, made bank deposits, etc., but when he bought the real estate on Forty-sixth street with this money and subsequently invested the proceeds of this real estate, he made such investments in his own name and that of his wife. Under the authority of Matter of Thompson (167 App. Div. 356), the fact that the bond, mortgage and certificate of deposit were taken in the names of the husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, shows an intention to create in the wife the right of survivorship, and, this being so, it follows that no part of the same was subject to a transfer tax. (Citing Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723; Matter of Meehan, 59 App. Div. 156; West v. McCullough, 123 id. 846, affd., 194 N. Y. 518. See, also, Matter of Dalsimer, 167 App. Div. 365; Matter of Tilley, 166 id. 240, affd., 215 N. Y. 702.) No evidence appears which in my opinion would warrant me in finding that the decedent had a different intent. On the contrary, from the evidence submitted, I reach the conclusion that the money which is now invested on bond and mortgage and that which is evidenced by the certificate of deposit having had its source in the joint efforts of the husband and wife, the decedent intended when he made the investments stated to create in his wife a right of survivorship. It follows that neither the bond and mortgage nor the certificate of deposit is liable to any tax. Even if there had been no evidence at all as to the sources from which the money came which is now reflected in these securities, I feel that under the form of investments and under the law as enunciated in Matter of Thompson (supra), the same result would obtain. The order appealed from is reversed and the report is remitted to the appraiser for correction as indicated. Order reversed and report remitted to appraiser. In the Matter of the ESTATE OF ELLEN B. LUCAS, Deceased. (Surrogate's Court, Bronx County, October, 1915.) DECEDENTS' ESTATES-FUNERAL EXPENSES PLEADING SURROGATES' COURTS -EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CODE CIV. PRO., §§ 2686, 2729 (3). The petitioner paid the funeral expenses of the decedent to the undertaker and took an assignment for the same from him. The decedent died and the funeral expenses in question were incurred prior to the time subdivision 3 of section 2729 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended and renumbered as section 2686 of the Code by the amendment of chapter XVIII thereof by chapter 443 of the Laws of 1914 that became effective on September 1, 1914. This proceeding was commenced after said amendment of 1914 took effect. The answer of the administratrix disputed the reasonableness of the amount of the funeral expenses. Held, that under these circumstances this proceeding is governed by said section 2686 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not by said subdivision 3 of said section 2729 of the Code prior to amendment; that, as section 2686 provides that if the answer disputes the reasonableness of the amount of the claim for funeral expenses the surrogate shall direct that the claim so disputed be heard upon the judicial settlement of the account of such administrator, the court has no power now to decide the matter nor take any proof upon it, but must direct that the claim so disputed be heard upon the judicial settlement of the account of the administratrix. PROCEEDINGS upon the judicial settlement of the account of an administratrix. Garvin & Young, for petitioner. William G. Mulligan, for respondent. SCHULZ, S.- The undertaker having charge of the funeral arrangements of the decedent has assigned his claim to the petitioner herein, a grandson of the decedent, who now begins this proceeding against the administratrix of the decedent to compel the payment of these funeral expenses. The administratrix files an answer wherein among other things she disputes the reasonableness of the amount of the funeral expenses. It appears that while there is no proof that the administratrix has received moneys belonging to the estate which are applicable to the payment of this claim, certain moneys were paid to the clerk of the Surrogate's Court, county of Bronx, under an order of the Supreme Court, county of Broome, which belong to said estate, which are now in the hands of the city chamberlain and which are applicable to the payment of this claim. Section 2729, subdivision 3, which was in force prior to the recent amendment of chapter XVIII of the Code by chapter 443 of the Laws of 1914, so far as material, provided that in a proceeding of this kind "the surrogate shall, unless the validity of the claim and the reasonableness of its amount are admitted by such executor or administrator, take proof as to such facts, and if satisfied that such claim is valid shall fix and determine the amount due thereon and shall make an order directing the payment within ten days after the service of such order. ***." By the law referred to, subdivision 3 of section 2729 was amended and renumbered so that it is now section 2686 of the Code, and became effective September 1, 1914. The section as amended, in so far as material to the present controversy, provides: -*- If the executor or administrator files an answer setting forth the facts, and therein disputes the validity of the claim or claims, or the reasonableness of the amount thereof, the surrogate shall direct that the claim or claims so disputed be heard upon the judicial settlement of the accounts. of such executor or administrator." 66* * Report The purpose of the amendment as indicated by the “ of the Commission to Revise the Practice and Procedure in Surrogates' Courts" (p. 214) is that if the claim is disputed it ought not to be tried until all interested parties are in court, hence, in such case, the trial is to be postponed until judicial settlement. In the matter now under consideration the admin istratrix is also the sole next of kin, but the estate appears to be insolvent, and hence creditors would be affected by the allowance of the funeral bill in question. If, then, the present proceeding is governed by section 2729, subdivision 3 of the Code prior to its amendment, I should now take proof and dispose of the matter. If, on the other hand, it is governed by section 2686 of the present Code, I have no power to hear the matter at this time but must make an order reserving it to the final accounting. The decedent died prior to the time the amendment of 1914 became effective and the funeral bill in question was incurred at that time. The bill was paid, the assignment made to the present claimant and this proceeding commenced after the amendment of 1914 took effect. Under these circumstances, is the proceeding governed by subdivision 3 of section 2729 of the Code prior to the amendment, or is it governed by section 2686 of the present Code? The question has been determined by an adjudication in the Appellate Division which is binding upon this court. In Matter of Kipp (70 App. Div. 567) it appeared that subdivision 3 of section 2729 went into effect on September 1, 1901. In that case, the services were performed on or about March 19, 1901. The claim was presented June 17, 1901, and an order referring the matter to a referee to take proof and report to the court was made on December 26, 1901. There, as here, the services were rendered before the law in effect when the proceeding was commenced had been enacted, and the court says: "It is objected by the appellant that as the amendment to section 2729, constituting subdivision 3 thereof, went into effect on September 1, 1901, it is not applicable to the matter at bar, as the claim accrued before the amendment. became operative. It seems to be sufficient to say upon this point that the amendment of section 2729 was a mere regulation of procedure; and it is a well-settled rule that no matter when a claim may mature, the form of procedure provided for by the * * * law for its collection at the time the proceeding for collection is commenced must be the one adopted, and consequently the claimant was required, at the time at which he presented his application, to proceed in the manner then provided by the law for enforcing its collection." While this question has not been raised by counsel, it follows that in the matter now before me the claimant must proceed under the provisions of the law which are contained in section 2686 of the present Code, and that I cannot decide this matter now or take any proof upon it, but must, as the said section provides, direct that the claim so disputed be heard upon the judicial settlement of the account of the administratrix. Decreed accordingly. Matter of the Guardianship of MARGARET CROSS. (Surrogate's Court, Bronx County, October, 1915.) GUARDIANS *-OF INFANTS-WHO MAY MAKE APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT-COURT GUIDED BY BEST INTERESTS OF INFANT EVIDENCE. The petitioner having the care and custody of an infant to which he was not related and which resided with him applied for appointment as guardian of its person and estate during its minority. Two of its maternal aunts opposed the application and claimed the right of guardianship on the ground of relationship, of their desire to care for it and of their desire that it be brought up in the faith of its deceased parents. It appeared that the parents of the infant were of the Catholic faith, and not long prior to the death of the mother she left a memorandum expressing the wish that the infant remain in the charge of the petitioner and his wife until she returned to claim her. The mother died before returning for the infant and there was some evidence that the mother before her death expressed the desire that one of the maternal aunts have the custody of the infant. In granting the application of the petitioner, it was * See Notes Vol. VI, pp. 161, 471; Vol. XIV, P. 150. |