Wiedemann v. Walpole, '91, 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 534, is full of comfort for persons accustomed to leave their letters unanswered. To this numerous class nothing could seem more alarming than the doctrine that if A does not answer B's letter he thereby confirms any charge which B has been pleased to make in the letter. This view, adopted as it was by so eminent a judge as Baron Pollock, threatened to nullify the protection provided by 32 & 33 Vic. c. 68, s. 2, against groundless actions for breach of promise of marriage, and it is preeminently satisfactory to know that this enactment as construed by the Court of Appeal, has the effect which every ordinary layman supposed it to have, namely that no plaintiff could recover a verdict in an action for breach of promise simply on the strength of the plaintiff's own bold assertions or own reckless letters. A doubt may be entertained whether the learned Baron's opinion substantially differed from that of the Court of Appeal. He may very well have thought it right to prevent further litigation by letting a possibly dubious question of law come before the Court of Appeal in a shape which enabled them finally to decide the whole matter in dispute between Miss Wiedemann and Mr. Walpole.

The master of a German ship carrying a cargo shipped by British subjects under an English bill of lading from Singapore to London, sells part of the cargo at the Cape under circumstances which justify his act according to German, but do not justify it according to English law. His liability is under these circumstances to be determined in accordance with the law of the flag, i. e. German law. This is the effect of The August, '91, P. 328. The judgment of Sir James Hannen is, as it appears to us, a legitimate application of the principles laid down by Willes J. in Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115. It is satisfactory to find that eminent judges fully recognise the authority of a case which on one point at any rate connected with the conflict of laws provides the perplexed student of a difficult topic with clear guidance.

The principle established by Hick v. Rodocanachi, '91, 2 Q. B. (C.A.) 626, is that where persons have undertaken to do a particular thing, in the particular case to unload a cargo, within a reasonable' time, the 'reasonableness' of the time for doing the act depends upon the circumstances which exist at the time when the act has to be done. From this principle it follows that if the consignees of goods which under a bill of lading must be unloaded within a reasonable time are delayed by a strike for which they are not responsible they are not

liable to the shipowner for the delay. What is rather odd is that in a good number of cases the judges have shown a tendency to hold that a reasonable time for unloading cargo means a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances (see Wright v. New Zealand Shipping Co., 4 Ex. Div. 165), and that therefore a person who has undertaken to unload a cargo without fixing any definite time within which the discharge is to take place, agrees to do the work within a time which is reasonable under ordinary circumstances, and takes upon himself liability for delay caused for extraordinary circumstances which no man could fo esee. Most persons will hold that the judges have at last worked round by a process of judicial legislation to a sound and sensible rule in harmony with the usual course of business. Students concerned with legal theory should note that Hick v. Rodocanachi is an example of the way in which contracts are gradually modified by implied obligations introduced into judicial decisions, and of the sagacity with which English judges, when time is allowed to them, and when they are not interfered with by legislation, mould the terms of a contract so as to make it correspond with the requirements of custom and of common

sense.

A question has been raised, how far an adjudication under the English Bankruptcy Act affects land in the colonies? This enquiry is answered by Callender v. The Colonial Secretary of Lagos, '91, A.C. 460. An adjudication of bankruptcy under the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869, applies to the whole of the British dominions, and therefore passes to the English trustee in bankruptcy the bankrupt's title to land situated in the colonies. The land, however, is, it would seem, transferred subject to the special requirements (if any) prescribed by the local law as to the conditions necessary to effect a transfer of land situated in a colony (compare ex parte Rogers, 16 Ch. D. 665). Callender v. The Colonial Secretary of Lagos, it is true, is decided under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, but the grounds of the decision are, it is submitted, applicable to the Bankruptcy Act, 1883.

It is difficult to deduce any general principle from De Ricci v. De Ricci, '91, P. 378. But that case, taken together with Forsyth v. Forsyth, '91, P. 363, show the very wide powers which in one way or another the Divorce Court exercises with regard to the variation of settlements. They also show how the general course of events which stimulates communication between the inhabitants of different countries makes it absolutely necessary for English Courts constantly

to deal with the recognition of rights acquired under foreign law. In De Ricci v. De Ricci first the Registrar, and then to a certain extent the Court, were called upon to consider the effect of the Code Napoleon on a marriage settlement which, though made by British subjects, avowedly adopted French law as determining the civil conditions of the parties to the contract. Forsyth v. Forsyth, again, determines that the Court may vary settlements of divorced persons, although both the petitioner and respondent were domiciled in Scotland at the time of their marriage and the settlements were made in Scotch form.

We do not for a moment maintain that the judgment of Romer J. in Coombs v. Wilkes, '91, 3 Ch. 77, is erroneous. On the contrary. we are fully inclined to agree in his decision that the documents before him did not constitute a memorandum within the Statute of Frauds, s. 4. But Coombs v. Wilkes, just because it is rightly decided, raises the question which must often suggest itself to any one who has studied the 4th and 17th sections of the Statute, and the cases to which they have given rise, namely, whether these sections do not hinder rather than promote the maintenance of justice. The documents in Coombs v. Wilkes which do not satisfy the Statute are nearly enough, even taken alone, to satisfy any sensible man that the defendant did enter into the agreement which he cannot be compelled to perform, and a little additional verbal evidence might probably make this fact absolutely certain. Is it really worth while to guard against possible and uncertain frauds at the price of certainly encouraging dishonest breaches of contract? It is of course true that whatever good is worked by the Statute can by the nature of things not be visible to the public, for whenever it operates beneficially it prevents an unjust claim from being brought into Court. It is, however, equally true that in almost every case in which the operation of the Statute of Frauds is visible to the public it works injustice.

The Attorney-General v. Chapman, '91, 2 Q. B. 526, determines the meaning of the words 'passing under' any past or future voluntary settlement in 44 & 45 Vic. c. 12, s. 38, and shows that where a power is created by a marriage settlement, and subsequently exercised by deed, the property to which the power refers passes under the settlement. The decision is in harmony with decisions under the Succession Duty Act. It also has the merit of cutting short attempts to escape the payment of duties on what are after all little

better than verbal quibbles. Judges are too apt to forget that the object of a taxing Act is to tax.

A summons in Chambers for the leave of the Court to pay addresses to a lady ward is not the most romantic commencement of courtship. Miss Lydia Languish would undoubtedly have objected to it strongly, and to anyone coming so recommended. Not so the lady in Bolton v. Bolton (91, 3 Ch. 270), whose admirer had obtained a 'courting' order on his undertaking to abide by the directions and orders of the Court. This lady was not only propitious, but ready to give away her fortune as well as herself to the suitor from the Court; too ready in fact, for between them they executed a settlement a few days after the lady's coming of age, giving them a joint power of appointment over the ward's property. This was not what the Court would approve, but the young lady had in the meanwhile become emancipated: so the Court, finding its control gone, wisely thought it best to say nothing about the matter: and as to the gentleman, in the first place he had received no orders from the Court to abide by, and in the next it was impossible, as Lindley L.J. observed, to restrain him from marrying without also restraining the lady. If a lady ward must not wed without the consent of the Court, neither must she, it seems, become the bride of the Church, in other words, a postulant or novice (Re Gill, 27 L. R. Ir. Ch. 129). This is important, for wards of the Court being generally dowered with this world's goods, are rather prize postulants.

The restraint on anticipation exists ostensibly to prevent a married woman being kissed or kicked' out of her property, but the area of its usefulness is not limited to this. Skilfully used it may be made to produce results which would have surprised Lord Thurlow. Thus it enables a married woman to give unlimited orders for gowns, bonnets, and jewellery, and then, when sued, to set up her incapacity to contract (Braunstein v. Lewis, 64 L. T. R. 265). It enables her to desert her husband without paying damages under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1884 (Mitchell v. Mitchell, '91, P. (C.A.) 208). If her husband gets a divorce from her she has only to marry again, thereby reviving the restraint, and the Court cannot decree maintenance to the wronged husband and the children. This last was the device which the Court of Appeal was invoked to frustrate in Midwinter v. Midwinter (40 W. R. 33) and it did its best to do so by directing an inquiry as to the wife's means so as to be prepared, on the decree being made absolute, with an order

to forestall her anti-marital manoeuvres.

The unique advantage of

the married woman's position is that she can use the restraint to discomfit her enemies, and when it suits her convenience she can get the Court to remove it (Re Milner's Settlement, '91, 3 Ch. 547).

Collins J. refused, after consideration, and in a case which went near to justify straining the law, to extend the doctrine of Scott v. Sebright, 12 P. D. 21, as to a marriage being null on the ground of coercion Cooper v. Crane, '91, P. 369. 4, whom B does not, on her own showing, love or care for, cannot be said to put coercion upon B by threatening to shoot himself. B's proper course is to let him shoot himself if he means it, which he probably does not. To allow B to marry A with apparent calmness and intelligence, and then plead coercion, would be to make the law dangerously lax, however badly A may have behaved.

In these days of agricultural depression an abortive sale is a by no means uncommon occurrence, and when the abortive sale is by a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act, the incidence of the costs becomes a matter of considerable importance: witness Re Smith's Settled Estates ('91, 3 Ch. 65), where the reserve price (not reached) was £97,000 and the costs £1171. After careful consideration of the Act, Kekewich J. following Stirling J. (Re Llewellin, 37 Ch. D. 317) has laid down that such costs are payable out of capital, and may be raised by a charge on the inheritance. But the abortive attempt to sell must be made bona fide, otherwise a sanguine or spiteful tenant for life might go on loading the inheritance with the costs of abortive sales. A tenant for life in fact under the Settled Land Act has the rights but also the responsibilities of a trustee for all parties. It is when the part of trustee or bonus paterfamilias comes to be played by a ruined spendthrift as in Marquis of Ailesbury's Settled Estates (65 L. T. R. 409 Times, 14 Dec. '91) that the humour of the thing becomes apparent, recalling Master Dick's impersonation of his parent at the office' in 'Vice Versâ.' A tenant for life selling a few heirlooms as in Earl of Radnor's Will Trusts (45 Ch. Div. 402) to keep up the state of a place like Longford Castle is a minor matter, but when Charles Surface not content with putting his ancestors up for sale knocks down that 'unique historic possession' Savernake Park at the instance of an 'unconscionable dog' of a moneylender-well, the remaindermen may be allowed to feel aggrieved (even though the estate fetches a good price) not knowing, 'good easy men,' till now that the tenant for life is 'master of the situation' and entitled to 'override'