and no testimony which did not leave a considerable sum due him if those services were properly rendered. The court in charging the jury told them in substance that they were at liberty, if not satisfied with the testimony of the experts, to use their own judgment. on the question of value. They were also instructed that if plaintiff's course was unskilful, they might reduce the fees accordingly, as in their judgment should be deemed proper. They gave plaintiff nothing. There can be no presumption of law concerning the value of a surgeon's services and there is no presumption that a jury can ascertain it without testimony of some kind, from persons knowing something about such value. As already suggested there was positive testimony of value not discredited, and, in the case of Dr. Harding, given by a disinterested witness called for important purposes by the defendant himself. We can see no sufficient reason for the suggestion that all of this testimony might be disregarded, and there is no rule which would allow the jury to entirely ignore the testimony, and at the same time to form an independent conclusion without testimony upon a matter which required proof beyond their conjecture or their opinion. We do not say that the value of a physician's services at a given time and place may not be known to other persons than physicians, if they have been in a position to learn the customary or proper rates. But there is no legal presumption and no reasonable probability that all jurymen have this knowledge. And there can be no safety to any one if juries are to use their own unguided views on such matters. Neither was there any evidence which would justify the jury in reducing the otherwise appropriate compensation on the ground that plaintiff's treatment was improper. There was no such evidence. The fact that the injured limbs were slow in healing and imperfectly healed at last does not necessarily show that the treatment was improper. The injuries as described were of a very aggravated nature, and beyond any ordinary fracture, the limbs being bruised and badly lacerated, the bones crushed and an artery Both medical witnesses were of opinion that there was danger in leaving the right leg on. There is nothing to show that the course taken under plaintiff's oversight was not the proper one, and nothing to show that when he left the case in the hands of the regular surgeon and nurse, anything necessary had been omitted or anything done out of the way. On the contrary, not only the torn. plaintiff but Dr. Harding gave positive testimony the other way. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff did not possess and use competent skill. The fact that some time later Dr. Jessop made some change in the management of the remaining limb had no tendency to show that the previous treatment was not proper at the time, and no one testifies that it was not. Dr. Harding's testimony indicates entire harmony of views, and Dr. Jessop is not produced to contradict him. No other medical testimony is offered to show any failure of skill or any mistake in the treatment. Where all the testimony in the case is in favor of the treatment pursued, and the question is one of medical skill, which can only be tested by those familiar with such matters, it was error to let the jury draw adverse conclusions, which could only be based on their unprofessional notions of how such injuries should be treated. The fact that Murray survived is not evidence that his case was not desperate in appearance or in fact, and the fact that his limb is not restored to perfect soundness is no proof that he has been maltreated. The jury could not rightly be allowed to find malpractice without testimony from persons who were qualified to give opinions on the methods of treatment. The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial granted. (The other justices concurred.) Sometimes on the ground of special skill in the witness, and sometimes upon the ground of the impossibility of describing in adequate language matters which have been previously presented to his personal observation, opinions are admitted in evidence in courts of justice. To prove value, opinion evidence is resorted to as a general rule from necessity, not only where the subject of such testimony is a matter of common knowledge, but also where it is of a kind requiring special skill to explain or appraise it. There are many things whose value any one may testify to, it being a matter of common knowledge, and not one requiring special and peculiar study, observation or skill. Thus, every one may be presumed to have a somewhat correct idea of the value of property which is in almost universal use. Thus the question is as to the value of a cow. Here the opinion of an ordinary witness would be sufficient, and would be admissible. Again, the question is as to the value of a steam engine, or a diamond. Here the opinion of an ordinary witness would neither be sufficient nor admissible: Ohio, &c., Railroad Co. v. Irvin, 27 Ill. 179 (1862). So it has been held that an ordinary article of clothing may have its value proved by a wearer of such garments who has made inquiries as to their price for the purpose of purchase: Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144 (1879). In a Mississippi case, the question was as to the value of a gun, and it was held that the opinion of an ordinary witness was competent: Cooper v. State, 53 Miss. 398 (1876). "In the nature of things," said the court, "the value of this sort of property in such common to attach to such estimate: Bedell v. use can be estimated by almost every man in the community. It is not like painting, or precious stones, of which experts alone can form an intelligent judgment, but is rather like that class of merchandise and commodities of the value of which most persons have knowledge." And in Indiana, it has been ruled that "it does not require a knowledge of any particular science, art or skill to enable one to testify as to the value of board and lodging:" Chamness v. Chamness, 53 Ind. 301 (1876). "It is not necessary, in order to qualify one to give an opinion as to values, that his information should be of such a direct character as would make it competent in itself as primary evidence. It is the experience which he acquires in the ordinary conduct of affairs, and from means of information such as are usually relied on by men engaged in business for the conduct of that business, that qualifies him to testify:" WELLS, J., in Whitney v. Thacher, 117 Mass. 526 (1875). Therefore, though as a general thing, a witness, not an expert, cannot be said to be qualified to express an opinion as to the value of a thing, unless he has seen it: Westlake v. St. Lawrence Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Barb. 206 (1852); Todd v. Warner, 48 How. Pr. 234 (1874); or has some special knowledge of its value: Sanford v. Shephard, 14 Kans. 228 (1875); Elfel v. Smith, 1 Minn. 126 (1854); Whitmore v. Bowman, 4 G. Greene 148 (1853); Selma, &c., Railroad Co. v. Keith, 57 Ga. 178 (1874); Haight v. Kimbark, 51 Iowa 13 (1879); Clussman v. Merkel, 3 Bosw. 402 (1858); still there is no rule of law, and there can be none, defining how much a witness shall know of property before he can be permitted to give an opinion of its value. He must have some acquaintance with it, sufficient to enable him to form some estimate of its value, and then it is for the jury to determine how much weight Long Island Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 367 (1871). A stricter rule is adopted in Rhode Island, for there a witness is required to show the possession of some peculiar skill and knowledge on the subject, before he will be permitted to give an opinion as to the value of land or other property: Buffum v. New York, &c., Railroad Co., 4 R. I. 221 (1856); Forbes v. Howard, Id. 364 (1856). Nevertheless, in other states, some special information (unless the matter is one of common and universal knowledge) must be shown to be possessed by the witness whose opinion is asked. An adjudged case or two will illustrate this. In Schmidt v. Herfurth, 5 Robt. 145 (1867), the witnesses whose opinions as to value were asked, were held not sufficiently qualified to testify. There the question was upon the value of a Prussian thaler in United States currency. Two witnesses were called. One had bought bills of exchange in that money in Europe, he could not tell precisely its value in American currency, as he depended on the value of gold which he only knew from reading American newspapers abroad. The other was a soldier in the United States army, and did not show any special knowledge of the matter. Their opinions were rejected. In another case, the question was as to the value of a mill and privilege. A. testified that he was something of a judge of the real estate in the vicinity, but had no special knowledge of the value of mills or mill privileges on the stream; he had never bought, sold, owned or operated a mill. His opinion was inadmissible: Clark v. Rockland Water Power Co., 52 Me. 77 (1860). "The witness," said the court, "distinctively negatives the idea that he was possessed of peculiar knowledge or skill in relation to the matter upon which his opinion was desired. It cannot be necessary to cite authorities to show that the opinions of a witness thus 1 situated are not admissible in evidence as an expert." The qualification of a witness to express an opinion as to value is a matter to be decided by the trial court: Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch Railroad Co., 6 Allen 117 (1863). I. VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY. The market value of land is not a question of science and skill upon which only an expert can give an opinion. Persons living in the neighborhood may be presumed to have a sufficient knowledge of the market value of property from the location and character of the land in question: Pennsylvania, &c., Railroad Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Penn. St. 426 (1876). Therefore, except in one state, it is held that the value of real property may be proved by the opinions of witnesses ou the subject: Brown v. Corey, 43 Penn. St. 495 (1862); Cleveland, &c., Railroad Co. v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568 (1856); Atlantic, &c., Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 4 Id. 583 (1858); Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 440 (1861); Evansville, &c., Railroad Co. v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 560 (1858); Ferguson v. Stafford, 33 Id. 162 (1870); Sater v. Burlington, &c., Railroad Co., 1 Iowa 386 (1855); Henry v. Dubuque, &c., Railroad Co., 2 Id. 289 (1855); Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Id. 437 (1861); Holton v. Commissioners of Lake Co., 55 Ind. 194 (1876); Tate v. Missouri, &c., Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 149 (1876); Warren v. Wheeler, 21 Me. 484 (1842); Carpenter v. Robinson, 1 Holmes 73 (1871); Brown v. Providence, &c., Railroad Co., 5 Gray 35 (1855); French v. Snyder, 30 Ill. 344 (1863); Laswell v. Robbins, 39 Id. 210 (1866); Cooper v. Randall, 59 Id. 317 (1871); Lafayette, &c., Railroad Co. v. Winslow, 66 Id. 219 (1872); Green v. City of Chicago, 97 Id. 374 (1881); Frankfort, &c., Railroad Co. v. Windsor, 51 Ind. 238 (1875); Shaw v. City of Charlestown, 2 Gray 107 (1854); Walker v. City of Boston, 8 Cush. 279; Wyman v. Lexington, &c., Railroad Co., 13 Metc. 327 (1847); Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 38 (1862); Sexton v. North Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 200 (1874); Hawkins v. City of Fall River, 119 Id. 94 (1875); Dwight v. County Commissioners, 11 Cush. 203 (1853); Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch Railroad Co., 6 Allen 116 (1863); Whitman v. Boston, &c., Railroad Co., 7 Allen 316 (1863); Fowler v. County Commissioners, 6 Id. 96 (1863); Russell v. Horn Pond Branch Railroad Co., 4 Gray 607 (1855); Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Id. 546 (1859); Hanlenbeck v. Cronkright, 23 N. J. Eq. 408 (1873); Somerville, &c., Railroad Co. v. Doughty, 22 N. J. L. 495 (1850). In a Pennsylvania case (Kellogg v. Krauser, 14 S. & R. 142 (1826) ), the question was the value of mortgaged property, and the opinion of a witness was received. As to the admissibility of this evidence, it was said in the Supreme Court: "The principal reason asssigned by the plaintiff against this evidence was, that an opinion of the value of land is not evidence, because it is not a fact. It is certain that such opinions are every day received as evidence, although it is true that an opinion is not strictly a fact; and it is difficult to conceive how the value of land can be proved without them. The witness may, indeed, prove the prices at which other lands in the neighborhood were sold, but that would not ascertain the value of the land in question without a comparison between it and the land which was sold as to quality; and quality is very much a matter of opinion. It is a kind of evidence so commonly admitted without dispute or defection that I have no doubt of its legality." In an Illinois case, it was said: "All know that the value of real estate in this country is matter of estimate or conclusion of the mind, arrived at by comparison with sales of like property, made under circumstances calculated to produce competition among purchasers, and develop the full value, by considering its adaptation to use, present and prospective; its advantages and disadvantages, and upon which those equally well qualified to judge will largely disagree. To describe to a jury a piece of ground, however minutely, with its supposed adaptations to use, advantages and disadvantages, and demand of them, upon this information alone, a verdict as to its value would be merely farcical; and this indeed is all that can be done to enable them to arrive at a conclusion as to its value, unless the witnesses are allowed to state their judgment or opinion, together with the facts upon which such opinion is founded:" Illinois, &c., R. R. Co. v. Von Horn, 18 Ill. 257 (1857). "It is well settled in this Commonwealth," says GRAY, J., in a Massachusetts case (Swan v. County of Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173 (1869)), "that when the value of real estate is in controversy, opinions of persons acquainted with its value are admissible in evidence. These opinions are admitted, not as being the opinions of experts, strictly so called, for they are not founded on study, or training, or professional experience, but rather from necessity, upon the ground that they depend upon knowledge which any one may acquire, but which the jury may not have, and that they are the most satisfactory and often the only attainable evidence of the fact to be proved. *** The knowledge requisite to qualify a witness to testify to his opinion of the value of lands may either be acquired by the performance of official duty, as by a county commissioner or selectman, whose duty it is to lay out public ways, or by an assessor, whose duty it is to ascertain the value of lands for the purpose of taxation; or it may be derived from knowing of sales or purchases of other lands in the vicinity, either by the witness himself or by other persons." II. LAND-FARMING LAND AND PRO DUCTS. Farmers are experts as to the value of farming land and its products: Robertson v. Knapp, 35 N. Y. 91 (1866). Thus, in one case, where the defendant, the owner of a brick kiln, was sued by a gardener for injuries to his garden from smoke, the opinion of another gardener concerning the depreciation of his garden and the things growing therein from the nuisance, was admitted: Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Metc. 288 (1847); Inhabitants v. Chase, 5 Gray 421 (1855). In another case, the plaintiff claimed damages for the construction of a railroad through his farm, and a farmer was allowed to give his opinion as to the increased expense to the owner in carrying on the farm, arising from the road running through it: Tucker v. Massachusetts, &c., Railroad Co., 118 Mass. 546 (1875). In another, A. sued B. for damages caused by B.'s cattle entering his land and destroying his grass, and the opinion of a farmer as to the value of the grass destroyed was admitted: Townsend v. Brundage, 6 Thomp. & C. 527; 4 Hun 264 (1875). In another, A. sued B. for permitting his cattle to destroy his corn, and a farmer was allowed to express an opinion as to how many bushels of corn there would have been on the land but for the trespass of the animal: Sickles v. Gould, 51 How. Pr. 25 (1875); Gould v. Day, 94 U. S. 405 (1870). In another, A. sued B. for injury to his cattle by falling through B.'s wharf, and the opinion of a stock-raiser as to the damage done to the cattle was received: Polk v. Coffin, 9 Cal. 56 (1858); and see Snyder v. Western Union Railroad Co., 25 Wis. 60 (1869). III. GOODS AND CHATTELS. "Market value," said Mr. Justice STORY, in an early case (Alfonso v. United States, 2 Story 421 (1843)), "is necessarily a matter of opinion as well as of fact, or rather of opinions gathered from facts. How are we to arrive at it? Certainly not by the mere purchase made by a |