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determining what the intention of the parties was, as to the laws of which state their contract had reference, or by which it was to be construed: Newman v. Kershaw, 10 Wis. 341; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chandler 83; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige Ch. 225; 2 Kent's Com. (12 ed.) 460. It is a fact of no greater significance than is found in this case, where the borrower actually negotiated for the loan in the state of his residence, dated his note there and stipulated for interest allowed by her laws: see Hosford v. Nichols, supra, 1 Paige 225.

In a recent case, Kellog v. Miller, 13 Fed. Rep. 198, decided by MCCRARY, C. J., in the Circuit Court of Nebraska, he held, upon a state of facts very like those recited in this case, except that there was a mortgage security, that the contract was valid upon both grounds assumed in this opinion; first, because the contract was to be performed in Nebraska, and second, on the ground we are now considering. "A citizen of one state may loan money to a citizen of another state, and contract for the rate of interest allowed by the laws of the latter state, although the legal rate of interest allowed is greater in such state than in the state where the contract is made, and in which it is to be performed." See also Tilden v. Blair, 21 Wall. 241, and the comments thereon of FOLGER, J., in Dickinson v. Edwards, 77 N. Y. 580, that the ruling consideration of that case was the intention of the parties, that the draft should be used in Illinois, as a contract of that state, although accepted and payable in New York: Wayne County Savings Bank v. Low, 6 Abbott's New Cases, 76, 95, affirmed in 81 N. Y. 569; 2 Kent's Com., 12 ed., bottom paging 622 to 625, and note; Vliet v. Camp 13 Wis. 208. Indeed these cases are but applications of the rule as given by Lord MANSFIELD: "The law of the place can never be the rule, where the transsaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by which it is to be governed:" Robinson v. Bland 2 Burr. 1078.

"The place of making the contract is not to be so exclusively regarded, but that when the contracting parties had reference to another place, that may be regarded. That is, the intention of the parties shall govern when it is made manifest:" Fisher v. Otis, supra. That the parties here entered into this contract in good faith with reference to the laws of Illinois, there can be no doubt. The law of Ohio never entered into the transaction so far as the

intention of the parties can be ascertained. There was no intention to make an illegal contract; and to hold it illegal, we must be able to say that the mere fact that Scott forwarded this note to his surety for his signature, and that it was signed and delivered by the surety in Ohio, and the money there paid (more than probably as a mere matter of convenience), has the effect of defeating the intention of the parties. It is difficult to perceive upon what principle we should so find.

We do not, in thus holding, encourage two citizens of Ohio, to attempt to contract here for money to be used here, and make their notes payable in another state; nor, in any way, relax the strictness of the rules which prevent any form of evasion of the law against usury; but we hold that it is not repugnant to such laws for a person to contract with reference to the law of his domicile, for money to be used there, when no such evasion is sought or intended.

Judgment affirmed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.2

COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.5

ADMIRALTY. See Shipping.

Damages for Collision-Appellate Jurisdiction.-The libellant in a suit in rem, in admiralty, against a vessel, for damages growing out of a collision, claimed, in his libel, to recover $27,000 damages. After the attachment of the vessel in the District Court, a stipulation in the sum of $2100, as her appraised value, was given. The libel having been dismissed by the Circuit Court on appeal, the libellant appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court: Held, that the matter in dispute did not exceed the sum or value of $5000, exclusive of costs, as required by sect. 3 of the Act of February 16th 1875, and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction

1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 107 Otto. * From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 105 Ill. Reports. From J. Shaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Md. Reports. From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Mo. Reports.

From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 38 or 39 Ohio St. Reports.

of the appeal: Starin v. Schooner Jessie Williamson, Jr., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

A decree against the vessel for $27,000 would not establish the liability of the claimant to respond for that amount in personam, unless he was the owner of the vessel at the time of the collision, and that fact must appear by the record, in order to be so far a foundation for such liability as to authorize the court to consider the $27,000 as the value of the matter in dispute on such appeal: Id.

AGENT.

Contract-Enforcement of by Principal.-Where an agent enters into a contract without disclosing his principal or agency, the principal, if he takes advantage of the contract, must do so subject to all the rights and equities of which the other contracting party, who had no knowledge of the agency, might avail himself as against the agent, assuming the latter to be a principal: Miller's Ex'rs. v. Sullivan, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

Liability for Tort in Business of Principal-Distinction between General Superintendent and Intermediate Manager.-The law is established that in the case of an agent or steward committing a tort while acting within the scope of his employment, he and his employer may be sued separately or jointly at the election of the party injured. Nor is it material to the latter's right to sue, in what proportions, if any, they share the benefits of the wrongful act: Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md.

The cases in which the intermediate manager or head employee has been held not liable for trespasses of workmen under him, and in which recourse can be had only to the actual wrongdoer, or to the master, on the principle of respondeat superior, are distinguishable from those where the tort is in consequence of the command or neglect of the general superintendent: Id.

ASSIGNMENT. See Bank; Estoppel.

ATTORNEY.

Striking from Roll-Breach of Private Trust.-Where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit: The People v. Appleton, 105 111.

Although the general rule is, that an attorney at law will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment: Id.

BANK. See National Bank:

Notice Assignment for Creditors--Check antedated.-L. & Co. made

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an assignment for the benefit of creditors, under the insolvent laws of Ohio, on September 26th 1874. On September 29th 1874, L. & Co. gave their check on the First National Bank of Ravenna to H. & S., and dated it back to September 22d. On September 29th, the bank paid the check, with knowledge of the assignment of L. & Co., but without knowledge that the check had been dated back: Held, in an action by the assignee of L. & Co. to recover moneys on deposit with the bank at the date of the assignment, the knowledge of the bank that L. & Co. had made an assignment prior to the presentation of the check, put it upon inquiry as to whether or not the check had in fact been given before the assignment. And such payment of the check would not be a defence for the bank: Chaffe v. First National Bank of Ravenna, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

Sale of Stock-Representations of Officer-National Bank-Ultra Vires. A person buying stock of a bank from the bank is entitled to rely upon assurances of an officer of the bank as to its financial condition; and, if already a stockholder, is not bound to avail himself of his right of examining the books of the bank: Union Nat. Bunk v. Hunt, 76 Mo.

A representation by a bank officer that stock of his bank is worth $100 per share is a mere expression of opinion or commendation of the stock, and if it turns out to be false a note taken by him for the price of the stock will not thereby be avoided though it was relied on by the purchaser, but it is otherwise with a representation that the bank is in a solvent condition and doing a good business: Id.

When a national bank purchases its own stock to protect itself from loss upon a debt, it is bound to sell the stock within six months, and may sell on credit and take the purchaser's note, with the stock sold as collateral to secure it, provided this is done in good faith: Id.

An abuse of the corporate powers is not a sufficient defence to such a note. The question of misuser will not be decided collaterally by setting aside a sale otherwise good: Id.

Check-Right of Holder to Balance in Bank.-A bank is under no obligation to pay any sum on a check payable to the drawer's order and by him assigned, when the drawer has not sufficient money on deposit to his credit in the bank to pay the check in full, and no recovery in such case can be had by the assignee. The rule may be different when the drawer himself is plaintiff: Coates v. Preston, 105 Ill.

BILLS AND NOTES. See United States Courts.

Letter of Credit-Liability on- - Consideration of Drafts.-In order to render the writer of a letter of credit liable, either upon an implied acceptance of, or an agreement to accept, drafts taken on the faith of such letter, the drafts must be taken for a valuable consideration: Sherwin v. Brigham, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

A promise to have the drafts discounted, and to take up notes on which the persons taking the drafts are liable as indorsers, is not a valuable consideration: Id.

If a letter of credit provides that drafts drawn under its authority shall be used only for the purpose of being discounted at a particular bank,

persons taking such drafts, with notice that they have been offered to the bank for discount and refused, cannot recover thereon: Id.

Signature obtained through Misrepresentation as to Character of Paper.—In an action by the holder of a promissory note against the person purporting to be the maker, the defendant testified that he had never given the note in suit, nor had ever seen the paper before its production in court. At this point he was interrupted by his counsel, who admitted that the signature was genuine. The defendant then testified in detail to his having been approached on the day of the date of the note by a person representing himself to be the agent of the persons named as payees, and who solicited him to become their agent; that he finally consented and signed a contract of agency in duplicate; and that he signed no other papers on that day or on any other day, and never signed such a paper as the note in suit, at all, and never saw it before seeing it in court. On a prayer offered by the plaintiff asserting the legal insufficiency of the defendant's evidence as a defence, it was held, that to render the defendant liable on said paper he must have been aware at the time of signing the same, or possessed opportunities, such as a reasonable cautious man would have exercised, of knowing that he was signing a note for the payment of money, as represented by the paper; and that although the genuine signature of the defendant was subscribed to the paper, he was not liable thereon, if his signature was obtained surreptitiously and by fraud, and with an understanding at the time had with the payees or their agent that he was signing a paper of a different character: Kagel v. Totten, 59 Md.

CHARITY.

Gift for, when valid.-Sect. 2419 of the Code of Georgia is as follows: "No person leaving a wife or child, or descendants of a child, shall by will devise more than one-third of his estate to any charitable, religious, educational or civil institution, to the exclusion of such wife or child; and in all cases the will containing such devise shall be executed at least ninety days before the death of the testator, or such devise shall be void: Held, not to invalidate a charitable devise contained in a will executed within ninety days before the testator's death, unless he leaves a wife or child or descendants of a child: Jones v. Habersham, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

CHECK. See Bank.

CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Municipal Corporation.

COMMON CARRIER.

Delay in delivery-Liability for-Form of Action-Measure of Damages. In actions against a common carrier, for the breach of a contract for the carriage and delivery of goods, the suit may be framed either ex contractu, upon the breach of the engagement, or ex delicto, upon the violation of the public duty. But whether the action be assumpsit on the contract, or case for the violation of duty, the same law is applicable to both classes of action, and the measure of damages is equally a question of law, and as much under the control of the court, as if the right rested in agreement only: Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Pumphrey, 59 Md.

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