compared with some other endowments subservient to our intellectual improvement, that I have long been accustomed to consider that promptness of reply, and dogmatism of decision, which mark the eager and practised disputant, as almost infallible symptoms of a limited capacity; a capacity deficient in what Locke has called (in very significant, though somewhat homely terms) large, sound, roundabout sense.1 In all the higher endowments of the understanding, this intellectual quality (to which nature as well as education must liberally contribute) may be justly regarded as an essential ingredient. It is this which, when cultivated by study, and directed to great objects or pursuits, produces an unprejudiced, comprehensive, and efficient mind; and, where it is wanting, though we may occasionally find a more than ordinary share of quickness and of information, a plausibility and brilliancy of discourse, and that passive susceptibility of polish from the commerce of the world, which is so often united with imposing but secondary talents, we may rest assured, that there exists a total incompetency for enlarged views and sagacious combinations, either in the researches of science, or in the conduct of affairs.2

1 Conduct of the Understanding, ? 3. The outlines of an intellectual character, approaching nearly to this description, is exhibited by Marmontel in his highly finished (and, I have been assured, very faithful) portrait of M. de Brienne. Among the other defects of that unfortunate statesman, he mentions particularly un esprit à facettes; by which expression he seems, from the context, to mean a quality of mind precisely opposite to that described by Locke in the words quoted above:"quelques lumières, mais éparses; des apperçus plutôt que des vues; et dans les grands objets, de la facilité à saisir les petits détails, nulle capacité pour embrasser l'ensemble." A consciousness of some similar deficiency has suggested to Gibbon the following criticism

on his own juvenile performance, entitled Essai sur l'Etude. It is executed by an impartial and masterly hand; and may perhaps, without much injustice, be extended not only to his Roman History, but to the distinguishing features of that peculiar cast of genius, which so strongly marks all his writings.

"The most serious defect of my Essay is a kind of obscurity and abruptness which always fatigues, and may often elude the attention of the reader. The obscurity of many passages is often affected; proceeding from the desire of expressing perhaps a common idea with sententious brevity: brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. Alas! how fatal has been the imitation of Montesquieu! But this obscurity sometimes proceeds from a mixture of light and darkness in the

If these observations hold with respect to the art of reasoning or argumentation, as it is cultivated by men undisciplined in the contentions of the schools, they will be found to apply with infinitely greater force to those disputants (if any such are still to be found) who, in the present advanced state of human knowledge, have been at pains to fortify themselves by a course of persevering study, with the arms of the Aristotelian logic. Persons of the former description often reason conscientiously with warmth, from false premises which they are led by passion, or by want of information, to mistake for truth. Those of the latter description proceed systematically on the radical error of conceiving the reasoning process to be the most powerful instrument by which truth is to be attained; combined with the secondary error of supposing that the power of reasoning may be strengthened and improved by the syllogistic art.

In one of Lord Kames's Sketches, there is an amusing and instructive collection of facts to illustrate the progress of reason; a phrase by which he seems to mean chiefly the progress of good sense, or of that quality of the intellect which is very significantly expressed by the epithet enlightened. To what is this progress (which has been going on with such unexampled rapidity during the two last centuries) to be ascribed ? Not surely to any improvement in the art of reasoning; for many of the most melancholy weaknesses which he has recorded, were exhibited by men distinguished by powers of discussion, and a reach of thought which have never been surpassed; while, on the other hand, the same weakness would now be treated with contempt by the lowest of the vulgar. The principle cause, I apprehend, has been the general diffusion of knowledge (and more especially of experimental knowledge) by the art of printing; in consequence of which, those prejudices which had so long withstood the assaults both of argument and of ridicule, have been gradually destroyed by their mutual collision, or lost in the infinite multiplicity of

author's mind; from a partial ray which strikes upon an angle, instead of

spreading itself over the surface of an object."

elementary truths which are identified with the operations of the infant understanding. To examine the process by which truth has been slowly and insensibly cleared from that admixture of error with which, during the long night of Gothic ignorance, it was contaminated and disfigured, would form a very interesting subject of philosophical speculation. At present, it is sufficient to remark, how little we are indebted for our emancipation from this intellectual bondage, to those qualities which it was the professed object of the school logie to cultivate; and that, in the same proportion in which liberality and light have spread over Europe, this branch of study has sunk in the general estimation.

Of the inefficacy of mere reasoning in bringing men to an agreement on those questions, which in all ages have furnished to the learned the chief matter of controversy, a very just idea seems to have been formed by the ingenious author of the following lines, who has, at the same time, hinted at a remedy against a numerous and important class of speculative errors, more likely to succeed than any which is to be derived from the most skilful application of Aristotle's rules; or, indeed, from any direct argumentative refutation, how conclusive and satisfactory soever it may appear to an unbiassed judgment. It must, at the same time, be owned that this remedy is not without danger; and that the same habits which are so useful in correcting the prejudices of the monastic bigot, and so instructive to all whose principles are sufficiently fortified by reflection, can scarcely fail to produce pernicious effects, where they operate upon a character not previously formed and confirmed by a judicious education.

"En parcourant au loin la planète où nous sommes,

Que verrons nous ? les torts et les travers des homines!

Ici c'est un synode, et là c'est un divan,
Nous verrons le Mufti, le Derviche, l'Iman,
Le Bonze, le Lama, le Talapoin, le Pope,
Les antiques Rabbins et les Abbés d'Europe,
Nos moines, nos prélats, nos docteurs agrégés;
Etes vous disputeurs, mes amis? voyagez.'

1 Discours sur les Disputes, par M. de Rulhiere.

To these verses it may not be altogether useless to subjoin a short quotation from Mr. Locke; in whose opinion the aid of foreign travel seems to be less necessary for enlightening some of the classes of controversialists included in the foregoing enumeration, than was suspected by the poet. The moral of the passage (if due allowances be made for the satirical spirit which it breathes) is pleasing on the whole, as it suggests the probability that our common estimates of the intellectual darkness of our own times are not a little exaggerated.

"Notwithstanding the great noise that is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, There are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the truth, but, indeed, because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any opinion of their own, much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, shew their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a man's life shews that he has no serious regard for religion, for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? "Tis enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, and protection in that society. Thus men become combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads; and THOUGH ONE CANNOT SAY THERE

ARE FEWER IMPROBABLE OR ERRONEOUS OPINIONS IN THE WORLD THAN THERE ARE, YET THIS IS CERTAIN, THERE ARE FEWER

THAT ACTUALLY ASSENT TO THEM, AND MISTAKE THEM FOR TRUTHS, THAN IS IMAGINED."

"1

If these remarks of Locke were duly weighed, they would have a tendency to abridge the number of controversial writers, and to encourage philosophers to attempt the improvement of mankind, rather by adding to the stock of useful knowledge, than by waging a direct war with prejudices, which have less root in the understandings, than in the interests and passions. of their abettors.

SECTION III.-IN WHAT RESPECTS THE STUDY OF THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC MAY BE USEFUL TO DISPUTANTS.-A GENERAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH IT JUSTLY REGARDED AS AN ESSENTIAL ACCOMPLISHMENT TO THOSE WHO ARE LIBERALLY EDUCATED. —DOUBTS SUGGESTED BY SOME LATE WRITERS, CONCERNING ARISTOTLE'S CLAIMS TO THE INVENTION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC THEORY.

The general result of the foregoing reflections is, That neither the means employed by the school logic for the assistance of the discursive faculty, nor the accomplishment of that end, were it really attained, are of much consequence in promoting the enlargement of the mind, or in guarding it against the influence of erroneous opinions. It is, however, a very different question, how far this art may be of use to such as are led by profession or inclination to try their strength in polemical warfare. My own opinion is, that, in the present age, it would not give to the disputant, in the judgment of men whose suffrage is of any value, the slightest advantage over his antagonist. In earlier times, indeed, the case must have been different. While the scholastic forms continued to be kept up, and while schoolmen were the sole judges of the contest, an expert logician could not fail to obtain an easy victory over an inferior proficient. Now, however, when the supreme tribunal to which all parties must appeal, is to be found, not within, but without the walls of universities; and when the most learned 1 Essay on Human Understanding, Book iv. c. 20.