moves the property of the debtor out of the reach of his creditors: Cornish vs. Clark, L. R., 14 Eq., 189.

But the rule applies only to that which the debtor could have made available for payments of his debts. For instance, the exercise of a general power of appointment might be fraudulent and void under the statute, but not the exercise of a limited or exclusive power, because, in the latter case, the debtor never had any interest in the property himself which could have been available to a creditor, or by which he could have obtained credit: May on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 33. It is true that creditors can obtain relief in respect to a fraudulent conveyance where the grantor cannot, but that relief only restores the subjection of the debtor's property to the payment of his indebtedness as it existed prior to the conveyance.

A person has an insurable interest in his own life for the benefit of his estate. The contract affords no compensation to him, but to his representatives. So the creditor has an insurable interest in the debtor's life, and can protect himself accordingly, if he so chooses. Marine and fire insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity; but while this is not so as to life insurance, which is simply a contract, so far as the company is concerned, to pay a certain sum of money upon the occurrence of an event which is sure at some time to happen, in consideration of the payment of the premiums as stipulated, nevertheless the contract is also a contract of indemnity. If the creditor insures the life of his debtor, he is thereby indemnified against the the loss of his debt by the death of debtor before payment; yet, if the creditor keeps up the premiums, and his debt is paid before the debtor's death, he may still recover upon the contract, which was valid when made, and which the insurance company is bound to pay according to its terms; but if the debtor obtains the insurance on the insurable interest of the creditor, and pays the premiums himself, and the debt is extinguished before the insurance falls in, then the proceeds would go to the estate of the debtor: Knox vs. Turner, L. R., 9 Eq., 155.

The wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of the husband and father, and if insurance thereon be taken out by him. and he pays the premiums and survives them, it might be reasonably claimed in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, that the policy would inure to his estate.

In Continental Life Ins. Co. vs. Palmer (42 Conn., 60), the wife insured the life of the husband, the amount insured to be payable to

her if she survived him, if not, to her children. The wife and one son died prior to the husband, the son leaving a son surviving. The court held that under the provisions of the statute of that State, the policy being made payable to the wife and children, the children immediately took such a vested interest in the policy, that the grandson was entitled to his father's share, the wife having died before the husband, but that in the absence of the statute "it would have been a fund in the hands of his representatives for the benefit of the creditors, provided the premiums had been paid by him." So in the case of Anderson's Estate, Hay's and Kerr's Appeal (85 Pa. St., 202), A insured his life in favor of his wife, who died intestate in his lifetime, leaving an only child. A died intestate and insolvent, the child surviving, and the court held that the proceeds of the policy belonged to the wife's estate, and, under the intestate laws was to be distributed share and share alike between her child and her husband's estate, notwithstanding under a prior statute life insurance taken out for the wife vested in her free from the claims of the busband's creditors. But if the wife had survived she would have taken the entire proceeds.

We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter, while they are living, can exercise no power of disposition over the same without their consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he can avail himself, nor upon his death have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of such contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries to whom they are payable.

It is, indeed, the general rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it belong, the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the person named: Bliss on Life insurance, 2d ed., p. 517; Glanz vs. Gloeckler, 10 Appellate Court, Ill., 486, per McAllister, J.; S. C., 104 Ill., 573; Wilburn, vs. Wilburn, 83 Ind., 55; Ricker vs. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 27 Minn., 193; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. vs. Brent, 47 Mo., 419; Gould vs. Emerson, 99 Mass., 154: Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. vs. Weitz, Id., 157.

This must ordinarily be so where the contract is directly with the beneficiary; in respect to policies running to the person insured, but payable to another having a direct pecuniary interest in the life

insured; and where the proceeds are made to enure by positive. statutory provisions.

Mrs. Hume was confessedly a contracting party to the Maryland policy; and as to the Connecticut contracts the statute of the State where they were made and to be performed, explicitly provided that a policy for the benefit of a married woman shall enure to her separate use or that of her children, but if the annual premium exceed three hundred dollars, the amount of such excess shall enure to the benefit of the creditors of the person paying the premiums.

The rights and benefits given by the laws of Connecticut in this regard are as much part of these contracts as if incorporated therein, not only because they are to be taken as if entered into there, but because there was the place of performance, and the stipulation of the parties was made with reference to the laws of that place.

And if this be so as between Hume and the Connecticut companies, then he could not have at any time disposed of these policies. without the consent of the beneficiary. Nor is there anything to the contrary in the statutes or general public policy of the District of Columbia.

It may very well be that a transfer by an insolvent of a Connecticut policy, payable to himself or his personal representatives, would be held invalid in the District, even though valid under the laws of Connecticut, if the laws of the District were opposed to the latter, because the positive laws of the domicil and the forum must prevail; but there is no such conflict of laws in this case in respect to the power of disposition by a person procuring insurance payable to another.

The obvious distinction between the transfer of a policy taken out by a person upon his insurable interest in his own life, and payable to himself or his legal representatives, and the obtaining of a policy by a person upon the insurable interest of his wife and children, and payable to them, has been repeatedly recognized by the courts.

Thus in Elliott's Appeal, (50 Pa., State R. 75), where the policies were issued in the name of the husband, and payable to himself or his personal representatives, and while he was insolvent were by him transferred to trustees for his wife's benefit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while holding such transfers void as against creditors, say:

We are to be understood in thus deciding this case that we do not mean to extend it to policies effected without fraud directly and on their face for the benefit of the wife, and payable to her; such policies are not fraudulent as to creditors, and are not touched by this decision.

In the use of the words "without fraud," the court evidently means actual fraud participated in by all parties, and not fraud inferred from the mere fact of insolvency; and, at all events, in McCutchin's Appeal (99 Pa., State R. p. 137), the court say, referring to Elliott's appeal:

The policies in that case were effected in the name of the husband, and by him transferred to a trustee for his wife at a time when he was totally insolvent. They were held to be valuable choses in action, the property of the assured, liable to the payment of his debts, and hence their voluntary assignment operated in fraud of creditors, and was void as against them under the statute of 13th Elizabeth. Here, however, the policy was effected in the name of the wife, and in point of fact was given under an agreement for the surrender of a previous policy for the same amount also issued in the wife's name. . . . . The question of good faith or fraud only arises in the latter case; that is, when the title of the beneficiary arises by assignment. When it exists by force of an original issue in the name, or for the benefit of the beneficiary, the title is good notwithstanding the claims of creditors. . . . There is no anomaly in this, nor any conflict with the letter or spirit of the statute of Elizabeth, because in such cases the policy would be at no time the property of the assured, and hence no question of fraud in its transfer could arise as to his creditors. It is only in the case of the assignment of a policy that once belonged to the assured that the question of fraud can arise under this act.

And see Etna National Bank vs. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 24 Fed. Rep., 770; Pence vs. Makepeace, 65 Ind., 374; Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. R., 326; Stigler's Ex'r vs. Stigler, 77 Va., 163; Thompson vs. Cundiff, 11 Bush, 567.

Conceding then in the case in hand, that Hume paid the premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet as Mrs. Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts covered their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what ground the creditors, or the administrators as representing them, can take away from these dependent ones that which was expressly secured to them in the event of the death of their natural supporter. The interest insured was neither the debtor's nor his creditors'. The contracts were not payable to the debtor, or his representatives, or his creditors. No fraud on the part of the wife, or the children, or the insurance company, is pretended. In no sense was there any gift or transfer of the debtor's property, unless the amounts paid as premiums are to be held to constitute such gift or transfer. This seems to have been the view of the court below, for the decree awarded to the complainants the premiums paid to the Virginia company from 1874 to 1881, inclusive, and to the other companies from the date of the

respective policies, amounting, with interest to January 4, 1883, to the sum of $2,696.10, which sum was directed to be paid to Hume's administrators out of the money which had been paid into court by the Maryland and Connecticut Mutual companies.

But, even though Hume paid this money out of his own funds when insolvent, and if such payment were within the statute of Elizabeth, this would not give the creditors any interest in the proceeds of the policies, which belonged to the beneficiaries for the reasons already stated.

Were the creditors, then, entitled to recover the premiums?

These premiums were paid by Hume to the insurance companies, and to recover from them would require proof that the latter participated in the alleged fraudulent intent, which is not claimed. Cases might be imagined of the payment of large premiums, out of all reasonable proportion to the known or reputed financial condition of the person paying, and under circumstances of grave suspicion, which might justify the inference of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount from the debtor's resources; but no element of that sort exists here.

The premiums form no part of the proceeds of the policies, and cannot be deducted therefrom on that ground.

Mrs. Hume is not shown to have known of or suspected her husband's insolvency, and if the payments were made at her instance, or with her knowledge and assent, or if, without her knowledge, she afterwards ratified the act, and claimed the benefit, as she might rightfully do (Thompson vs. Amer. Ins. Co., 46 N. Y., 675), and as she does (and the same remarks apply to the children), then has she thereby received money which ex æquo et bono she ought to return to her husband's creditors, and can the decree against her be sustained on that ground?

If in some cases payments of premiums might be treated as gifts inhibited by the statute of Elizabeth, can they be so treated here? It is assumed by complainants that the money paid was derived from Hume himself, and it is therefore argued that to that extent his means for payment of debts were impaired. That the payments contributed in any appreciable way to Hume's insolvency is not contended. So far as premiums were paid in 1880 and 1881 (the payments prior to those years having been the annual sum of $196.18 on the Virginia policy), we are satisfied from the evidence that Hume received from Mrs. Pickrell, his wife's mother, for the benefit of Mrs. Hume and her family, an amount of money largely in ex