in her assignee a good title to the policy, then he was entitled to the fund.

The assignment is formal, and her husband joined her in its execution. Whatever title she had, therefore, passed to her assignee. The extent and character of her title appeared plainly on the face of the policy. She was the payee named in the first instance, but the promise to her was not an absolute and unconditional promise to pay to her, or to her administrators, executors, or assigns, but a promise to pay her upon condition that she was living when the policy should fall due. If she survived her husband, the insurance money was payable to her, but, if she did not, it was payable to her children then living. Their right to the money depends upon the terms of the contract, which was payable to them if she was not living at the death of the insured. They were parties to the contract as truly as she was, and with as clear a right to sue upon it upon the happening of the contingency that made them the payees as she could have had if living. Her assignment put her assignee in no better position than she occupied, and conferred upon him no greater interest in the policy. Her death in the lifetime of her husband extinguished her interest in the policy, and it can no more survive in the hands of her assignee than in her administrator. The condition on which her right to recover was to end, and that of her children was to arise, has happened, and the contract of the insurance company is now with the children, and must be enforced by them or for their benefit.

It seem to have been thought that an important question about whether the lex fori or the lex loci ought to prevail was involved in this case, but that is a mistake. The insurance company came into this state, and paid the money into court for the benefit of the party entitled to it. The present contest is between residents of this commonwealth, over a fund in the possession of the court of common domicile, and depends upon the contruction of the contract under which both parties claim. The judgment is affirmed.

TOTAL LOSS-ACCEPTANCE OF.-A steamer became stranded upon a reef, and the
owners, apprehending a total loss, gave notice of abandonment to the in-
surer, who sent a wrecking expedition and by which the vessel was
brought to a foreign port and repaired by the insurers. No offer was
made to return the vessel to the owners. It was claimed by the in-
surer that it acted upon notice of the abandonment under a mistaken
belief that the loss was occasioned by a peril insured against and the
mistake was not discovered until the repairs had been made.

Held, That an abandonment once accepted fixes the rights of the parties and
renders the insurer liable as for a total loss.

Held, That taking charge of the vessel upon notice of abandonment, bringing
her to port, repairing and not offering to return her, is an acceptance of
the abandonment, and passes the title to the insurer.

Held, That the insurer may decline to accept an abandonment until inquiry as
to the causes of the disaster are made. But a policy stipulation that acts
of the insurer for the preservation or recovery of the property shall not be
regarded as an abandonment, will not permit all the acts done in this
case and a claim to be set up for the first time, after action begun that the
abandonment was not conclusive.

Held, That no particular form of abandonment is necessary and unless re-
quired by the policy need not be in writing. Richelieu & Ontario Nav.
Co. vs. Ins. Co., 161.

ACCIDENT.

1. ENTERING A MOVING TRAIN.-A policy of accident insurance contained the
express condition that it should not cover accidents, injuries, or death
from trying to enter a moving steam-vehicle, this provision not being
applicable to railway employes. The assured, a banker, was killed
while attempting to get on a moving railway train. Held, that the com-
pany was not liable.

A provision of the policy limiting the liability of the company to a less sum
than that named in the policy, if the assured should be injured in any oc-
cupation or exposure classed as more hazardous than that specified in the
policy, held, not to affect the case. Miller vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 231.

2. EXTERNAL INJURY FROM RUNAWAY.-The insured was driving in a carriage
when the horse took fright and ran some distance before being brought

VOL. XVIII.-57.

under control. Thongh no damage resulted to the vehicle, the insured
immediately afterwards experienced great sickness and pain, and died in
almost an hour, as was supposed from a rupture of a blood vessel due to
the physical and mental strain.

Held, That this was death from bodily injuries effected through external, vio-
lent and accidental means within the meaning of an accident policy.
The policy provided that it should not extend to bodily injuries of which
there were no external and visible signs.

Held, That this provision referred simply to accidents not resulting in death.
The dead body is sufficient visible sign of injury. McGlinchy vs. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 128.

3. FROM LEAVING CARS.-A contract of life and accident insurance excepted
from the risks covered by it injuries resulting from being upon the plat-
form of moving cars, or from attempting to enter or leave such cars in
motion; this exception not being applicable, however, to the exposure of
railway employes in the performance of their duty. The assured, a shop-
hand of a railway company, while being carried homeward from the
shop at the close of the day's work, upon one of the company's trains,
went out upon the platform while the train was in motion, intending to
get off when it should stop, for the purpose of crossing over, by a switch,
to another track. He was thrown off and killed. Held, That the case
was within the specific exceptions in the contract, and the insurer was
not liable. Hull vs. Equitable Accident Ass'n., 778.

4. INHALING GAS. - An accident policy stipulated that it should not be liable
except for bodily injuries through external, violent, and accidental means,
or in the event of death occasioned by bodily means received as above,
nor should it extend to any bodily injury of which there should be no ex-
ternal and visible sign upon the body, nor to any death caused by inhaling
gas. The insured died from inhaling gas from an open burner while
asleep.

Held, That the inhaling gas excepted referred to voluntary inhalation of an
anææsthetic.

Held, That the required external and visible injury was limited to cases of
temporary injury.

Held, That the gas was an external and violent means, and the death was ac-
cidental within the policy. Paul vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 187.

5. INTENTIONALLY SHOT.-An accident policy provided that it should not be
liable if the death or injury was caused by "intentional injuries inflicted
by the insured or any other person."

Held, That no recovery can be had in case of death, where insured was
intentionally shot by another without provocation. Fisher vs. Travelers
Ins Co., 642.

6. NEGLIGENCE IN PASSING FROM CAR TO CAR.-An accident policy prohibited
standing, riding, or being on the platform of a moving car, or entering
or attempting to enter, leaving or attempting to leave while in motion.
Held, the clause excluded death while riding on the platform, but not while
passing from car to car.

Held, That passing from car to car is negligence within the policy. Sautelle
rs. Railway Passenger Ass'e Co., 892.

7. THROUGH EXTERNAL VIOLENT MEANS-ASSASSINATION.-The insured under an
accident policy against death “through external. violent, and accidental
means, was waylaid and assassinated for purposes of robbery.

Held, That in order to recover under an accident policy it is not necessary
that the injury should be intentionally inflicted so long as it was unfor-
seen, or a casualty to the party injured.

The policy provided that it should not be liable if the death or injury was
caused by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other
person."

Held, That the assassination was an intentional injury for which the policy
was not liable. Hutchcraft's Ex'r vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 315

8. TOTAL DISABILITY.-A party, insured as a retired gentleman, was tempora-
rily disabled from the the use of a hand while using a buzz-saw.
Held, That this was not a total disability which would prevent him from pur-
suing any of his accustomed avocations. nor was the injury incident to
his occupation. Knapp vs. Preferred Mut. Accident Ass'n., 651.

9. TOTAL DISABILITY.-The plaintiff was insured against accident as a mer-
chant. On the occurrence of an accident he was informed by the agent
that, being so insured, he could not recover for injuries received as a
leather cutter, and he thereupon surrendered the policy for a new one,
insuring him as a leather cutter and merchant, which the jury found had
been issued under agreement with the secretary that it was to apply to
the injuries already received.

Held, That such an agreement and substitution was within the power of the
company.

The second policy recited that he was insured in the medium class, which ac-
cording to a classification on the back did not expressly include leather
cutters, and it provided that in order to recover he must be wholly dis-
abled from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining
to the occupation under which he was insured.

Held, That the classification on the back of the policy could not control the
express stipulation on its face.

Held, That, in order to recover, the insured must be totally disabled both as a
cutter and merchant. Ford vs. U. S. Mut. Accident Relief Co., 379.

10. TOTALLY DISABLED-PROOFS OF BENEFITS.-The certificate of a benevolent
society referred to the laws governing the relief fund as controlling in re-
spect to such fund. One of the sections of these laws provided that
should a member become totally and permanently disabled from fol-
lowing his or her usual or other occupation by reason of disease or acci-
dent" such member should be entitled to certain benefits. Another sec-
tion provided that the following should be total disabilities within the
meaning of the section above: The loss of both hands; the loss of both
feet; the loss of both eyes; the loss of one hand, and permanent crip-
pling of the other; the loss of one foot, and permanent crippling of the
other foot or leg; such a permaneut and disabling sickness as shall render
the member helpless to the extent of permanently preventing the mem-
ber from following any occupation whereby he or she can obtain a
livelihood."

Held, That a member who was disabled from pursuing his usual avocation as
a barber, but was able to pursue another avocation by which he could
earn a livelihood, though permanently disabled within the meaning of
the first section if standing alone, was not so within the meaning of the
two sections taken together, and was not entitled to the benefits.

Under the same laws the right to allow a disability claim was with certain
officers of the Supreme Council. By another section proofs of benefits
must be approved by the subordinate council.

Held, That the latter section was merely directory of the manner of preparing
proof and gave the subordinate council no right to reject a claim. Albert
vs. Order of Chosen Friends, 154.

11. VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE ON CAR-RULE OF CORPORATION.-Riding on the plat-
form of a car without sufficient reason is voluntary exposure to unneces
sary danger, but otherwise if impelled by nausea or overcome by heat
within the car.

Such riding is not a violation of "a rule of a corporation" where it is per-
mitted by the corporation, though the latter had adopted a rule forbid
ding it, which was a dead letter.

A "rule of a corporation" within the meaning of an accident policy must be
one that is enforced, and is within the knowledge of the insured. Marr
vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 727.

See BENEVOLENT SOCIETY 1.

ACCOUNTING. See POLICY 1; TONTINE.

ACTION.

1. FORM OF DECLARATION-CONTRACT BY AGENT.-In an action by a husband,
for the use of his wife, on a policy of insurance, which policy de-
scribed the property insured as the plaintiffs', and contained a
provision that, if the insured is not the absolute owner of the prop-
erty, it must be so expressed in writing in the policy, otherwise the
insurance as to such property shall be void; the declaration was in the
form prescribed by our statute (section 61, c. 125, Code); the plaintiff, at
the instance of the defendant, filed a particular statement of the facts he
expected to prove at the trial; among those facts he stated that the in-
sured property belonged to his wife, and that he so informed the agent of
the defendant at the time the insurance was procured, but that said agent
contrary to his instructions, and without his knowledge, made out the
policy in his name, instead of that of his wife; the defendant then de-
murred to the declaration and this statement; held (1), if the defendant
desired to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' case as thus presented,
his demurrer was the proper proceeding; (2), the plaintiff had the right
to sue on said policy in his own name for the use of his wife; and (3), the
circuit court improperly sustained said demurrer.

Where a contract, not under seal, is made by an agent in his own name, for
an undisclosed principal, either the agent or the principal may sue upon
it, and parol evidence is admissible to enable the principal to show that
he is the real contracting party. Deitz vs. Providence-Wash. Ins. Co., 283.
2. IN EQUITY.-A doubtful or partial remedy at law does not exclude the in-
jured party from relief in equity.

A suit may be maintained in a court of equity by or in the name of the sher-
iff, under section 15, c. 141, Code 1887, of W. Va., where there is a con-
flict between two or more execution creditors in respect to the same fund
or property, and such suit will avoid a multiplicity of suits. Nease vs.
Etna Ins. Co., 541.

3. JURISDICTION. -The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction
in case of an action instituted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to re-
cover from an insurance company of another State the amount of a
judgment secured against the company in a Wisconsin court in a suit for
violation of a State statute requiring certain returns to be made regard-
ing its property and business. The rule applies that the courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another except in cases expressly ex-
tended.

Records of judgments obtained in another jurisdiction though conclusive as
to the matter adjudged, do not extend the jurisdiction of the court.
They are simply entitled to faith as evidence. And such judgments do
not preclude the Federal court to which they are presented from ascer
taining whether the cause of action was one of which it would have had
original jurisdiction. State vs. Pelican Ins. Co., 314.

4. PROOF OF LOSS-ADJUSTMENT AS WAIVER.-In case of action on a fire
policy, the statute of Iowa requires the plaintiff to prove the loss
of the building; that he had given defendant notice in writing
of the loss, accompanied by an affidavit stating the facts as to
how the loss occurred, so far as they are within his knowledge, and the
extent of the loss; and that such notice was given within sixty days.
Held, That a petition which shows that the proof was not given within the
statutory time, and fails to show any fact from which a waiver may be
presumed, is defective, and a demurrer is well taken.