saved from such witless thoughts if he had only been wise enough to remember that "things infinite are too large for our capacity."1 I steadily hold that the infinite and the inapproachable should be reserved for the consideration of Gods or children.

3. Concerning the existence of the Supreme Being.—If even such things as we have noted are utterly mysterious in their ultimate nature, the existence of a Supreme Being, or a First Cause, with all its attributes must, a fortiori, be utterly mysterious. If the beginning of an atom be incomprehensible (which it is)—an operation absolutely baffling and confounding to human thought, obviously the existence of the Creator of the Atom must be a still deeper mystery: therefore the immeasurable folly of attempting to plumb this mystery; of being fond enough to suppose that we may understand God.

Deep however, yea, unfathomable though that mystery be, it would neither justify us in coming to the conclusion that a First Cause did not exist, nor that we cannot know anything of the nature of that First Cause. Causes may be partly known from their effects. A beautiful work of art carries our thoughts back to the idea of an artist with beautiful thoughts and deft manual powers; a wellcultivated field of grain carries our thoughts back to the idea of an intelligent and industrious farmer; a visit to the Forth Bridge immediately convinces us that there are admirable engineering intelligences among us; a visit to a cotton-mill with its thousands of whirring looms, immediately impresses us with the conviction of human ingenuity; a noble poem immediately gives rise to thoughts of the

1 Locke: A. C. Fraser, p. 35. Mr. W. L. Courtney makes a mistake similar to that of Kant when he says-"We ascribe consciousness to God, but we do not ascribe the limited consciousness of individuality." Constructive Ethics, p. 51. All such speculations are quite illegitimate. No human attempt to span Divinity can succeed. Is any poor man unfortunate enough to suppose that he really comprehends God, or has any chance of comprehending Him!

noble mind that gave utterance to it. Such is our position also in view of the works of Nature; whilst it is apparent at a glance that the works of Nature are infinitely grander than the works of man. Then, just as we inevitably conclude a Mind behind a mill, and judge something, or apprehend something, of the Mind behind the mill, so in view of the works of Nature the natural Mind of man concludes the existence of a Mind behind the works of Nature; and as the works of Nature seem to be on the whole very clever, ingenious, useful, powerful, beautiful, sublime, thereupon, by parity of reasoning, we reach the conclusion arrived at by most of the wise men of most ages and nations, that there exists behind the works of Nature, a Mind very clever, ingenious, practical, powerful, beautiful, sublime: in a word, we bethink us of an Infinite God.

Touching this great question, the existence of God, one of two conclusions, and only two, is open to us. Behind the veil of Nature, there is either a First Cause (i.e. God), or no Cause. If a First Cause, it is absolutely incomprehensible and scientifically inapproachable by us; if no Cause at all, the mystery of existence is no whit lessened. We are intellectually impotent to grapple with either alternative; but on the analogy of our human experience as just set forth, and on the authority of the Causal Judgment, which I propose to discuss in the next chapter, we are forced to the conclusion that there is a First Cause. In other words, arguing from the Known to the Unknown, an absolutely scientific rule of procedure, it is rational to suppose that there is a First Cause; and irrational to suppose that things are causeless or blindly determined. The fitness, beauty, magnificence and perfection apparent in so many of the known works of Nature, may well be taken, I submit, as a high warranty of the existence of a Power adequate to produce such Works. In other words, the analogy of the finite forces us

to the conclusion, as aforesaid, that there is an Infinite God.

4. Concerning the mysterious in general.—Thus, with regard to the Infinite generally, it is not legitimate to argue as the sceptics do, that "what cannot be comprehended as possible by us, is impossible in reality"; for, as we have seen, the necessities of thought "are not always positive powers of cognition, but of the negative inabilities to know." Consciousness" is never spontaneously false, and Reason is only self-contradictory when driven beyond its legitimate bounds. We are therefore warranted to rely on a deliverance of consciousness when that deliverance is that a thing is, though we may be unable to think how it is."1 Consciousness is the most positive of all things and it is the only criterion by which we can be positive about anything.

Folly of wrestling with the Infinite.-Now, one would think, as previously remarked, that it might be a very easy task for philosophers not to talk about things which they don't understand, beyond saying that they don't understand them; but, unhappily, these appear to be the very things they most delight to talk about, much to the confusion and loss of philosophy. 'As soon as they are entangled in the words infinite and eternal, of which we have no idea but that of our insufficiency to comprehend them, they are forced," as Hobbes said, "either to speak something absurd, or which they love worse, to hold their peace."2 Would that they held their peace! Consider, for example, the following Kantian pronouncement:" Unfortunately for speculation-but perhaps fortunately for the practical interests of humanity-Reason in the midst of her highest anticipations finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and contradictory conclusions from which," says he, "neither her honour nor her safety will permit her to draw back."3 Surely, a most absurd conclusion. Surely

1 Hamilton: Lectures, vol. ii. pp. 404, 544.

English Works, vol. i. p. 414. 3 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 291.

both honour and safety demand that speculation shall retire from braving the impossible, the incogitable. Even decency requires it. Do you know all about a flea? No. Then why, in the name of thunder, should you think it possible to tell us all about God! Explain the flea first. It is really inexcusable that any man, born like a wild ass's colt, should be rash enough to suppose that he may plumb the depths of all the Universe. It is entirely proper, yea,

expedient, to think of things down to the very Bedrock of consciousness and up to the very heights of intelligence, but it argues imbecility in the thinker to attempt to think deeper than that Bedrock of consciousness or higher than these. heights of intelligence. It is remarkable that a man of Kant's discernment did not see the fatuity of such efforts. He never seems to have known when he was wrangling about questions beyond our faculties. This, I think, is one of the root-errors and chief sources of confusion in his metaphysics. Trespass upon the Unknowable is the grand sin of speculators of all kinds. The chief fruit of such speculations is a vile spawn of "Gorgons, Hydras and Chimeras dire." Let not the sober student follow them in their folly. Let him tenaciously remember that all science, all philosophy, all theology and all religion must take their departure from the data of consciousness (in its powers of intuition, observation and reasoning), steadily stepping forward from truth to truth and from fact to fact, as there given; and that, conversely, all science must return to consciousness for its ultimate justification and ratification. No other sound method of procedure is conceivable. Neither affirmation, nor denial, nor doubt is rightly possible, but upon the basis of consciousness. "Ego" says that such a thing "is so." Ego's

1 For example, did the unfortunate Hegel suppose he was uttering anything sensible when he wrote-“God is Himself Consciousness, He distinguishes Himself from Himself within Himself, and as Consciousness, He gives Himself as object for what we call the side of Consciousness"? Philosophy of Religion, vol. ii. p. 329. His work seems to be a prolonged Hum-m-m-m.

ultimate and basal proof for anything is―" I am convinced it is so." This consideration destroys at one blow (in thought, of course) all transcendental, esoterical, mystical and occult sciences, philosophies and theologies, and establishes the theoretical necessity of common sense. Fertility of the finite. This view of the Infinite ought, at once, both to humble and elevate us. It ought to humble us by the view which it gives of the comparative insignificance of our intellectual powers in general; whilst on the other hand, it ought to afford us high gratification that we have intellect enough to recognise our intellectual impotence in relation to the Universe in its totality. To know that we know some things is a mark of common intelligence (indeed, as we have seen, it is disastrous not to be possessed of this mark of intelligence); whilst to know that we know not, but can yet apprehend, the presence of the Infinite, is a mark of philosophic dignity which brings us into a sublime spiritual relationship with the Infinite. We are not in the presence of the Infinite like sticks or stones; we are not like dumb cattle; we view it not through glass eyes; it does not stand to us as Infinite Negative but as Infinite Positive. We regard, with awe and worship, the positive presence of the Infinite, whilst we actually know that we are unable to comprehend its Immensity. Whilst we cannot see God Himself, I think we can see some evidences of the Divine Power and Majesty; whilst we are unable to understand Him, I think we may very reasonably wonder and worship before Him-very reasonably wish and nobly labour to stand towards Him as sons and daughters. These, I think, may be taken to be positive and high marks of our intelligence and dignity.

Lao Tsze's rhapsody on the Infinite. "In the beginning," says Lao Tsze, "there was nought but chaos. O, how wild, O, how obscure it was! Then, out of its midst, came forth forms. O, how wild, O, how