the pantry; but I think we may take the liberty of regarding the sages of that school as fragments of chaos, safely neglectable. They seem to stand on the very apex of Merry-Andrewism. We simply request them to come down from that most ridiculous eminence. 5. Ethics We are in a similar position with regard to the Laws of Ethics of the Just and the Unjust. I think it will be found that the elementary laws of Ethics are a priori, intuitive, necessary-not generalised upon an induction from particular cases, not empirical. Of course, it is premised that the ethical judgment, like all other judgments, must be an honest deliverance. A man must have attained command of, or at least have arrived at, a critical attitude towards not only his prejudices and passions, but towards his very ignorance, before he can properly be said to think in the full sense of the word. By thinking, I always mean honest thinking-thinking to the very best of one's ability,-thinking, as answerable to the Supreme Majesty. It is of the utmost importance that this point should be duly noted that the consciousness must be honestly read. A man's verdict on any philosophical question, if it is to be of any worth, presupposes that he has thought about and given his judgment concerning it, to the very best of his ability. In this sense, "A wise man (i.e. an honest man, primarily) will hear and will increase learning, and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsels." When in any philosophic question, a man's good faith is suspected, we, by that fact, send him out of court. We cannot take into our counsels one who is apparently under the servitude of ignorance, prejudice and passion, without trying to take account of the obliquities of judgment arising under such a servitude. But notwithstanding the fact that we are all, more or less, labouring under this disadvantage, and though ignorance, prejudices and passions probably play a larger part in our ethical affairs than in any others, we yet find that, upon elemental moral questions, an astonishing unanimity manifests itself amongst the leading men, at least, of the most widely different ages and nations. Just glance at a few of these ethical deliverances. (1) Historical Evidence Plato.-Plato seems to think that the moral judgment is born with us. Take the following passage: "Socrates. You thought, then, it seems, when you were a mere boy, that you knew what is just and unjust. Alcibiades. I did think so; and knew it too. Socrates. At what time did you discover it? For certainly it was not when you merely thought you knew. Alcibiades. Certainly not then. Socrates. At what time then did you think you did not know? Reflect, for that time you will never find. Alcibiades. By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell."1 And so on. Aristotle.-The works of Aristotle abound with recog"Givers are called liberal. . . nitions of moral principle. but those who receive are not praised at all.” 2 "The And there is nothing smaller, being more means." 3 Here is The illiberal man "The magnanimous term liberality is applied in proportion to a man's fortune, for the liberal consists not in the quantity of the things given but in the habit of the giver. to hinder the man whose gifts are liberal, provided he gives from smaller the very doctrine of the widow's mite. "benefits nobody, not even himself.1 man is disposed to bestow but ashamed to receive benefits; for the former is the part of a superior, the latter, of an inferior; and he is disposed to make a more liberal return 1 First Alcibiades, 15. 3 lb., Bk. iv. c. i. 9. 2 Nic. Ethics, iv. c. i. 5. 4 lb., Bk. iv. c. i. 15. for favours. It is characteristic of the magnanimous man to ask no favours, or very few, of anybody; but to be willing to serve others. Another characteristic is not to go in search of honour, nor where others occupy the first places... and to be inclined to do but few things, but those great and distinguished. He must also necessarily be open in his hatreds and frendships; for concealment is part of the man who is afraid." 1 "All men think that each of the points of moral character exists in us in some manner naturally; for we possess justice, temperance, valour and the other virtues immediately from our birth." 2 Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, liberality, placability, prudence, etc. all those characteristics are assumed by him to be, without question, beautiful and honourable, whilst the contrary of these are, in their nature, taken to be ugly and dishonourable and hateful. In the several instances of moral depravity which he adduces, he says that both their results and "their indications and the like attendant circumstances are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful and make one ashamed." 3 About such things we cannot think otherwise when we have once grasped their meaning. Notice this last point. We do not say that necessary moral truth is seen at a glance, any more than we say that any proposition in Euclid is seen at a glance; but what we do say is that when once seen, it is perceived to be marked with the note of necessity. There were some very important points in morals which Aristotle did not see; but concerning 1 Nic. Ethics, Bk. iv. c. iii. 14-15. 2 Ib., Bk. vi. c. xiii. 1. 4 3 Rhetoric, Bk. i. c. ix. 5-6; Bk. i. c. x. 4; Bk. ii. c. vi. 11. 4 There is observable, for example, an ugly moral blur—a failure in moral perception in such passages as the following. "The magnanimous man," he says, "wishes to be superior; and the benefits which he confers he hears with pleasure, but those which he receives, with pain." Nic. Ethics, Bk. iv. c. iii. 13. "He is truth-telling, except when he uses dissimulation; but to the vulgar he ought dissemble." Bk. iv. c. iii. 16: passages which bring out the vanity with which the character of Aristotle has been charged. which, had he once seen them, he would have been as emphatic, I surmise, as he was touching those truths which he did see. Aeschylus. Aeschylus has no doubt whatever touching the necessary truth of moral principles. Take that passage "The spoiler still is spoiled; The slayer pays his debt; Yea, while Zeus liveth through the ages, this Lives also that the doer dree his weird; For this is law fast fixed."1 Fast fixed! Again "The man who does ill, ill must suffer too." 2 In Justice, it must be so. It is unthinkable that any other arrangement could be just. The saying of Plautus that Lupus est homo homini is all too true in multitudes of cases, but in so far as man is a wolf to man, he must not expect anything better than a wolf's reward. Let the ill-doer escape punishment - even the ill-doer against human law, and society is shaken to its foundations. But ethical law is much more exacting than our civil or criminal laws. Under these, the maxim runs, De minimis Under ethical law, it clearly appears, I think, that no offender can escape. The liar's lie, for example, is primarily a dart thrown at his own soul, sure to hit and sure to wound. non curat lex. "Thou seest a vengeance voiceless and unseen The same doctrine over again: no escape from it. 1 Agamemnon 1538-42 (Plumptre's tr.). 3 lb. 269. Wrong-doing is necessarily followed by punishment. Punishment in some shape or form, is continually treading upon the heels of wrong-doers. It is this necessary truth which seems to render a Universe of free beings practicable. What a den this world would be, if the sinner were unrestrained by law-by the fear of natural consequences as well as of police consequences! It can properly be said by the righteous man only-"I will walk at liberty, for I seek Thy precepts." Sophocles.-Sophocles is equally convinced of the moral necessity of Justice. "God looks upon the righteousness of man And his unrighteousness; nor ever yet Hath one escaped who wrought iniquity."' On the other hand, Oedipus asks "When hath not goodness blessed the giver of good?" Again, Ajax is represented by Sophocles as saying— "But most be ye my helpers, awful powers, Who know no blandishments, but still perceive All wicked deeds i' the world-strong, swift and sure "3 Cicero. Or listen to Cicero. "There is one true and original law, conformable to reason and to nature, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to the fulfilment of duty and to abstain from injustice; and which calls with that irresistible voice which is felt in all its authority wherever it is heard. This law cannot be abolished or curtailed, nor affected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a whole people, cannot dispense from its paramount obligation. It requires no commentator to render it distinctly intelligible . . . but in all ages and in all nations, it is and has been and will be one and ever 1 Oedipus at Colonus, 282-4 (Campbell's tr.). 3 Ajax, 835-8. |