(B) THE LAW BROKEN BY IDEALISTS OF ALL KINDS

The Realist, Intuitionist or Man of Common Sense takes his invincible stand upon the facts and laws of consciousness as ultimate. His opponents, the Illusionists and Dubitationists of all sorts and sizes, fondly flatter themselves that they have only to deny the intuitions of Common Sense in order to deprive the Intuitionist of any remedy against them; they pretend to rail at the Johnsonian argument. In so doing they make a prodigious mistake, in the very perpetration of which, they manifest sheer philosophical inaptitude. It is exactly as if a thief were gaily to assert that he had only to deny his theft in order to baffle judge and jury and escape from the correction of the stocks. Common Sense need never find any difficulty in dragging its opponent into the light and showing that he is not a wise man.

When a lunatic takes himself to be a poached egg, it may, of course, be impossible to dislodge him from that belief; in which case we excuse him on account of his lunacy. On the same ground alone, can we excuse the "philosopher" who denies the requisitions of Common Sense. Thus, quoad their illusionary theories, all the illusionists appear to be either intellectually or morally bankrupt.

Like the materialist, the idealist also refuses to accept the full testimony of consciousness and garbles it or rejects it for his own particular purposes. Certain idealists, antipodean to the materialists, say-" All is mind; there

1e.g. Mr. Leslie Stephen in The English Utilitarians, over and over again. To the statement "this is a necessary belief," it is a sufficient answer, he says, to reply, "I don't believe it "-(vol. i. p. 152): which is a fundamental error, when it can be shown that the denier himself constantly acts as if he believes it; and this is the terrible pickle in which all the opponents of Common Sense continually find themselves steeped. It is not, as Stewart says, "from any defect in the power of ratiocination or deduction that our speculative errors chiefly arise."

is no matter." According to them, the Universe is mere idea. Now, in this basal notion of their system, there is no difficulty in showing that their own consciousness immediately contradicts them. They are at war with the first axiom of all possible science, namely, that consciousness is veracious. Let us hasten to the practical test. All persons must be treated as charlatans who shun the practical test.

The practical test.-There is a row in the street, and good Bishop Berkeley, one of our idealists, hearing it, what does he do? What does he think? He does not think,— does not even fancy for one moment that the row is merely a commotion within his own ego, or under his own waistcoat, does not think for a moment that the esse of the row is merely percipi. Not at all. He immediately and invincibly thinks of it as an actual disturbance in the street, and proceeds to open his window to have a fuller view or perception of it, firmly convinced within the circumference of his own consciousness that the window is composed of actual glass and timber, and that vital boneand-muscle power-not idea merely, is necessary to raise it. The window being raised, the amiable bishop projects his body through the opening quite cautiously. Why? Because, whether he acknowledge it or not, he is firmly convinced in his own mind and in the very teeth of his own theories, that esse is not percipi,-that the esse or matter is subject to a certain law of gravitation-a law most hostile to his theory; that his own body is matter, and subject to that most exigent law; and that if he projects it through the window aperture too far, it will be in extreme danger of tumbling out into the street: catastrophe which he is as willing and determined to prevent as any materialist in Ireland. In short, our idealistic bishop balances and controls his episcopal body as cautiously and carefully as a materialistic Clodd or Morison placed in similar circumstances: ergo, the bishop's over

a

mastering consciousness of realities, manifested by his actual conduct amid such realities, absolutely effaces and gives the lie not only to his ideal theory, but to his professed belief in that ideal theory.1

The idealist practice always opposed to the idealist theory. The idealist takes as kindly to all material comforts as anybody else. He avoids all material dangers and inconveniences as assiduously as anybody else. He manifests as great a dislike to the death of his body as anybody else. He does not sit down upon a hot stove more readily than anybody else. Bishop Berkeley is as careful that nobody shall stamp on his corn as Mr. Clodd or Mr. Morison. Why? Simply because his own consciousness -i.e. his highest knowledge, swears against and defies his theory. His theory that his corn is mere percipi and not an external reality, is at war with the primary postulate of science, the veracity of consciousness. He knows, despite himself, that there is matter in the Universe as well as mind. And yet idealists ask us to take them seriously! If there be any of them left alive, let us recommend to their consideration an incidental saying of Aristotle "Generally, it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself or would feel inclined to do; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do." 2 Briefly then, the idealist whilst

1 There seems also to have been a school of Hindoo Berkeleys who conceived the material Universe to be nothing but an illusive representation presented by the Deity to the mind-which illusion they characterised by the name of Maja. Brown (quoting Sir W. Jones): Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 522. All philosophers should, as far as possible, apply the practical test to their theories, and discard them whenever they find that they will not stand the practical test. Thus, as suggested in the text, let the Illusionist try to disregard the law of gravitation in practice! If the philosophers would only be good enough to follow this rule steadily, if they would only be loyal to the dictates of Nature, it would save us from the wretched harassment of thousands of their confused and obstructive tomes.

Rhetoric, Bk. ii. c. xxiii. 7.

professing to call in question the testimony of consciousness as to external things, has never been known to show his faith by his works; never attempted to bring his conduct into harmony with his theory: therefore the validity of consciousness remains invincible and invulnerable against the idealist just as we have found it to be invincible and invulnerable against the materialist.

Berkleian Absurdities.—A word more about this much overrated metaphysician. If esse were merely percipi, as Berkeley pretended to hold, then he had only to close his eyes to make light cease to be, and to open them again in order to make it again spring into existence. If esse was merely percipi, then he was able to annihilate and recreate the visible universe more promptly than is recorded in Genesis-in fact, by a mere wink! But Berkeley was not really such a lunatic as really to suppose that there was any justification for his doctrine. If he had taken a Bible oath that he really believed that esse was percipi, I, for one, should not have believed him; nor, to speak with absolute candour, shall I believe any one who may tell me that he believes the Berkleian doctrine. Thus we get rid of many speculators.

Or look at the matter from the moral point of view. Supposing that he had seen a thief stealing a gammon of bacon, is anybody green enough to suppose that Berkeley would have regarded his own personal perception of the theft as the thief!-that the esse of the theft was merely percipi! If he had been bold enough to appear in a witness-box with this kind of doctrine in his mouth, what would any sane judge have said to him? It is amazing that such crazy notions should ever have imposed upon anybody. How, by a mere "idea" of the business, was poor Berkeley even to get his porridge boiled?

The theory of "consistent illusion," untenable.—There is no corner in which the idealist can successfully conceal his absurdity. Even if we grant to him the right of

assuming the benefit of "consistent illusion" in favour of his theory, that assumption must, eo ipso, possess all the characteristics of reality in order to make the illusion. consistent, and consequently can never be shown to be illusive or other than real. Indeed, that which possesses all the characteristics of reality cannot be anything but reality itself. Thus if your illusive dinner answers all the purposes of a real dinner without the possibility of detecting any illusion about it, wherein does it differ from a real dinner? If your illusive boots are as good as any real boots without the possibility of detecting any illusion about them, wherein are they inferior to any real boots? If your illusive dinner is as good as my real dinner, wherein have I the better of you? So that the very talk about "consistent illusion" is a mere rattle of nonsense.

The same with the theories of sceptics and nihilists.Likewise against sceptics and nihilists of all kinds and degrees, the law of consciousness is, as a matter of fact, invincible and invulnerable. Some of the sceptics say that there is neither mind nor matter, or at least, that it is very doubtful as to whether there is either mind or matter. Scepticism is "the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance which undermines the foundation of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein." 1 Take Hume on the subject. The unlearned, he admits, believe through their senses in the actual existence of an outer world; but he goes on to say that "this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us than nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets through which their images are conveyed without being able to introduce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object." 2 We possess no certainty, he

1 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, p. 265 (Meiklejohn's tr.).

* Essays Moral, Political, etc.: Concerning Human Understanding, Sect.