CHAPTER V

WE MUST OBSERVE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE

Common Sense: what it is.-A common-sense doctrine is one concerning which all men are agreed either explicitly or implicitly. All men are implicitly agreed that there is a sense of things common to all men-a Universal Reason. Even Hume admits this truth when forgetful of the demands of his sceptical theories, and speaks of "the essential and universal properties of human nature."1 The phrase "common sense" is the spontaneous expression of the general conviction of mankind that there is a perception of facts and principles which is common to all men—that there is a reference to universal principles implied in all discourse. It might also be well rendered as the Universal or Catholic Sense, embracing that sum of principles which every man believes as far as his understanding carries him, in spite of any efforts he may make to believe something contrary. It is the presupposed, natural basis of the verdict of Smith and Brown touching any problem which they may discuss. In this position also, David Hume is with us. "The faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together."2 Every sane man who addresses his fellow-men, implicitly, at least, assumes the existence of

1 The Natural History of Religion, Sect. xiv. p. 361 (Green and Grose's ed.)

2 Essays, etc. Concerning Human Understanding, vol. ii. p. 66.

such common sense, such Universal Reason. No sound science, i.e. no science at all, either secular or sacred, can be built but upon this ground. It is universally allowed that nothing is more provocative-perhaps nothing so provocative of vituperative language as breach of Common Sense. Hume and all the satirists continually invite us to scorn and laugh at those whom they satirise because of the ridiculous opposition which they manifest to the plain dictates of Common Sense. The common target of the satirist is the man who breaks away from Common Sense. If a would-be satirist venture to attack Common Sense, his effort invariably recoils upon himself.

We must guard against the mendacity of witnesses. — Of course it is to be understood that the verdict of Smith and Brown is not the verdict of their ignorance, nor of their prejudices, nor of their passions, nor of their schools, colleges, and churches, but in very deed, the sacred "MayGod-Help-me" verdict of their intelligence after it has been consulted to the very best of their ability. Unhappily the verdicts which many philosophers give us, are those of their passions or their ignorance, of their schools, colleges, or churches: hence the Babel din in the Temple of Philosophy.

The opponents of Common Sense are, properly speaking, infidels. It should also be noted that every man in so far as he distrusts the Common Sense, should be regarded as a sceptic. All anti-Common-Sense schemes of philosophy and theology are, substantially, schemes of scepticism and infidelity. Thus, even all orthodox personsdistrusting and betraying the very faculties which their Maker has given them, must be regarded as sceptics and infidels.

They are at war with the Obvious.-The opponents of Common Sense are engaged in a ghastly polemic against the obvious,—a proceeding which they seem to regard as

quite legitimate and, indeed, rather philosophic and impressive. They could not make a greater blunder. It should be clearly understood by all who are not labouring under mental disability of some sort, that it is not philosophic at all, but strictly and heinously idiotic to quarrel with the obvious—which all the opponents of Common Sense are continually doing, except, of course, when they forget the exigencies of their theories, and kindly Nature hustles them back into the ways of Common Sense. What is particularly required in the interests of philosophy and life is that all such theories should be thrown into the Rubbish-Shoot of Existence as promptly as possible, just as any engineering scheme which proposed to disregard the law of gravitation and build a castle in the clouds, would immediately be thrown into that great Rubbish-Shoot. A meeting of anti-Common-Sense philosophers met to determine their position on anti-Common-Sense principles, could only resolve itself into a council of phrenetics. However articulate their talk might be, it could only result in an irrational gurry-worry.

The distinction between the finite and the infinite. Four relationships in which the Universe stands to the finite mind. -Bearing these Common-Sense principles in mind, let us now go on to observe that we are face to face with things infinite as well as finite; that man is merely a finite intelligence; and that being merely finite, his knowledge of the universe of Mind and Matter must necessarily be limited by his finitude. Under this limitation he will find that the Universe and its contents may be said to stand to him in one or other of four relationships, namely, (1) as known, or within the touch or grip of consciousness; (2) as knowable, or reducible within the touch or grip of consciousness; (3) as unknowable through inaccessibility of adequate data or evidence; (4) as absolutely unknowable, or mysterious, under the limitations of our finite faculties.

(4) THE KNOWN

It is a

In the first place, we find ourselves face to face with what I will be bold enough to call the Known. highly important thing, as I have already had occasion to remark, to know our own ignorance to know that we don't know. It is no less important to know that we actually do know. As an admirable Chinese philosopher expresses it: "A knowledge of our own ignorance is a proof of superiority, but ignorance of our knowledge is nothing less than a mental malady, which like all other maladies will be best escaped by those who have a dread of the sufferings it will give rise to."1 So, Herbert Spencer: "Which is the more misleading, belief without evidence, or refusal to believe in presence of overwhelming evidence? If there is an irrational faith which persists without facts to support it, there is an irrational lack of faith which persists spite of the accumulation of facts which should produce it; and we may doubt whether the last does not lead to worse results than the first." 2 All the opponents of Common Sense should lay these wise words to heart. My contentions as to The Known would be quite banal unless they were denied and impugned; but they are denied and impugned, by implication at least, under various schemes of philosophy: therefore the necessity of affirming them. The intelligent student of the history of philosophy will scarcely fail to perceive that a very large number of philosophers have tragically, yet ridiculously, grown crazy through the ravages of this scurviest of all maladies-ignorance of, and opposition to, their own knowledge.

1. The Known in Zoology.-Just let us think what a considerable amount of actual and useful knowledge we possess in zoology. What a quantity of books exist on 1 Lao-Tsze: The Tao-Tih-King, c. lxxi. 2 Principles of Ethics, vol. ii. p. 247.

that subject! What a deal of information-information which seems absolutely reliable, exists in those books and elsewhere. For example, there is beyond question, an almost infinite variety of animals. There are land, water and aërial animals. There are amphibia,animals which haunt both land and water, such as frogs, lizards, serpents, crocodiles, turtles, salamanders, hippopotami, etc. Not only so, but there is a third kind of animals which the naturalists don't seem to have named or differentiated (if so, I am ignorant of the fact), to wit, what we might call the tribia: animals which inhabit not only land and water, but the aëriel regions as well, e.g. the wild duck. That animal waddles about successfully on land; swims, obviously, with great ease, on water; and betakes itself to the aerial regions on fitting occasions with grace, power, and whistling velocity. We have seen all these bodily movements of the wild duck with our own eyes, and admired the facilities of locomotion possessed by that fowl. Indeed, a large number of fowls might be regarded as tribia. There is really no doubt about it.

Naturalists divide the animal kingdom into orders, tribes, genera, species, etc., a perfectly reasonable and proper proceeding, the outcome of knowledge.

Amongst land animals, they distinguish quite correctly between the two-footed and the four-footed, and arrange them accordingly. Amongst these, again, there are numerous divisions and subdivisions,-feathered and unfeathered; smooth and hairy; carnivorous and graminivorous; hardbilled and soft-billed, etc. They range in size, also, from elephants down to microbes. Nor do we only know of the existence of these beasts: we actually preserve flies and stuff elephants.

Amongst water animals again, there is an almost boundless variety-ranging from whales down to infusoria—which you may drink without knowing it. All this we know.

The Historic Continuity of Species.

We know that a