Millsaps v. Shotwell (Miss.).. 359 982 Millsaps, Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. (Miss.).. 672 220 Northen v. Hanners (Ala.). Norton v. Kumpe (Ala.). Nott v. State Nat. Bank (La.). New York Steam Dye Works v. Frazier 1026 .1038 .1019 664 1026 401 817 841 475 141 Moll v. Sbisa (La.). 141 Monroe Building & Loan Ass'n v. Johnston (La.) Monroe County, Weiler v. (Miss.). 352 Ogletree, Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n Monroe Nat. Bank, J. A. Fay & Egan Co. v. (La.) Montague, Wallen v. (Ala.). 773 Oldacre v. Stuart (Ala.). 38 Monteleone, Hinnricks v. (La.). 546 Oliver, Smith v. (Ala.). .1027 Montgomery v. Thomas (Fla.). 62 Montgomery, Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. (Miss.) Ong-Hiller Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (La.). 973 ..1035 Orleans Levee Board, Koerber v. (La.). O'Rourke v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. (La.) 415 323 Moore v. Drew (La.). 402 O'Shee, Town of Alexandria v. (La.). 382 Moore, Bigbee & W. R. Packet Co. v. (Ala.) 602 | Overstreet, Angas v. (Fla.).. Silver Springs & W. R. Co. v. St. Petersburg State Bank (Fla.).. 1033 779 Simmons v. State (Fla.). Richberger, American Exp. Co. v. (Miss.).. 1035 62 881 1038 1037 1032 563 280 374 406 33 650 880 957 39 Rightor, State v. (La.).. 972 Rike v. Nichols (Ala.). Smart, Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. (La.) 443 1019 Smith v. Oliver (Ala.). 1027 Southern Fertilizer Co., Pollard v. (Ala.).. 169 Ass'n v. 564 State, Eggart v. (Fla.). 144 1039 State, Ellis v. (Ala.). 1 34 State, Evans v. (Ala.). 175 1039 State, Fields v. (Ala.). 726 811 State, Gafford v. (Ala.). 10 295 State, Garner v. (Miss.). 363 219 State, Handy v. (Ala.). 1023 853 State, Hardy v. (Miss.).. 1037 State v. American Sugar-Refining Co. (La.) 447 State, McClellan v. (Ala.). 158 725 State, McLeroy v. (Ala.).. State, McQueen v. (Ala.). 951 State, McRae v. (Ala.). 279 State, Marshal v. (Ala.). 104 State, Martin v. (Ala.). 648 State, Maxwell v. (Ala.). 394 State, Nabors v. (Ala.). 384 State, Odam v. (Ala.). 93 State, O'Hara v. Ala.).. 109 State, Quinn v. (Ala.). 396 State, Ray v. (Ala.).. 247 .1026 214 208 255 235 529 .1026 622 694 1027 State, Brown v. (Fla.).. Torbert, Treadwell v. (Ala.). Torre v. Jeannin (Miss.). Threefoot, Standard Guano Co. v. (Miss.)..1039 216 White, Western Assur. Co. v. (Miss.). 860 White Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Saxon (Ala.)... 784 Torrey, Birmingham Shoe Co. v. (Ala.). 763 White Sewing-Mach. Co., Chapman v. Town of Alexandria v. O'Shee (La.). Town of Lake Maitland, Dawson v. (Fla.)..1029 Towns v. Towns (Ala.). Trahan v. Simon (La.). Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Johns (Fla.). 1034 836 White v. State (Miss.). .1039 494 ... 382 (Miss.) 868 715 374 Whitman v. Owen (Miss.). 669 .1030 1039 1034 391 411 143 619 704 Tyson Co., Disston v. (Fla.). Union Bank & Trust Co., Gilreath v. (Ala.) 581 367 Wills Val. Min. & Mfg. Co., Etowah Min. 720 225 THE SOUTHERN REPORTER. VOLUME 25. DENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT-CONSPIRACY. 1. On a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, evidence of a previous difficulty with the person assaulted, tending to show malice of the accused in making the assault, is competent. 2. An accused, on cross-examination of a witness who testifies that he saw two sets of men's tracks in a field where a previous difflculty was shown by the prosecution to have occurred, may show the size and shape of the tracks, in rebuttal of the evidence as to the difficulty. 3. An instruction that an accused, answering a charge of crime by plea of self-defense, must, to be acquitted, be "entirely free from fault in bringing on the difficulty,' is not erroneous, since the word "entirely" exacts no higher degree than the expression "free from fault." 4. A definition of "reasonable doubt" as "doubt for which a reason may be assigned" is correct. 5. Where, on a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, there is evidence to prove and disprove a conspiracy between accused and another, an instruction that, to convict, it was not necessary for the jury to find that there was such a conspiracy, is proper. 6. An instruction that if the sole purpose actuating accused to stab a person was revenge for a wrong previously done him, whether real or fancied, the act was done with malice, is not erroneous, where the stabbing is not denied, and there is evidence that it was done for revenge. 7. Passion engendered by mere words, or by information communicated by another, will not serve to reduce a felonious assault to a simple assault. Appeal from city court of Montgomery; A. D. Sayre, Judge. John Ellis was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he appeals. Reversed. On the trial of the case, the state introduced as a witness one Jack White, who testified that, a short time before he appeared before the grand jury that found the indictment against defendant, the defendant attacked him, and stabbed him several times with a knife; that the facts of the difficulty were as follows: He was going along the public road with several other persons, and as he approached the defendant he was standing near 25 So.-1 the side of the road; the latter beckoned to him to stop; that, as he (the witness) went up to the defendant, the defendant grabbed him with one hand, and began to stab him with a knife which he held in the other, saying to him that "you told Mr. Chestnut"; that the witness did not offer to strike the defendant, and had no weapon of any sort in his hand; that, as the defendant was stabbing him, Jim Williams came up, and, pointing a gun at the witness, told the other people to stand back, and not to interfere. The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give the same as asked: "If the defendant attacked Jack White unlawfully, but made such attack, not from malice aforethought, but from passion aroused by recent knowledge that Jack White had falsely accused him of a felony, you may look at this to determine the grade of offense committed by defendant." Joseph Callaway, for appellant. Charles G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State. DOWDELL, J. The appellant was tried and convicted on an indictment for an assault with intent to murder. Upon the trial the state introduced testimony tending to show the felonious character of the assault. Jack White, the assaulted party, among other things, testified as follows: "What started the trouble was this: The night before the difficulty, I was watching a field for Mr. Chestnut, as for several nights previous to this some person or persons had been stealing from it. While I was so watching, I saw Jim Williams and defendant stealing from this field, and shot at them. In reply, defendant snapped a cap at me. After this, both ran off. The next day, I told Mr. Chestnut what happened in the field the night before." This testimony, no doubt, was offered to prove a previous difficulty, and as tending to show malice on the part of the defendant in making the assault for which he was on trial, and for that purpose was competent. On the cross-examination by the defendant of the state's witness, Mr. Chestnut, the defendant sought to show by the witness, who |