plaintiff could not recover if injured through the negligence of a fellow servant. A request for instruction to the jury respecting a sound principle of law not applicable to the evidence is denied rightly. [14] There was no error in denying the requests to the effect that the defendant was not responsible if the rope (whose parting permitted the fall of the tub upon the plaintiff) was purchased from a reputable maker and gave way because of a hidden flaw after using a few times. On the defendant's own testimony, he had owned the rope for about six months and had used it for unloading one cargo of coal before the one on whch it was being used at the time of the accident. The instructions given upon this point cannot be pronounced insufficient under all the circumstances. Exceptions overruled. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. MCCARTHY'S CASE* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT-DECISIONS OF ACCIDENT BOARD-REVIEW. Decisions of Industrial Accident Board on questions of fact stand on same footing as verdict of jury or finding of judge, and are not subject to review, except to determine whether there is any evidence to support them. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN'S ACT-WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF DUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD. COMPENSATION TESTIMONY--IN Weight and credibility of testimony as to any causal connection between injury to decedent and tuberculosis which resulted fatally to him is for the Industrial Accident Board. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) COMPENSATION ACT-CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INJURY AND DEATH-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMAN'S In widow's proceedings for compensation for death of her husband, evidence there was no causal connection between injury and tuberculosis from which decedent died held to support decision of Accident Board in favor of insurer. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, amended by St. 1912, c. 571), by Ellen McCarthy, to recover compensation for the death of her husband, Dennis McCarthy, the employee, * Decision rendered, Nov. 23, 1918. 120 N. E. Rep. 852. on the ground that it was caused by personal injury received by him, that his condition of tuberculosis was accelerated by the injury, and that the weight of the medical evidence was decisive, that the disease and the injury had a direct connection. The proceeding was opposed by the Massachusetts Employees' Insurance Association, and from a decree of the superior court sustaining the finding of the Industrial Accident Board that the accident had no causal connection with the death, the widow appeals. Affirmed. Bernard J. Killion, of Salem, and Charles Toye, of Boston, for appellant. John W. Cronin and Frederick A. Carroll, both of Boston, for appellee. PER CURIAM. [1-3] It has been decided repeatedly that the decisions of the Industrial Accident Board upon questions of fact stand upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury or the finding of a judge and are not subject to review. The only question in that connection is whether there is any evidence to support the decision. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737; Moran's Case, 230 Mass. 500, 119 N. E. 956; Knight's Case, 231 Mass. 142, 120 N. E. 395. The crucial question in the case at bar was whether any causal connection was shown between the disease known as acute miliary tuberculosis, which résulted fatally to the employee on February 2, 1915, and the abrasions on his leg and foot, received in the course of and arising out of his employment on the 14th of the preceding September. The record shows that while there was some testimony tending to show that there was such connection, there was other testimony tending to show that there was no such connection. Its weight and credibility were for the Industrial Accident Board. The decision of the board in favor of the insurer has ample support in the evidence and cannot be set aside. Decree affirmed. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. SUFFOLK. MELLON'S CASE.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EXPENSES-APPOINTMENT OF LEGAL REPRESEN TATIVE. Fact that compensation insurer would not pay deceased employee's beneficiaries in Scotland and insisted on appointment of administrator, was not inconsistent with existence of some estate to be administered on death of employee, and so not sufficient to bring appointment of administrator within Workmen Compensation Act, pt. 2, § 13, as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 7, as to expenses of appointment of a "not otherwise necessary" legal representative. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 420.) * Decision rendered, Nov. 29, 1918. 121 N. E. Rep. 18, 2. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED EMPLOYEE-COMPENSATION BY INSURER. Duty placed upon insurer by Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 2, § 13, as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 7, to pay for legal services in connection with appointment or duties of legal representative of deceased employee not otherwise necessary, is limited to necessary disbursements for appointment, representative's necessary expenses, and compensation for time necessarily spent in carrying out provision that, if payment is made to him, it shall be paid to dependents. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 420.) Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Michael Ruane, administrator of the estate of John Mellon, deceased employce of Fred L. Jordan, for compensation for legal services, opposed by the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, insurer. From a decree refusing compensation, claimant appeals. Affirmed. Fred W. Mansfield, of Boston, for appellant. Jos. A. Dennison and Robt. Gallagher, both of Boston, for insurer. PIERCE, J. This is an appeal from the decree of the Industrial Accident Board refusing to allow to the appellant compensation for legal services, alleged to have been rendered in opposing the petition of the insurer to that board to re-open the John Mellon case, "because of the agreement of compensation was signed by mistake" and in opposition to a petition of the insurer to vacate a decree of the superior court entered upon the filing of the agreement therein. St. 1911, c. 751, part 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14. The appellant was appointed administrator upon the estate of John Mellon, the employee, deceased. The beneficiaries, entitled to compensation lived in Scotland. The insurer agreed to and insisted upon the appointment of an administrator. The record does not disclose the next of kin or whether or not the deceased left estate to be administered. The appellant has been paid for legal services connected with his appointment and for his services as administrator. The questions presented are, whether the appointment of the administrator is shown by the record to have been "not otherwise necessary," and whether, if it appears to have been "not otherwise necessary," the insurer under part 2, § 13, of St. 1911, c. 751, as amended by St. 1914, c. 703, § 8, is liable for professional services rendered to the administrator in addition to the necessary disbursements and expenses of the administrator with reasonable compensation for his time necessarily spent in carrying out the provisions of this act. Section 13, above referred to, reads as follows: "The compensation payable under this act in case of the death of the injured employee hall be paid to his legal representative; or, if he has no legal representative to his dependents; or, if he leaves no dependents, to the persons to whom payment of the expenses for the last sickness and burial are due. If the payment is made to the legal representative of the deceased employee, it shall be paid by him to the dependents or other persons entitled thereto under this act. When the appointment of a legal representative of a deceased employee, not otherwise necessary, for carrying out the provisions of this act, the association shall furnish or pay for all legal services rendered in connection with the appointment of such legal representative, or in connection with any of his duties, and shall pay the necessary disbursements for such appointment, the necessary expenses of such legal representative, and reasonable compensation to him for time necessarily spent in carrying out said provisions. All of said payments shall be in addition to all sums paid for compensation." [1] There is nothing in the statements that the insurer would not pay money to the beneficiaries in Scotland, and that the insurer insisted in getting an administrator appointed, inconsistent with the existence of an estate of greater or less value which remained to be administered upon the death of the employee. This is all the record discloses, and manifestly is not sufficient to bring the appointment of the appellant administrator within the terms of the above act. If a legal representative was appointed to administer property left by the deceased employee, the insurer would not be held to reimburse that person for money paid for legal services rendered him in the recovery of the compensation which, under the statute is to be paid by him to dependents or other persons entitled thereto. [2] We are of opinion section 13, supra does, not place such a burden upon the insurer in case a legal representative not otherwise necessary to be appointed is appointed to receive and distribute the compensation in accordance with "the provisions of this act," and that the duty placed upon the insurer by the terms of the statute is limited to the "necessary disbursements for such appointment, the necessary expenses of such legal representative, and reasonable compensation to him for time necessarily spent in carrying out" the provisions of the statute that, "if the payment is made to the legal representative of the deceased employee, it shall be paid by him to the dependents or other persons entitled thereto under this act." Decree affirmed. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. SUFFOLK. DOW'S CASE. In re AMERICAN MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-BURDEN OF PROOF. Burden was on deceased employees' dependents to prove alleged injury to employee was sustained while he was alive, and that death resulted therefrom, and that injury arose out of and in course of employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 403.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EFFECT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY. Member of Industrial Board hearing workmen's compensation case, and the full board, were not bound to accept conclusions of medical witnesses as to whether employee was dead when he fell on a machine, or whether living, so that machine caused his death. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) * Decision rendered, Nov. 29, 1918. 121 N. E. Rep. 19. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CAUSE OF DEATH-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Evidence held sufficient to sustain finding of Industrial Board that deceased employee was alive when he fell upon machine, so that machine caused his death. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405 [4].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. Employee's fall upon machine was proximate cause of death, cause of fall being remote cause only, since fall itself placed employee's body in such relation with machine that neck was torn open and carotid artery severed. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 374.) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT "OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.” Where beam tender of tire fabric company, whose business it was to see that yarn was wound around revolving cylinder, was killed when he fell on machine, so that his neck was torn open and carotid artery cut, injury arose "out of and in the course of employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 373.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571), by Lillian Dow, dependent mother of John Dow, employee, for compensation for his death, opposed by the American Tire Fabric Company, the employer, and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the insurer. Compensation was awarded, the award affirmed by the superior court, and from its decree the insurer appeals. Decree affirmed. Sawyer, Hardy, Stone & Morrison, of Boston (Gay Gleason and E. C. Stone, both of Boston, of counsel), for appellant. Oscar H. Nelson and Horace I. Bartlett, both of Newburyport, for appellee. PIERCE, J. The deceased employee was a beamer tender in the employ of the American Tire Fabric Company. As such, it was his business to see that yarn was wound around a revolving beam, or cylinder, which had a beam-head with a flat surface and an edge about fiveeights of an inch wide. Back of the beam upon which the yarn is wound is a roll four or five inches in diameter, which presses against the beam; and there is a long leverage which goes to the ceiling and there gives compressed leverage: Because of the pressure roll the beamer tender is never supposed to pass his hand across the yarn to see if it is running smoothly: If anything was wrong with the machine it was the duty of the employee "to put his foot on the treadle and stop the machine." A few minutes before the accident the deceased, apparently all right, talked to his foreman in front of his machine. No one saw the accident. The machine was stopped almost immediately after the accident. The deceased was found with his left arm in the machine and his right arm outside the beam. "His left hand and arm were caught in and his right arm was lying outside "toward the large cam the other side of the |