There is much sense and wisdom in this legislative interpretation of a group of words which has caused the courts no end of trouble. It will be observed that the idea of place is the controlling feature of this interpretation, and we approve and adopt it. When Totzke entered the inclosure of the Inland Steel Company undoubtedly he was in a place where his employer's business required him to be, and so long as he remained in that place he was exposed to certain inherent dangers to which he would not have been exposed apart from the business of his employer. By one of the inherent hazards of that place he was fatally injured, and the Industrial Board was justified in finding that the injury which resulted in his death arose out of the employment.

]5[ Was the workman's injury which resulted in his death due to his intoxication? If so, there can be no award even though his death arose out of the employment. Section 8, W. C. A. On this point the board made the following finding:

"The said Anton Totzke was not intoxicated at the time of his injury, and his injury and death were not due to his intoxication."

The most that can be said in favor of appellant's contention that the workman was intoxicated at the time of the accident is that the evidence relating thereto is conflicting.

The award is affirmed, and by virtue of the statue the amount thereof is increased 5 per cent.

APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA.

DIVISION No. 2.

HEGE & CO. ET AL.

V.

TOMPKINS ET AL. (No. 10415.)*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-BURDEN OF PROOF. In a proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act the burden rests upon the servant to show facts from which the conclusion may be properly drawn that the injuries were caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 403.)

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT-REVIEW-QUESTION OF FACT.

COMPENSATION

The finding of facts by the industrial board stands on the same footing as the finding of the trial court or the verdict of a jury, and, when sustained by competent evidence, is conclusively binding on the appellate

court.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].)

3. MASTER AND SERVANT-PROCEEDINGS BEFORE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION-EVIDENCE.

The industrial board may draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances in evidence.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[1].) •

*Decision rendered, Jan. 28. 1919. 121 N. E. Rep. 677,

Vol. LIII-23.

5. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-RULES OF PROCEDURE.

Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 55, providing that the industrial board may prescribe its own procedure, which shall be "as summary and simple as reasonably may be," the board is not bound by the technical rules of court procedure in civil actions, including those relating to hearsay evidence.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § §§ 404, 414.)

6. MASTER AND SERVANT INDUSTRIAL PETENT EVIDENCE-REVERSAL.

BOARD-INCOM

The admission of incompetent evidence by the industrial board will not operate to reverse an award if there be any basis in the competent evidence to support it.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[8].)

7. MASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-HEARSAY EVIDENCE-OBJECTIONS.

In a proceeding before the industrial board it is necessary that a party object to hearsay evidence in order to overcome the presumption that he consented to its admission and consideration.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[4].)

8. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-REPORT OF ACCIDENT-ADMISSIBILITY.

In a proceeding before the industrial board the master's report filed pursuant to Workmen's Compensation Act, § 67, showing the character of the injury, and that it was within the scope of employment, is admissible as a statement by the party primarily liable, notwithstanding its ex parte character, and is not within the hearsay rule.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.)

9. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-REPORT OF ACCIDENT-VOLUNTARY STATEMENT. A master's report of an accident made to the industrial board pursuant to Workmen's Compensation Act, § 67, requiring it to be made on a blank prepared by the board, must be held a voluntary statement by the master's adoption of the printed portion, where not accompanied by other explanation.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.)

11. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-REPORT OF ACCIDENT-ADMISSIBILITY.

An admission by a master in report to the industrial board that servant was injured in a particular manner in the course of his employment is admissible, although the master based such report upon hearsay evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.)

12. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-REPORT OF ACCIDENT-ADMISSIBILITY.

The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 56, that "these reports shall not be used as evidence against an employer in any suit at law brought by an employee for the recovery of damages," referring to master's report of accident, does not prohibit the use of such reports as evidence in proceedings before the board for an award.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.)

13. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACT-PROCEEDINGS—EVIDENCE.

An unimpeached report of master to the industrial board, stating manner of the accident and injury to servant, and that the same was within the scope of the servant's employment, together with other evidence, held, sufficient to sustain the industrial board's award.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].)

Appeal from Industrial Board.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Adra M. Tompkins, widow of Howard Tompkins, deceased, and the deceased's dependent_children, opposed by Hege & Co., employer, and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, insurer. From an award, after review by full board of an award made by one member thereof, the employer and insurer appeal. Affirmed, and increased by 5 per cent. by virtue of Acts 1917, c. 63.

Taylor, White & Wright, of Indianapolis, for appellants.

Marshall Hacker and Frank S. Jones, both of Columbus, for appellees.

BATMAN, P. J. Appellees, who are the widow and children of Howard Tompkins, deceased, filed their application before the industrial board, alleging that they were dependents of said decedent, and asking for an adjustment of their claim against appellant Hege & Co., for compensation on account of the death of said decedent resulting from injuries received by him while in its employ. Said application was heard by a single member of the industrial board, resulting in an award in favor of appellees, based on a finding of facts which recited that appellant Fidelity & Casualty Company was the compensation insurance carrier of said Hege & Co. on the date the decedent received his said injuries. This award was afterward reviewed by the full board on the application of appellants, which resulted in an award in favor of appellees, and from which award appellants are prosecuting this appeal.

[1-3] Appellants have assigned as errors on which they rely for reversal that the award of the full board is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Under these assigned errors appellants assert that there is no competent evidence in the record proving, or tending to prove, directly or by legitimate inference, that the injury causing the death of said Howard Tompkins was sustained by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment by appellant Hege & Co. This is the sole question presented for our consideration. We agree with appellants' contention that the burden rested on appellees to furnish evidence establishing facts from which the conclusion could be properly drawn that the decedent's injuries were caused by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment by Hege & Co. Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown (1917) 117 N. E. 555. Also that the ultimate facts upon which an award is based must be supported by some competen: evidence. United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis (1917) 117 N. E. 276. However, it should be borne in mind that a finding of facts by the industrial board stands upon the same footing as the finding of the trial court or the verdict of a jury, and when sustained by any competent evidence is conclusively binding on this court. Bloomington Bedford Stone Co. v. Phillips (1917) 116 N. E. 850; Sugar Valley Coal Co. v. Drake (1917) 117 N. E. 937. Such board, like a court or jury, may draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances in evidence. Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown, supra.

With these well-settled rules in mind, we proceed to determine the question before us. The evidence in this case discloses that the deceased died as a result of an injury to one of his thumbs. W. F. Kendalì, a

member of the firm of Hege & Co., testified that the deceased was in the employ of said firm as a carpenter at the time of his injury, and that the deceased told him that he had run a splinter or sliver in his thumb while he was at work finishing a room at the residence of James Pierce. Adra M. Tompkins, widow of the deceased, testified that her husband came home on the evening of the day he was injured and told her that he had hurt his thumb, and that he thought he had struck it on a screw. A. A. Kirkpatrick, a physician who attended the deceased after his injury, testified that the deceased stated to him that he had hurt his thumb with a sliver off a screw while at work. The witness said that from the nature of the injury he thought that was correct. Paul C. Graham, another physician who treated the deceased after his injury, testified that the deceased told him that he had pricked the end of his thumb with the burr on a screw. Both physicians gave it as their opinions that the deceased died as a result of the injury to his thumb. The evidence shows that the deceased was injured on April 8, 1918, and that he died as a result thereof on April 18, 1918. On April 17, 1918, his employer, Hege & Co., made a report of the accident in question to the industrial board. This report is in evidence, and states, among other things, that on April 8, 1918, the deceased was injured while in its employ by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, the employment; that the injury was caused by a sliver off a screw being run into the end of one of his thumbs, resulting in infection of his left hand and forearm. This is substantially all the evidence bearing on the question under consideration.

[4-7] Appellants contend that the statemets made by the deceased to the several witnesses as to the cause and manner of his injury are hearsay, and therefore incompetent as evidence. Appellees admit that such statements are hearsay, but assert that, under the state of the record, the industrial board had the right to consider the same regardless of such fact. It is firmly settled in this state that a material fact at issue may be established by hearsay evidence, where the same is admitted without objection. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lyons (1912) 50 Ind. App. 534, 98 N. E. 824. In that case the court said:

"The party against whom such evidence is introduced may not take his chance of obtaining a favorable verdict at the hands of the jury on the evidence so admitted, and then, after an adverse verdict, obtain a new trial on the ground that the verdict does not rest on any competent evidence."

The above case has been cited with approval in Wagner v. Meyer (1913) 53 Ind. App. 223, 101 N. E. 397; Buttz v. Warren Mach. Co. (1913) 55 Ind. App. 347, 103 N. E. 812; Baxter v. Moore (1914) 56 Ind. App. 472, 105 N. È. 588.

The reasons for adopting the above rule in ordinary civil actions apply with even greater force in hearings before the industrial board. It is evidently the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act that, by concise and plain summary proceedings, controversies arising under the same should be promtly adjusted by a simplified procedure, unhampered by the more technical forms and intervening steps which sometimes incumber and delay ordinary civil actions. Acts 1915, p. 408, § 55. In harmony with the manifest intention of the act, this court has held that the industrial board is not bound by the rules of court procedure in civil actions (Hagenback v. Leppert [1917] 117 N. E. 531); that a motion for a new trial is not an essential to the right of appeal on any question (Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 63 Ind. App. 548, 114 N. E. 872); that the admission of incompetent evidence by the industrial board will not operate to reverse an award, if there be any basis in the competent evidence to support it (United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis, supra). To deny the application of the rule relating to hearsay evidence, as stated and applied in the case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lyons, supra, in proceedings before the industrial board, would be to violate

the spirit of the act by applying a more rigid rule with reference to hearsay evidence in such proceedings than is applied in civil actions. We see nothing unreasonable or harmful in applying the rule announced to proceedings before the industrial board, as it would only require that a party. objects to hearsay evidence when offered, in order to overcome the presumption which would otherwise arise that he consented to its admission and consideration by the board. In this case the hearsay evidence was admitted without objection, and the board, therefore, had a right to consider the same, and give it such probative force as it might believe it merited, under all the attendant facts and circumstances.

[8-13] Appellants also contend that the report of the accident filed by Hege & Co. with the industrial board, and introduced in evidence, is not competent as an admission against appellants that the deceased was injured by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment. It bases this contention on a number of reasons, which we will consider in the order given. It is claimed that the report is an ex parte statement and within the hearsay rule. It appears to have been introduced in evidence without objection, and, as it is a statement by the party primarily liable, it is competent as an admission, notwithstanding its ex parte character. It is also urged that the report was filed pursuant to section 67 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which required that it be made on a blank prepared and furnished by the industrial board for that purpose, and therefore was not a voluntary statement of a material fact. The record does not disclose what portion of the report is the printed form and what portion was inserted therein by the party making the same. But, conceding that the statement in question is a part of the printed form, it appears in evidence over the signature of the decedent's employer without explanation, and it must be held to have adopted the same. While the law requires that such reports must be made on blanks to be procured from the industrial board for that purpose, it is not so unyielding or unreasonable as to require the adoption of any statement therein, or the making of an answer to any question, which is not in accord with the facts, or about which the party making the report cannot obtain reliable information. It is further urged that such statement is a conlusion of law and not a statement of a material fact. But admitting, without deciding, that such statement is a conclusion of law, still we know of no rule that requires an admission to be disregarded because made in the form of a conclusion of law rather than a statment of fact, and hence we conclude that this reason gives no support to appellant's contention. It is claimed that the uncontradicted evidence shows that the statements made in the accident report are based on hearsay evidence, and not upon facts within the knowledge of the deceased's employer or its agent. If this be conceded, it does not follow that the report must be disregarded. We know of no rule that precludes a party from making an admission based on hearsay evidence if he chooses so to do, and therefore we cannot adopt appellant's view in this regard.

It is finally urged that, by the provisions of section 56 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, accident reports received from employers in accordance with section 67 thereof are private records of the industrial board, open only for the inspection of the parties directly involved, and that their use as evidence against an employer is prohibited. An inspection of said section 56 will disclose that it does not make an absolute prohibition against the use of such report as evidence, the exact provision in that regard being as follows: "These reports shall not be used as dence against an employer in any suit at law brought by an employee for the recovery of damages." This provision cannot be construted as a prohibition against the use of such reports in proceeding before the industrial board by injured employees or their dependents to secure the compensation due them under the provisions of said act. We therefore conclude that appellant's contention with reference to the competency of the accident re

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