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warranted relief. Karoly v. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al.
(Col.)

......

Error assigned on abuse of discretion in award of lump sum judgment instead
of periodical and terminable payments to injured workman examined
and not sustained. Raffaghelle v. Russell (Kans.(
Compensation Board might provide by rule that working days shall mean
total number of days in period covered according to calendar, less Sun-
days, legal holidays, half holidays for each week, and days when em-
ployee was prevented from working trough no fault of his own, to
facilitate determination of weekly wage upon which proportionate com-
pensation was based-the law did not give any definite meaning to
"working day," but left that as between parties in interest under various
circumstances to be determined by Board. Jensen v. Atlantic Refining
Co. (Pa.)

386.

....

DEATH BENEFITS.

(1). In general.

Partially dependent mother of deceased painter, whose average weekly wage
amounted to $24, of which he gave her $15, or five-eights of maximum
weekly wage for purpose of computing compensation, held entitled to
award of $8.25 a week for 300 weeks, with burial expenses. General
American Tank Car Corporation v. Borchardt (Ind.)....

(2). Deductions.

In deciding whether parent is wholly or partially dependent on wages of
deceased child, expenses incurred by parent on account of child on one
side to be weighed against wages received by parent from child on other
side and all circumstances are to be considered in reaching conclusion-
no deduction can be made on account of expenses for clothing annually
incurred on account of child-that father chose to have deceased minor's
wages, as well as his own,turned over to his wife as manager of family
finances did not diminish his own right to son's wages or his obligation
to support family, and he was entitled to entire award as partial de-
pendent; wife not being such also. Dembinski's Case. Appeal of Em-
Pers' Liability Assur. Corporation. (Mass.).
Injured employee's compensation under statute paid pursuant to voluntary
agreement with employer cannot be credited, upon employee's death,
against compensation awarded dependent. Jackson v Berlin Const. Co.
et. al. (Conn.)..
Under act providing that payments other than for necessary medical, surgical
or hospital fees shall be deducted from amount payable on death. and
.section 8 providing that compensation for injury not resulting in death
shall include medical, surgical and hospital fees, not to exceed $200.,
master cannot have the excess over $200 voluntarily paid, credited upon
death compensation in absence or agreement therefor. Crescent Coal
Co. v. Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.)..

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293

657

700

151

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240

(4). Commutation of payments and award of gross sum.
Industrial Commission cannot direct payment to state insurance fund of
present value of future installments of compensation awarded dependent
mother of deceased employee, commuted on basis that such award is
of value equal to life award, in view of section providing that award to
dependent mother is only payable during dependency-basis for commu-
tation fixed by Law providing that commutations shall be upon basis of
Suvivorship Annuitants' Table of Mortality and Remarriage Tables of
Dutch Royal Insurance Institution, would not apply to award to a mother
during her dependency. Bailey v. Columbian Rope Co. et al. (N. Y.)... 176
In computing number of working days to determine workmen's average
daily earnings during six months preceding accident under rule of Board
providing that "days employee was prevented from working, through
no fault of his own,' should be deducted, days during which work was
suspended on account of labor dispute, together with Sundays and
holidays should be deducted-in case of instaneous death period of com-
pensation does not begin until 14 days after death. Rakle v. Jefferson &
Clearfield Coal & Iron Co. (Pa.)..

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Agreement of employer, as a condition of being allowed to carry its own in-
surance, to pay, when required, the present value of future payments
under award, not applying, when made, to an award of death benefits
to widow, no method of estimating contingency of remarriage existing
was not enlarged by subsequent amendment of statute, providing method
of estimating present value of such award. State Industrial Commission
V. Yonkers R Co.. (N. Y.)..

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Under act workman so injured as to be entitled to compensation may, if dis-
figured, also have compensation for disfigurement. Wells Bros. Co. v.
Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.) . . . . .

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512

255

388. PERSONS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR DEATH OF EM-
PLOYEE (DEPENDENTS).

In proceedings by deserted wife and by mistress of deceased, fact that wife
was wholly dependent on deceased, and that illegitimate children of

mistress and deceased were wholly dependent upon him did not necessitate disposal of case under act, as though there were no dependents, on theory that condition was one not contemplated by statute-deserted wife, who had subsequent to her desertion been guilty of adultery, is not a "dependent"-illegitimate children of deceased employee living with decedent and their mother are "dependents" of decedent within the act as part of his family; a "family" being a collective body of persons who live in one house under a head or manager who has legal or moral duty to support. Scott's Case (Me.)..

To entitle parents of deceased to compensation for his death sufficient if he contributed to their support within four years prior to time of injury and they need not have been dependent on him. Humphrey et al. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al. (Ill.)..

To entitle parents of deceased employee who died during minority as result of injury caused by employment to compensation it is not necessary that contribution of minor was in excess of expenses or that contrabution to parents had any regularity-it is duty of parents to support minor children until they reach age of majority and minor child "contributes to support of its parents" within the act when it contributes substantial sum to support of family. etc. Metal Stamping Corporation v. Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.)..

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527

Wife can claim support if husband was under legal obligations to support her, although they were not living together at the time and wife was not dependent on him for support. Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.).... Dependency of 13 year old daughter of deceased, not presumed to be conclusively dependent, is to be determined as question of fact upon consideration of father's legal obligation under divorce decree ordering payment for her support, or moral obligation, and whether order would be discharged or enforced. Schwartz v. Gerding & Aumann Bros. et al (Ind.) Daughter of deceased servant, over 18, married and living with her blind husband, she herself being totally blind and therefore physically incapacitated from earning, was entitled to equal share in death benefit with surviving widow. Gavaghan's Case. In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, Limited (Mass.).. Father, partially dependent upon wages of son, could participate in compensation allowed, though son left totally dependent widow, father being entitled to part of award proportionate to his part of total contribution to support father and wife made by son. Penn et al. v. Penn. (Ky.).... 634 Award to widow does not preclude award also to minor children. Wolford v. Geisel Moving & Storage Co. (Pa.).. 798 "Dependency" means reliance for support upon workman's earnings at time of injury resulting in death and not at any time thereafter. Newton v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I.).. Word "widow" since it is not defined by act is to be given its ordinary meaning, which is "a married woman whose husband is dead"—although claimant and deceased had lived together for about six years under belief that they were lawfully married, where there was no compliance with statute further than to make out two of three affidavits for license, claimant was not "widow" of deceased within act-though claimant believed she was lawfully married she was not a "dependent." Meton v. State Industrial Insurance Department (Wash.)... Where deceased workman leaves widow and minor children award should be made in favor of children to begin after award to widow ceases and to continue until each child reaches 16 years of age. Irvin v. William M. Frost & Co. et al. (Pa.).... Persons in enumerated classes may be wholly or partially dependent and come within contemplation of provisions, if dependency existed at time of injury-one claimed to be dependent must show that contributions were relied upon for living-"support" as applied to "dependency" is broader than food, clothing, etc., and includes all means of living-condition of health of claimant and need for medical attention, etc., are proper subjects for consideration in determining question of dependency. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Palmatory et al. (Del.)... Beneficiaries as well as apportionment must be determined by Compensation Act and not statutes governing recovery of damages for wrongful death. Vaughan et al. v. Southern Surety Ins. Co. (Tex.)..

§ 389. SUBROGATION TO RIGHTS OF INJURED EMPLOYEE. Under section providing for adjustment of compensation where employee is injured by act of third person, the employee, after employer has indemnifted himself by suing third person, is entitled to entire balance' of judgment recovered if more than sufficient for such indemnification-employer may sue for entire damages either in his own name or that of his employee, or may continue any suit begun in name of such employee after liability is fixed-court may by order distribute proceeds as between employee and employer. Gones v. Fisher (I.). Compensation Act permits ascignment of injured person's right of action against tort-feasor not previously sanctioned by law and provides that making by injured employee of lawful claim under act against employer and latter's insurer shall operate as transfer of legal title to his claim for damages against tort-feasor to employer or latter's insurer-use of word "subrogated" did not render right of action against tort-feasor

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596

acquired by employer's insurer, which paid claim, an equitable cause of
action as against tort-feasor, though as between insurer and employee
right of subrogation was equitable right arising out of payment of claim.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal
Rys. (Cal.)

Where dependents of killed employee assigned the cause to insurance car-
rier, latter could maintain action against wrongdoer. Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Padula Co., Inc. (N. Y.)..

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Decision of higher state court denying relief under New Jersey Act for
drowning in navigable waters not reviewable by national Supreme Court
on writ of error. Coon v. Kennedy (U. S.).....

$392.

....

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339

403

-AUDIT OF CLAIMS INCURRED OR PAID BY BOARDS OR COM-
MISSIONS.
(8).

Where assignment or change of interest without endorsement was prohibited
and insured's wife inherited and carried on his business after death, com-
pany was not liable after she had sent policy to company to be trans-
ferred, but before insurer endorsed transfer of interest, even though
afterwards insurer accepted balance of earned premiums, where it had
no knowledge of injury to servant. Kolb v. Brummer et al. (N. Y.).. 351

| 393. TERMINATION OF PAYMENTS.

Where one entitled to compensation secured a determination and award for
permanent disability and died before lapse of maximum number of
payments had been made according to terms of award, right to compen-
sation under award ceased with death. Lahoma Oil Co. et al. v. State
Industrial Commission of Oklahoma et al. (Okla.).

If award to widow ceases before decedent's children reach 16 years of age,
they are entitled to compensation until they reach that age. McCarl
et al. v. Borough of Houston (Pa.)....

In view of fact that no provision is made that remarriage of widow shall
excuse further payments where court awarded 300 weeks' compensation,
widow's remarriage did not entitle employer to vacation of award. New-
ton v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I.)..

§ 3932.

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788

527

Where workman directed by master to one hospital, went to another and
was refused care, he was not entitled to award for medical services.
Cella v. Industrial Accident Commission et al. (Cal.).
Not against public policy, under Compensation Act for employer to agree
to pay doctor salary, employer to retain medical fees allowed by in-
surance association. Sherrill v. Union Lumber Co. (Tex.)...
Injured servant authorized to select own physician at expense of employer
only where latter has neglected or refused to abide-employer under
no duty to offer further medical attention, servant having previously con-
sulted physician of own choice. Leadbettor et al. v. Industrial Accident
Commission (Cal.)...

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Procedure for recovery of compensation under act not applicable to cases
where suit is to enforce terms of agreement to pay stipulated sums,
made after accident. Burns v. Edison (N. J.).....

395. WHAT LAW GOVERNS.

Test of whether or not locomotive engineer was engaged in interstate com-
merce when he was injured is that, if accident was incident to interstate
work or to whole day's work. partly interstate and partly intrastate,
he is engaged in "interstate commerce"-where locomative engineer em-
ployed by common carrier, acting under two orders, one to help interstate
freight train to summit and other to return with engine, was injured on
return trip, he was engaged in "interstate commerce." Callahan
Boston & M. R. R. (N. H.)...

V.

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775

to

Plaintiff, as station agent of defendant, was not, while attempting
start fire in depot stove, engaged in "interstate commerce"-for railroad
employee to come under Federal Employers' Liability Act it must appear
that injury was incurred while he himself was employed in interstate
commerce. Benson v. Bush (Kan.)

Test whether railroad employee is engaged in interstate commerce is whether
at time of injury he was engaged in interstate transportation or in work
so closely related to it as to be practically part of it-work of repairing
tracks of interstate railroad is part of interstate commerce. Kusturin
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (III.)..
All controversies touching liability of railroad company engaged in interstate
commerce to employees likewise engaged are removed by federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act from sphere of state legislation and Commission
has no jurisdiction where injury occurred while engaged in interstate

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commerce. (Iowa)

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365

Des Moines Union Ry. Co. v. Funk, Industrial Com'r et al. True test as to whether plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce is: Was he engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically part of it. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. True. (Okla.) Evidence showing railroad employee was injured while repairing locomotive used in pulling interstate train insufficient to show that rights of parties were controlled by privileges and obligations arising under federal liability Act. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cronin (Okla.) . . . . . . Employee of interstate railway carrier, who is injured while removing snow from track over which interstate trains are being run regularly, is engaged in interstate commerce. Koofos v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (N. D.). 652 Member of switch engine crew, killed in movement of engine, without cars, going from setting one train containing interstate cars, to move another train also containing interstate cars, was engaged in interstate commerce. Wangerow v. Industrial Board et al. (Ill.) Servant was engaged in "interstate commerce" where injury occurred while on way to work which was in interstate commerce, to which he had been regularly assigned and which he had been performing for three weeks. Lindstrom v. New York Cent. R. Co. (N. Y.).............. Watchman of railroad shops where engines used in interstate commerce were repaired, held not engaged in interstate commerce. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.)...

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Where insurer brings suit to set aside findings and award of Board, issue to be tried is, not collection of sum of weekly payments due under award, but determination of full amount of insurer's liability that might be recovered, where such amount is in excess of $500 the district court has Jurisdiction. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Griesenbeck et ux. (Tex.)........ 801

397: BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS.

Where claim was not within Act, Commission had no power or authority to approve compensation agreement entered into by employer and employee, pursuant to section 20, or to enforce its execution, since no act or acquiescence could confer jurisdiction on subject-matter. In re Hassen. Appeal of United States Casualty Co. (N. Y.)....... Board possesses only powers expressly granted, together with those arising from implication because necessary to full exercise of granted powers. Aetna Life Ins Co. v. Shively et al (Ind.)

Where servant had written agreement with master and insurer as to payment of award, but parties did not agree as to the time the servant was entitled to such payments, question was proper one for board. Adams v. W E. Wood Co. et al. (Mich.).

Industrial Commission being court of limited jurisdiction cannot take cognizance of application for order staying execution of judgment entered on its award brought by one who had not joined in any proceedings before it nor had questioned validity of its award prior to final adjudication and affirmance. Gamble v. Superior Court in and for Alameda

County et al. (Cal.)... Plaintiff, by appearing before Industrial Commission would not waive his right to object to jurisdiction where commission had no jurisdiction oversubject-matter, since parties in such case could not confer jurisdiction even by stipulation. Waldum v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry. Co. et al. (Wis.)......

While Industrial Commission has power to determine whether policy still exists it must determine that question on recognized principles of law. Kold v. Brummer et al. (N. Y.).....

§ 3972.

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Provision of Alaska Compensation Law, requiring employer who had been furnished by employee with names and addresses of his beneficiaries to notify them of his death, held to apply to employer which, with other companies, hired men through a common agent who was furnished with such statement. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co. v. Crinis (U. S.).... 679 Statute providing that commission may issue subpoenas, compel production of books, etc.. contemplates that Commission may require report from employer of accidents. F. Eggers Veneer Seating Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin et al. (Wis.)....

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398. NOTICE OF INJURY OR CLAIM, AND DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION. Unauthorized agent acting for employer and insurer cannot waive Sec. 28, requiring claim to be filled with Commission within one year, so as to make waiver binding on parties to proceeding to obtain compensationemployer and insurer were not estopped to set up that Sec. 28, requiring claim to be filed within one year was not complied with, because insurer had paid medical bills for injured employee-injured employee in barred after one year. Twonko v. Rome Brass & Copper Co. et al.-Appeal of American Mut. Compensation Ins. Co. (N. Y.)....

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That employer was represented at inquest showed employer had notice. Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al. (Ill.).....

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"Due notice" to employer of injury to servant being such notice as is required by Act, means a notice given in the manner and to appropriate person specified-injured servant's informal statement in familiar style as to injury received, directed and delivered to assistant foreman, with request that servant's wages be paid to messenger, foreman not being person to whom notice might be given, was not "due notice" to employer. In re Colon. Appeal of American Linoleum Mfg. Co. et al. (N. Y.). Where agreement between injured servant and insurer has not been filed with and approved by Board, servant cannot after six months from time of injury proceed under Act as amended by section providing that if association and servant fail to agree as to compensation, or disagree as to tinuance of payments, either party may notify Board, etc. Courtney's Case (Mass.) Though death of servant did not occur until nearly two years after accident, and he failed to file claim as required, where under act requiring notice within one year after accident, or, if death results, within one year after death, claim of widow of servant filed day after death of husband is within time. O'Esau v. E. W. Bliss Co. et al. (N. Y.)..... Knowledge of employee's injury on part of employer is substitute for written notice and employer must have knowledge within time when written notice should have been given-fact that subscriber did not give notice to its employee that it was insured under act and that he did not have knowledge of insurance until some months subsequent to injury, had no effect on rights in relation to giving notice of injury, or claiming excuse therefrom. Frier's Case (Mass.). Injured employee's statement to foreman that he had been hit in eye was insufficient to give foreman knowledge of injury-notice need not give full or exact description; notice that will enable employer to give medical attention, etc., being sufficient-employer's actual knowledge need be only such knowledge of injury as to apprise him of its nature and extent -Statute, requiring notice "as soon as practicable" should be given liberal construction so as not to deprive meritorious claimant of compensation -compensation will not be denied on ground of failure to give, or delay in giving. employer notice of injury, where such failure or delay is due to honest mistake and did not prejudice employer-where injury to employee's eye caused impairment of eyesight at time of accident and was not aggravated by failure to receive prompt medical attention employee's failure to give notice without delay was not prejudicial to employer and therefore does not preclude recovery. Bates & Rogers Const. Co. et al. V. Allen (Ky.) To entitle applicant to participate in Compensation Fund he must have filed application with Commissioner within six months after date of death or Injury of person on whose account claim is made-neither date of mailing or posting of application nor date when by due course it should have reached Compensation Commissioner can be treated as date of filing, though such delay may have been due to existence of state of war not between the United States and the country in which such application was posted, statute not in terms suspending operation of statute of limitations in such cases. Poccardi, Royal Consul of Italy v. Ott, State Compensation Com'r (W. Va.).

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Making of claim for compensation within six months after accident is essential to right to award-it need not be in writing but may be verbal and it is sufficient if employer is informed by it that employee intends to claim benefit of act. Moustgaard v. Industrial Commission et al. (Ill.). 600 There is distinction between the terms accident and injury as used in Compensation Act. Leadbettor et al. v. Industrial Accident Commission. (Cal.) Notice of injury suffered by watchman at railway shops given to foreman or superintendent is sufficient. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission et al. (III.) 400. PARTIES.

If claim was within jurisdiction of commission insurance carrier did not need to be party to compensation agreement made pursuant to Sec. 20. In re Hassen. Appeal of United States Casualty Co. (N. Y.)... 401. PLEADING.

That

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workmen's Law existed in state of Iowa at time of injury is unimportant, it being matter of defense, to be pleaded and its application shown. Nash v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. (Minn.)...... .. 157 Where defendant did not plead that either deccased or employer were subJect to Compensation Law, court did not err'in refusing to allow defendant to introduce testimony in support of defense that plaintiff, deceased's wife, had filed her claim with Commission. Arkansas Valley Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Ballinger (Colo.)

Where one of dependents of deccased sought award abandoned second paragraph of its answer setting up willful misconduct defense was waived. National Car Coupler Co. v. Marr et al. (Ind.)....

It is essential in bringing action for personal injuries at common law, that it be made to appear from statement and show by evidence that defendant had elected not to comply with provision of act. Reynolds v. Chicago City Ry. Co. (Ill.)

Declaration which in substance alleged that defendant was engaged in electrical work was not defective because it falled to allege that defendant

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