HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONS. CHAPTER XVII. THE SECOND RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS—ITS INCIDENTS, ITS By his flight to Paris after the irretrievable discomfiture of his army, Napoleon betrayed at once a pusillanimity and a selfishness which justly forfeited him the confidence and attachment of the French people. It had surely been more noble in him to remain steadfast with his troops, to rally them yet behind the Sambre, to extricate and join to his own broken forces the detached army under Grouchy, and to make a last glorious stand against the invasion and conquest of France, or to lay down his life in the heroic adventure. But the days of mere heroism were passed for Napoleon; when he could still hope to fight, not alone for a throne, but for a predominant empire, he displayed all those great qualities which mark the puissant and indomitable warrior; but now the fire of his character paled under the pressure of accumulated difficulties, and, having scarcely longer a part of his own to play, he gave himself as a buffet to the merciless kicks of adverse fortune. So he abandoned his defeated soldiers and the field of war, to be overtrod by a victorious enemy, intent chiefly to uphold his supremacy in the government, which he knew would be seriously jeopardised by the unfortunate issue of his aggressive campaign. He was conscious that his claim to a throne he had won and made good by arms, must be gravely perilled if not extinguished by an overwhelming reverse on his favourite theatre of action; and yet he thought that his presence in the capital might still avail to crush incipient opposition, and prolong his tenure of power, were it only from a sense of the desperate predicament in which the country stood, exposed in its very existence to the vengeance of domineering conquerors, and out of which his stalwart arm alone might be expected haply to extricate it. Accommodating himself, however, to his altered condition, and as if to mark his conviction that he had ceased to be the monarch, and could aspire henceforth only to be the first citizen, and peradventure the defender of France, he turned aside from the regal palace of the Tuileries, and alighted at the more humble mansion of the Elysée Bourbon. In this, doubtless, he acted discreetly, although it was an artifice which served neither to cajole nor to conciliate. The majority of the Chamber of Representatives, which had already proved so suspicious and even inimical towards him, was not rendered more indulgent or placable by his calamity. Lafayette, the hero of '89, had emerged from the retreat in which he had secluded himself for twenty years, and reappeared on the scene when he heard again the welcome tocsin of revolution sounding; he was a member of the Chamber, and took a prominent part in this critical conjuncture. To him and the other leaders of the popular or republican party, it seemed possible to found a completely new state of things, to discard alike the Bonapartean and the Bourbon dynasties, to resuscitate the national sovereignty, and to educe therefrom institutions fitted to insure at once the future tranquillity and the liberties of the French people. To enable these views to be realised, it was first necessary that the existing legislature should arrogate supreme power, both constituent and executive, and that Napoleon should be induced quietly to abdicate. Accordingly Lafayette, in the sitting of the 21st June, after delivering an energetic harangue, introduced five distinct propositions: 1st, To proclaim the independence of the country menaced; 2dly, To declare the sittings of the Chambers permanent, and any attempt to dissolve them an act of treason; 3dly, To declare that the troops of the line had deserved well of the country; 4thly, To call out the National Guard as the best preservative of the national independence and of the national legislature; 5thly, To pronounce the ministers responsible to the Chambers, and calling upon them for reports relative to the affairs of their administrations. These propositions, so hostile to Napoleon, and even subversive of his authority, were voted by acclamation, and a committee of five members was nominated to confer with a similar committee of the peers and the ministers upon the means of saving the country. This committee included Lafayette himself, Lanjuinais, Dupont de l'Eure, Grenier, and Lacoste, all decidedly opposed to the continuance of Napoleon on the throne. But before these measures were finally adopted, Prince Lucien, who had generously forgotten all his wrongs, and almost alone strenuously laboured to uphold the sinking cause of his brother, ventured to address the Assembly, protesting against its abandonment of the Emperor, and warning it that it would expose itself before the tribunal of nations to the most severe judgment for inconstancy and levity. What language is this we hear?' Lafayette exclaimed in reply. Dare any one accuse France of fickleness or want of fidelity with regard to Napoleon! She has only been too faithful to him, as the bones of her sons on the sands of Egypt, on the frozen deserts of Russia, on fifty battle-fields, can testify. In a space of ten years, three millions of Frenchmen have perished for a man who would still keep Europe in a state of convulsion. We have done enough for him. Our duty now is to save the country.' Such the abjuring and expurgatory words of the sturdy patriot, who certainly in his own person was deeply indebted to Napoleon, since to him he owed his liberation from the lawless thraldom of the most ruthless of modern despots, Francis I. of Austria, who, unhappily for the sake of example, escaped into the tomb ere the retribution of his perfidies and misdeeds overtook his family and his tribe. The situation of the parties thus dividing or contesting power in France at this period was very peculiar, although by no means singular in her recent history. Napoleon sat upon the throne by virtue of a military revolt, which had been crushed upon the plains of Waterloo, and thereby the basis of his sovereignty undermined; the Chambers had an existence only through his fiat, and their members had taken a solemn oath of fealty to him not three weeks ago, in the open sight of Heaven, notwithstanding which, they claimed to be the sole undoubted organs and representatives of the French nation. In this capacity, then, they also claimed to have the absolute disposal of the government, even to the dethronement of him who had given them birth, and to whom they had sworn fidelity. It is true that the obligation of an oath had grown marvellously weak in France during the Revolution, and had almost ceased to be regarded as of any force, for never, surely, had a nation exhibited so monstrous a succession of public perjuries as her rulers and assemblies since 1789; but the assump tion of a sovereign prerogative by the Chambers was otherwise wholly out of place and unwarranted. Moreover it was prepos terous, inasmuch as they had no means of enforcing their determinations. Two alternatives only were open to them: either they must defend the country from foreign conquest, of which there was no chance save through the redoubtable arm of the great Napoleon; or they must repudiate their only defender, and by negotiations with the Allies, obtain from them such terms as they desired and contemplated. Upon this latter course it was they resolved to act; and accordingly, after a conference had been held between the committees and the ministers, a formal motion was made in the Chamber of Representatives, that a deputation should wait upon the Emperor and demand his immediate abdication. This deputation, consisting of five persons, and headed by Lafayette, was ushered into the presence of Napoleon on the evening of the 21st, he having around him his ministers, his councillors of state, and several delegates from the assembly of peers. In this grave council, sitting over the dissolution of a colossal empire, the question of what should be done in the existing situation of France was solemnly discussed; but in truth it had been already resolved by the usurping Chamber, since Lafayette had announced, amid vehement acclamations, that if the abdication were delayed, even for an hour, he would initiate a motion of dethronement. Under such a threat, the deliberations could not be considered free; yet they were opened by the Emperor in firm and touching accents, such as befitted the disastrous aspect of affairs, and in which he sought to rouse the patriotism and stimulate the devotedness of all Frenchmen. He asked for men, and promised, with adequate reinforcements, to repel the invading enemy, offering to lead the army of deliverance as a simple soldier. Lafayette coldly replied that resistance would but aggravate the calamities of the country-that the Allies at the outset had insisted upon a particular condition, which they were not likely to forego after gaining a decisive victory-that one measure alone could avert a desolating conflict, and the nature of that measure must spontaneously occur to the great and generous mind of the Emperor. Maret, Duke of Bassano, so long minister of foreign affairs under the Empire, and who was warmly attached to the person of Napoleon, rebuked Lafayette for holding such language, and recommended, on the contrary, severe measures against the Royalists, coupled with an appeal to the old revolutionary fervour. As he gave hot utterance to these sentiments, he was stopped by a riotous disapprobation, which broke forth despite the overawing majesty of imperial sadness. Yet Carnot himself, the steadfast republican, he who alone had refused to bend the knee in the dazzling era of 1805, and recorded his vote against the constitution of the Empire, interposed to give his voice in favour of defensive hostilities continued under the leadership of Napoleon. In a pathetic oration, he urged that the first paramount object was to save the independence of the country, after which internal differences might be satisfactorily composed; but to attain this end, the services of the greatest captain of the age were essential. In the midst, Regnault de St Jean d'Angely interrupted him: We are wasting time,' rudely spoke that old Jacobin commissioner: 'we must come to a decision; the hour is nearly elapsed.' 'What hour?' inquired the Emperor, turning abruptly to the speaker. The hour which the Representatives have agreed to wait for your majesty's abdication, replied the froward Regnault. This was too much for Napoleon's temper to endure. The Chamber,' he exclaimed, 'is composed of Jacobins, of madmen, who wish power and disorder. I should have de nounced them to the nation, and chased them from their places. Dethrone me!-they would not dare!' But after a moment's pause, he addressed Fouché, who stood near him, saying, 'But it is better: let them know they shall be satisfied; but not nowto-morrow!' With these words he retired. Fouché and the Representatives interpreted them to express an intention of abdicating, and when this was conveyed to the Chamber, still sitting anxiously awaiting the decision of the council, the members exulted in vehement apostrophes, as if they had achieved the most signal of victories. The Emperor has abdicated!' they shouted. 'We will have neither Bonapartes nor Bourbons! Vive la nation! In these vociferations they indulged until they exhausted their ardour, and then they separated for the night. It has been well remarked by a historian, not otherwise distinguished for solidity of judgment, or even coolness of observation,* that Napoleon lacked boldness and resolution when not in the midst of soldiers; and in corroboration of his assertion instances the 18th Brumaire, when the firmness of Lucien saved him from the consequences of a failure, and this present crisis of his fate, when he timidly shrank from adopting the courageous counsel of that same Lucien. It is undoubted that during this eventful day of the 21st of June he exhibited an indecision and vacillation which provoked Lucien into the remark, that the smoke of Mont St Jean had confused his brain. When he left the army to take care of itself, and hastened to Paris after his defeat, his conduct, so reprehensible in a military point of view, could have but one interpretation, apart from his fear of being taken prisoner, which was not a probable event-namely, the motive of preventing the Chambers from passing any hostile measures, or, if they proved refractory, of dissolving them and seizing absolutely upon the government. This, indeed, was so well understood, that the popular leaders instantly took the alarm, and procured the adoption of the five resolutions proposed by Lafayette, the first of which declared the independence of the country to be menaced, and the second denounced as a traitor any one who should attempt to dissolve the legislature. These measures were levelled directly at Napoleon, and they appear to have completely disconcerted him. In vain Lucien, Labédoyere, Flahault, and others of his more eager partisans, urged him strenuously not to hesitate a moment, but at once to dissolve the Chambers by force, as the only resource left him for the maintenance of his power. Before taking so decisive and perilous a step, however, he consulted other and more discreet counsellors, particularly Caulaincourt and Carnot, who dissuaded him from risking an enterprise which would almost surely end in his irretrievable ruin, since it was * Montgaillard, Hist, de France depuis Louis XVI., tome viii. p. 221. |