and may be permitted to remain in the possession of his nominal rank, and in the enjoyment of his emoluments, in the degraded and disgraceful situation, to which he has submitted for more than a year. Thus has general Dearborn, by adopting a measure, which brought the principal part of the enemy's force against my army, exhibited his profound skill in military operations, and his talents and qualifications as commander in chief of the American army.

I shall now proceed to consider that part of the President's message, of the fourth of November, eighteen hundred and twelve, which developes the objects of my unfortunate campaign. It is in the following words.

"Previous to its declaration, [the declaration "of war] it was deemed proper, as a measure of "precaution and forecast, that a considerable "force should be placed in the Michigan terri"tory, with a general view to its security, and in "the event of war, to such operations in the up"permost Canada, as would intercept the hostile "influence of Great Britain over the savages, "obtain the command of the lake on which that "part of Canada borders, and maintain co-ope"rating relations with such forces as might be "most conveniently employed against other parts.

"Our expectation of gaining the command of "the lakes, by the invasion of Canada from De"troit, having been disappointed, measures were instantly taken to provide on them a naval "force superipur to that of the enemy."

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The objects of the force intrusted to my command, are here particularly stated. They are stated by the first magistrate to the legislature of the nation. This is a document of the highest authority, and must be considered as conclusive evidence, that these were the objects, for which the expedition was ordered, and which the President expected would have been accomplished. If it was the expectation of the President, that with the few militia under my command, I should have obtained possession of the lake, it is unaccountable, that it never was communicated to me. All my instructions from the Department of War were laid before the Court Martial, and there was not the least intimation of the kind. Indeed I never had the most distant idea, that this expectation was entertained, until it was disclosed in this message. Both in my repeated written communications, and in frequent conversations with the President and Secretary of the Department of War, I had urged the necessity of a navy on lake Erie, superiour to the British, in the event of war with Great Britain. I well knew at that

time, they had a strong naval force on the lake, perfectly manned and prepared in every respect for offensive or defensive war. The United States had not a single vessel or gun boat on those waters. All they had was an old unarmed transport vessel, repairing on the stocks, and which was not launched until near a month after the declaration of war.

There were but two modes of taking possession of the lake; one, by taking or destroying the enemy's naval force; the other, by taking possession of all their posts and harbours, both on the main land and islands, an extent of coast more than three hundred miles. I am confident no one will believe it was possible for me, either to have taken or destroyed the British fleet then on the lake, with the means I possessed. The force, under my command, was totally inadequate to have effected it in the other way, especially after the fall of Michilimackinac, and all the northern nations of savages were in hostility against me. Although I still entertain the same opinion I gave to the government, before the declaration of war, that a navy on lake Erie was essentially necessary;. yet, I now believe, had an adequate force been sent to the Michigan territory, and sufficient forces had been ordered to have taken possession of forts George and Erie at the same time, and

these armies had co-operated, the whole of that part of the province of Upper Canada, which borders on lake Erie, might have been in our possession in the campaign of eighteen hundred and twelve, with all the enemy's harbours on the borders of the lake, by which means the naval force would have been destroyed, or must have surrendered at the approach of winter.

This idea I suggested to the Secretary of War, in my memoir of the sixth of March, eighteen hundred and twelve, provided the object was the reduction of the Canadas, and it was the intention of the government, contrary to every opinion I had given, not to build a navy on lake Erie. I suggested it as the only possible mode, and at the same time pointed out all the difficulties which would attend it. On the sixth of March, at the time when this memoir was presented, I had no command in the army, and had uniformly declined to accept a military appointment, although I had been strongly solicited. Being then the governour of the Michigan territory, it was my duty to induce the government to provide means for its safety.

About the eleventh of April, after I had been appointed to the command of the north-western army, unsolicited, and even undesired on my

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part; I then presented to the President, through the medium of the Department of War, another communication, in which I represented in the strongest and most explicit terms, the necessity of our having a naval force superiour to the enemy on the lakes; and that without it, and unless the army I was to command was strengthened by additions to its numbers, and unless it were followed by detachments to keep open the communication, and insure its supplies from Ohio; and unless it was supported by co-operations on other quarters, my army could not be able to maintain itself at Detroit, much less carry on offensive operations in the enemy's country..

After these communications, and under the circumstances in which I was placed, I ask you, my fellow-citizens, whether I had any reason to believe it to be the expectation of the government, that I should have obtained the command of the lakes? But in this I was mistaken. It really appears, that it was, because the President says, in the Message I have quoted, “Our expectation of "gaining the command of the lakes by the inva"sion of Canada from Detroit having been disap"pointed, measures were instantly taken to pro"vide on them a naval force, superiour to that of "the enemy."