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entered into another agreement, before the | June 9, 1904, and the agreement of July 14, termination of the original contract. pursuance of this agreement MacDonald paid to Lynch the further sum of $500 on account of the purchase price, and upon the perfection of the record title to said property and notice thereof to him he was to pay the balance of $2,000. Lynch agreed to perfect the title within a reasonable time, say 90 days, and to make the title satisfactory to MacDonald and his attorneys, Messrs. Jordan, Treat & Brann, and to convey the prop-chasing. erty unincumbered upon payment of the balance of $2,000.

In 1904, were acknowledged by MacDonald and recorded. The court also found that E. J. Lynch never tendered a deed of the property to said L. D. MacDonald or notified him of the cancellation of his contract.

The various conveyances by which the other appellants acquired their alleged interests were made after June, 1905, and it is found that all of these grantees had knowledge of MacDonald's contract before pur

The case of Collischon v. MacDonald was tried with this one, and the same judgment was made applicable to both causes.

By the writing of July 14, 1904, the obligation of Lynch to convey was to terminate [1] Appellants contend that the contract if MacDonald should fail to make the final of June 9, 1904, was rescinded by that of payment. Time was not made of the essence July 14th, and that, as the latter, signed only of the latter agreement, and there was no by Lynch, was not entitled to be recorded, provision therein for the forfeiture of the there was no notice to the subsequent purpart payments in case of default by the pur- chasers. But the agreement of July 14th chaser. Lynch employed MacDonald's attorwas not a novation. By the contract of June neys, Messrs. Jordan, Treat & Brann, who 9th Lynch agreed to sell and MacDonald to brought suit against several persons for buy. In the later agreement there was no the purpose of correcting the defect in the contract of purchase and sale but merely a title. The summons was served upon one of modification of the terms. Furthermore, the defendants, Rodman, by publication. these terms were modified by Lynch alone Judgment was entered on December 20, 1904. for his own benefit. In such cases the quesLynch notified MacDonald of the successful tion of novation is always one of intention. outcome of the suit and demanded the bal-The rule is well expressed in 29 Cyc. 1134, ance of the purchase money, but the title was

not then perfected to the satisfaction either of MacDonald or of his attorneys; the latter advising him that no perfect title would exist until one year from the entry of the jugdment. MacDonald refused to pay, but the court found that his refusal did not cancel the contract of sale. The rest of the transaction may be described by quoting certain findings of the court: "That on the 15th day of March, 1906, said L. D. MacDonald was notified by Jordan, Treat & Brann, the attorneys for E. J. Lynch in the suit to quiet title above referred to, that the judgment rendered therein had become final and conclusive, and that the title to said property was satisfactory to them, and that it would then be safe for him to pay the balance of the purchase price of said prop erty. That this was the first and only notice given to MacDonald of the perfection of said title, after the judgment to quiet title became final, and the first and only notice that the title was satisfactory to Jordan, Treat & Brann. That immediately after receiving such notice, to wit, on March 15, 1906, said L. D. MacDonald tendered to said E. J. Lynch the balance of the purchase price of said property, to wit, $2,000, and demanded of said Lynch a conveyance to himself of said property, but said Lynch refused to accept the balance of said purchase price, and refused, and still refuses, to carry out his said contract with said MacDonald, and refused, and still refuses, to convey said property to said MacDonaid, and such conveyance has not been made." The court further found that on June 15, 1905, the contract of

intention, and a mere change in the amount as follows: "The question is always one of of the debt, the terms and mode of payment, the rate of interest, or the nature of the

securities does not effect a novation, unless the intention of the parties to novate the obligation is clearly shown." The agreement with reference to the extension of time was not a novation or a new contract. Oakland Paving Co. v. Barstow, 79 Cal. 47, 21 Pac. 544. The contract of June 9th was acknowledged by MacDonald, and the agreement of July 14th was not acknowledged at all. It does not clearly appear whether or not Lynch acknowledged the first writing. Much learning is expended by counsel in an effort to determine whether or not the vendee had a right to record these writings. The fact remains that they were attached together physically and were recorded. The stipulation of facts contains the following statement: "The plaintiff and the defendants in said action, other than L. D. MacDonald, prior to purchasing their respective interests in the property described in the pleadings therein, searched the records in the recorder's office of the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, and there found and read the contracts between L. D. MacDonald and E. J. Lynch, dated respectively June 9, 1904, and July 14, 1904, and recorded June 15, 1905, in liber 50 of covenants, at page 314. That other than above said parties had no additional notice of said contracts except the constructive notice from the recordation of said contracts."

[2, 3] Under the circumstances it makes no

difference whether the writings were in a technical sense such as might properly be recorded. The reading of the instruments was actual notice to the intending purchasers, whether the documents were lawfully of record or not. The Supreme Court of Indiana has correctly dealt with a similar problem as follows: "We agree with appellee's counsel that an instrument, not entitled to go upon record, is not constructive notice, although recorded. Reeves v. Hayes, 95 Ind. 521, page 531; Watkins v. Brunt, 53 Ind. 208; Taylor v. City of Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274; Kennedy v. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474; Lockwood v. Slevin, 26 Ind. 124; Deming v. State ex rel., 23 Ind. 416; Reed v. Coale, 4 Ind. 283. But we do not agree that such an instrument may not impart actual notice to one who has seen it of record, for the law is that, if the purchaser does actually see the instrument of record, it constitutes notice. Musick v. Barney, 49 Mo. 458; Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481; Gilbert v. Jess, 31 Wis. 110; Musgrove v. Bonser, 5 Or. 313, 20 Am. Rep. 737. It is difficult to imagine any reason why this should not be the law, since it is immaterial where the purchaser sees the instrument, whether on the record or elsewhere." Walter v. Hartwig et al., 106 Ind. 123, 128, 6 N. E. 5, 7.

The next contention of appellants is that the purported tender made by MacDonald was not sufficient. All of the evidence on the subject is contained in the following stipulation: "Said MacDonald tendered said $2,000 by letter received by said Lynch in regular course of mail, and said letter is in words and figures following: 'March 15, 1906. To S. M. Snyder and Edward J. Lynch: The undersigned hereby tenders and offers to pay you $2,000 on account of purchase of 33 lots in block 1158 outside lands in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, as per contract of purchase dated June 9, 1904, and July 14, 1904. The undersigned hereby demands a deed to said property. Yours, etc., L. D. MacDonald.' ” Appellants cited with much emphasis the case of Doak v. Bruson, 152 Cal. 21, 91 Pac. 1001, as authority for their belief that no sufficient tender is shown. Perhaps if there had been merely an allegation of a tender and a denial thereof, a showing of the sending of the letter and its receipt would not amount to sufficient proof of such tender.

[4] But in MacDonald's answer to plaintiff's complaint and in his cross-complaint he avers that, immediately upon notice from Jordan, Treat & Brann that the title was perfected, he tendered to Lynch the balance of the purchase price and demanded a conveyance. Appellants in their answer aver that "no such offer or demand was made by said MacDonald until about the 15th day of March. 1906." In the stipulation of facts quoted above is the statement that MacDonald "tendered" the money by letter. The

the pleadings and having been admitted by stipulation, the sufficiency of the letter in and of itself need not be considered.

[5-7] There was no compulsion upon MacDonald to tender any of the money to Lynch's grantees, although he knew that deeds had been delivered to them. There was no privity of contract between him and them. The fact that Lynch had transferred the land to third parties was not in and of itself an abandonment of the contract with MacDonald. Shively v. Semi-Tropic Land & Water Co., 99 Cal. 261, 33 Pac. 848; Garberino v. Roberts, 109 Cal. 128, 41 Pac. 857. It was necessary for him to make a tender to Lynch in order to put the latter in default.

[8] Appellants make the objection that the offer to perform was not made with sufficient detail. There was no demurrer to the cross-complaint. The objection may not be taken here for the first time. Duff v. Fisher, 15 Cal. 381.

In

Appellants invoke the doctrine of laches. They call attention to the following facts: The decree quieting title was entered December 20, 1904, and within 30 days MacDonald was notified of that judgment. March, 1906, he was told by Messrs. Jordan, Treat & Brann that they were satisfied with the title. On March 15, 1906, he offered by letter to pay the balance of the purchase price. He was sued by Lynch on March 29, 1906, and answered the amended complaint (filed in October of that year) in November. But he did not seek affirmative relief by cross-complaint until November, 1907. Respondent makes two answers to this contention: First, that the question of laches, while not one which need be raised by pleading, is nevertheless a subject which may not be brought to the court's notice for the first time on appeal, and the record does not show that the subject was called to the attention of or considered by the lower court (citing Larkin v. Mullen, 128 Cal. 454, 60 Pac. 1091); second, that he was acting within his rights with due diligence and was not guilty of laches. Both positions are well taken.

[9] While it is true that the defense of laches need not be pleaded and that the court may in a proper case deny relief sua sponte to a seeker for relief in equity who has been guilty of laches (Stevinson v. San Joaquin, etc., Co., 162 Cal. 143, 121 Pac. 398), it is also true that, where the court's attention has not been in some manner drawn to the subject, the appellant may not first seek for relief on appeal.

[10] But, even if this point be waived, we do not find that respondent was guilty of laches. After the judgment quieting Lynch's title, MacDonald relied upon the advice of his attorneys to the effect that the said judgment might be assailed successfully by Rodman within one year. His act of record

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intended to assert his rights to the property, | months after such maturity was too late to if any he had. Lynch had not tendered him charge the indorser. a deed and demanded payment nor offered to repay either of the installments and to

rescind the contract. His answer to the complaint fully sets forth his claims of interest and his continued willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property. The lis pendens was notice to everybody that he stood upon the terms of his contract. There was nothing in his conduct indicating an intent to waive his rights. Nor does it appear that his neglect sooner to become the aggressor and to demand specific performance caused any one to be prejudiced. Under the circumstances he was not guilty of such laches as would bar recovery. Ex-Mission L. & W. Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 632, 32 Pac. 600; Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 47, 121 Pac. 1007.

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[11] Appellants insist that the judgment against Rodman and others gave Lynch a marketable title and that he was bound to accept it in spite of the advice of his attorneys. But the court found upon proper evidence that Lynch agreed to make the title satisfactory to MacDonald and his attorneys, Messrs. Jordan, Treat & Brann, Therefore the question was not whether the title was in fact a good or marketable one but whether it was acceptable to the respondent and his attorneys. Allen v. Pockwitz, 103 Cal. 88, 36 Pac. 1039, 42 Am. St. Rep. 99; Church v. Shanklin, 95 Cal. 627, 30 Pac. 789, 17 L. R. A. 207.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bills and Dec. Dig. § 404.j Notes, Cent. Dig. 88 1091-1099, 1101-1103;

3. BILLS AND NOTES (8 267*)—INDORSEMENT BY PAYEE-EFFECT.. An indorsement by the payee of a note is a contract in writing the effect of which is controlled by the law, and which cannot be changed to a guaranty by the oral agreement of the parties.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. 88 620, 629; Dec. Dig. 267.*1

4. PAYMENT (§§ 17, 18*) - TAKING NOTE EFFECT.

Taking a note either of the debtor or of a third person for an existing debt is not payment, unless it is expressly so agreed, and in case of failure of payment the creditor may ignore such note, and sue upon the original debt.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. 88 70-77, 78-85; Dec. Dig. §§ 17, 18.*]

5. MONEY LENT (§ 6*)—IMPLIED CONTRACTSUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING.

that expressed in the original note, given by A complaint alleging no promise except the debtor when the money was borrowed, and not alleging indebtedness in any other manner, was not sufficient to state a cause of action on the debtor's implied contract.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Money Lent, Cent. Dig. 88 8-10; Dec. Dig. § 6.*] 6. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (§ 25*)-NOTE.

Under the express provision of Code Civ. Proc. § 337, an action on a note is barred after four years.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 113, 118-131; Dec. Dig. § 25.*]

[12] We cannot say that Mr. Brann's advice to his firm's client was without justifi-7. cation. On the contrary, it was that of a careful lawyer. It was to the effect that a person served by publication may come in at any time within a year and have the judg-on ment set aside. To justify such advice we need only cite section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

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BILLS AND NOTES (§ 129*)-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (§ 48*)-NOTE-STATUTE.

Civ. Code, § 3135, declaring that the apparent maturity of a note payable at sight or demand with interest shall be one year after date, or, if without interest, six months after date, extends the maturity of such notes only for the purpose of prescribing the time within which they may be presented in order to fix the liability of the indorser, and does not extend the time for payment, or prevent the running of the statute of limitations in favor of the maker.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 283-292; Dec. Dig. § 129;* Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 259265, 351; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

8. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (§ 127*) - NEW CAUSE OF ACTION-AMENDED COMPLAINT.

Where a former complaint stated only a cause of action against defendant upon his indorsement of the note of a third person, or upon an alleged guaranty of payment by him, an amended complaint, sufficient only on the theory that it was a suit upon defendant's note to plaintiff, stated an entirely new cause of action, so that limitations ran until the amended complaint was filed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. 88 543-547; Dec. Dig.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases. see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 1022-1028; Dec. Dig. §§ 127.*] 396.*]

2. BILLS AND NOTES (8 404*)-PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND TIME.

Upon a note, assumed to mature, for the purpose of presentment to charge the indorser, after one year from its date, as provided by Civ. Code, 8 3135, a demand more than four

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; J. P. Wood, Judge.

Action by the Merchants' National Bank of Santa Monica against George R. Bentel.

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff ap- There is nothing to show that presentment peals. Affirmed.

Tanner, Taft & Odell, of Los Angeles, for appellant. H. C. Millsap, of Los Angeles, for respondent.

SHAW, J. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment given against it upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. This is the second appeal in the action. Upon a former trial judgment was given for the plaintiff, and upon appeal by the defendant, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. See Merchants' Natl. Bank v. Bentel, 15 Cal. App. 170, 113 Pac. 708. The present appeal is from a judgment given after the cause was remanded.

The grounds of demurrer assigned were that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, that the action was barred by section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the complaint was uncertain and ambiguous in certain specified particulars.

Such

for payment was waived or excused. presentment to the maker, accompanied with a demand for payment, is essential to fix the liability of the indorser of a promissory note upon his indorsement. Applegarth v. Abbott, 64 Cal. 459, 2 Pac. 43; Kellogg v. Pac. Box Factory, 57 Cal. 329; Haber v. Brown, 101 Cal. 451, 36 Pac. 1035; Cousins v. Partridge, 79 Cal. 229, 21 Pac. 745; Jones v. Nicholl, 82 Cal. 32, 22 Pac. 878; 7 Cyc. 959; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 352; 2 Daniel, Neg. Ins. § 871; 2 Randolph on Com. Paper, § 758. The complaint avers that payment was demanded of Barlow, but it lacks the allegation that the note was presented to him at the time of said demand or at all. This is essential to make a valid presentment. 2 Randolph, Com. Paper, § 1131.

[2]. Furthermore, the only demand alleged was made more than four months after the apparent maturity of the note, assuming that it became mature, for the purposes of presentment to charge the indorser, after the expiration of one year from its date, as provided in section 3135 of the Civil Code. This was too late to be of any effect to charge the indorser upon the indorsement. Cousins v. Partridge, supra; Jones v. Nicholls, supra; Beer v. Clifton, 98 Cal. 326, 33 Pac. 204, 20 L. R. A. 580, 35 Am. St. Rep. 172; Wills v. Booth, 6 Cal. App. 201, 91 Pac. 759.

[3] The allegation that the indorsement was intended and accepted as a guaranty must be disregarded. An indorsement by the

writing, and its effect is controlled by the law, and cannot be changed by the oral agreement of the parties. Goldman v. Davis, 23 Cal. 256. It follows that the complaint cannot be considered as a statement of a cause of action upon the indorsement, or upon the alleged guaranty. Upon either theory it fails to state sufficient facts.

The facts alleged are as follows: (1) On August 23, 1906, the defendant borrowed of plaintiff $5,000, and gave to plaintiff his promissory note of that date, thereby promising to pay said sum to plaintiff one day after said date. (2) "The defendant remained indebted to plaintiff according to the terms" of said note until January 24, 1907. He then paid the plaintiff $1,000 and the interest on said note, leaving due thereon a balance of $4,000. At the same time he substituted for said note and delivered to plain-payee of a promissory note is a contract in tiff instead thereof a promissory note of one W. H. Barlow, payable to said defendant on demand, with 9 per cent. interest per annum at Barlow & Bragdon's offices, dated July 8, 1906, for $8,000, of which $4,000 then remained unpaid. He indorsed this note at the time of the delivery by a general indorsement, merely writing his name on the back thereof. (3) There was at that time no agreement or understanding that the note of Barlow should be accepted in payment of the said indebtedness of the defendant to plaintiff. It was then understood and agreed that this said indebtedness should continue, and that he would pay the same to plaintiff. His indorsement was intended by him and accepted by plaintiff as and for a guaranty to plaintiff that the Barlow note would be paid in satisfaction of defendant's debt to plaintiff. (4) On November 27, 1907, at the office of Barlow, "plaintiff demanded of said Barlow that he pay said note, and thereafter on the same day notified defendant that said note was not paid, and demanded that he pay the same." (5) No part of said sum of $4,000 due from defendant to plaintiff has been paid, except the interest up to September 13, 1907.

[1] If the complaint is regarded as an attempt to set forth a cause of action against the defendant upon his indorsement of the

The appellant practically concedes this proposition. Its theory is that the complaint states a cause of action upon the original debt created by the transaction of borrowing and lending on August 23, 1906. It is argued on its behalf that the debt arose upon the implied agreement of the borrower to repay the money borrowed, that the giving of defendant's note for the sum borrowed did not extinguish that debt, but merely extended the time of payment thereof until the maturity of that note, and that the substitution thereafter of the Barlow note for his own note, it not being taken as payment, did not extinguish the original debt or his own note, but again extended the payment of both to the time of the maturity of the Barlow note. Upon this theory, counsel say, the facts stated show a cause of action upon the debt of $4,000 due from the defendant to plaintiff, and therefore, that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The authorities in this state support this

Griffith v. Grogan, 12 Cal. 322;
lington, 23 Cal. 322; Brown v. Olmsted, 50
Cal. 165; Comptoir v. Dresbach, 78 Cal. 21,
20 Pac. 28; Jenne v. Burger, 120 Cal. 446,
52 Pac. 706; London Bank v. Parrott, 125
Cal. 473, 58 Pac. 164, 73 Am. St. Rep. 64.

is

Welch v. Al- ¡dorsement or upon that guaranty. sufficient only upon the theory that it is a suit upon the defendant's note to plaintiff. It, therefore, states an entirely new cause of action different from that embraced in the former pleading, and the action thereon must be deemed to have been commenced on October 25, 1911, the date the last amended com

Cal. 33, 65 Pac. 134; Lambert v. McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 67 Pac. 6. The period of limitation began to run on August 24, 1906, or at the latest on January 24, 1907, the day the Barlow note was substituted, and it continued to run until October 25, 1911, a period of more than four years, before the suit upon the present cause of action was begun. It is therefore barred, and the demurrer was properly sustained.

[4] The rule is said to be that "taking a note either of the debtor or of a third person for a prior existing debt is no payment, un-plaint was filed. Campbell v. Campbell, 133 less it be expressly agreed to take the note as payment." Comptoir v. Dresbach, supra. And the cases hold that upon failure to pay such note, the creditor may ignore it and sue upon the original debt. Higgins v. Wortell, supra; Jenne v. Burger, supra. Upon the authority of these decisions we should hold that the complaint is sufficient in this respect and states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon the original note. [5] The complaint cannot be regarded as a statement of a cause of action on the implied contract. No promise is alleged except that expressed in the original note given when the money was borrowed, nor is the indebtedness alleged in any other manner. If the complaint is good, it is because it states a cause of action upon the note of August 23, 1906, due one day after its date.

[6] The third amended complaint was filed on October 25, 1911. If that date is taken as the beginning of the action, it is barred by the four years' limitation of section 337. The theory of the appellant that the substitution of the Barlow note extended the original time until the maturity of that note, and that the latter, being payable on demand and bearing interest, did not mature under section 3135 of the Civil Code, until July 8, 1907, one year after its date, would not prevent this result, since the third amended com•plaint was filed more than four years after the expiration of that year.

[7] It may be well to say, however, that the decisions are that section 3135 is to be taken as extending the maturity of such a note only for the purpose of prescribing a time within which the note may be presented in order to fix the liability of the indorser, and that it does not extend the time of payment, or prevent the running of the statute of limitations, so far as an action upon the note itself against the maker is concerned. Jones v. Nicholls, supra; Cousins v. Partridge, supra; Machado v. Fernandez, 74 Cal. 362, 16 Pac. 19.

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: SLOSS, J.; ANGELLOTTI, J.

(166 Cal. 469)

BORDEN v. BORDEN. (L. A. 3,217.) (Supreme Court of California. Dec. 3, 1913.) 1. DIVORCE (§ 133*)-DESERTION-SEPARATION BY MUTUAL CONSENT.

Separation by mutual consent, within Civ. Code, $ 99, providing that separation by consent with or without the understanding that one of the parties will apply for a divorce is not desertion, may be implied from circumstances disclosing consent, or showing that the separation was not against the will of the spouse suing for divorce on the ground of desertion. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 446-448; Dec. Dig. § 133.*] 2. DIVORCE (§ 147*) — DESERTION - QUESTION OF FACT.

The court, in a suit for divorce on the there was an absence of consent to living apart, ground of desertion, must determine whether which is essential to constitute desertion justifying a divorce.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. 88 489-493; Dec. Dig. § 147.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1010*)-FINDINGSCONCLUSIVENESS.

A finding sustained by ample evidence is conclusive on appeal.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3979-3982, 4024; Dec. Dig. 1010.*]

4. DIVORCE (§ 37*)-DESERTION-CONSENT TO SEPARATION-EVIDENCE.

Under Civ. Code, § 101, providing that consent to a separation is revocable, and if one of the parties in good faith seeks a reconciliation and restoration, but the other refuses, the refusal is desertion, a wife suing for divorce on ground of desertion must show, on it appearing that the separation was by mutual consent, that she in good faith sought a reconciliation and restoration, and that the husband refused and persisted in the refusal for the statutory period.

[8] An examination of the records in the case show that the former complaint stated nothing more than a cause of action against Bentel upon his indorsement of the Barlow note, or upon an alleged guaranty of payment by him. No mention was made therein of the note executed by him to plaintiff, or of any other debt antecedent to or contemporaneous with the indorsement and guaranty of the Barlow note. As we have seen, the third amended complaint cannot be regarded Where, in an action by a wife for divorce as stating a cause of action upon that in- on the ground of desertion, she testified that, For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 27, 107-134, 136-138; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]

5. DIVORCE (§ 127*) — GROUNDS - EVIDENCE

SUFFICIENCY.

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