ment or measure adopted or defeated under, ments under consideration amend appròxithe provisions of this amendment shall be amended, repealed or revived, except by petition and electoral vote." mately 20 sections, add 20 new sections, and repeal about 20 sections, possibly by implication certain paragraphs in some few other sections, leaving approximately 300 sections untouched, and without the greater part of which no charter for any municipality would be anywhere near complete. It will be observed from the language used in both sections 4 and 5 that the people of Denver were given the exclusive power to amend their charter. Section 5 in substance provides that it shall be competent for qual- It is true that the amendments are, in a ified electors in number not less than 5 per way, a departure from the system heretocent., etc., to petition the council for any fore provided for the management of the mumeasure or charter amendment or for a char-nicipality. In this respect, they are different ter convention. This is followed with a meth- and are new, so far as the number of officials od as to what shall then be done. As we in- is concerned; but, regardless of this, they terpret the language there used, it means are germane to the subject of municipal govthat they may petition for any amendment; ernment, that is the only proper subject emthat in the manner used, the word "amend- bodied in the charter, and they pertain to ment" is unqualified and unlimited, and that and affect this subject, each covering a sepathey are entitled in this manner to have sub-rate and distinct branch thereof. This brings mitted anything included within the defini- them within practically all the definitions of tion of the word "amendment," unless there the word "amendment," as defined in all the is something to be found elsewhere in article authorities cited. The fact that in a way 20 which would tend to limit or confine its they present something new or different in meaning to a narrower scope. We have been the management of municipal affairs in no unable to find anything elsewhere in the arti- way militates against their being amendcle which would tend to sustain such a claim. ments. It is common knowledge that comThis limits the question as to whether these mission government, in some form, has, withtwo amendments constitute a new charter, or in the past few years, been adopted in many whether they are in fact amendments to the cities in the United States, but, regardless of existing charter. We are of opinion that this, they still continue to be municipalities, they come within the definition of the word and their charters pertain only to local self"amendment," when unlimited in its scope government. When these changes are analyzas here used. Webster's New International ed, it will be found that the difference is not Dictionary, 1911 edition, defines the word so great as the term used might imply; for "amendment," "In public bodies: Any altera- instance, under the old system there were tion made or proposed to be made in a bill two legislative bodies, consisting of about 25 or motion by adding, changing, substituting members; under the new, but one legislative or omitting." body, consisting of 5 members. In each instance they are elected by the people. The new body enacts ordinances, etc., the same as the old; in this respect their powers and duties are identical. Under the old system, a mayor was elected by the people, with a power of veto; under the new system, the commissioners elect one of their number as mayor, but without any power of veto. Under the old system, certain city offices were created with the incumbents thereof designated to perform the duties pertaining to certain county and precinct offices, as provided by article 20; while under the new system, the commissioners are designated to perform the duties pertaining to most, if not all, of these county offices, and the number of city offices wherein the incumbents were designated to perform the duties of county and precinct officers has been materially reduced. It will thus be observed that about the only changes of any consequence are the reduction in the number of officials heretofore provided for the management of the city's affairs, and the withdrawal from the mayor of the power of veto; but in a way this power has been vested in three members of the commission, as that number can defeat any proposed legislation. When the former charter is considered in connection with the changes brought about by these enactments, it is convincing of the fact that they are amendments only. A new charter would be an instrument complete within itself. When these amendments are considered alone, they fall far short of such an instrument, and will be found to cover but a portion of the questions necessary to be included in a charter for the government of any municipality. For instance, they fail to cover or change the question of the appointment of many appointive officers and employés, provided for in other portions of the charter; they fail to make any provisions concerning their duties or for their salaries; such matters as civil service, the fire and police department, the public health, the fiscal management of municipal affairs, finances, public utilities and the control thereof, franchises and public improvements, or most of them, are left untouched with the exception of a few instances where it is provided that a commissioner shall become the head of certain departments, which were heretofore in control of certain boards or some elective officer. The charter, prior to amendment, appeared to cover all questions of municipal government. It consisted of In Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 pressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed. No such provisions are to be found in article 20 in providing for initiated amendments to a charter. This is further evidence of the correctness of our conclusion that the word "amendment" as therein used was intended to be unqualified and unlimited in its scope. for plaintiffs in error, it is said: "The signifi- | than one subject, which shall be clearly excance of the term 'amendment' implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed." This covers the amendments under consideration. The lines of the original instrument cover the question of local self-government for the city and county of Denver. The amendments include such additional changes within the lines of the subject covered by the original instrument, viz., local self-government, as are thought will improve or better carry out the purposes for which it was framed. By the adoption of article 20 to our state Constitution, we embodied therein radical changes by consolidating the city and county of Denver and allowing it to designate the persons therein who should perform the duties pertaining to county offices, as well as granting to it the right to make its own charter, a power theretofore resting in the Legislature. The validity of this amendment has been sustained. People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34; People v. Cassiday, 50 Colo. 503, 117 Pac. 357. In Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066, as well as in Londoner v. People, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156, we held that article 20 was intended to grant home rule to the city and county of Denver and other municipalities, and to bestow upon them every power possessed by the Legislature in making their charter. This being true, if the matter was still in the hands of the Legislature, and a legislator was drafting the title to a bill concerning this subject, if he followed the repeated suggestions of this court, he would make it broad enough upon the general subject to include all appropriate matters pertaining thereto. In such case, any matter pertaining to local self-government covered in the general title would be germane by way of amendment. Article 20 authorizes the city and county of Denver to make its charter, which, in a sense, is its constitution concerning local affairs; the state Constitution provides the method by which it can be amended. This does not include the restrictions placed upon the Legislature in the enactment of laws, or any restrictions other than the word "amendment" would imply. This makes the rules pertaining to amendments to constitutions more applicable to those under consideration than amendments pertaining to general laws; such being the case, the principles recognized by this court in Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 Pac. 221, are applicable, wherein Mr. Justice Elliott, in speaking for the court, calls attention to this distinction and the reasons therefor, as follows: "The power of the General Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution is not subject to the provisions of article 5, regulating the introduction and passage of ordinary legislative enactments. A proposed amendment to the Constitution need not be restricted, like an ordinary legislative bill, to a single subject; the only restriction is, that 'amendments shall not be proposed to more than one article of this Constitution at the same session.' Const. art. 19, § 2. It is not essential that the subject of a proposed amendment shall be expressed in its title; a proposed amendment need not have any title except as it designates the article of the Constitution to be amended. In changing a proposed amendment to the Constitution during its passage through either house, it is not necessary that such change should be printed, nor that the original purpose of the proposed amendment should be strictly adhered to. Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543 [14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609]. Section 2 of article 19 prescribes the method of proposing amendments to the Constitution, and no other rule is prescribed. It is not, therefore, by the 'legislative' article, but by the article entitled 'amendments,' that the legality of It should also be borne in mind that in its the action of the General Assembly in promethod of enacting laws and amendments posing amendments to the Constitution is to thereto, the Legislature is limited by certain be tested. Article 19 is sui generis; it prorestrictions contained in the Constitution. vides for revising, altering, and amending Article 5 provides that no law shall be passed the fundamental law of the state, and is not except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered in pari materia with those provisions of or amended on its passage through either article 5, prescribing the method of enacting house so as to change its original purpose. ordinary statutory laws. The distinction is Also, that no bill except general appropria- obvious. When an ordinary legislative bill, tion bills shall be passed containing more free from constitutional objection, is intro This court, as well as the court of appeals, has repeatedly sustained sundry and different kinds of amendments to the former charter, some of which made radical changes in the management of its affairs. Cunningham v. Denver, 23 Colo. 18, 45 Pac. 356, 58 Am. St. Rep. 212; In re City of Denver, 18 Colo. 288, 32 Pac. 615; Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 426, 8 Pac. 924; Carpenter v. People, 8 Colo. 116, 5 Pac. 828; Brown v. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. 455; City of Denver v. Barron, 6 Colo. App. 72, 39 Pac. 989. that amendments referred to and provided for in their charter were only such revisory or supplemental changes as the showing of the present charter might suggest, and should not be held to refer to amendments which alter or annul the basic plan or principle upon which the city government was duced and passed by both houses of the Gen-¡ments." In that case, as here, it was urged eral Assembly, as provided by article 5, it becomes, when approved by the Governor (or without his approval when passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses), a valid and binding law; thus, an act of ordinary legislation is fully and finally consummated, and thus a statutory law is brought into existence by virtue of the power vested in the legisla- | founded. This contention was not sustained. tive department of the government. But, in proposing an amendment to the Constitution, the action of the General Assembly is initiatory, not final; a change in the fundamental law cannot be fully and finally consummated by legislative power. Before a proposed amendment can become a part of the Constitution, it must receive the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of the state voting thereon at the proper general election. When thus approved, it becomes valid as part of the Constitution, by virtue of the sovereign power of the people constitutionally expressed." In Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340, it was held that an act is amended when it is, in whole or in part, permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made or some other object or purpose. In Cantini v. Tillman (C. C.) 54 Fed. 969, it is said: "Nothing is more common than to amend by striking out one section and by inserting another, or by striking out several sections and by inserting one or several; and if it be competent to amend by striking out and inserting one, two, three, four sections, clearly it is competent to strike out all the sections, and to insert others, in pari materia. Striking out all after the enacting words and inserting is nothing but an amendment, and is governed by the same rules as other amendments." See, also, Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 77; Brake v. Callison (C. C.) 122 Fed. 722; State v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, 12 Pac. 708. The commissioners who for this reason had refused to call the election were compelled to do so. Without being understood as approving or rejecting all the reasons given, we are of opinion that the conclusion reached by the Washington court was sound, and that there, as here, where the word "amendment" is used without limitation, any matter which is germane to the principal subject, to wit, that of municipal government, is proper to be submitted as an amendment. The case of State ex rel. v. City of Portland et al. (Or.) 133 Pac. 62, is also relied upon by defendants in error, but upon account of the difference between their Constitution and charter provisions and ours we think it is unnecessary to attempt to apply its principles to the facts under consideration. In City and County of Denver et al. v. New York Trust Company et al., 229 U. S. 123, 33 Sup. Ct. 657, 57 L. Ed. 1101, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the validity of section 264a, which was an amendment to this charter initiated by the people and voted on at the May, 1910, election. This section was in relation to certain public utilities; it created a public utilities commission, and designated its first members instead of leaving them to be elected in accordance with the provisions of section 198 of the charter; it also prescribed a different mode of acquiring a municipal water plant than that provided in article 9 of the charter. It authorized the issuance of bonds, and contains many other provisions upon the water subject. The voter was required to accept or reject it in its entirety; he was given no opportunity to vote for or against its different provisions, or for or against the commissioners named in the act. In commenting upon this subject, the court said: "But it may be added that we think all the provisions of the amendment have such a relation to the principal subject, namely, the public utilities of the city, as to permit their inclusion in a single amendment. Of the other two branches of this objection it is enough to say that the amendment supersedes pro tanto the A proposed change from the commission form to the mayor form was under consideration in State ex rel. Hindley et al. v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 352, 126 Pac. 920. The city of Spokane had by charter convention adopted the commission form of government; thereafter the requisite number of citizens who desired to go back to the mayor form petitioned the council to call a special elec- original provisions of the charter with which tion for that purpose; they refused. The it is not in accord. The purpose in adopting court held the method which controlled was it was to introduce something new-to make provided for in their charter. The portion a change in existing provisions and being involved reads: "This charter may be amend- adopted comformably to the constitutional ed by a majority vote on such amendments. and charter requirements, the new or changThe provisions of this charter, with respect ed provisions became at once a part of the to submission of legislation to popular vote charter, thereby supplanting or modifying by the initiative, or by the council of its own the original provisions to the extent of any motion, shall apply to and include the pro- conflict." We are not unmindful of the lan In Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), at page 164, the author states: "But it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a complete statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the time it leaves the hands of the legislative departA statute may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event." plaintiff in error claim sustains their con- | ipal ordinances, otherwise valid, may, like tention that this is a new or revised charter. an act of the Legislature, be adopted to take It is: "In the briefs some reference is made effect in future and upon the happening of a to Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325 [122 Pac. contingent event." 768], where the Supreme Court of the state recently had before it a proposed amendment radically and extensively changing the form of the city government. The opinions rendered in the case disclose some differences of opinion upon the question whether what was proposed could be regarded as a mere amendment. ment, but the question was not decided, and nothing was said in the opinions that tends to sustain the objection now made to § 264a." By this language, we do not understand that the question here was under consideration in that case, or that it was meant to intimate that a change could not be made, by amendment, from the mayor form to the commission form. According to our views, the language hereinabove first quoted would indicate that the court was of opinion that such changes could be made for the reason that, in referring to section 264a, it states: "The purpose in adopting it was to introduce something new-to make a change in existing provi- | principle may be modified by the second maxsions." As we understand it, the object of all amendments is to make changes, something different, or something new, or to eliminate something if desired. In State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279, it is said: "It is not at once apparent that there can be any sound objection to the enactment of laws to take effect upon the occurrence of future events, such as the Legislature may prescribe." In Pueblo County v. Smith, 22 Colo., at page 541, 45 Pac., at page 360 (33 L. R. A. 465), this court said: "It will be conceded that the powers conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other body or authority, except as the Its im. It is, however, not essential that the law should take effect immediately upon its leaving the hands of the Legislature. operation may, under certain limitations, be made to depend upon a contingency." To the same effect in principle are: People ex rel. Rhodes v. Fleming et al., 10 Colo. 553, 16 Pac. 298; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. (54 Va.) 78; Burnside v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271. [5, 6] It is claimed that the form of the [3, 4]. The contention that the manner of their submission was such as to afford no opportunity to the voters of lawfully exercising their right of franchise is not well taken. The claim that the two amendments, by their terms, are made interdependent, so that neither may be effective unless both are adopted, is not altogether sustained by the record. The adoption of the commission gov-ballot violates the provisions of section 179 ernment amendment does not appear to be dependent upon the adoption of the nonpartisan election amendment. It is true that its last paragraph says: "The foregoing amendment shall not go into effect until at the same election when it is adopted or at some subsequent election an amendment shall be adopted providing for commissioners to assume the duties herein provided for, and designating the time when said commissioners shall take office, and it shall then go into effect when said commissioners do take office." This means that it shall not take effect until some provision be made for the election of commissioners, and not then until they shall assume the duties of their offices. In this respect this amendment was not self-executing. We do not understand that this fact makes it void. 8 Cyc. 752; Ex Parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 17 Am. Rep. 425. It is true, as contended, that the adoption of the first portion of the nonpartisan election amendment, viz., that providing for the election of commissioners, was contingent upon the adoption of the commission government amendment. We do not understand that this makes it void ab initio. In Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed., vol. 2), at page 905, it is said: "Munic By of the charter, which provides that the of- county of Denver the power to initiate proposed amendments to their charter. The authorities all seem to hold that the going into effect of such an amendment can be made contingent upon the happening of other events. In case this small per cent. of the electors is enforcing futile and senseless proceedings, and will persist in so doing, as counsel argue, the remedy lies with the people to amend the Constitution in a manner which will prevent it. This court is not possessed of that power. In People v. Cassiday, supra, in referring to article 20, which grants this privilege, we said: "It is not only a part of the Constitution, but it is there to stay, until the authority which voted it in shall vote it out. It, as any other part of the Constitution, is to be given force and effect according to its plain intent, purpose and meaning." is sufficient to convince us that there is no valid foundation for this contention. [8] It is claimed that while the form of submission purports to submit only two amendments, there were, in fact, a large number of distinct and separate amendments submitted and voted upon as one amendment. In this respect great stress is placed upon the argument wherein it is claimed that the two amendments were interdependent, which contention has heretofore been disposed of. It is claimed that, inasmuch as the commission form of government amendment makes regulations concerning the duties of the commissioners as the city council, and provides that the doing of certain things shall be a sufficient cause to declare the office vacant, and that, as it eliminates the veto power of the mayor and provides for a reduction in the number of other officers, these [7] It is claimed that the language upon and other matters were separate and distinct the ballot submitting the amendment pro- propositions, upon which the people had a viding for commission form of government right to express themselves separately. It is calculated to mislead the voter. An ex- is also claimed that the section in the elec- · amination of the ballot when considered with tion amendment which changes the time for the result of the election shows this conten- city elections, and the section which protion to be incorrect. The ballot discloses hibits political parties from naming candithat there were four separate and distinct dates as such, and the section which inpropositions submitted. The first was for or creases the term of office of the election comagainst a nonpartisan system of election. | mission, are distinct and separate questions The second was for or against initiated upon which the elector had a right to be amendment that gives immediate nonparti- heard separately. san commission government to the city and county of Denver. The third was for or against the holding of a charter convention to adopt a nonpartisan commission form of government for the city and county of Den ver. (The validity of such a designation we give no opinion concerning.) The fourth pertains to the property and rates of a telephone company. The electors voted to adopt the first, second, and fourth, rejecting the third. It is not contended that the vote upon each was not sufficient to disclose an intelligent expression of the people upon these questions, though the submission clause to the amendment concerning commission government might appeal to us as disclosing a strong partiality for the adoption of that measure, and, to a certain extent, be unfair in its caption, or was somewhat in the manner of a campaign document, as counsel suggest. It is not alleged that it misled any voter, but, to the contrary, it stands practically admitted that there was a decided expression by the electors upon all of these questions. This same contention was raised in People v. Sours, supra, pertaining to the title under which article 20 of the state Constitution was submitted, in which case it was said: "There is no proof that any elector was deceived by the title under which the amendment was submitted." Not only is this the case here, but the record shows that 26,842 votes were cast for or against this amendment. This fact, coupled with the absence of any allegation that any elector was We are of opinion that the matters above referred to are but incidents to the main objects sought to be accomplished by the amendments. The commission amendment provides for the commission form of government. To do this it was necessary to make changes in the charter, so as to adapt its provisions to the conditions involved by the change. This could not be accomplished by declaring that the city and county of Denver should have a commission form of government, consisting of five commissioners, one of whom, selected by themselves, should have the title of mayor. To obtain the object sought, it was necessary to abolish many offices, to create others and provide their duties, and to make other changes thought necessary in order to perfect a complete government under the commission system. We are of opinion that the changes referred to were germane to the principal subject and were made as incidents thereto. In People v. Sours, supra, it was said "that if an amendment embraces more than one subject, said subjects need not be separately submitted if they are germane to the general subject of the amendment, or if they are so connected with or dependent upon the general subject that it might not be desirable that one be adopted and not the other." If a bill were introduced in the Legislature entitled "An act in relation to elections," making a change in the dates thereof, it could not consistently be maintained that it was not covered by the title. We |