Stark v. Chesapeake Insurance Co. 7 C.

stand it, or that it should receive so extensive an application as the plaintiff is desirous of giving to it. The parties certainly meant to apply it only to the case of those losses or injuries for which the assurers, if they had happened, would have been responsible. Having, in such cases only, an interest in rescuing or relieving the property, it is reasonable that then only they should defray the charges incurred by an effort made for that purpose; but when a loss takes place which cannot be thrown on them, it would require a much stronger and more explicit stipulation than we find in the policy to render them liable to contribute to such expenses. If a cargo be insured for a long voyage against sea risks only, and a capture intervene the very day after the vessel leaves port, it is very clear that the underwriter is not only not liable for such a loss, but that he derives an advantage from it, as his risk may be terminated thereby, and the whole premium be earned; and yet, if the construction now endeavored to be put on this clause should prevail, all the expenses of claiming a property, in which he had no interest, and which if condemned is a matter of indifference to him, and all the costs of pursuing it through an almost endless litigation, would be thrown, whether the pursuit were successful or otherwise, on an insurer who had taken care to restrict his liability to losses by perils of the sea only. The court cannot subscribe to such an interpretation, when a more natural, rational, and obvious one, and that without departing from the letter of the instrument, presents itself, which is, that this clause can never

apply but in such cases as would, if they happen, be losses, [* 420] either partial or total, within the meaning of the policy. We are therefore of opinion that the underwriters, not being answerable for the principal loss in this case, they cannot be so for the subsequent expenses which were incurred in recovering the property.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs.

1 W. 219.

STARK V. THE CHESAPEAKE INSURANCE COMPANY.

7 C. 420.

The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction admitting an alien to be a citizen, need not find the facts requisite by law to entitle the applicant to be so admitted.

ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the district of

Williams v. Armroyd. 7 C.

Maryland. On the trial in that court, it became necessary for the plaintiff to prove his citizenship, and to do so he introduced a duly authenticated copy of a record of the court of common pleas in the State of Pennsylvania, which contained a petition by the plaintiff to be admitted to citizenship, proof of residence, an oath of allegiance, and then the record stated that he was admitted by the court to become a citizen, &c. It was objected that the record did not show any previous declaration, and this objection having been sustained by the circuit court, the plaintiff excepted, and brought his writ of error. The court, without pronouncing any opinion, reversed the judgment of the circuit court.

Harper, for the plaintiff.

Martin, for the defendant.

WILLIAM WILLIAMS and others, Appellants, v. GEORGE [* 423 ] ARMROYD and others, Appellees.

7 C. 423.

The sentence of a competent court, proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and works an absolute change of the property.

A sale, before condemnation, by one acting under the possession of the captor, does not - divest the court of jurisdiction, and the condemnation relates back to the capture, affirms its legality, and establishes the title of the purchaser.

A foreign sentence of a competent court, though avowedly contrary to the law of nations, is valid here, because not examinable. But congress might make it examinable by our courts, if it thought fit.

APPEAL from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. The only material fact not stated in the opinion of the court was, that St. Martin's was a Dutch island, and the sale spoken of was by the order of the Dutch governor of that place.

L. Law and Dana, for the appellants.

J. R. Ingersoll, for the appellees.

[ *432 ]

*MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

Williams v. Armroyd. 7 C.

A vessel, with a cargo belonging in part to the appellants, was captured on the high seas, on the 20th of August, 1809, by a French privateer, and carried to St. Martin's, where the vessel and cargo were sold, by order of the governor, at public auction, and part of the cargo purchased and sent to the appellees in Philadelphia. After the sale, the vessel and cargo were condemned by the court of prize, sitting at Guadaloupe, professedly for a violation of the Milan decree in trading to a dependence of England. On the arrival of the goods, they were claimed by the original owner, who filed a libel for them. In the district court they were adjudged to him. The circuit court reversed that sentence, and from the judgment of the circuit court there is an appeal to this court.

It appears to be settled in this country, that the sentence of a competent court, proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and operates as an absolute change of the property. By such sentence, the right of the former owner is lost, and a complete title given to the person who claims under the decree. No court of coördinate jurisdiction can examine the sentence. The question, therefore, respecting its conformity to general or municipal law, can never arise, for no coördinate tribunal is capable of making the inquiry. The decision, in the case of Hudson & Smith v. Guestier, reported in 6 Cranch, is considered as fully establishing this principle.

It is contended that the sentence, in this case, has not changed the property, because—

[*433]

*1st. The sale was made under the direction of the governor of St. Martin's, before the sentence of condemnation was pronounced.

2d. The sentence proves its own illegality, because it purports to be made under a decree which the government of the United States has declared to be subversive of neutral rights and national law.

1st. In support of the first objection, it has been urged, that the jurisdiction of the court depends on the possession of the thing; that a sentence is a formal decision, by which a forcible possession is converted into a civil right; and that the possession being gone, there remains nothing on which the sentence can operate.

However just this reasoning may be when applied to a case, in which the possession of the captor has been divested by an adversary force; as in the cases of recapture, rescue, or escape; its correctness is not admitted when applied to this case. The possession is not an adversary possession, but the possession of a person claiming under the captor. The sale was made on the application of the captor, and the possession of the vendee is a continuance of his possession.

Smith v. The Delaware Insurance Co. 7 C.

The capture is made by and for the government; and the condemnation relates back to the capture, and affirms its legality.

2d. That the sentence is avowedly made under a decree subversive of the law of nations, will not help the appellant's case, in a court which cannot revise, correct, or even examine that sentence. If an erroneous judgment binds the property on which it acts, it will not bind that property the less because its error is apparent. Of that error, advantage can be taken only in a court which is capable of correcting it.

It is true that in this case there is the less difficulty in saying, that the edict under which this sentence was pronounced, is a direct and flagrant violation of national law, because the declaration has already been made by the legislature of the Union. But what consequences attend this legislative declaration? Unquestionably, the *legislature which was competent to make it, was also com- [*434 ] petent to limit its operation, or to give it effect by the employment of such means as its own wisdom should suggest. Had one of these been, that all sentences pronounced under it should be considered as void, and incapable of changing the property they professed to condemn, this court could not have hesitated to recognize the title of the original owner in this case. But the legislature has not chosen to declare sentences of condemnation, pronounced under this unjustifiable decree, absolutely void. It has not interfered with them. They retain, therefore, the obligation common to all sentences whether erroneous or otherwise, and bind the property which is their object; whatever opinion other coördinate tribunals may entertain of their own propriety, or of the laws under which they were rendered.

The sentence is affirmed, with costs.

7 C. 107; 3 P. 193; 13 H. 493.

SMITH and BUCHANAN V. THE DELAWARE INSURANCE COMPANY.

7 C. 434.

A verdict "for the defendants, subject to the opinion of the court upon the points reserved," does not authorize an absolute judgment for the defendants, unless the points reserved and the opinion of the court thereon, are stated on the record.

ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

Holker v. Parker. 7 C.

The jury found a verdict "for the defendants, subject to the opinion of the court on the points reserved." And judgment was thereupon rendered "for the defendants accordingly."

The plaintiffs, by their counsel, moved the court below that the points reserved and the opinion of the court upon those points, should be entered on the record.

[* 435 ]

The court did not act on this motion.

The defendants, it was said, would not agree to any arrangement by which the legal merits of the cause, as they appeared below, might come into discussion here.

Pinkney, attorney-general, for the plaintiffs.

Harper, for the defendants.

MARSHALL, C. J. The case is too plain for argument. The jury did not intend to find a general verdict; but to submit the points of law to the court. If the law had been for the plaintiffs, the court could only have awarded a venire de novo. The facts ought to have appeared, so that the judgment might have been either reversed or affirmed upon the merits.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.

[* 436 ]

HOLKER and others v. PARKER.

7 C. 436.

An attorney at law, as such, has authority to submit the cause to arbitration.

But an attorney at law, merely as such, has no right, strictly speaking, to make a compro

mise for his client.

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, in a suit in chancery brought by Holker, and others, his assignees, against Parker, to set aside an award made under a rule of court in a suit at law in the same court between Holker and Parker.

The case, as stated by MARSHALL, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, was as follows:

In the year 1782, John Holker, one of the plaintiffs in this cause, Daniel Parker, the defendant, and William Duer, who is dead insol