INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

1. Where there is a complete taking at sea by a belligerent, and his possession continues
to the time of the abandonment, there is a constructive total loss which justifies the
abandonment, though the property be neutral. Rhinelander v. Ins. Co. of Pennsyl
vania, 9.

2. The state of the loss at the time of the abandonment fixes the rights of the parties,
and the subsequent release of the vessel does not prevent the recovery as for a total
loss. Ib.

3. The right to abandon depends on the actual state of the loss at the time of the aban-
donment, not upon the information concerning the loss then in the possession of the
assured. Marshall v. Delaware Ins. Co. 70.

4. Though a capture, and possession under it, constitute a technical total loss, and jus-
tify an abandonment, yet the right to abandon is terminated by a final decree of
restitution, though the decree had not been actually executed when the offer to aban-
don was made. Ib.

5. The seizure of the cargo, the vessel being at liberty to proceed, does not justify an
abandonment of the vessel. Alexander v. Baltimore Ins. Co. 140.

6. Whether a certain state of facts, justifies the master in breaking up a voyage, and
if so, whether the cause is a peril within the policy, are questions of law. King v.
Delaware Ins. Co. 322.

7. The right to abandon exists during the detention under a capture, but it must be
exercised within a reasonable time after notice of the loss. Chesapeake Ins. Co. v.
Stark, 397.

8. What is a reasonable time is a question for a jury under the direction of the court.
Ib. Maryland Ins. Co. v. Ruden's Administrator, 426. Livingston v. Maryland Ins.
Co. 648.

9. The right to abandon may be kept in suspense by mutual consent. Livingston v.
Maryland Ins. Co. 400.

10. If a voyage is abandoned by reason of fear of seizure founded on false information,
no real cause for seizure existing, underwriters on freight are not liable. King v.
Delaware Ins. Co. 322.

11. Underwriters upon cargo are not liable to the owner for freight, in case of aban-
donment. Caze v. Baltimore Ins. Co. 569.

12. A supercargo, after capture, acts for whom it may concern, and if an abandonment
be duly made, he is the agent of the insurer. Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Stark, 397.

INSURANCE, 12.

ABATEMENT.

ABSENT DEFENDANT.

ABSENT DEFENDANT.

In Virginia, if the marshal return on an alias capias that one defendant is not an in-
habitant the suit abates as to him. Barton v. Petit, 510.

ACCOUNT.

1. If a bill seeks to open a settled account and surcharge and falsify it, the complain-
ant must show clearly the errors complained of, otherwise the settlement remains a
bar. Chappedelaine v. Decheneaux, 114.

2. Where a complainant has a right to an account, the court may refer the cause,
either with or without instructions, as to the principles upon which it is to be taken.
Field v. Holland, 303.

3. An account-current sent by a foreign merchant to a merchant in this country, and
not objected to for two years, is deemed an account stated, and throws the burden
of proof upon him who received and kept it without objection. Freeland v. Heron,

490.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3; LIMITATIONS OF SUITS, 1-5; Partner-
SHIP, 4; PRACTICE, 6.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
DEED, 4. 5. 7.

ACTION.

The assignee of one share of a pending mercantile adventure, who makes an express
promise to the managing partner to assume the liability to him of the assignor, on
which the managing partner acts, by thereafter prosecuting the adventure, treating
the assignee as his copartner, is liable to an action at law on such promise. Clark's
Executors v. Currington, 546.

ASSUMPSIT; BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c., 2. 4. 5; CONTRACT, 4. 5; CORPORATION;
FRAUD, 4; PATENT; PLEADING, 5. 7; POSTMASTER, 2; Slave, 2.

ADMIRALTY.

Cases of seizure upon waters navigable from the sea, by vessels of more than ten tons
burden, for breach of the laws of the United States, are civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and are to be tried without a jury. Whelan v. United States,

475.

APPEAL, 1; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1. 18. 31; EVIDENCE, 12. 19. 21. 23;
JUDGMENT, &c. 9.

AGENT.

The United States are not bound by the declarations of their agent, founded upon a
mistake of fact, unless it clearly appear that the agent was acting within the scope
of his authority, and was empowered in his capacity of agent to make such decla
ration. Lee v. Munroe, 572.

ABANDONMENT, 12; CORPORATION; PUBLIC Lands, 14 ; USURY.

ALIEN.

1. A person born in England before the year 1775, and who always resided there, and
never was in the United States, is an alien, and could not, in the year 1793, take
lands in Maryland by descent from a citizen of the United States. Dawson's Lessee
v. Godfrey, 122.

2. An alien enemy may take lands in Virginia by devise, and hold the same until
office found. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 684.

CITIZEN; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 510-514; NATURALIZATION.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

BOND, 2.

AMENDMENT.

1. A libel may be amended after reversal, for want of substantial averments. Schooner
Anne v. United States, 673.

2. It is not error to allow an amendment of the date of the demise, in a declaration in
ejectment. Blackwell v. Patton, 626.

FORFEITURE, 3; PRACTICE, 4. 5; WRIT OF Error, 7.

ANSWER.
EQUITY, 6.

APPEAL.

1. In admiralty an appeal suspends the sentence, and it is not res judicata until the
final sentence of the appellate court is given. Yeaton v. United States, 263.

2. If the law, under which a sentence of forfeiture was inflicted, expire, or be abso-
lutely repealed, after an appeal, and before sentence by the appellate court, the sen-
tence must be reversed.

Ib.

3. If the counsel for the appellant neglect to furnish the court with a statement of the
points of the case, the appeal will be dismissed. Schooner Catherine v. United States, 468.
BOND, 2; COSTS, 2; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1-16. 19-21. 28; DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1; EVIDENCE, 23; INQUISITION, 1; PRIZE, 2. 3; WRIT
OF ERROR, 1.

APPEARANCE.

If the defendant in a foreign attachment appears, he places himself on the same ground
as if he had been personally served with process. Pollard v. Dwight, 158.

WRIT OF ERROR, 14. 16.

APPRAISEMENT.

EVIDENCE, 19.

ARBITRATION.

AWARD.

ARREST.

In the district of Connecticut, the marshal may, upon an attachment for debt, without
a mittimus commit the defendant to prison for want of bail. Pulmer v. Allen, 667.

JURISDICTION, 2.

ASSIGNMENT.

ACTION; BOND, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 1. 4.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. Upon a special contract executed on the part of the plaintiff, indebitatus assumpsit
will lie for the price. Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrator, 540.

2. If a contract under seal be partly performed, and the execution of the residue pre-
vented by the defendant, assumpsit upon a quantum meruit, for the work actually
done, will not lie. Young v. Preston, 86.

LIMITATIONS OF SUITS, 1.

ATTORNEY.

1. An attorney at law, as such, has authority to submit the cause to arbitration. Hol-
ker v. Parker, 606.

2. But an attorney at law, merely as such, has no right, strictly speaking, to make a
compromise for his client. Ib.

AUDITOR.

1. An order in an equity suit, made by consent, that two persons be appointed "audi-
tors," to examine certain accounts, does not make them referees. Field v. Holland,
303.

2. Upon the report of auditors it was competent for the court, on exceptions filed, to
look into the evidence in the cause, and to direct an issue, which it might afterwards
revoke; and if without an express revocation the court proceed to find the facts,
this amounts to an implied revocation. Ib.

3. It is not necessary to take exceptions to the report of auditors, if the errors appear
upon the face of the report. Himely v. Rose, 277.

AWARD.

1. An award will not be set aside in equity on account of an omission by the arbitrators
to act upon part of the matters submitted, unless that omission shall have injured the
complainant. Davy's Executors v. Faw, 502.

2. When the price of land and not the question of title, is submitted, the submission
and award need not be by deed. 1b.

3. An award is not void because it is in the alternative, and contingent, nor because
one of the alternatives requires the party to do an act in conjunction with others,
not parties to the award, and over whom he has no control. Thornton v. Carson, 681.
ATTORNEY, 1; AUDITOR 1.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

COURTS OF THE United StaTES, 9; STATUTES, 7.

BANKRUPT.

1. Under the Bankrupt Act, (2 Stats. at Large, 19,) a debt due from a firm, of which
the bankrupt was a member, dissolved before the bankruptcy, may be set off against
a debt due to the bankrupt alone, in an action by his assignee. Tucker v. Oxley,

183.

2. In the distribution of a bankrupt's effects in this country, the United States are
entitled to a preference, although the debt was contracted by a foreigner in a foreign
country; and although the United States had proved their debt under the commis-
sion of bankruptcy, and had voted for an assignee. Harrison v. Sterry, 267.
3. The bankrupt law of a foreign country cannot operate a legal transfer of property
in this country. Ib.

PARTIES 3; Partnership, 2.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

1. To charge one who indorses a promissory note for the accommodation of the maker,
a demand on the maker and notice to the indorser are necessary. French's Execu-
trix v. Bank of Columbia, 48.

2. An accommodation indorser of a note negotiable in the Bank of Alexandria, is by
force of the act of incorporation, liable to an action before the maker has been sued,
and though he be solvent. Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 189.

3. If a person write his name on a blank piece of paper, with the intent to have it
operate as an indorsement of a negotiable note, to obtain a loan for the benefit of a
friend, who is to sign as maker, and the note be written and signed, and the loan
made on the faith of it, the signature operates as an indorsement, and binds the
indorser. Violett v. Patton, 212.

4. Under the law of Virginia, an indorsee of a negotiable promissory note cannot
maintain an action at law against his immediate indorser, without proof of insolvency
of the maker, or of a suit against him, even if the maker resided out of the juris-
diction, and the indorser put his name on the note to give it credit with the plaintiff,
and took security for his indemnity. Dulany v. Hodgkin, 285.

5. If a foreign bill be indorsed in Virginia, and duly protested for non-payment, the
indorser is liable to an action for fifteen per cent. damages; his contract being
governed by the law of the place where it was made. Slacum v. Pomery, 377.

6. A declaration against an indorser of a foreign bill, which does not allege notice of
the protest, is bad, on error. Ib.

7. The mere possession of a promissory note by an indorsee, who has indorsed it to
another, is not sufficient evidence of his right of action against his indorser, without
a reassignment or receipt from the last indorsee. An indorsement "without re-
course," is not evidence of money had and received by the indorser to the use of
the indorsee. Welch v. Lindo, 496.

8. Under the law of Virginia, the holder of a negotiable promissory note may maintain
a bill in equity against a remote indorser, to recover its contents. Riddle v. Man-
deville, 281.

9. The right thus asserted, is the right of the indorsee who took the note from the
defendant, and therefore any legal defence, valid as against such immediate indorsee
of the defendant, is valid in equity as against the remote indorsee. Ib.
10. Although the consideration of a promissory note fail, by reason of the failure of
the payee to perform his part of the agreement upon which it was given, yet if a
new agreement as a substitute for the old one be entered into between the original
parties to the note, this failure of the original consideration creates no equity in
favor of the maker of the note against the indorsee, even in Virginia. Young v.
Grundy, 666.

11. In an action in Virginia by the assignee of a negotiable promissory note against
the maker, the latter may set off a negotiable note of the assignor which he held at
the time of receiving notice of the assignment of his own note, although the note
thus set off was not due at the time of the notice, but became due before the note
upon which the suit was brought. Stewart v. Anderson, 371.
CONTRACT, 4. 5; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 14; EVIDENCE, 9-11;
INSURANCE, 9; PAYMENT, 3; PLEADING, 9.

BLOCKADE.

1. An intention to enter a blockaded port is not a breach of blockade; there must
also be an attempt to enter, knowing the fact of blockade. Fitzsimmon v. Newport
Ins. Co. 65.

2. Where orders had been given to the blockading force not to capture a vessel, unless
previously warned not to enter, the master is not bound to make inquiries elsewhere,