bility of our attaining to any principles, in which we can repose entire confidence? The solutions of these questions, will lead to a full development of the true nature and spirit of the inductive method of reasoning, which, although it has been abundantly discussed in the modern schools, has not even yet, in my estimation, been rightly understood by the greater part of those writers, who have undertaken to explain it.

We have seen that man can attain his first and simplest perceptions, both of body and mind, only by experience. It is not until the senses have exercised their functions, that he becomes acquainted with the properties of bodies, that marble is hard, gold is yellow, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter. In like manner, it is by reflection only or consciousness, that he is introduced to a knowledge of the properties of his mind, as thinking, feeling, willing. The mind is endowed with no powers, which could communicate to him this intelligence, unless it be actually conveyed into his understanding, through the appointed inlets of sensation and reflection. Here, then, we cannot fail to perceive, that in the very commencement of our knowledge, nature opens to our view a dark and impenetrable wilderness, in which we can not move a foot in safety, without the light of experience. Reason, intense as her light afterwards becomes, in tracing the abstract relations and habitudes of things, and in collecting from observation the materials out of which to form her structures, is here but a dim taper, that glimmers through the darkness, or an ignis fatuus, if too confidently trusted, to decoy us into bogs and brakes. To demonstrate the force and justness of these observations, let us imagine mankind made acquainted by perception, with the objects around them and their qualities, say with fire, water, sugar, salt, aqua regia, and gold. Suppose them, antecedently to experience, to begin to form conjectures about their probable operations on each other. Is it credible, that any conjectures

they might form, would make even the smallest approximation to the truth? Could they have any idea, that if water were thrown in sufficient quantity upon fire, it would extinguish it, that the same fluid would melt the sugar, and that aqua regia would dissolve the gold? It is evident that these are lessons which could be learnt only from experience, and that we are endowed with no powers, which enabling us to penetrate into the internal structures of these substances, would enable us at the same time, to foretell or determine a priori, what would be the results of their action upon one another. The king of Siam, inhabiting a country along the eastern side of the bay of Bengal, and within the tropics, could not be induced to believe the report of the Dutch Ambassador, that by the coldness of the winter, water, which always appeared to him in a state of fluidity, could ever become so hard, as to sustain upon its surface a loaded wagon. He could form no idea, of the manner in which cold could produce such a wonderful change in the consistence of water, and thence concluded that it was impossible. Unphilosophical as this conclusion was, it reveals to us an important fact in the science of the human mind, viz. in what complete ignorance we are left by the Creator, in regard to the operations, as well as the whole frame and organization of nature, until by experience and observation of phenomena, we have learned to trace back effects to the causes that produce them. The next stage, therefore, in our progress in human knowledge, is to endeavour to refer effects, or phenomena to the causes that produce them, and at this point it is, that the inductive method of Bacon properly commences. After having attained to an acquaintance with the properties of substances, and their operations upon each other, we next commence philosophers, and make an attempt to class the phenomena under general heads, and assign the causes that operated in the production of them. This is one of the efforts of reason, deducing its lessons from an obser

vation of facts. We are not any longer contented with remarking, that clouds in summer dispense to us rain, and in winter snow; that the tides rise and fall; that lightning in hot weather passes from the clouds to the earth; that the sun retreats in the fall, and returns to us in the spring; but with the zeal of Democritus, we are curious to ascertain the reason of these changes and revolutions in the system. Now, it is clear, that as before we could not proceed a step, in enlarging our acquaintance with nature, without the aid of experience; so also, here, we might indulge ourselves in endless conjectures, without making the smallest approach to the truth, unless we devote ourselves sedulously to a complete collection of facts. If in our simplest perceptions we could obtain no information, save from a consultation of na ture, and becoming the interpreters of her signs, how shall we expect by any other course of examination, to attain to the noblest conclusions of the understanding? Here it is that the mind of man, discovers itself brought into contest with the gigantic strength of nature, and exhibiting but the feebleness and incapacity of an infant, can accomplish nothing, except when assisted by the powerful instrument of induction. What kind of explanation is it to be supposed, should we at first afford of the several phenomena of the generation of the clouds, of the flux and reflux of the tides, of the recess and approach of the sun, during his passage in the ecliptic? Surely none that would be satisfactory; and the mind of man, while in the savage or barbarous state, failing at once in its endeavours to account for them, would seek a refuge from its incompetency to trace them through a series of natural causes, in ascribing them immediately to the agency of superior spirits; and Gods, to whom he would pay adoration and worship, would be imagined to take under their superintendance and control, these several departments of the system. Reflecting men, however, as soon as they passed out of this state of savagism to one of civiliza

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tion, would begin to trace with delight the chain of causes and effects. By the aid of this engine of induction, the farmer, although unconscious of it, would deduce all his maxims of husbandry, would observe with the nicest attention the appearances of the air and heavens, and learn to predict the changes of the seasons; would become acquainted with the most eligible periods of sowing his seeds, and gathering in his crops, and with the operation of all those causes, that contribute to diminish or augment the fruits of his labour.

Laying hold of this same instrument, the philosopher explains all the most interesting and stupendous phenomena, the flux and reflux of the tides, those of thunder and lightning, of earthquakes and volcanoes, the sizes, distances, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies.

We have seen that this instrument, although unknown to the schools for so many ages, was in the most familiar use amongst mankind; let us now proceed more fully to explain its nature and application. We have said, that the great secret in the inductive method of philosophising, consists in drawing no conclusions not warranted by facts, and attempting to establish no principles of science, but upon the solid and immovable basis of experience and observation. Nothing can be more true than this, and nothing more indispensable, in order to arrive at a just philosophy, than a rigid and persevering adherence to this method of inquiry. After only a partial or incomplete collection of phenomena, if we undertake to deduce general inferences, or what Bacon denominates his axiomata generalia, we sally forth into the dark, and almost always arrive at erroneous and false principles; or, if perchance they are true, we cannot repose with entire confidence and full assurance upon them: they do not rest upon the sure foundation of moral certainty. When, therefore, assuming them as settled and established truths, we undertake to form out of them, as is usually done, the axiomata media of lord Bacon, or intermediate maxims of philo

sophy, we involve ourselves in a labyrinth of uncertainty, and our reasoning being vitiated in the outset, we only plunge more and more deeply into error.

On the other hand, let us reflect upon the inductive mode of procedure. Upon this plan, freeing our minds from all errors and prejudices, or their devotion to the numerous idols, as the abovementioned author calls them, which occasion them to view every object through a discoloured medium, we should appear at the entrance of the dominions of nature, as when we seek to enter into the kingdom of heaven, like little children, if we are desirous to gain admittance. Homo, naturæ minister et Interpres, says Bacon, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturæ ordine, re vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit aut potest. Nec manus nuda, nec intellectus sibi permissus, multum valet; instrumentis et auxiliis res perficitur; quibus opus est non minus ad intellectum quam manum. Causa verò et radix fere omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est; quod dum mentis humanæ vires falsò miramus et extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non queramus. Ut non alius ferè est aditus ad regnum hominis, quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum cælorum; in quod nisi sub persona infantis, intrare non datur.

Thus prepared for the enterprise in which we are engaging, we should proceed in the interpretation of nature, continenter et gradatim, cautiously and by a just gradation; first carefully examining all the phenomena presented to cur inspection, comparing with the utmost attention and discrimination, those which are favourable and those unfavourable; and when we have advanced far enough in the matter of observation and experience, settle our axiomata media or intermediate principles of science; and having attained to this point in our progress, we must advance with equal care and attentive collec ion of facts, to our axiomata generalia or general principles. And when by this process we have remounted to great maxims, we may safely take a retrograde course