ciated in the ownership of certain placer claims located by them at Searles Borax Lake; that he and they had arranged for the performance of certain assessment work to be done on these claims; that defendants Lee and Toland instructed him to take a party of laborers to the claims to do that work; that the defendant Lee employed one Varney to take these laborers and provisions for them in automobiles to the camp which he, Pack, was to establish on the lake; that he established the camp and bought supplies for several days from the Teagles, plaintiff's assignors; that he requested the Teagles to let Varney have what was needed at the camp; that he later repeated this request at the express direction of the defendant Lee; that subsequently in April, 1912, he, at the defendant Lee's direction, wrote the Teagles promising payment; that Lee, during the spring of 1912, endeavored to raise the money necessary to pay the Teagles for the goods purchased from them; that the defendant Lee never at any time repudiated the bill due the Teagles, but, on the contrary, declared that he would pay the same "as soon as he could get the money." The testimony of the Teagles, which was presented in the form of depositions, established the reasonable value of the merchandise in question to be the sum of $953.05, and the delivery of the same to Varney for use at the camp established by Pack and maintained by all of the defendants for the performance of the assessment work hereinbefore referred to. Their testimony, however, showed that but three hundred dollars had been paid on account, and that their claim against the defendants had been duly assigned to the plaintiff.

The foregoing résumé of the evidence adduced in support of the plaintiff's case is made in response to the contention that the evidence fails to show that the defendants Pack and Lee were jointly indebted to plaintiff's assignor, and that therefore the plaintiff failed to bring his case within the provisions of section 989 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

That the defendant Pack was liable for the payment of the indebtedness in suit was established beyond controversy by the judgment previously entered against him; and that the defendants Lee and Pack were principals in the transaction out of which the obligation arose was, we think, sufficiently shown, and therefore the obligation in suit was imposed upon both. Consequently the presumption prevails that the obligation was joint (Civ. Code, sec. 1431). The fact that the de

fendant Lee's connection as a principal in the transaction was not disclosed to plaintiff's assignors will not avail to relieve him of an obligation which was created for and in behalf of him and his codefendant. (Dashaway Assn. v. Rogers, 79 Cal. 211, [21 Pac. 742].)

The trial court did not err in its ruling permitting the defendant Pack to testify to conversations with the defendant Lee without first showing that the relation of principal and agent existed between them. The testimony of the defendant Pack contained no suggestion that he was acting as the agent of the defendant Lee in the transaction in suit in any respect save that which may have been implied from the fact that the defendants Toland and Lee were associated with him in the ownership and operation of the placer claims which they had located at Searles Borax Lake. Moreover the joint obligation having been established, the testimony of Pack concerning the conduct and conversations of Lee in connection with the transaction in suit was rightfully received in evidence (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1870, subd. 5).

The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.

Kerrigan, J., and Richards, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 642. First Appellate District.-November 16, 1916.] THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. C. L. BAENDER, Appellant. CRIMINAL LAW-GRAND LARCENY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-In this prosecution for grand larceny it is held that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County, and from an order denying a new trial. T. W. Harris, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. L. Baender, in pro. per., for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and John H. Riordan, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

THE COURT.-The defendant in this case was charged by an information filed in the superior court of the county of Alameda with the crime of grand larceny. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the state prison, and now appeals from the judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The only point presented in support of the appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the verdict and support the judgment; and in that behalf it is insisted (1) that there is a variance between the allegations as to the ownership of the subject matter of the larceny and the proof proffered in their support; and (2) that the verdict was had and rests solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

A thorough examination of the record has satisfied us that there is no merit in either phase of the point above stated, and that the evidence upon the whole case amply supports the verdict and judgment.

The judgment and order denying the defendant a new trial are affirmed.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on January 11, 1917, attention being directed to the opinion in Burke v. Maze, 10 Cal. App. 206-211, [101 Pac. 438, 440.]

[Civ. No. 1679. Second Appellate District.-November 16, 1917.] GEORGE H. CRAM, Appellant, v. H. H. MCNEIL, Respondent.

CONTRACTS-EMPLOYMENT OF REAL ESTATE BROKER ORAL CONTRACT— SECTION 1624, CIVIL CODE.-A contract under which a party agrees to furnish another party with the name of a person who will likely purchase his property, in consideration of which the latter agrees to pay the former a commission, comes within subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, and where it is not in writing it is invalid. ID. COMMISSION-WHEN EARNED.-An agent or broker earns his right to a commission when he has either produced to his principal a person ready and willing to enter into a contract upon the terms proposed by the principal, or has produced to his principal a binding contract or offer to contract which the principal accepts.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Willis I. Morrison, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

George H. Woodruff, and Clyde C. Shoemaker, for Appellant.

Bert Campbell, and Willoughby Rodman, for Respondent.

JAMES, J.-Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered in favor of defendant.

As foundation for his suit plaintiff alleged the making of an oral contract under which defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff and one Norris a sum of money. The trial judge found all of the facts in favor of plaintiff, but as a conclusion of law determined that the contract was void because it was in violation of subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code, that being one of the subdivisions of the statute of frauds. In the section referred to it is provided that certain contracts are invalid unless some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or his agent, including: 6. "An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or a commission." We quote from the findings of fact:

"That on the twenty-eighth day of November, 1913, the plaintiff and one Harry C. Norris had knowledge of the fact that a certain person in Los Angeles, California, was desirous of buying a small improved ranch, with dwelling-house thereon, and had been informed that such person was able and willing to pay cash for any property that he might determine to buy; that plaintiff and the said Norris also had information at said time that such person would not negotiate the purchase of any property through any real estate agent or agency.

"That on the said twenty-eighth day of November, the defendant was the owner of a ranch located one and onefourth miles from the Santa Ana car line and due north of Garden Grove Station on the Anaheim-Long Beach oiled road in Orange county, state of California, . . . ; and that the plaintiff and said Norris knew, at said time, that the defend

ant was offering said ranch for sale through and by reason of a circular published by the defendant. . . .

"That on the said twenty-eighth day of November, the plaintiff and said Norris told the defendant that they knew of a person desiring to purchase for cash a small improved ranch, and they also informed defendant, at said time, that they believed that defendant's said ranch would suit such person, but that it would be useless for the plaintiff and said Norris, or either of them, to show or undertake to negotiate a sale of the defendant's said property to the person to whom they referred, for the reason that said person would not deal with or purchase property through any real estate agent or agency; that thereupon, and on the said twenty-eighth day of November, at the city of Los Angeles, in said Los Angeles county, the defendant orally promised and agreed to and with the plaintiff and the said Norris, that in consideration of the plaintiff and the said Norris putting the defendant in possession of information as to the identity and residence of such person, that he, the defendant, would personally endeavor to sell his said twenty-acre ranch to such person, and in case he should make a sale thereof to such person, then he, the defendant, would pay the plaintiff and the said Norris for such information a commission equal to five per cent of any price at which he, the defendant, might sell his said ranch. to such person, and the plaintiff and said Norris, in consideration of the said promise of the defendant, orally promised and agreed to put the defendant in possession of the said information; and the court finds that said agreement between the plaintiff and said Norris and the defendant was oral and not in writing.

"That thereafter, and pursuant to the said oral agreement, the plaintiff and said Norris, at the said city of Los Angeles, gave to the defendant the name and residence of one Frank Meier, being the person whom the plaintiff and said Norris knew was desirous of buying for cash a small improved ranch, as hereinbefore set forth; and that thereafter the defendant dealt and negotiated with the said Frank Meier, and thereafter, and before the commencement of this action, the defendant sold his said ranch to the said Meier, at the price of sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000)."

The findings further recite that no writing had been made evidencing the contract, and that payment of the amount of