in respect to illegitimate children, a child to-day, made legitimate by statute, has more restricted rights of succession than an illegitimate child in the year 1850.

It is suggested that sections 215 and 230 are mere statutes of status, and confer no rights of succession, and that those rights must be sought in the sections of the code dealing with succession. That is perfectly true; but the fallacy of appellants' position is that they ignore the changed status of the respondents, and seek to relegate them to section 1387, dealing with the rights of succession of illegitimates, and to exclude them from section 1386, which deals with the rights of legitimates.

If sections 230 and 1387 were concurrent and conflicting legislation, there would be some force in the contention that the rights of succession of a child legitimated by section 230 should be governed by section 1387; for it could be argued that as the same requirements are found in both sections, it was intended that although on the one hand compliance with them conferred legitimacy, yet when it came to the question of succession, such compliance did not put the illegitimate in the situation of a legitimate, but only had the limited effect stated in section 1387, and that their apparent conflict should be reconciled in that way. But the re-enactment of the provisions of section 1387 did not make them concurrent legislation with section 230. The rule in this regard is that "Where there are two conflicting sections in a code or other compilation of statutes, that section prevails which is derived from a source which may be considered as the latest expression of the law-making power, without regard to the relative position of such sections in the code." (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 735, citing Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158, [33 S. E. 958].) As we have seen, the provisions of section 230 were later legislation than that contained in section 1387; and the latter section means no more and can be given no other construction than it theretofore had, when its effect was solely to give certain restricted rights of inheritance to illegitimates as such. It is obvious that there is no conflict between such legislation and a subsequent law conferring legitimacy, even though incidentally the same conditions are made sufficient to confer legitimacy which formerly only gave restricted rights of inheritance.

Moreover, the proposition that section 1387 is not to be regarded as a limitation upon section 230 has been directly decided by the supreme court of this state in the case of In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408 (447), [6 L. R. A. 594, 21 Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742, 1028], wherein it is said: "We cannot agree to the proposition that the provision contained in section 1387 of the Civil Code, that 'every illegitimate child is an heir of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of such child,' is a limitation upon section 230, and excludes an illegitimate child, adopted as provided in the latter section, from the inheritance. If so, section 230 would be deprived of much of its force. Section 230 expressly provides that upon the adoption of a child as therein provided, it shall be deemed to be legitimate for all purposes.'"'

...

That the words "children" and "lawful issue" when found in statutes of succession are not to be confined to their strict common-law signification, was decided by our supreme court in the Estate of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484, 491, where it is said: "If courts were now to restrict the word to its common-law meaning, all children born of an unlawful marriage, all children by adoption or acknowledgment of their father, and all children whose parents intermarried subsequent to their birth, would be excluded from rights of inheritance or succession. But by statute, the offspring of marriages null in law (Civ. Code, sec. 84), children born out of wedlock whose parents. subsequently intermarried (Id., sec. 215), and children by acknowledgment or adoption of their father (Id., secs. 224, 227, 228, and 230), are all legitimate. These, although incapacitated at common law from succeeding to any rights of their father, are regarded for all purposes as legitimate from the time of their birth. . . . Hence the term 'children' as used in section 1307 of the law of succession must relate to status, not to origin-to the capacity to inherit, not to the legality of the relations which may have existed between those of whom they may have been begotten. The word has, therefore, a statutory and not a common-law meaning; and its meaning includes all children upon whom has been conferred by law the capacity of inheritance."

Finally, the contention is made that the respondents do not come within the terms either of section 215 or section 230, for the reason that these sections, as the appellants claim, refer

only to minor children. It is true that in the Estate of Pico, 56 Cal. 413, section 230 was thus limited in its effect; but the reason it was so limited, as is apparent from the opinion in that case, was that the section comprises part of a chapter of the code on adoption, and the language of the section is that the illegitimate child, by the acts therein enumerated, is "adopted" as a legitimate child, and thereby becomes legitimate. As the provisions of the code relating to adoption apply only to minors, the court concluded that the section. could not apply to one who had attained his majority because he could not be adopted. But section 215 is not included in the chapter on adoption; and the reasoning in the Estate of Pico, supra, has no application to it. Its language makes no distinction between minors and adults, and there is nothing in the reason or necessity of the enactment which would warrant this court in confining its application to children who had not attained their majority.

. It results from what we have said that the respondents, having been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents, come within the terms of section 1386 of the Civil Code, and that within the meaning of that section they are "lawful issue" and take by representation. The portion of the judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Lennon, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on January 8, 1917, and a petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on February 7, 1917, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:

THE COURT.-We concur in the conclusion of the district court of appeal as to the capacity of the respondents to inherit from Tobe Funkenstein, through their deceased father, Newman Wolf, but in denying the application for a hearing in this court we deem it proper to say that we are not entirely in accord with all the reasoning by which that conclusion is reached by that court. We cannot agree either that section 1387 of the Civil Code has no application to children situated as are the respondents, or that, fairly construed,

that section excludes respondents from taking a share of the estate of the mother of their deceased father. To our minds the term "illegitimate child" as used in both sections 1387 and 1388 includes illegitimate children who have been legitimated, and in so far as they lay down rules of succession contrary to the general rules found in section 1386 of the Civil Code, must prevail as to any child born illegitimate. (See Estate of De Cigaran, 150 Cal. 682, [89 Pac. 833].) But, in our opinion, section 1387 should be construed as not providing any rule contrary to section 1386, in so far as children situated as respondents are concerned. When the section expressly provides, as it does, that an illegitimate child "does not represent his father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of his or her kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless, before his death, his parents shall have intermarried, and his father, after such marriage, acknowledges him as his child, or adopts him into his family," it by necessary implication recognizes the right of one whose parents intermarry and whose father, after such marriage, acknowledges him as his child or adopts him into his family, to represent his father or mother by inheriting from the kindred of either, either lineal or collateral, just as a legitimate child would inherit under section 1386 of the Civil Code. We do not believe that the succeeding clause, commencing with the words, "in which case such child and all the legitimate children are considered brothers and sisters," etc., should be construed as a limitation on this right. This clause was manifestly intended to remove all doubt as to the right of brothers and sisters to inherit from each other where one of them is legitimated as provided in the preceding part of the section, and gives the legitimated child a right of direct inheritance from brothers and sisters, in addition to the right of inheritance by representation conferred by the preceding clause. The result is the same as that reached by Mr. Justice Kerrigan in the opinion of the district court of appeal, viz., that section 1386 does apply in this case, and that under its provisions respondents are, in view of the facts, heirs of Tobe Funkenstein.

The application for a hearing in this court is denied.

Mr. Justice Melvin and Mr. Justice Lawlor dissented from the order denying a hearing in this court.

[Civ. No. 1934. First Appellate District.-December 11, 1916.]

BEN LEVI, Respondent, v. JOSEPH SOCKOLOV, Appellant.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID ON LOT-FAILURE TO COMPLETE BUILDING IN WORKMANLIKE MANNER-PLEADING— DEFECTS IN CONSTRUCTION-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.-In an action to recover a sum of money paid on account of the purchase price of a lot, on the ground that the defendant had failed to construct and complete the building which was in course of construction on the lot at the time the money was paid, in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with his agreement, it is not necessary for the complaint to set forth in detail all of the defects in the work of construction, but it is sufficient to call attention to the chief objections thereto.

ID. RECOVERY OF MONEYS EXPENDED SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.A complaint drawn in conformity with the common count for moneys expended for the use and benefit of another is not subject to special demurrer for failure to allege the expenditures in detail, as the same are obtainable through a demand for a bill of particulars.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and from an order denying a new trial. George H. Cabaniss, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

G. Gunzendorfer, for Appellant.

Wal J. Tuska, for Respondent.

RICHARDS, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment in plaintiff's favor and from an order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

The action was brought to recover the sum of $1,563 alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff upon the purchase price of a lot upon which there was at the time a building in course of construction, the defendant agreeing to complete the construction of said building in a workmanlike manner, and to deliver the same to the plaintiff frce and clear of encumbrances with the exception of an existing mortgage for fifteen thousand dollars, the plaintiff agreeing to take the premises when so completed and to pay