Neither do we deny that it would be better practice for a board of supervisors to require sworn evidence of some kind, of such facts, before passing its resolution of intention in proceedings of that kind.

As we have shown, section 2 of the Storm-water District Act, as adopted in 1909, requires the clerk of the board of supervisors to mail copies of the specified notice to each owner of land in the proposed district "whose name appears as such on the last completed assessment-roll," etc.; whereas the same section as amended in 1913 omits the word "completed" from the clause just now quoted. This verbal change made no difference in the meaning of the clause. An uncompleted assessment-roll is not an assessment-roll at all. In the proceedings here under review, as the return herein shows, copies of the notice of intention to form the United Storm-water District of Orange County under the resolution of intention passed June 7, 1916, were mailed to sundry persons by the clerk of the board on the twenty-seventh day of June, 1916. On that day the clerk duly made his affidavit of mailing such notices, and therein stated that he had sent them by registered mail, postage prepaid, to each owner of land in the proposed storm-water district "whose name appears as such on the last completed assessment-roll of said county of Orange." The time of the hearing before the board as provided in the notice was the nineteenth day of July, 1916. The hearing at that time was duly adjourned to the twenty-fifth day of July. On that date sundry objections, which had been filed, were presented. One of the objections urged at that time, and also now insisted upon, was that copies of the notice had been sent to only a portion of and not to each owner of land in the proposed district whose name appeared as such on the last assessment-roll of the county. The objections were heard and considered by the board, which thereafter overruled the objections by resolution, wherein it was recited that the clerk did send a copy of said notice by registered mail, etc., "to each owner of land in the proposed district whose name appears as such on the last assessment-roll of said county of Orange, . . . as will more fully appear by the affidavit of J. M. Backs on file in the office of the county clerk of the county of Orange." A list of the persons to whom notices were sent is attached to the affidavit of J. M. Backs, the clerk of the board. The assessment-roll of the county for

the year 1916-17 could not legally have been completed so as to become an assessment-roll, under the provision of the Political Code, as early as the twenty-seventh day of June. The board of supervisors cannot hold its meeting to examine the assessment-book and equalize the assessment of property until the first Monday in July (Pol. Code, sec. 3672); and in contemplation of law there cannot be a complete assessmentroll until the business of equalization is completed. The board may order the addition of new items to the assessmentbook. (Pol. Code, sec. 3681.) The affidavit of Mr. Backs, therefore, apparently referred to the "assessment-roll" of 1915-16.

But by the stipulation to which we have referred it is admitted (subject to respondents' objection that the facts are neither material, competent, nor relevant, and shall not be considered unless this court shall hold that they are admissible) that it appeared from the evidence taken before the board of supervisors at the hearing before it that the clerk had mailed the notice only to persons whose names appeared as owners of land upon a partially completed assessment-roll of 1916-17, and the residue from that portion of the statements of taxpayers, made and filed with the county assessor of said county between the sixth day of March, 1916, and the twenty-seventh day of June, 1916, which had not at that time been entered upon said roll, or upon the reports of the field deputies of said county assessor made and filed with said county assessor between said dates; that said assessment-roll had at that time been mostly completed, and there were but a few of said reports of field deputies which had not been entered on the book; that on the twenty-seventh day of June, 1916, no assessment-roll for the fiscal year of 1916-17 had been certified by the county assessor of said county, or delivered by said county assessor to the board of equalization of said county. But that said reports of field deputies of the assessor were, on the twenty-seventh day of June, 1916, all in the assessor's office, and no change was afterward made in said reports, and the data shown by said reports were afterward put on the assessor's books of 1916-17; so that the names of land owners, appearing on the assessment-roll of 1916-17, as the same was certified and filed with the board of equalization on July 3, 1916, were the same as appeared by said reports of said field deputies from which said mailing list was prepared. That

said clerk in mailing the said notices did not refer to or use the assessment-roll of 1915-16; that the names and addresses shown by the said affidavit of the clerk are the names and addresses as they now (date of stipulation being September 26, 1916) appear upon said assessment-roll of 1916-17; but it does not contain the names of all owners of land within said proposed district whose names appear as such upon the assessment-roll of 1915-16. Further facts are stipulated showing that the assessment was delivered to the board of equalization on July 3d as required by law, and that the equalization proceeded to completion in due form.

For the same reasons, and upon the same authorities which have led us to accept for use herein the stipulated fact that no evidence was received by the board prior to the passing of its resolution of intention, we also accept, as part of the return, the foregoing agreed facts, whereby it appears that the clerk did not mail copies of the notice of the subsequent hearing to all owners of land within the proposed district whose names appeared as such upon the last assessment-roll, and to whom the statute required that such notices should be sent. That the board of supervisors was without power to proceed further in the formation of the proposed district until notice had been given to all persons whom the law has pointed out as interested parties entitled to such notice is, of course, to be assumed without argument.

The petitioners herein further contend that the notice as published and mailed by the clerk is not in the form and does not contain the matters required by the statute; also, that the petition, notice, and resolution of intention were all fatally defective in that the attempted description of the exterior boundaries of the proposed district is so ambiguous on its face that it is impossible to trace the proposed boundaries or identify the land to be included in the district. It appears from the record that the notice as given followed the form prescribed in section 2 of the Storm-water District Act as enacted in 1909, and omits all of the additional matters required in such notice under said section 2 as amended in 1913. It is not necessary for us at this time to enter into a discussion of the effect of these omissions upon the question of sufficiency of the notice. Neither is it necessary to examine into the alleged defects in description of the boundaries of the proposed district. Since the judgment herein must go

in favor of the petitioners by reason of the failure of the clerk of the board of supervisors to give notice to some of the persons entitled thereto, it is fair to assume that if the attempt to form the storm-water district shall be prosecuted any further, care will be taken to frame the petition and the notice in the required statutory form and to avoid the alleged defects in description of boundaries.

For the reasons herein stated the demurrer is overruled, and it is ordered that the resolution of the board of supervisors of Orange County declaring the formation of the United Storm-water District of Orange County be and the same hereby is annulled and set aside.

[Civ. No. 1865. First Appellate District.-January 12, 1917.] E. G. L. SMITH, Appellant, v. C. H. HIRST et al., Respondents.

PROMISSORY NOTE-INDORSER

PREMATURE NOTICE OF DISHONOR.-An oral notification given by a notary public to the indorser of a promissory note that the maker of the note had absconded, and that the note had not been paid, is not a sufficient notice of dishonor, where such notification was given in the course of the afternoon of the day of the maturity of the note, but at a time when several hours of such day yet remained, notwithstanding the note had been placed in the hands of a bank for collection, whose business hours closed at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. J. M. Seawell, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, for Appellant.

F. A. Dorn, and C. D. Dorn, for Respondents.

RICHARDS, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant N. A. Dorn after his demurrer to the

third amended complaint of the plaintiff had been sustained, the latter declining to further amend his pleading.

The facts of the case are these: On March 1, 1912, the defendant C. H. Hirst made, executed, and delivered to one L. L. Long his promissory note for the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars, payable one year after date, of which said note the defendant N. A. Dorn was the indorser. Before the maturity of said note the maker thereof absconded and departed from the state of California, and had neither a residence nor place of business therein at the time said note fell due. Prior to the maturity of the note, said L. L. Long transferred and delivered the same to the plaintiff herein, who, also prior to the date of its maturity, delivered said note to the Crocker National Bank of San Francisco for collection. The first day of March, 1913, the date of the maturity of said note, fell on Saturday. At about the hour of 4 o'clock of said day, said note not having been paid, the said bank directed one Alice Spencer, a notary public, to give notice of dishonor of said note to said defendant Dorn, and at about 4:30 o'clock of said day said Alice Spencer personally and orally notified said Dorn that the said C. H. Hirst had absconded and departed from the state of California and was then absent from said state, and that said note had not been presented to C. H. Hirst for payment, and had not been paid by him. On the morning of March 3, 1913, said Alice Spencer inclosed in an envelope a written notice signed by her, to the effect that said note had not been paid, and addressed and mailed the same to the defendant Dorn at his office address in the city of San Francisco, which notice said. Dorn received at his said office address on the morning of March 4, 1913. He did not pay the note, and this action was commenced to recover upon the same.

The judgment of the trial court in favor of said defendant was predicated upon the foregoing facts.

The sole question presented for decision upon this appeal is as to whether or not the said defendant Dorn had due notice of the dishonor of the note in question so as to bind him as its indorser. The appellant seems to concede that the written notice from the notary public mailed to said Dorn at his office on March 3, 1913, and received by him on the morning of the following day, to the effect that the note had not been paid, was insufficient to bind him as an indorser thereon for