The point thus raised has been squarely decided against the contention of the defendants in two cases in this state. In the case of Rosenthal v. Perkins, 123 Cal. 240, [55 Pac. 804], a provision of the State Insolvency Act, [Stats. 1880, p. 82], similar to the one here involved was construed. That provision named one month as the time prior to the commencement of an action during which, if an attachment were levied, it became void by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the debtor, in the same way as under the federal act four months is the period fixed. Referring to that provision, the supreme court said: "It is clear, for reasons which need not be enlarged upon, that if at the time the proceeding in bankruptcy is instituted there is no attachment in force on which the proceeding can operate, if the attachment lien has already been discharged by a bond for that purpose, then the liability of sureties on the bond is not affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of their principal. . . . The mistake of the defendants lies in supposing that the lien of the attachment in Rosenthal v. Brusie continued on the attached goods after they had been released to Brusie in consequence of the delivery of the bond. Our statute and the inferences which follow from the decisions of this court seem to put that question at rest.”

In the case of San Francisco Sulphur Co. v. Aetna Co., 11 Cal. App. 695, [106 Pac. 113], the provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act here involved was construed, and the court. followed the rule applied in the case of Rosenthal v. Perkins, 123 Cal. 240, [55 Pac. 804].

One other point is stated in the brief, but it is not at all discussed, and is without merit. We need not therefore refer to it at length.

The judgment is affirmed.

Lennon, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 518. Second Appellate District.-January 26, 1917.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK HENSON, Appellant.

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CRIMINAL LAW ROBBERY EVIDENCE- CONFESSIONS OF DEFENDANT PROOF OF CORPUS DELICTI.-In a prosecution for the crime of robbery it is not necessary that the testimony of the prosecuting witness be corroborated in establishing the corpus delicti, as preliminary to the admission in evidence of testimony of confessions made by the defendant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order denying a new trial. G. W. Nicol, Judge presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. B. Conlin, for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Robert M. Clarke, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

CONREY, P. J.-The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery and has been sentenced to a term in the state prison. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

Appellant claims that the court erred in admitting testimony of confessions made by him, because the people had failed to establish the corpus delicti. This claim is manifestly wrong. The first witness at the trial was E. Lubansky, the victim of the robbery, who testified fully to the facts showing that he was held up and robbed at the time and place referred to in the information. There is no merit in the proposition of counsel for appellant that corroboration of the testimony of Lubansky was legally necessary.

It is next complained that the testimony of the witness Brown showed that he was an accomplice, and that his testimony was not corroborated. But the record shows that in so far as the testimony of the witness Brown had any tendency to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, such testimony was amply corroborated by other evidence "which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the

accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." (Pen. Code, sec. 1111.) The facts admitted by the defendant in his conversations with certain police officers were sufficient to establish his guilt. A proper foundation was laid for the evidence by testimony showing that these confessions were free and voluntary. One of these statements was made by defendant in the presence of his father. The criticisms directed by counsel toward this evidence relate to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. But it was for the jury and is not for this court to determine whether such evidence was worthy of belief. Complaint is further made that the district attorney was guilty of misconduct in asking certain questions and in making certain statements to the jury. These matters are of such slight importance that we are not justified in entering into a discussion of them. It appears that the defendant had a fair trial, and that upon entirely sufficient evidence he was found guilty of the crime charged.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

James, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 1892. Second Appellate District.-January 26, 1917.] CURTIS C. LEGERTON, Petitioner, v. JOHN S. CHAMBERS, State Controller, Respondent.

PUBLIC OFFICERS JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT-TIME FOR TAKING OFFICE. Until the Secretary of State has certified the result of the election to the Governor and the Governor has, upon examining the same, issued his commission, a person elected to the office of judge of the superior court for a "short" term, that is, the term intervening between the end of the term of the incumbent who was appointed to fill a vacancy and the commencement of the regular term next succeeding, is not entitled to take office.

ID. DE FACTO OFFICER-SALARY.-As the collection of salary or compensation annexed to an office is an incident to the title to office, de facto officers, whose acts for the sake of public interest may be held legal, cannot recover compensation for their services.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandate originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Curtis C. Legerton, in pro. per., for Petitioner.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Robert M. Clarke, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

JAMES, J.-Petitioner herein was at the general election held in November, 1914, elected to the office of judge of the superior court in the county of Los Angeles for the "short" term; that is, the term intervening between the end of the term of the incumbent who was appointed to fill a vacancy and the commencement of the regular term next succeeding. In this case the short term ended upon the incoming of the newly elected officer, who was other than this petitioner, in January, 1915. The election took place on the 3d of November, and on the sixth day of December following petitioner received from the Secretary of State a commission signed by the Governor. Prior to that date, however, and on the nineteenth day of November, petitioner sought to qualify for the office by taking the oath and filing a copy thereof with the Secretary of State. He did in fact enter upon the duties of the office at that date, and so continued up to the time he received his commission, and afterward during the short term. On the eighteenth day of November, 1914, the board of supervisors of the county of Los Angeles completed the canvass of the returns, and petitioner alleges that said board thereupon "declared your petitioner elected to said office of judge of the superior court." These facts are set forth in the petition which was filed herein. The answer as made by the controller in effect raises issues of law, and the matter has been submitted upon the points and authorities filed by petitioner and a brief for respondent.

The two principal questions presented are: 1. Was petitioner, upon the canvassing of the vote as made by the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County, entitled to immediately assume office as an officer de jure? 2. If he was not so entitled and because of his assumption of the duties of the office

he became a de facto officer, was he under such circumstances entitled to the salary attached to the office? In many of the cases cited by the petitioner, all, however, from other jurisdictions, it is held that the issuance of a commission is not a necessary prerequisite to the determination of the fact that an officer has been duly elected. Under our statute, however, the various duties to be performed by not only the canvassing boards at the election, but the certifying officers thereafter, are held to be a part of the machinery of the election, until the performance of which there can be no legal determination as to the results. In the case of a superior judge the board of supervisors is without power to issue a certificate of election, because the office is viewed as a state office; the statute expressly excludes the board of supervisors from any such right when it provides that, after election returns have been canvassed, "The county clerk must immediately make out and deliver to such person (except to the person elected superior judge) a certificate of election signed by him, and authenticated with the seal of the superior court." (Pol. Code, sec. 1284.) Section 1288 of the same code requires each county clerk, in the cases of "officers chosen by the electors of the state at large, or for judicial officers," to make out a statement of the vote of his county as entered upon the records of the board of supervisors, and certify the same and transmit the statement to the Secretary of State. Section 1290 of the same code provides as follows: "On the fortieth day after the day of election, or so soon as the returns have been received from all the counties of the state, if received within that time . . . the secretary of state must compare and estimate the vote, and make out and file in his office a statement thereof, and transmit a copy of such statement to the governor, except in the cases of senators and members of the assembly.' Section 1291, immediately following, reads: "Upon receipt of such copy the governor must issue commissions to the persons who from it appear to have, received the highest number of votes for offices, except that of governor or lieutenant-governor, to be filled at such election." The provision as to the taking of an oath of office contains the requirement that the oath shall be subscribed and filed within thirty days after the officer has "notice" of his election or appointment, or before the expiration of fifteen days from the commencement of his term. (Pol. Code, sec. 907.) In People v. Shaver, 127 Cal. 350, [59