bank commissioners' act, the court said: "The attorney general is authorized to proceed against the corporation alone, and for the sole purpose, in effect, of winding up its business. In other words, he represents the interests of the people in a matter of public concern." Appellant's exceptions to the complaint, answer, and decree in the case of People v. Pacific Bank cannot be sustained. As the suit was by the people under a statute authorizing it, and for the purposes hereinbefore stated, the judgment declaring the bank insolvent is conclusive for all the purposes of the act, and binding upon appellant, so far at least as concerns his right to maintain his attachment; and the pleadings were properly read, for the purpose of showing that the judgment of insolvency was rendered in a case within the statute. If it were otherwise, since the affidavit of Mr. Gerberding that the bank was in fact insolvent on June 23d, and ever since remained so, was not controverted, the order dissolving the attachment might have been properly sustained without the evidence excepted to, and, if so, appellant was not prejudiced by its admission. As our conclusion is based upon the force and effect of the bank commissioners' act, and proceedings thereunder, a review of the numerous cases cited by appellant which do not refer to this statute could not be profitable. The order appealed from should be affirmed, but without costs to either party, the parties having so stipulated. We concur: VANCLIEF, C.; SEARLS, C. PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the order appealed from is affirmed, without costs to either party. MURPHY v. PACIFIC BANK. (No. 15.867.) (Supreme Court of California. Feb. 5, 1895.) Separate actions by F. D. Murphy. Thomas V. Cator, and others against the Pacific Bank. Plaintiff in each case sued out a writ of attachment. From an order dissolving the writ in each case, the several plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. A. Barnard, Thos. V. Cator, and W. H. Hutton, for appellants. Sawyer & Burnett, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The appeals in these cases are from an order dissolving an attachment, and are submitted upon the same record and briefs as the case of Crane v. Bank (No. 15,863; this day filed) 39 Pac. 215; and upon the authority of that case, the facts in each being the same, the orders appealed from are affirmed, without costs. (26 Or. 596) CRAWFORD v. WIST. (Supreme Court of Oregon. Feb. 18, 1895.) NOTICE OF APPEAL. A notice of appeal which contains no other description of the judgment appealed from than that it was rendered for costs and disbursements in an action between certain parties at a specified term of the circuit court, and which does not even state the nature of the action, or contain any references by the aid of which the particular judgment may be identified, is too indefinite and uncertain, and the appeal will be dismissed. Appeal from circuit court, Tillamook county; George H. Burnett, Judge. Action by Robert Crawford against E. G. E. Wist for slander. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Dismissed. T. B. Handley, for appellant. C. W. Fulton, for respondent. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Tillamook county. The notice thereof is as follows: "In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Tillamook County. Robert Crawford, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. E. G. E. Wist, Defendant and Respondent. To E. G. E. Wist, the Above-Named Defendant: Take notice that the abovenamed plaintiff hereby appeals from the judgment of the above-entitled court, rendered at the August term thereof for 1893, in the above-entitled cause, in favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, for the costs and disbursements of said action; and on said appeal plaintiff will rely on the following grounds, to wit." Here follow the assignments of error. The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal because the judgment mentioned in the notice is not sufficiently described therein for identification. The tendency of the court, as indicated by recent decisions, is to construe notices of appea! liberally, and hold them sufficient if, by fair construction or reasonable intendment, the court can say that the appeal is taken from the judgment in a particular case. notice of appeal like the one in question. which contains no other description of the judgment than that it was rendered for costs and disbursements in an action between certain parties, at a specified term of the circuit court, and which does not even state the nature of the action, or contain any references by the aid of which the particular judgment can be identified, is manifestly so indefinite and uncertain that the court cannot say that the appeal was taken in any particular case; for a judgment in any case between the same parties for costs and disbursements, rendered at any time during the term, would satisfy the description in the notice. If, therefore, it be conceded that a judgment rendered on the 6th day of September, 1893, was rendered at the August term of the court,-a fact which does not appear from the transcript,-the other But a defects above mentioned render the notice ineffectual for the purpose intended. However liberal a rule we may be inclined to adopt in the construction of notices of appeal, we cannot dispense with such a notice as will distinctly make known the judgment appealed from. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed, and it is so ordered. (55 Kan. 60) DODGE CITY WATER-SUPPLY CO. An objection to the introduction of any evidence on the trial, upon the ground that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, raises only an issue of law; and, where such an objection is sustained, a motion for a new trial is not necessary to review such decision. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error from district court, Ford county; A. J. Abbott, Judge. Action by the Dodge City Water-Supply Company against the city of Dodge City. There was a judgment for defendant, and from an order denying a new trial plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. M. W. Sutton, for plaintiff in error. W. E. Hendricks, for defendant in error. JOHNSTON, J. The Dodge City WaterSupply Company brought an action against the city of Dodge City to recover for water supplied to the city, and also for the costs of relaying water mains alleged to have been made necessary by the action of the city in grading the streets. The petition was in two counts, to which answer was made by the city, after which a reply was filed by the company. Upon the issues thus joined, the cause came on for trial; and when the jury was impaneled and sworn, and the plaintiff had called its first witness, the defendant objected to the introduction of any testimony by plaintiff under the petition, for the reason that it did not in either of the counts state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This objection was sustained by the court, and the plaintiff then, in open court, announced that it declined to further prosecute the action. Thereupon the court discharged the jury, and rendered judgment dismissing the action, at the costs of the plaintiff. Within three days thereafter, the plaintiff filed its written motion for a new trial, alleging, as a reason, that the ruling of the court in rejecting all testimony was contrary to law. The motion for a new trial was not heard until the succeeding term of court, when, on motion of the defendant, it was stricken from the files, upon the ground that the motion was improper and unauthorized. The only question presented for review arises upon the ruling of the court refusing to entertain the motion for a new trial. Was such a motion authorized or necessary to a review? A new trial is only authorized at the end of a trial for the purpose of re-ex amining an issue of fact in the same court. Civ. Code, § 306. The objection to the introduction of any evidence raised no issue of fact, and is not an uncommon method of challenging the sufficiency of a petition. When the objection was made, the trial court was simply called upon to determine whether the petition contained facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The objection to the sufficiency of a petition upon that ground may be taken advantage of by demurrer, or by an objection to the introduction of evidence on the trial. Civ. Code, § 91; Brown v. Smelting Co., 32 Kan. 528, 4 Pac. 1013. The issue raised by the objection was one of law, and in the case of Ritchie v. Railroad Co. (Kan.) 39 Pac. 718, it was held that a motion for a new trial is not necessary to the review of a decision determining an issue of law. Following the rule there laid down, no error was committed by the court in declining to consider the motion for a new trial, and in striking the same from the files. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. All the justices concurring. (54 Kan. 683) STATE v. ROGERS. (Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 9, 1895.) BURGLARY-BREAKING INTO COURTHOUSE-COMPETENCY OF JURORS-CHANGE OF VENUEADMISSIONS AS EVIDENCE. 1. A building occupied as a courthouse, in which valuable records and papers belonging to the county are kept and deposited, may be the subject of the crime of burglary in the second degree, and is included within the term "other building" in paragraph 2195 of the General Statutes of 1889. 2. Under the facts disclosed by their examinations, this court finds no error in the action of the trial court in overruling the challenges to jurors. 3. An application for a change of venue having been made, and a very large number of affidavits having been introduced on each side with reference to the existence of prejudice in the minds of the people of the county against the defendant, and the finding of the court on such application denying the change of venue being supported by ample evidence, this court will not reverse its ruling merely because there is evidence tending to prove the grounds of the defendant's application. 4. The admissions or confessions of an alleged co-conspirator with the defendant in the commission of crime, made after the offense had been fully consummated, and the criminal design fully carried out, are inadmissible on the separate trial of the defendant for any purpose. Johnston, J., dissenting. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Harvey county; F. L. Martin, Judge. George W. Rogers, convicted of burglary, appeals. Reversed. O'Bryan & Gordon, T. B. Wall, and Willard Kline, for appellant. John T. Little, Atty. Gen., and C. E. Branine, for the State. ALLEN, J. The defendant, George W. Rogers, and George H. Shirley, were jointly charged in two counts with the crime of burglary. The first count charged the felonious breaking and entering a building belonging to Philip Bretch and others, occupied by Harvey county as a courthouse, in which were kept and deposited the books and records of Harvey county, with the intent to steal said books and records. The second count differs from the first only in that it charges that the breaking was with the intent to set fire to, burn, and destroy said books and records. The defendant was convicted on the second count, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of five years. From this conviction and sentence he appeals. Various errors are assigned, which will be considered in the order of their statement in the appellant's brief. A motion was made to quash the information, on the ground, among others, that it does not state a public offense. The particular objection is that a courthouse, in which public records are kept, is not such a building as is meant by the statute defining the crime of burglary in the second degree. The information is based on the provisions of paragraph 2195 of the General Statutes of 1889, which reads as follows: "Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering in the night time: First, any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, but not forming a part thereof; or, second, any shop, store, booth, tent, warehouse or other building, or any boat or vessel, in which there shall be at the time some human being, or any goods, wares or merchandise, or other valuable thing, kept or deposited, with intent to steal or commit any felony therein, shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of burglary in the second degree." It is said that the term "other buildings" must be held to refer to buildings of the same general character as those specifically mentioned, and that the phrase "or other valuable thing" really means no more than goods, wares, or merchandise. It is argued that a courthouse and the records therein are public property, of a character altogether dissimilar from private stores, warehouses, and their contents; that in another section of the statute, defining the crime of arson, public buildings are specifically mentioned; and that their omission from this section indicates that the legislature did not intend that they should be included under the general term "other buildings." Numerous cases are cited in support of this contention; among others, that of People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137, 15 N. E. 371. That was a prosecution for breaking and entering a structure for the permanent interment of the dead, built above ground. While there is some language used in the opinion of the court which gives support to the appellant's position in this case, the decision, after all, is to the effect that a place of burial for the dead, even though built above the ground, and costly, is not included within the statute. The fact is commented on that it was "really nothing more than a grave above ground," and the court expressly restricted the decision to the case presented. While we are satisfied with the reasoning of the court as applied to that case, we do not regard it as decisive of the one now presented. To constitute burglary under the second clause of the paragraph under consideration, there must be a breaking and entering in the nighttime of a building, booth, or tent; there must be a human being therein, or goods, wares, or merchandise, or other valuable thing, must be kept or deposited therein; and the breaking must have been with the intent to steal or commit a felony. The crime of burglary in the first degree can only be committed in a dwelling house. By another section of the statute, station houses, depots, ticket offices, passenger coaches, baggage, freight, and express cars, cabooses, and other railway carriages, are also declared subjects of burglary. The building entered in this case was the property of private individuals, though occupied by the public. That it was a "building," within the usual and ordinary meaning of the word, is perfectly clear. Are the books and records kept and deposited in it things of value? They are certainly so, and of very great value. The place where the crime is alleged to have been committed, then, falls clearly within the terms of the statute. If excluded, it must be by construction, only permissible where the spirit of the enactment is such that it can safely be said that it was not intended to be included by the legislature. We think the legislature intended to include buildings of other classes than those specifically mentioned. We are very clear that banks, offices, and buildings used for many other purposes are within the protection of the statute, if valuable things are kept in them. Churches were subject to burglary, even at common law. We perceive no good reason why the legislature should not and has not extended the same protection to public as to private property. The term "other buildings" has been held to include a saloon building (State v. Comstock, 20 Kan. 650); a granary (State v. Groning, 33 Kan. 18, 5 Pac. 446); a buggy house (State v. Garrison, 52 Kan. 180, 34 Pac. 751); a stable (Orrell v. People, 94 Ill. 456); a railroad ticket office (People v. Young, 65 Cal. 225, 3 Pac. 813); a railroad depot, under a statute passed before such a thing was known in the state (State v. Bishop, 51 Vt. 287). We think the objection to the information not well taken. 2. The challenges to jurors were properly overruled. While the very adroit examination of jurors by the counsel for defendant elicited answers to the effect that the jurors had formed opinions based on the action of the justice of the peace in holding the defendant for trial, and the information sworn to by the prosecuting attorney, on further examination by the court it was made clear that the jurors had no settled opinions disqualifying them to sit in the case. 3. An application was made for a change of venue, on the ground of prejudice of the inhabitants of Harvey county against the defendant. In support of this application, a large number of affidavits were offered on the part of the defendant tending to show many expressions of opinion against the defendant. On the other hand, a very large number of affidavits was offered by the state tending to show that expressions of belief in the guilt of the defendant were not general. The case, as presented to us, is one of a disputed fact; namely, whether or not the people of Harvey county were generally prejudiced against the defendant. On the evidence before us, perhaps the trial court might with propriety have granted a change of venue. Possibly the expense to the county might not have been greatly increased by so doing, and a trial in another county might possibly have been preferable. We cannot say, however, that the court erred in its conclusions. The commission of any grave crime invariably attracts the attention of, and excites comments from, the citizens. Crimes are prosecuted by the state because they are offenses against the whole public, and the whole public is always interested in the punishment of violators of the Criminal Code. It does not follow, however, that there is any endency or disposition to punish the innocent. The fact that the crime was charged to have been committed against public property does not necessarily prejudice the defendant, and is not of itself ground for a change of venue. State v. Read, 49 Iowa, 85; Phillips v. State, 29 Ga. 105; Com. v. Delamater, 145 Pa. St. 210, 22 Atl. 1098. 4. The fourth assignment of error is with reference to the introduction and rejection of testimony. In order to understand the questions presented, it is necessary to give a summary of the principal evidence offered at the trial. It was not claimed that Rogers was personally present at the time the register's office was broken into and the records burned. The theory of the prosecution was that Rogers, who owned a set of abstracts of the records in the register's office, procured his codefendant, George H. Shirley, to employ others to do the deed. Rogers alone was on trial in this case. The state first offered evidence showing that a burglary had been committed by breaking into the building occupied as a courthouse; that a hole had been made through the wall into the vault in which the records were kept; that the record books were pulled down, and piled on the floor of the vault, saturated with kerosene oil, set on fire, some of the books wholly consumed, and others more or less injured. J. B. Smith, called by the state, testified that he was a barkeeper for Clark Fierce, who kept a joint in the second story of a building belonging to the defendant, Rogers. On the same floor of this building was a bedroom occupied by Shirley. The regular hours of work of the witness were from 3 o'clock in the afternoon till 12 o'clock at night. The records were burned on the night of March 23, 1893. The witness testified that, by direction of Shirley, he quit work at 11 o'clock on the nights of the 22d and 23d of March, leaving the room in charge of Shirley; that he had never before or after that time been discharged from his duties before the regular hour; that he returned to the joint about 7 or half past 7 in the morning; that he went upstairs, and found the door locked, then went to Tyson's restaurant, got the key from Clark Fierce, and went up into the joint; that he there found on the table some hop-tea bottles, scraps of bologna, and a sack of sandwiches in a sitting room, in front of and connected with the room in which the joint was kept. The witness further testified that during the few days prior to the 23d he had noticed three strange men around there, whom he described. The bedroom occupied by Shirley had a door opening into the sitting room. One Thomas E. Carroll was then called as a witness, and testified that he came to Newton about the 10th or 12th of March, in company with one James Martin; that he went to the house of Joe Miller, where he found Mrs. Miller and Shirley; that he asked for Mr. Miller, and was told by Shirley that he was not at home; that, as they started away, Shirley came out, and they made an appointment to meet at the Clark Hotel that evening; that they did meet, and had a conversation, which ended by making an appointment to meet the next evening; that they then met according to appointment, and that the witness Martin and Shirley went to Shirley's office; that Shirley there told them that he wanted them to go to the courthouse, break into the register's office, take the books off the shelves, pite them on the floor, pour coal oil on them, turn the gas on, and touch it off with a match; that he was authorized to pay $500 for the job; that Shirley then gave them $5 each. He states that on Sunday evening they again met in front of Tyson's restaurant, and agreed to go from there to the joint, Shirley saying that, if the bartender was there, he would send him home; that they went into the joint, had a bottle of whisky, and talked the matter over; that Martin had been up to the place, looked it over, and discovered some one living in the adjoining building, and said the job was worth $1,000 or $1,500; that Shirley would not consent to pay any more, and said, "You don't want to let the lives of two or three people stand in the way of four or five hun dred dollars;" that Shirley provided a bottle of coal oil and a gun, and wanted them to wait until 2 o'clock; that they then went around in front of Stager's restaurant, where he met a fellow he knew, whom he let into the secret; that this fellow was a friend of himself and Martin, and wanted to make some money, and he thought he would let him in on the job; that, after parleying between the three of them, Martin decided not to have anything to do with it that night; that they took the coal oil down the railroad track towards the roundhouse, and hid it under some ties; that he left Newton on the following day, about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. On cross-examination, this witness testified that his business was that of a gambler; that he had also done a little "boosting" (stealing); that he was a thief; that Martin (also called "Riley" by the witness) was a shoplifter; that the witness had done some "plugging" for Martin. In explanation, he said that Martin was a shoplifter, and he had disposed of some of his goods. For the purpose of corroborating this witness, it was shown by two boys that they found bottles of coal oil under a pile of railroad ties, and took them to a junk man to sell. G. O. Smith testified that he was a clerk in the restaurant of Mr. Matthews in the Rogers building on the lower floor, under the joint before mentioned; that he went to work at 7 o'clock on the night of the fire, and quit at 7 the next morning; that he saw Shirley on that night, first, at about 1 o'clock in the morning, in the restaurant; that he got a lunch, consisting of pie, sandwiches, meat, and took it away with him; that he came into the restaurant again about 4 o'clock, and was out and in quite a number of times, and acted restless and excited; that he pulled out a large roll of bills, which he said was $400, which he said he had made that night gambling; that at one time he came in, and went through the room "on a kind of a tiptoe, double-quick run; then he came back and went up stairs"; that that was about 4 o'clock in the morning; that about 5 o'clock the witness went up stairs, and got a bill changed, and there saw Clark Fierce and Shirley also; that Shirley was stooping over a trunk as though in the act of packing something; that witness heard of the fire between half past 5 and 6 o'clock. The janitor testified that he went to the courthouse about 6 o'clock, opened the front door, discovered the fire, got a bucket of water, threw it on the fire, and then went and called the sheriff. William Fleming, a brakeman, testified that he went to the joint kept by Fierce between 5 and 6 o'clock on the morning of the fire, and there saw Shirley and Fierce, and learned of the fire; that he went for the purpose of borrowing some money of Shirley; that Shirley appeared to be intoxicated or excited. Edward Harris was then called by the state, and testified that he came to Newton from Wichita, furnished by a man named Edwards with a little paper star, by which he was told Shirley would recognize him; went into a joint over a restaurant, where he found several people, Shirley among them; that he introduced himself to Shirley through the star; that they had a talk in the room in front of the barroom after the saloon was closed, about 12 o'clock; that Shirley then told him and Edwards that he wanted them to burn the county records. This witness then details at length the negotiations between himself and two other men, whom he names as English and Ripple, with Shirley, with reference to the destruction of the records, their final agreement, and the manner in which the work was accomplished. The witness testified that he stood guard at the corner of the building while the other two men did the work; that, after it was accomplished, they went back to Shirley's; that he then gave them $50 a piece, and agreed to meet them behind Fahy's saloon in Wichita, and pay them $150 more, the balance of the agreed price for the work; that, when they went back to Shirley's, they had a kind of lunch of sandwiches and canned stuff; that Shirley afterwards met them in Wichita, and paid the balance as agreed. On cross-examination, this witness testified that he was also known by the name of Mickey Slade; that he had been frequently arrested for petty crimes; and that he was promised immunity from prosecution if he would testify to the facts within his knowledge in this case. H. W. Black was then called as a witness, and testified that he had lived in Wichita for 23 years, and had known George H. Shirley between 9 and 10 years; that Shirley had been his tenant: that in February, 1893, Shirley lived in one of the witness' houses in Wichita; that on one Sunday witness went to see Shirley about borrowing some money from him; that, in the course of the conversation, Shirley said that he wanted some dirty work done, and wanted to know of the witness if he knew of any one he could get to do a dirty job. Some time in April, and after the records were burned, the witness was again at Shirley's house, and had a conversation with him, in which he states that Shirley said: "I don't know whether I will be prepared to let you have it or not. Mr. Rogers, my partner, objects to loaning any money out of Harvey county." "But he says: 'Doc, I guess I will let you have it before a great while out of my own, whether he objects or not." " The witness further testified: "I says: 'George, did you ever find your men to get that work done you spoke of?' He says: 'Yes; I got my men, and the work is done, and the records of Harvey county is burned, and we have the only abstract books of that county.' He says: 'By God, Doc, by God, we have got something equal to a gold mine. Yes,' he says, 'better; a gold mine might play out, and this never will.'" The witness Carroll testified with reference to a One |