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meet the same, it means only that the con- an appropriation. Herein the language of troller shall not draw a warrant for a spe- the supreme court of Colorado, in Institute cific object when he has already drawn for v. Henderson, 18 Colo. 105, 31 Pac. 714, is the full amount of the appropriation made peculiarly apposite: "To perinit the disbursefor that object.” The true test as to wheth- ment of an indefinite amount of money, as er any particular language in an act is suffi- these bounty acts contemplate, is to introcient to make an appropriation is here found. duce an element of uncertainty into these "To an appropriation, within the meaning of calculations that will seriously embarrass the constitution, nothing more is requisite both the legislature and the departments in than a designation of the amount and the giving effect to our state constitution with fund out of which it shall be paid." If the relation to the levying of taxes to meet apamount be certain, one of the reasons for propriations. If the legislature desires to the constitutional requirement is complied pay bounties, it may do so for all proper purwith, in that the people are enabled to de- poses by making the necessary appropriatermine how much of their money is to be tions therefor. Thus the public funds of the devoted to the named purpose. The desig- state will be protected, and the safeguards nation of the fund likewise enables the provided by the vigilance of the framers of peopļe to see how much of the moneys set our fundamental law will be given a conapart to a particular fund is to be drawn struction best calculated to prevent the evils from it and used for the specific end. But aimed at." The conclusion thus reached is under our system, countenanced by the cus
in no wise affected by such cases as San tom of years, it is not necessary in all cases
Francisco V. Dunn, 69 Cal. 73, 10 Pac. 191, that the act in terms should name the fund. and Grand Lodge v. Markham, 102 Cal. 169, The general fund itself is defined to be 36 Pac. 423. In those cases the acts con“the moneys received into the treasury, and strued made contribution to the support of not specifically appropriated to any other indigents, under section 22, art, 4, of the confund." Pol. Code, $ 454. From these mon
stitution. As to the act under consideration eys all appropriations are paid which are in Grand Lodge v. Markham, the constitunot made payable out of any other especially tion itself provides the manner of the mak. named fund.
ing of the appropriation, and the act, conThe language of the act here under con- forming to the manner prescribed, has the sideration is as follows: “Any person who
constitution of the state for its direct aushall kill or destroy any coyote or coyotes thority. In San Francisco v. Dunn, 69 Cal. shall be paid a bounty of five dollars out of
73, 10 Pac. 191, it was held that no legislathe general fund in the state treasury, for tive action is required to give force to the each coyote so destroyed.” The question constitutional proviso, and that upon the hapremains whether, measured by the rule pening of the contingency the language of above given, this language constitutes an the constitution, ex proprio vigore, acted as appropriation. We think not. The fund an appropriation, and qualified the general from which the bounties are to be paid is
constitutional inhibition. These cases, thereexplicitly designated, but the amount of mon
fore, are not in point upon the present quesey in the general fund devoted to the pay
tion. ment of these bounties is not specified. The For this reason, in addition to those herelanguage lacks the first essential to an effi- tofore given, the judgment is reversed, and cient appropriation. There is no designated the court below directed to dismiss the wr.. amount, and consequently there is no "specific appropriation" to be exhausted, unless We concur: TEMPLE, J.; GAROUTTE, it can be said that the whole general fund J.; HARRISON, J.; MCFARLAND, J. is set aside as a specific appropriation to the end in view,-a proposition not seriously 10 BEATTY, C. J., and VAN FLEET, J., did be considered. Redding v. Bell, 4 Cal. 333. not participate in this decision. It is freely conceded that the use of technical words in a statute is not necessary to create an appropriation. But, while no set
(4 Cal. Unrep. 973) form of language is requisite, upon the oth
PEOPLE v. DILLWOOD. (No. 21,121.) er hand there are some things which plainly enough are not severally an appropriation. (Supreme Court of California. Feb. 21, 1895.)
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IMPEACHMENT OF WITA promise by the government to pay money
NESS - CONTRARY STATEMENTS BEFORE TRIAL is not an appropriation. A duty on the CROSS-EXAMINATION PENDING CRIMINAL part of the legislature to make an appropria- CHARGES-EVIDENCE. tion is not such. A promise to make an 1. Where the testimony of a witness for the appropriation is not an appropriation. Us- prosecution is materially different on the trial age of paying money in the absence of an
from what it was on preliminary examination,
the extent to which defendant is to be allowed appropriation cannot make an appropriation
on cross-examination to go into the present surfor future payment. Ristine v. State, 20 Ind. roundings of the witness, in order to show the 333. The utmost that can be claimed for
motives inducing him to change his testimony,
is within the discretion of the court. the act under consideration is that it pledges 2. Under Code Civ. Proc. $ 2052, it is prop the good faith of the state to the making of er, when the testimony of a witness on preliminary examination is sought to be used to con- tion 2032, Code Civ. Proc., applied in such tradict the witness, to require it to be read and
cases. shown to the witness on demand. 3. To discredit a witness for the prosecu
Elmo Headley, a witness for the prosecuition, it may be shown that criminal charges are tion, admitted that he had "pleaded guilty pending against him, as tending to show a de- to stealing the Johnson cow," and had been sire to seek favor at the hands of the prosecution, by aiding in the conviction of the de
sent to the Whittier Reform School. He was fendant.
then asked if charges were not then pend4. Such charges must be proven by record ing against him in that county for felonies, if oral evidence thereof is objected to.
and which were pending before he was sentIn bank.. Appeal from superior court, enced to the reform school. Before the enFresno county; S. A. Holmes, Judge. actment of section 2051, Code Civ. Proc.,
Alfred M. Dillwood was convicted of bur- the conviction of a felony could only be glary, and appeals. Affirmed.
proved by the production of the record, if S. J. Hinds, for appellant. Atty. Gen.
objection were made. That it may now be Hart, for the People.
shown by the admission of the witness upon
the stand is an exception to the general PER CURIAM. The appellant was con
rule that the record, being the best evidence, victed of burglary in the first degree, and must be produced. It is competent to show appeals from the judgment and an order
the fact that other criminal charges are denying a new trial.
pending in the same court against the witThomas Philbin, a witness for the prose
ness at the time he testifies, not, however, as cution, admitted upon cross-examination
evidence of particular wrongful acts, for as that he had been convicted of a felony prior
to these he is presumed to be innocent, but to June 21, 1893, and afterwards, and prior
as a circumstance tending to show that his to the trial of this case, was granted a new testimony is or may be influenced by a detrial. On June 21st he was a witness in be- sire to seek the favor or leniency of the court half of Dillwood upon his examination be- and prosecuting officers by aiding in the fore the justice upon the same charge of
conviction of the defendant. These charges burglary here in question, and in his exam- should, however, be proved by the record ination in chief in the superior court had
if objection is made to oral evidence of testified to facts which, if believed by the
them. jury, would tend strongly to convict the No other questions need be noticed. The defendant. It was claimed by defendant judgment and order appealed from are afthat Philbin's testimony before the justice
firmed. was materially different from his testimony in chief upon the trial in the superior
(106 Cal. 129) court. If it were true that there was a ma
SAN FRANCISCO & F. LAND CO. v. BANterial difference in the testimony of the wit
BURY, County Treasurer, et al. ness on these two occasions, a very large
(No. 19,370.) liberty should be given the defendant to
(Supreme Court of California. Feb. 23, 1895.) prove the motives and influences inducing
Tax SALE-PURCHASE BY STATE — NOTICE TO REthe change, so as to enable the jury to deter
DEEM-VALIDITY-PAYMENT OF FEE. mine whether his testimony given before 1. Where the state is the purchaser of land them was prompted by a disinterested de
at tax sale, the controller and the attorney gensire that justice should be done, and there
eral have no authority to give notice for the
state of an intention to apply for a deed. Van fore likely to be true, or whether he was in- Fleet and Garoutte, JJ., dissenting. 37 Pac. fluenced by promises, or even by a hope not 801, affirmed. based upon promises or benefit to himself,
2. There being no statutory provision for
the disposition of a fee for notice of intention and therefore likely to be untrue. All the
to apply for a deed of land sold to the state for surroundings of the witness which can rea- taxes, it must be taken as the legislative intent sonably be supposed to influence his testi- that no such fee should be charged. 37 Pac. mony or affect his credibility should, under
801, affirmed. such circumstances, be permitted to be In bank. Appeal from superior court, Los shown. The court, however, must deter- Angeles county; Walter Van Dyke, Judge. mine, in view of the facts and circumstances Action by the San Francisco & Fresno as they arise, the limitations beyond which Land Company against J. Banbury, as trea'sa cross-examination of this character is use- urer of Los Angeles county, and others, to less or improper. We see no abuse of dis- compel the acceptance of money tendered cretion in this regard.
for the redemption of land sold for taxes. In the cross-examination of the witness Judgment was rendered for defendants, and Philbin, it was right to require that his tes- plaintiff appeals. Reversed. timony before the examining magistrate, Holdridge 0. Collins (James M. Allen and which was sought to be used to contradict
McAllister & Frohman, of counsel), for aphim, should be read to him, and, if required
pellant. Spencer G. Millard and Attorney by the witness, be shown to him. In Peo
General Hart, for respondents. ple v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 392, 16 Pac. 201, and in People v. Lee Chuck, 78 PER CURIAM. When this case was deCal. 322, 20 Pac. 719, it was held that sec- cided in department, the following opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice HARRISON: the amount tendered by it, should have also
“In June, 1892, the plaintiff, as the owner tendered $3 for each of the notices given by and successor in interest of 67 lots of land House, amounting to $201 in all; while the in McPherson's addition to the town of Mo plaintiff insists that the notice given by Pherson, formerly in the county of Los House was without authority of law, and Angeles, but now in the county of Orange, consequently that the item of $3 for giving sought to redeem them from a sale for de- such notice was not a part of the 'costs linquent taxes made to the state of Cali- and expenses of the redemption.' Section fornia March 12, 1889, and for that purpose 3817 of the Political Code provides that, tendered to the defendant Banbury, as treas- when the state has become the purchaser of urer of the county of Los Angeles, the sum land sold for delinquent taxes, the person of $225.60. It is conceded that this amount whose estate has been sold, or his successor of money was sufficient to effect the redemp- in interest, may redeem the same by paying tion, unless the sum of $3 for each lot, the amount of taxes due thereon at the time amounting to $201, for giving the notice of of the sale, with interest thereon, and any an intention to apply for a deed, and the other taxes then delinquent thereon, togethaffidavit therefor, fixed as a fee for giving er with a sum of money equivalent to the such notice by section 3785 of the Political taxes that would have been subsequently Code, should also have been tendered. The assessed, and also all costs and expenses, county auditor, in his estimate of the and 25 per cent. penalty which may have amount to be paid for redemption, included accrued by reason of such delinquency and this item in the certificates issued by him sale, and the costs and expenses of such under the provision of section 3817, Pol. redemption.'. Unless the item of three dol. Code; and the treasurer refused to accept lars for giving the notice is a part of the the amount tendered, or to give to the plain- 'costs and expenses' which have accrued tiff the certificates named in said section. ‘by reason of the delinquency and sale,' the The plaintiff thereupon brought this action plaintiff was under no obligation to tender to compel the treasurer to accept the sum it to the treasurer in order to effect a re tendered as above, and to give to it the trip- demption from the sale. Section 3785 makes licate receipts prescribed by the aforesaid provision for the issuance of a deed to the section 3817. The cause was tried in the purchaser in case there is no redemption court below, and judgment rendered for the from the tax sale, and requires that before defendant, from which, and from an order making application for a deed the 'purchasdenying a motion for a new trial, the plain- er' must serve upon the owner of the proptiff has appealed. Several questions are dis- erty purchased a written notice, containing cussed in the briefs of counsel, but the con- certain statements, and that for the service clusion which we have reached upon one of of said notice, and making an affidavit therethese questions renders it unnecessary to of, the 'purchaser' shall be entitled to redetermine the others. In May, 1892, the ceive the sum of three dollars, 'which sum defendant House, acting under the direction of three dollars shall be paid by the redempof the state controller, gave the notices re- tioner at the same time and in the same manferred to in section 3785, Pol. Code, and ner as other costs, percentages, penalties filed his affidavit thereof with the tax-col- and fees are paid.' The notice thus required lector of Los Angeles county. These sev- is to be served by the purchaser, or by some eral notices were signed, 'State of California, one in his behalf, whom he has authorized by R. F. House, Agent'; and, in the affidavit to serve it. Such notice, served by a stranof service filed with the tax collector, House ger, without any authority from the purstated that he was the 'agent for the pur- chaser, would not satisfy the requirements chaser of the property described in the fore of the statute, or entitle the purchaser to going notice.' House also testified at the insist upon a payment or tender of the three trial that prior to the date of giving the dollars, in order that a redemption might be notice he had been appointed by the state effected; and the rule in this respect is the of California, through the state controller same whether the state or an individual is and attorney general, and was authorized the purchaser. The state can act only to serve notices to cause the redemption of through officers or agents, and the duties property sold to the state for taxes.'
of its officers or agents must be defined by “The question here presented is not the statute, and the officer or agent who would right of the state to the issuance of a deed, give this notice must show his authority but the right of the delinquent taxpayer to therefor under some statute. We have not redeem the land struck off to the state un- been cited to any statute which confers upder the provisions of section 3773 of the Po- on either the controller or attorney general litical Code; and this right depends upon the right to appoint an agent for the purhis compliance with the requirements of the pose of giving this notice, or to take any statute in that behalf, the particular ques- step in reference to the issuance of a deed tion here presented being whether there was to the state for the property which may be a tender of a sufficient amount of money to struck off to it under the provisions of seceffect the redemption. It is insisted by the tion 3775 of the Political Code. The duties defendants that the plaintiff, in addition to of each of the above named officers are de fined in the Political Code-those of the con- terest paid in redemption shall be apportroller in sections 433-444, and those of the tioned between the state and county in the attorney general in sections 470-475,- and in same proportion that the state tax bears to neither of these sections can there be found the county tax,' and then declares, the monany authority for either of these officers to eys received for delinquencies shall be paid give the above notices, or for the appoint- to the county,' and makes no provision for ment of an agent to give the notices in be- the disposition of this item. If the legislahalf of the state. The provision in section ture had intended that the state, like any 433 making it the duty of the controller 'to other purchaser, should be entitled to charge superintend the fiscal concerns of the state and receive this item of three dollars, it only designates him as the accountant of would have made some provision that it the state's finances, and does not give to should be paid to it out of the redemption him any function regarding the same un- money, and not that it should be paid to the til the money over which he is to exercise a county. We are of the opinion that the supervision or control has come into the amount tendered by the plaintiff was suffihands of the treasurer, or some fiscal agent cient for the purpose of redeeming the lands of the state, or has become an obligation in question, and that the treasurer should in favor of the state, for which the state is have re ved he money, and issued to it the entitled to an immediate enforcement. The certificates authorized by the statute." 37 duty imposed upon this officer by virtue of Pac. 801. subdivision 16 of this section, 'to direct and A re-examination of the question serves to superintend the collection of all moneys due convince the court of the soundness of the the state, and institute suits in its name for views thus expressed. The legislative enall official delinquencies in relation to the actments contemplate that the state, in proassessment, collection and payment of the curing a deed, shall resort to the same prorevenue,' arises only when the moneys thus cesses made necessary for a private purto be collected are 'due the state,' and after chaser, the scheme of which is set forth in there has been some official delinquency •in section 3785, Pol. Code. But in so doing the relation to the collection or payment of the legislature-by oversight, seemingly-failed revenue. But, if the state has become the to empower any officer or agent to give the purchaser of land at a delinquent tax sale, requisite notice. Certainly, it has failed to the tax has been extinguished by the sale; empower either the attorney general or conand the state, instead of being a creditor of troller. It is a simple, and not unusual, case the taxpayer, or entitled to receive any of legislative lapse. While this court will go money due to it for taxes, has acquired an all reasonable lengths in interpreting the powinterest in the land, which is to be divested ers vested by the legislature in the ministerial only by some affirmative action on the part officers of the state, to give effect to the laws of the delinquent taxpayer. The care and and subserve the ends of justice, it will not, direction of the state's interest in land by construction, confer upon such officers auwou naturally fall to the department of thority which the legislature has seen to the surveyor general; but whether that offi- withhold. The dangers of such judicial legiscer has been intrusted with any function in lation would far exceed any temporary adreference to the lands purchased at a delin- vantage to the state which might arise from quent tax sale, or whether the state has it. The judgment and order denying a new failed to make any provision in reference trial are reversed. thereto, it is clear that neither the controller nor the attorney general has been intrusted VAN FLEET, J. I dissent. Further conwith the duty of guarding the state's inter-sideration of this case on rehearing has satest therein.
isfied me that the conclusion reached in de“It is not the policy of the state to increase partment, and now adhered to in the main the burdens of taxation beyond the necessary opinion, is wrong, as involving a too narrow cost of collection, or to impose any greater construction of the statute. While it is true burdens in a redemption from a delinquent that no specific provision of the statute gives tax sale than is necessary to secure the to the controller or attorney general the powpayment of the original tax. All matters of er to serve the notice required by section taxation are resolved in favor of the taxpayer, 3785 of the Political Code, I think that such and express statutes should be found for each power, as to the controller, at least, fairly and item of cost to be imposed upon him. There necessarily arises by implication, when the is no provision of law for the disposition of several sections of the Code bearing upon the three dollars claimed herein as a fee for the subject are construed together. In the giving the notice. Neither the controller nor first place, the Code expressly provides for
attorney general is entitled to it as a fee, the state becoming the purchaser at delin. or as a compensation for any official duty; quent tax sales (Pol. Code, 8 3773); and there nor, if the state is entitled to receive it, are are provisions expressly contemplating the they authorized to give it to any agent they making of a deed to the state in any instance may select for the purpose of serving the where it becomes such purchaser (Id. $ 3817). notice. Section 3816 provides that the orig- At the same time the state is not exempted inal tax and the twenty-five per cent. and in- from the provisions of section 3785, requiring
the purchaser, or some one authorized in his “from the time of filing notice of such lien or behalf, to give notice of his application for
claim with the clerk of the court in which such
judgment is entered." Held, that an attorney a deed, since it is therein provided that: "No
who filed a lien with the clerk of the superior charge must be made by the collector for the court upon a judgment therein cannot thereaftmaking of any such deed, where the state is er have set aside, to the extent of such lien, a the purchaser; and the acknowledgment of
satisfaction of the judgment effected by pay
ment through the clerk of the supreme court, all such deeds * shall be taken by the
after affirmance of the judgment in said court. county clerk free of charge." In fact, it is evident that the state has been put in the
Appeal from superior court, Chehalis counsame category, in all respects, excepting as
ty; Mason Irwin, Judge. to the time within which property sold to
Action by Charles T. Wooding against Osit can be redeemed, as private individuals.
car L. Crain. There was an affirmance by This being so, who is to act in behalf of the
the supreme court of a judgment of the sustate in giving the notice required by section
perior court for plaintiff. Under stipulation 3785? Certainly, the legislature should not
of parties, the judgment was paid to the be held to have left so glaring a hiatus in the
clerk of the supreme court in checks and law upon a subject of so much importance
drafts, and a full satisfaction entered. Plainto the people, if, by a reasonable construc
tiff's attorneys now seek by motion to have tion, the apparent omission in the scheme
the satisfaction of the judgment set aside provided can be supplied. And I think this
to the extent of liens for their compensation, can be done by a reference to the sections
created by filing and perfecting notice of of the Code prescribing the duties of the
such liens with a clerk of the superior court. controller. By section 433 of the Political
Denied. Code, it is made the duty of the controller J. C. Cross, for appellant. Ben Sheeks "to superintend the fiscal concerns of the and Hogan & McGerry, for respondent. state.” He is required to direct and superintend the collection of all moneys due the state GORDON, J. This was originally in relation to the "assessment, collection and
tried in the superior court of Chehalis counpayment of the revenue,” and against per- ty, where a judgment was rendered for the sons who have become possessed of money
plaintiff, Wooding, and against defendant, or property of the state, which they fail to
Crain; and subsequently, upon appeal to pay over, and against all debtors of the state.
this court, the judgment entered therein was And he may bring suit to recover in all such affirmed. 38 Pac. 756. Subsequently, and cases. The powers thus conferred are very on November 24, 1894, the amount of the broad and comprehensive in their scope, and
judgment was paid to the clerk of this court it is apparent that they must be necessarily in the form of drafts and checks, pursuant held to include any incidental acts requisite to a stipulation between the parties to the to give full and complete effect to the pri- | action filed with the clerk, by the terms of mary functions therein enumerated. He is which the clerk was directed to receive said given power to institute suits to recover, not drafts and checks in lieu of money; and on only the revenue, but the property, of the the same day the plaintiff and respondent state. By its purchase at a tax sale the state received from the clerk the drafts and acquires a property in the land, which it is
checks aforesaid, in full payment and satisthus made the duty of the controller to per- faction of said judgment. This is a proceedfect and secure. This can only be done by ing on the part of Messrs. Hogan & McGerthe giving of the notice required by section
ry, who were attorneys for the plaintiff and 3785, and that the power of the controller | respondent in both courts, and who filed to give such notice is necessarily implied is, liens for the amount of their compensation to my mind, obvious. Having the power, and as attorneys for services rendered in this the act being merely ministerial, he can di
cause, with the clerk of the superior court, rect it to be done through the agency of an- to set aside the satisfaction of judgment other. And the existence of this power in entered in this court to the extent of their the controller was, in my judgment, in con- said liens, being two in number, and aggre. templation by the legislature when they fail
gating $736, and permit execution to issue ed to make more specific provision on the upon the said judgment to satisfy said liens. subject.
Attached to and made a part of the affidavit
upon which the present application is based I concur: GAROUTTE, J.
are copies of the liens filed with the
clerk of the superior court, and it also ap(11 Wash. 207)
pears that the judgment debtor had been
duly notified of the filing of said attorneys'
liens. (Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 15,
Section 101 of the Code of Procedure pro1895.)
vides: “An attorney has a lien ir his com: ATTORNEY'S LIEN--FILING CLAIM IN COURT
pensation, whether specially agreed upon or PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT.
implied, as hereinafter provided: Code Proc. $ 101, gives an attorney a lien for his coinpensation for his services ren
(3) Upon money in the hands of the adverse dered in an action upon the judgment therein, | party in an action or proceeding, in which