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APPENDIX.

No. I.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES ON NAPOLEON'S EARLY

CAREER.

Volume III. page 21.

IT may be added to the meagre account given in the text, that Napoleon, though only a youth of twenty-four, was, on his return to Corsica in 1793, deeply involved in the politics of that island. For some time he held the same course with his venerated relative, Paoli, who, struck with his early talents and mode of expression, pronounced him to belong to those characters whom Plutarch records. About the same time, another remarkable person, the well-known statesman Count Pozzo de Borgo, was distinguished as a rising character in the same island. He was the relation, and originally the friend and companion, of Napoleon, and enjoyed, like him, great consideration among his countrymen. But when civil dissensions arose, the friendship between the two relatives was broken off. Pozzo de Borgo, who already held an important situation in the community of Corsica, adhered to Paoli. Napoleon embraced that side which espoused the cause of the French Republican party. He was at this time Lieutenant-Colonel of a regiment of the National Guard. The Colonel of the same regiment entertained different political sen

timents from his young assistant; and upon one occasion, Napoleon drew up a part of the regiment which adhered to him, and fired upon his commanding-officer and the rest. After this skirmish, he was engaged in others, until the party of Paoli becoming superior, Napoleon was solemnly banished from his native island.

He always blamed Pozzo de Borgo for having been active in procuring his exile; and with the strong love of revenge which is said to mark his country, never, amongst so many important affairs as afterwards required his attention, forgot his feud with his early rival. Wherever France obtained

an ascendency, an abode there became dangerous to the object of Napoleon's hatred; to avoid which, Pozzo de Borgo was compelled to retreat from one kingdom to another, until at last he could only find shelter in England. But the fate of these two early acquaintances seemed strongly connected and interwoven. As Napoleon began to lose ground, the fortunes of his relative appeared to advance, and honours and advan tages dropped upon him, in proportion to Napoleon's descent from eminence. It was even his remarkable destiny to have, from his influence in the Russian councils, no small share in deciding upon the destiny of his powerful persecu tor. When the councils of the allies were wavering respect→ ing the march to Paris, it was the arguments of Count Pozzo de Borgo which supported the Emperor of Russia in his re◄ solution to adopt that decisive measure.

In the same volume (III. p. 30,) mention is made of a "small Jacobin publication (by Buonaparte) called Le Souper de Beaucaire, a political dialogue between Murat and a Federate, or Girondist, in which the latter is overwhelmed and silenced by the arguments and eloquence of the friends of the people." This is an inaccurate account of the Souper de Beaucaire, of which the editor had not been able to find a copy. It has been since republished, and is of a tenor confor siderably different from what is above described. Murat, example, is not a personage in the dialogue. The scene is laid

at the period when the Federalists were making head against the Jacobin government in several of the towns of France, and particularly in Lyons and Marseilles. The date is 29th July, 1793. The plan of the work is as follows:

A miscellaneous party is supposed to meet at a table d'hôte at Beaucaire, during the last day of the great fair held at that place. The company consists of a military man, being the author himself, two merchants of Marseilles, a native of Nismes, and an artisan of Montpellier. They fall naturally into a train of conversation concerning the probable issue of the civil war. The Marseillese, who have just learned the bad success of their countrymen's attack upon Avignon, from which they had been driven by the Jacobins, after holding it for a short time, (see Vol. II. p. 257,) are inquisitive to know the state of the army of the democrats, under Cartaux; and the information which they receive from the young soldier, is of a nature to strike them with apprehension.

The Soldier. "The army of Cartaux was four thousand men strong when it assaulted Avignon, (then occupied by the Marseillese army,) it now amounts to six thousand, and within four days will reach ten thousand men. It has never been repulsed from Avignon, since it never made a formal attack; the troops only manoeuvred about the place, in order to ascertain where an attempt to force the gates, by means of petards, might be made to advantage; a few cannon were fired, to try the courage of the garrison, and it was then necessary to draw back to the camp, to combine the attack for the next morning. The Marseillese were three thousand six hundred men ; they had a heavier and more numerous artil❤ lery, and yet they have been obliged to recross the Durance. That surprises you, but it is only veteran troops who can endure the uncertain events of a siege. We were masters of the Rhone, of Villeneuve, and of the open country; we had intercepted all their communications. They were under the necessity of evacuating the town, (Avignon,) were pursued by the cavalry, and lost many prisoners, and two guns."

The Marseillesc endeavour to contrast these bad news

with what they had to expect from the proposed exertions of their city, in recruiting their army with new levies and with heavy cannon. But the young officer proceeds in a professional manner to show the inferiority of 18 and 24-pounders to field-artillery, when armies were to engage in the field, the superior skill of regular artillery-men in serving the guns, the advantages possessed by the disciplined soldiers of Cartaux over the raw recruits which Marseilles might call into the field, and the want of means of subsistence in the city in case of a close siege.

The Marseillais, in reply, plays the part usually ascribed to the interlocutor, in this species of dialogue, who combats the opinions favoured by the author. He proposes various schemes of defence, one after another, the weakness of which is easily exposed by his victorious antagonist. He points out to them, that there was the utmost folly in the extremity of resistance, and that the Marseillese possessed no means which could ultimately lead to success. "Your army," he said, "will be composed of all the wealthy and well-educated of your city, for the Sans Culottes will readily turn against you. Thus, you will expose the flower of your youth, accustomed to hold the commercial balance of the Mediterranean, and to enrich their country by mercantile speculations, by confronting them with veteran soldiers, who have been dyed a hundred times in the blood of the furious aristocrat and ferocious Prussian. Let poor countries fight to the last extremity. The native of Vevarais, of the Cevennes, of Corsica, may expose himself without fear to the event of battle. If he gain the fight, he has attained his purpose-if he loses, he is in no worse situation than before for making peace. But you-if you lose a battle, the fruits of a thousand years of fatigue, of labour, of frugality, of good fortune, become the prey of the soldier."

In this tone the discussion proceeds, until the Marseillese merchants, driven out of the field of dispute, are compelled to acknowledge, that submission is the best chance they have of escaping destruction. They agree to recommend it to their

countrymen, and treat the young soldier with a few bottles of champagne, in grateful acknowledgment, that he had been at the trouble to clear up their ideas on the subject.

From this analysis the reader will perceive that nothing can be more inaccurate than to term the Souper de Beaucaire a Jacobin pamphlet, although it is unquestionably written to urge the Federalists to submit to their inevitable fate, and avert extremity by doing so in time. The work is entirely free from all the exaggerated and cant language of the day. There is no mention of liberty, equality, or fraternity of the rights of man-no abstract discussion of political principles. The whole merits of the dispute betwixt Paris and the departments are hurried over with little or no argument. Buonaparte urges the Marseillese to submission, not because the principles which dictated their insurrection were erroneous, but because they had not means to maintain successful resistance; not because they had been confuted by the Jacobins in argument, but because they were unequal to the task of contending with them by force. Notwithstanding, therefore, what is said in the text, from erroneous information of the nature of this publication, there is nothing in it inconsist ent with Napoleon's own account of the origin of the work, that it was written under the assumed character of a Jaco bin, with the friendly intention of convincing the Girondists that they were choosing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner. (Vol. III. p. 31.) Ne vertheless, even the colour of his vizard disgusted the author on recollection. He called in and destroyed every copy of the Souper de Beaucaire which could be found, so that only one remained, from which the reprint of Monsieur Pancoucke has been executed.

The Souper de Beaucaire is written in a dry, dispassion ate, and constrained style; but there is another and earlier work of Napoleon's youth, which is much more worthy of commemoration, as indicative of the temper of the man. This was his Letter to M. Matteo Buttafoco, one of the

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