troops were close on their front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the "elite," and now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning their cannon and all their materiel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon being joined by Pirch's corps, again at- i tacked Flanchenoit, which he turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards the Genappe chaussée, and closed round the right of the French,1 driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their confusion. His troops came into the high road, or chaussée, near Maison du Roi, and Blucher and Wellington having met about the same time near La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no time to rally. The loss of the Prussians on the 18th did not exceed 800 men. The brunt of the action was chiefly sustained by the troops of the British and King's German Legion, as their loss will show. In stating this, it must be allowed, that much support was afforded by the other contingents; but they were chiefly raw levies, newly raised, who could not be depended upon in a situation of importance. Some behaved ill, as is publicly known. None were in the first line, except the Nassau troops at Hougomont, and some on our extreme left. They were placed in the second line, and in the valley behind the first line, and on the right, at Braine la Leude. They had generally been formed with the British brigades of the different divisions, (in the manner Lord Wellington found so advantageous with the Portuguese troops,) but these arrangements had just been made. The different brigades in a division had not any knowledge of, or confidence in, each other. Many battalions, particularly some Belgian troops, in the rear of the first line, stood with firmness against the French cavalry, and drove them back. They suffered more severely, perhaps, than

I Liv. ix. p. 169.

the first line, from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and at the close of the action, advanced in support of the first line with great steadiness and regularity.

The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. They once attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained themselves until daylight, the situation of the village being strong; this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over General Thielmann, and got possession of Wavre. He immediately retreated towards Namur, where his rear-guard maintained themselves against all the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to take the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blucher, and having rallied many of the fugitives, he brought his army without loss to Paris. He had been considered as lost, and his army made prisoners; this belief was a great cause of the resignation of Buonaparte; otherwise, with this army he could have mustered 70 or 80,000 men ; with the fortifications and resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the preceding year. The great central depots of Paris and Lyons gave him great advantages, as is well shown in the introductory chap., Liv. ix. and p. 181. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of war; he might at least have made terms. The southern and eastern parts of France were certainly in his favour; he and his army had been

well received there only a few weeks before. That army, and a great part of the population, would still have been glad to make sacrifices to endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least, the honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.

The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians, has been variously stated.1 The above account is perhaps as near the truth as can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the British, which continued upwards of seven hours, after their cavalry had been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no calculation could justify the idea, that we would have been so easily defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of our reverses. Even in such a case, the arrival of the Prussians must have obliged him to have retired. Muffling has observed, that the bold movement of Blucher on the 18th has not been sufficiently appreciated.

1 Liv. ix. says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy dated half past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this. Liv. ix.

2 Muffling. p. 61. "Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un general ordinaire au

It was bold and masterly. Even when he was told that Grouchy was in his rear with a large force, his plans were not shaken, though this might have somewhat retarded his movements. The skilful veteran knew that it was on the field of Waterloo where the fate of the day was to be decided, and if even Grouchy had attacked Bulow's corps, there was nothing to prevent the first and second corps from joining the British army by Ohain. Grouchy could only, at farthest, have checked the third and fourth corps. There cannot be a moment's doubt of the anxiety and exertions of the Prussians to assist on the 18th. The cordiality and friendship of the Prussians have been felt and acknowledged by every officer who has had occasion to visit Prussia subsequently; this has been particularly the case with the military.

This short campaign of "Hours" was a joint operation. The honours must be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect, which perhaps had never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a moment the destiny, of Europe was changed.

roit fait; mais une nouvelle de cette nature auroit pu entrainer le general le plus distingué à prendre des precautions, ou la resolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple demonstration."

No. IX.

BUONAPARTE'S PROTEST.

Volume IX. page 99.

"JE proteste solennellement içi, à la face du Ciel et des hommes, contre la violence qui m'est faite, contre la violation de mes droits les plus sacrés, en disposant par la force de ma personne et de ma liberté.

"Je suis venu librement à bord du Bellerophon; je ne suis point prisonnier ; je suis l'hôte de l'Angleterre. J'y suis venu à l'instigation même du Capitaine, qui a dit avoir des ordres du Gouvernement de me recevoir, et de me conduire en Angleterre, avec ma suite, si cela m'étoit agréable. Je me suis presenté de bonne foi pour venir me mettre sous la protection des lois d'Angleterre. Aussitôt assis à bord du Bellerophon, je fus sur le foyer du peuple Britannique. Si le Gouvernement, en donnant des ordres au Capitaine du Bellerophon, de me recevoir ainsi que ma suite, n'a voulu que tendre une embûche, il a forfait à l'honneur et flêtri son pavillon. Si cet acte se consommoit, ce seroit en vain que les Anglais voudroient parler à l'Europe de leur loyauté, de leurs loix, et de leur liberté. La foi Britannique s'y trouvera perdue dans l'hospitalité du Bellerophon. J'en appelle à l'histoire ; elle dira qu'un ennemi, qui fit vingt ans la guerre aux peuples Anglois, vint librement, dans son infortune, chercher un asile sous ses loix. Quelle plus éclatante preuve pouvaitil lui donner de son estime et de sa confiance? Mais comment repondit-on en Angleterre à une telle magnanimité ?— on feignit de tendre une main hospitalière à cet ennemi, et quand il se fût livré de bonne foi, on l'immola.

A bord du Bellerophon.

4 Août 1815."

(Signé) "NAPOLEON.