FOR the same reason, martial law must be universal: the government will defend itself; and it cannot defend itself, unless it every where watches its enemies, and hinders them from acting as soon as they begin to stir. Free governments may consider many libels and lies as idle words; many others as worthy only of moderate fines; but there is no safety in permitting your town-meeting orators to tamper with an army. The government must be jealous, and is scarcely permitted to be either magnanimous or merciful: its fears will make it always strict, and often cruel.

Ir is not possible, therefore, that the French should enjoy one half of the little liberty they had under their kings. Their revolution will lessen it throughout Europe. But it is certain, that the most rigorous governments are the hardest to maintain in tranquillity. Trivial risings of the people are not to be expected the certainty, that any small insurgent force would be instantly crushed by the great force of the army, will prevent any risings, but such as are serious struggles for empire, and these are to be expected.

A GREAT commander, with a hundred thousand men to second his designs, is crowned with success. The decision is made by the comparison of hostile forces, and the conqueror, having the greater force, claims the admiration of his countrymen and despotick authority over them. He obtains it. But in peace he has fewer to aid his designs, and more to obstruct them. Those whom he gratifies will not be grateful; those whom he denies will be vindictive. Extravagant hopes are formed, and even great success in a peaceful administration will not be splendid. Few will admire; many will repine and be disappointed.

THE circumstance, that his claim to reign is merely personal, will ensure disturbances. Tranquillity will not be expected to last longer than his life, and that expectation will abridge it. His indisposition, his old age, his mistakes, and his disasters, will all engender those forebodings of change, that will hasten changes. His ambitious lieutenants will aspire to his place, and will cabal in the army to gain a party to be ready

to salute them emperours, as soon as he is dead, or has become odious.

ANOTHER Consequence worth remark, is, that these changes have no tendency to establish liberty. A new struggle, like the old one, must be by violence, which can only give the sceptre to the most violent. The leaders will aim only at the power to reign, and it will not be their wish to lessen that power, which they hope to gain as a prize. The supreme power would not tempt them to such efforts, if it was to be made cheap and vile in their eyes, by bestowing it on the despised rabble of the cities and the common soldiery. These men are unfit for liberty; and, if they had it gained for them, would give it away to a demagogue, who would have, in six weeks, another army, and a new despotism, as hard to bear and to overturn as that which they had subverted. Nor could the leaders establish liberty if they tried: the supreme power being military, the contest can only determine what general shall hold it. A military government, in fact, though often changing its chief, is capable of very long duration. Rome, Turkey, and Algiers, are examples: France may prove another.

THUS the progress of mob equality is invariably to despotism, and to a military despotism, which, by often changing its head, embitters every one of the million of its curses, but which cannot change its nature. It renders liberty hopeless, and almost undesirable to its victims.

"HISTORY IS PHILOSOPHY TEACHING BY EXAMPLE."

First published in the Palladium, February, 1802.

AMONG states and nations the law of the powerful is des

potism. Yet there are, perhaps, of more than two hundred thousand heads of families in New-England, ten or twenty thousand, who sincerely believe, that the power of France is favourable to general liberty. The opinion is shallow, but a great many hundreds of the persons who entertain it are no fools. The errour, gross as it is, lies in want of thought, and want of information.

A NATION, which has made almost every sacrifice for its ambition to rule other nations, will not, now it is victorious, be very modest in requiring from them like sacrifices. France affects to be the imitator of ancient Rome: never was there a more abominable original, or a more servile copy.

THERE was almost no evil that Rome did not inflict, scarcely any humiliation that she did not impose on her allies. The people of Latium were denominated her confederates, and entitled to what was called, as a kind of eminence in slavery, the jus Latinum; the other states claimed only the jus Italicum. These were degrees in slavery. For when the Latins insisted, as well they might, that they would not follow the Romans in their wars, their refusal was called treason; a war ensued, and the Latins yielded on the terms of having the excellent privilege of the jus Latinum. After Latium was thus humbled, Rome extended her sway over the twelve states of Etruria. Those nearest to her, and the most afraid of her power, were tempted by all the offers of citizenship that tyranny could hold forth; and they were offered with effect: they were neutral. Etruria did not combine to resist Rome, till Rome was not to be resisted. Samnium was next attacked. Seventy years of necessary to sub

war, and more than twenty triumphs, were due the Samnites, who were as brave and as warlike as the Romans, but not half so well united. The Romans never failed

to use one set of slaves to conquer another. The Campanians were called allies, and, under that name, entitled to fight the Samnites; and, during a century of the most vigorous oppression, they were incessantly reproached with their ingratitude to the Romans, because they winced a little, when their chains galled to their marrow. The Samnites were reduced; and then Pyrrhus came. The people of Tarentum, who called him over, had little power, and his own state had none, for a distant expedition. He failed. The Carthaginians next disputed the dominion of Sicily with the Romans. They loved money better than glory; and the Romans sought money by winning glory. The men of the sword prevailed in combat against the shopkeepers.

Two extraordinary men raised up Carthage from the dust. Hamilcar, a great man, reduced Spain, where he was cut off in early life: Hannibal, his son, a greater man, perhaps the greatest of men, trained the armies and led them into Italy against the Romans. Much has been said, and more might be said, on this subject. Hannibal never met with his equal, and the reason why he did not finally conquer was, that the institutions of Carthage were inferiour to those of Rome. The policy of Carthage was to make money; that of Rome to make conquests. In consequence of this defect, Carthage lost both money and conquests; while Rome accumulated both. Carthage stood in fear of her allies; the allies of Rome were afraid of her. The conquests of Rome were old and well consolidated with her empire; those of Carthage recent and still turbulent. Accordingly, Spain, as soon as Hannibal left it, blazed out with wars, that made her the slave of Rome. Italy was more advanced in slavery, and felt an emulation among her states in their obedience to their mistress. She used her own allies as slaves, and the subjects of Carthage as aliies.

ROME courted the great; Hannibal the populace. This was one cause of the ardour and perseverance of the allies in the service of Rome, who courted the oligarchy of every state to assist in oppressing it. Another impediment to Hannibal's success, was in the government of Carthage. It was popular,

and, therefore, a prey to faction. Hanno prevented the supplies being sent to Hannibal, that would have given him the superiority. The jacobins of Carthage destroyed her independence they hated their rivals more than they loved their country.

THE Romans dissembled their anger against Philip, king of Macedon, as long as they had the Carthaginians to deal with. When Carthage was subdued, they picked a quarrel with Philip. Even then they allied themselves with the Etolians, the Virginians of ancient Greece, and used them as tools to subdue Philip. Philip was beaten at Cynocephale, and the Etolians were greatly disappointed on the peace that ensued. For they expected that Rome would allow them to domineer as despots in Greece; but Rome very discreetly chose to domineer herself.

INDEED, ancient history has a great deal to say to America ; but America will not hear it.

THE Ætolians, disappointed in their ambition, then said a great many things that were true; but they said all from spite, and were not regarded. Flamininus, the conqueror of Philip, proclaimed, at the Isthmian games, liberty to the states of Greece; that is to say, anarchy; that all should be weak, and Rome stronger than all.

HE, and the ten ambassadours, told the Roman senate, that, unless Lacedæmon were reduced, Nabis, the king of that state, would be lord of all Greece; and yet he told the assembled states of Greece, at Corinth, that it was wholly their affair and nothing to the Romans. The duplicity and profligacy of this transaction are exhibited even by Livy, who is a very Roman in his history.

By dividing, the Romans conquered. Weak confederacies are so many strong factions and crazy governments.

THESE old examples shew what France has already done in Europe, where she has destroyed every one of its republicks; and what she will do, if she and her allies, the jacobins, can, in America. They have begun their work-they have made progress.