Etruria is tricked out in purple robes, like a playhouse monarch, to tread the stage in mock dignity. The proud Spaniard finds for France gold and dollars, and for that proof of "civism" he is treated as headservant in Buonaparte's kitchen. So that to favour kings, and to depress, plunder, and destroy republicks, has been the sure and experienced consequence of French domination.

LET the ignorant hirelings of France prattle about the cause of liberty. Let them repeat the second million of times the silly lie, that we triumph with France. Her triumphs are terrible. A voice seems to issue from the tombs of the fallen republicks for our warning. Our citizens are warned, though our government is not; and they would be armed, if France or fate did not ordain, that we should be disarmed and defenceless.

POLITICAL REVIEW. N°. II.

ONE of the consequences of the progress of ancient Rome to empire was, to lower the spirit of all other nations, while she raised her own. Already Buonaparte talks in the tone of a master; and his rivals and enemies, like slaves. The emperour of Germapy has congratulated him in form, because he has elected himself president of the Italian republick. The grand Turk has renewed his old treaties with the man, whose expedition to Egypt, in a time of profound peace, shewed his absolute contempt of their obligation. Russia smothers her anger on account of Malta and Corfu. All Europe is striving to make its hypocrisy conceal its terrour.

AFTER every former war, the question in every state was, how to arrange its concerns so as best to profit by the mutual dread, in which every power stood of its neighbour. Since the treaty of Amiens, the little powers are extinct, and the only concern is, how to find defence against France: there is but one leviathan, and half a score of small fish.

BUT, as France emulates old Rome, it is material to note the points of difference and resemblance.

ROME achieved her conquests, while she was republican; France is now imperial, precisely in the state, in which Rome became pacifick and began to feel decline.

FRANCE is as corrupt, and has had as much to corrupt her, as Rome had, after the horrours of her civil wars. Yet it is probable Buonaparte is less of a politician and more of a warriour, than Augustus, the second Roman Cesar. The Roman, too, had no foe near him. Parthia lay beyond the Euphrates; and a desart of parching sand, without fountains of water, divided the two great empires of Rome and Parthia from each other. Wars, when they were waged, were, therefore, produced by vain-glory, and very little interested the passions of the people of either of these states. In order to make the comparison fairly, we must suppose that Cornelius Sylla, instead of abdicating the dictatorship, remained at the head of the Roman armies, the Buonaparte of Rome. Even then, we shall scarcely find a formidable enemy left. Gaul and Britain were barbarous; Carthage, Greece, Macedonia, and the Syrian monarchy under Antiochus, were reduced to subjection. Whereas the modern Sylla finds in England, Austria, and Russia, a Hannibal, a Philip, and a Mithridates.

FRANCE, then, as military as Rome was under the Cesars, finds, in these obstacles, infinitely greater incentives to her ambition than they did. She has enemies near, and in force. Of necessary consequence, her system will not be pacifick: to make the power of her enemies less, will be the same thing as to make her own greater. The power of England, depending on her navy, will necessarily engage her active hostility. She will try the utmost efforts of her policy and " diplomatick skill," to detach the United States from being customers of Great Britain; and will, if possible, unite them to herself, as auxiliaries to her scheme of aggrandizement. We have some thousands of jacobins wicked enough, and some tens of thousands of democrats weak enough, to second her plan. They are ready to make the United States the tool of France, and, in that illustrious character, to revive the famous resolutions of Mr. Madison, and the report of Mr. Jefferson on the

privileges and restrictions of our commerce with foreign nations, so as to render congress the instrument of their war upon Sheffield, Manchester, and Birmingham, in England. Mr. Madison, who knew a great deal less than nothing at all of his subject, fancied that we could starve these manufacturers; and because we could, he humanely and wisely insisted, that we ought to starve them; and, therefore, that we ought to frame regulations, by which our consumers and the English manufacturers would both suffer, and the French would gain. All this, so worthy of a Frenchman, was to be done to restore to trade its liberty: it was to suffer force, in order to be free. It was to be compelled to do, as it ought to be disposed, but was not disposed to do. Not one merchant supported this scheme; but it will be revived.

FRANCE will soon have Louisiana. A formal treaty has already given it to her, and all our papers have published its contents. She only waits for a more convenient season: she waits to conquer the islands. She waits to let the true Americans recover from their fears, and have her partisans profit by their superiority in our counsels. She will depend on our fears, to do all the mischief she meditates against Great Britain, as a peace-offering, to obtain the delay of that which she meditates against us; but she will not delay it long, even though we should commence a war of acts of congress against British ships and manufactures.

LOUISIANA will produce as much cotton, as Great Britain, imports; Georgia already yields two thirds of that amount. France will be in a hurry to send her legions to settle these fertile lands, vast enough in extent for an empire. She will be able to block up the Mississippi. She will be able to make terms for our degradation. She will menace our frontiers, while her faction in our bosom will enfeeble the centre. In a military and financial view, we shall become weaker than ever, at the very moment when we shall more than ever have need of force.

OUR wealth, supposed by the democratick babblers to be the incentive to war, is the security for our tameness. To

get, and to keep, and to enjoy, is the spirit of our nation; but to keep with honour and security, is no part of common arithmetick. The world, France excepted, is now peopled with Dutchmen. England is made tame by her banking and funded wealth she is bound in golden chains. France intends to take them off, and to put on chains of iron. Compared with England, France is now what her own Parisian rabble was in 1790, prone to any change, because there is much wealth to be gained, none to be hazarded. Our half-witted democrats insist, that great wealth produces war. So far is this from being true, that the pursuit and the possession of wealth make a nation not less servile than sordid, willing to take kicks for pay, and to prefer gain to honour and security. France has the spirit of a camp; the peace of Amiens shews, that England has that of a counting-house.

POLITICAL REVIEW. N°. III.

CORRECT views of European politicks lead to sound results of the publick judgment on our own. We have been long, too long, amused with the democratick prattle about the love of peace, and the love of our fellow-men, and the millennium, that would begin as soon as all kings were murdered, and all the citizen kings were fairly crammed together, forty deep, into a Philadelphia state-house-yard, or a Paris field of Mars, or a London Copenhagen-house, to exercise, as a triumphant mob, their imprescriptible and more than royal rights and functions. On the contrary, instead of perpetual peace among nations, we see a state of things, which renders all hope of any long peace ridiculously chimerical. Two mighty champions stand observing each other; and, though they have suspended the combat, they have not laid aside their arms: they are furbishing them up, expecting to renew it. England is in dread for her existence; France is full of impatience to effect the consummation of her ambition. Peace will afford neither to the one nor the other an hour of relaxation or repose.

It will turn no swords into plough-shares; but it is an awful interval of danger and terrour, which requires, that England, at least, should beat her plough-shares into swords. Including her militia, her land forces will exceed in the peace establishment, as it is called, the number she had on foot at the end of the American war. A peace, that requires more soldiers than such a war, is not the beginning of the expected millennium. How ardent France is to extend her domination, no man of the least sense and observation can need to be told. She has not lost a minute to recover St. Domingo, nor to prepare a great army to take possession of Louisiana, as soon as it will best answer her purpose. Since the preliminaries of peace were signed on the first of October, 1801, Buonaparte has appointed himself president of the Italian republick, in other, but not plainer, words, king of Italy. She has a treaty with Portugal, which brings her near enough to the mouth of the great river Amazon, to secure at a future day, her command of the vast territory, bigger than all France, lying on that river. She has prohibited all importation of English manufactures; and has obliged her viceroy, the king of Spain, and her subjects in Holland, to do the like.

WITH these decisive marks of rooted hostility, with these undisguised preparations of the means to renew the contest, whenever it can be done with the best prospect of subverting the government and independence of Great Britain, with all the parade of equipping new navies in France, and her Spanish and Dutch provinces, and with her legion of honour, the consuls, pretorian guards, and with the draft of twice sixty thousand men, to fill up the ranks of her armies, who will doubt, that she is intent on the schemes of her ambition, and will go to war on the first favourable occasion for their accomplishment?

WHETHER Great Britain is competent to defend herself against a force so vast, and a spirit of hostility so rancorous and ardent, is a question of infinite importance to the whole civilized world, and, perhaps, of as much to the United States, as to any nation in it.