trouble to subdue, or to keep in subjection. Egypt, under thePtolemies, was as despicable as the French found it lately under the mamelukes. The Romans overthrew Antiochus the great, and seized all the provinces of Asia more easily than their best general could take the single cities of Carthage or Numantia, To preserve her conquests, Rome built no fortresses, and resorted to no other means than armies and colonies. Her empire contained, Mr. Gibbon computes, about one hundred and twenty millions of souls; yet her army did not exceed sixty legions, being less than four hundred thousand men,

THE French keep on foot more soldiers; but, it is to be considered, their career of conquest was begun only ten years ago. They have imposed their yoke on nations, not divided into a hundred independent tribes, like the Gauls and Spaniards, not barbarians, like the Germans, not effeminate, like the Asiaticks, but on nations, who confided so entirely on their union, resources, and spirit, that they supposed it impossible they should be conquered. The states now subject to France exceed her in the number of soldiers, they still exceed her in the number of people. Their fall has roused every passion of pride, fear, and vengeance; and there is not the least reason to suppose, that the insolence and rapacity of the conqueror will suffer them to subside. The difference of language, character, and condition will prevent their assimilation into one people for

many years.

LONG before such an assimilation could take place, the military despotism of France will be weakened by its own intemperance and excess. As Buonaparte reigns by uniting in himself the command of all the armies, whenever his death, infirmity, or adversity shall afford the opportunity, may we not expect, that the commard of a great separate army will inspire into its chief the design of independence? For instance, Poland, and the North of Germany, which, let it be observed, the Romans could never subdue, could not be holden without a large French army; nor would that army, stationed for many years in the same quarters, lose the occasion of a vacancy in the government, to consider their general as their emperour

or king, and to place him on the throne of the country subject to their military jurisdiction. It is in vain for Buonaparte to multiply decrees of his senate, declaring his empire indivisible and hereditary. It is possible and, indeed, probable, that the government of France itself may after many years of convulsion become so.

BUT the vast countries overrun by the French will not lose their ancient honours and their recent shame; and if the descendants of their expelled princes should not recover their thrones, if their former subjects should not resume their arms, and chase the French out of their territories, yet the ambition of the French generals will divide the empire. The conquests of Charlemagne were sudden; but the nations, who were rather confounded than subdued, resumed their independence under his feeble successors.

THE wars of the ancients were marked with a peculiar animation and even ferocity. The weaker always dreaded, and generally suffered every extremity from the fury of the victor. The people were slaves, and all their property, including lands and houses, was booty. Such contests could not be maintained with the half hostile, half traitorous languor of the modern wars against France. They needed, and they roused all the energies of all the citizens. But when the war was over, the conqueror stripped his captives as naked of power as of all other possessions. Hence it was, that the Romans found it so extremely difficult to subdue enemies, who fought to the last with all the energy of despair; and hence too it was, that, when once effectually conquered, we hear no more of their resistance. The Romans were not greatly troubled with insurrections, except of their armies.

It is, however, the law, as well as the motive of modern conquests, to preserve rather than to destroy. The subjects change masters; they are oppressed by military contributions; but they are not wholly stripped. It is scarcely possible, that the mildest exercise of a conqueror's rights should not enrage them, or that any modern mitigation of them should wholly disarm their vengeance.

It ought to be observed, too, as a consequence of the last remark, that, in the times of the Roman emperours, the population of every country was in a great measure composed of slaves; that of Europe, which France has overrun, is much sounder. Rome, soon after the expulsion of the kings, was filled with citizens, who were all soldiers; but, in the time of the emperours, its vast walls were crowded with, perhaps, a million of slaves, who were all abject and base. As this was the case in Rome, it was still worse in Alexandria, Antioch, Nicomedia, Carthage, Sirmium, Aquileia, Ravenna, and Naples. A degenerate race of conquerors could keep slaves in subjection.

BUT the people of Germany are, at least, as warlike as those of France. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to conceive, what means the conqueror possesses or can employ always to keep his equals in his chains. Their princes may lose their thrones; but we cannot resist the opinion, that, ultimately, the nations will recover their independence.

SUPPOSING, then, that the French empire is, in its very structure and principles, a temporary sway, that the causes, whatever they may be, which have made its action irresistible, produce and prolong a re-action sufficient in the end to counteract their impulse, ought we not, as men, as patriots, to hope, that Great Britain may be able to protract her resistance, till that re-action shall be manifested? And, as mere idle wishes are unbecoming the wise and the brave, ought not the American nation to make haste to establish such a navy as will limit the conqueror's ravages to the dry land of Europe? We have more than a million tons of merchant shipping; more, much more, than queen Elizabeth of England, and Philip II. of Spain, both possessed, in the time of the famous armada. We be slaves in soul, and possess the means of defence, without daring to use them. We do possess them, and, if our spirit bore proportion to those means, in a very few years our ships could stretch a ribbon across every harbour of France, and say with authority to the world's master stop; here thy proud course is stayed.

may

368

DANGEROUS POWER OF FRANCE. N°. IV.

SUBJECT RESUMED.

First published in the Repertory, March, 1808.

WHEN men indulge their passions, they seldom stop where

they should excess breeds more excess. Party hatred surpasses all other, as if fiends from the bottomless pit had breathed their fell inspiration into the human heart. Their virulence strikes the understanding blind, and blindness augments their virulence, till a civil war rages in the state, and, without resort to arms, quenches half the joys and all the charities of life. In this condition, liberty is ejected from her temple, and stripped of her ornaments and her charms. And as impunity is not often long indulged to habitual vice and folly, whether in a publick or an individual, the enemy of the state seldom neglects the inviting opportunity to make a fatal progress, while the attention of the magistrate, who ought to be our common parent and protector, is wholly engrossed by a contest with his enemy. The chief ruler is in that case degraded from his exalted station. He is a man, and, when such passions blind him, a weak and bad man too, a magistrate for disorder, and our guardian to betray us.

In these observations we should suppose every man would concur, who is capable of understanding them; and, in this great crisis, we should think he could apply them too. Possibly, so predominant are party feelings, those will refuse assent to their truth, who can foresee their just political application. Nevertheless, let us presume to apply them.

MR. Jefferson has wrapped up all diplomatíck communications from France in mystery. Yet we believe it is unjust, on that account, to accuse him of a partial fondness for Buonaparte. Love Buonaparte! No human being ever loved him. Love the crocodile; love the shark, who feeds upon the dead; or the royal tyger of Bengal, who-snatches your children

from the cradle, and cracks their bones in your sight. Mr. Jefferson may fear Buonaparte, but he cannot love him. Nor is it possible, that he should wish to give him power in the United States. From the inestimable sacrifices he made to get his present power, we may be certain, that he loves it. Nor can we admit, that Mr. Jefferson, a veteran, and, many choose to say, an oracle in politicks, can be blind to the formidable danger of the present day. He knows, that France is not now in the political world what she was, when he was a publick minister to Louis XVI. Excepting England, she has absorbed that world into her own limits. A change of fourteen centuries has passed over her head. She has gone back so much, and Attila, "the scourge of God," has come again.

MR. Jefferson knows, that there is but one obstacle to the progress of French power, and that is the hated British navy. The immortal spirit of the wood nymph liberty, dwells only in the British oak. Suppose that navy destroyed, would our liberty survive a week? The wind of the blow that should destroy British independence, would strike our own senseless to the earth. Boastful and vain as we are, the very thought of independence would take flight from our hearts.

We have a curiosity to know, whether Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison do really believe we could support our liberty, if Great Britain had lost hers. Without intending to indulge in the too common rudeness and disrespect of party addresses, we should deem it a signal work of patriotism, if, by any thing we shall offer, we could induce those gentlemen to examine, with the precision and acuteness of mind that they are allowed to possess, this awful question for America, If Great Britain falls, will not America fall? Shall we not lie in the dust at the conqueror's foot, and with servile, affected joy receive our chains without resistance.

It will be ever fashionable to boast of the invincible spirit of freemen, as long as power is to be won by flattery. We remark, that some speakers in congress assume it as a thing impossible, that an invading foe could make any progress in our country. Others, in party opposition to them, either blind