Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent, a Texas corporation, for some time prior to 1917 was engaged in oper LUCAS, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, v. ating a sawmill, selling lumber and buying NORTH TEXAS LUMBER CO. and selling timber lands. December 27, 1916, Argued Jan. 15, 16, 1930. Decided Feb. 24, it gave to the Southern Pine Company a ten 1930. No. 92. 1. Internal revenue 7(11)-Gain derived by lumber company from sale of timber lands held taxable income (Act Sept. 8, 1916, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757; Act Oct. 3, 1917, § 1200, 40 Stat. 329). Gain derived from sale of timber lands by lumber company engaged in selling lumber and buying and selling timber lands held taxable income under Act Sept. 8, 1916, § 2(a) 39 Stat. 757, and Act Oct. 3, 1917, § 1200, 40 Stat. 329. 2. Internal revenue 7(4)-Option to purchase accepted December 30, 1916, did not create unconditional liability in purchaser in 1916, nor authorize return of purchase price as 1916 income, where transaction was closed in 1917 (Act Sept. 8, 1916, 8 10, 39 Stat. 765; Act Oct. 3, 1917, § 201, 40 Stat. 303; Revenue Act 1916, § 13d). Where vendor corporation granted ten-day option to purchase timber lands, and purchaser on December 30, 1916, gave notice that it would exercise option and pay purchase price as soon as papers were prepared, and vendor did not prepare papers necessary to effect transfer or demand purchase price in 1916, but delivered necessary papers on January 5, 1917, when transaction was finally closed, option and notice of acceptance created executory contract, with right of possession and title remaining in vendor until transaction was closed, and did not create unconditional liability of purchaser for purchase price in year 1916, and hence vendor was not authorized to return purchase price as income for year 1916, rather than for year 1917, when tax would be higher, under Act Sept. 8, 1916, § 10, day option to purchase its timber lands for a specified price. The latter was solvent and able to make the purchase. On the same day title was examined and found satisfactory to the Pine Company. It arranged for the money needed, and December 30, 1916, notified respondent that it would exercise the option, On that day respondent ceased operations and withdrew all employees from the land. January 5, 1917, the papers which were required to effect the transfer were delivered, the purchase price was paid, and the transaction was finally closed. *13 *Respondent kept its accounts on the accrual basis, and treated the profits derived from the sale as income in 1916. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the gain had been realized in, and was taxable for, 1917. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained his finding. 7 B. T. A. 1193. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board. 30 F. (2d) 680. [1] The gain derived from this sale was taxable income.1 If attributed to 1916, the tax would be much less than if made in 1917.2 Section 13 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1916 provided that a corporation keeping its accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis failed clearly to reflect income, might make return upon the basis upon which its accounts were kept and have the tax computed upon the income so returned.3 [2] An executory contract of sale was creat 39 Stat. 765, and Act Oct. 3, 1917, § 201, 40 Stat. ed by the option and notice, December 30, 303, in view of Revenue Act 1916, § 13d, 39 Stat. 771. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Proceeding by the North Texas Lumber Company against Robert H. Lucas, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, taken to the Board of Tax Appeals. Petition to review the order of the Board of Tax Appeals adverse to the taxpayer was granted by the Circuit 1916. In the notice, the purchaser declared itself ready to close the transaction and pay the purchase price "as soon as the papers were prepared." Respondent did not prepare the 1 Section 2 (a), Act of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 757. Section 1200, Act of October 3, 1917, 40 Stat. 300, 329. 2 Section 10, Act of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 765. Section 201, Act of October 3, 1917, 40 Stat. 300, 303. 39 Stat. 756, 771. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 50 S.Ct. papers necessary to effect the transfer or make tender of title or possession or demand the purchase price in 1916. The title and right of possession remained in it until the transaction was closed. Consequently unconditional liability of vendee for the purchase price was not created in that year. Gober v. Hart, 36 Tex. 139. Cf. United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422, 441, 46 S. Ct. 131, 70 L. Ed. 347; American National Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 99, 47 S. Ct. 520, 71 L. Ed. 946. The entry of the purchase price in respondent's accounts as income in that year was not warranted. Respondent was not en *14 titled to make return or have the tax computed on that basis, as clearly it did not reflect 1916 income. Judgment reversed. (280 U. S. 400) MINERALS SEPARATION NORTH AMERI- Argued Jan. 9, 1930. Decided Feb. 24, 1930. 1. Patents 328-962,678, claims 1 and 2, for method of concentrating ores, held invalid as anticipated. Patent No. 962,678, claims 1 and 2, for a process of concentrating ores with mineral frothing agent in solution, held invalid by reason of anticipation. 2. Patents 66(1)-Question in determining "anticipation" is not what is precise scope of claims, but what is disclosed in specification. The question, in determining whether patent is anticipated, is not what is the precise scope of claims in prior patent, but what is disclosed in specification and made known to the world. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First, Second, and Third Series, Anticipation.] On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Suit by the Minerals Separation North American Corporation against the Magma Copper Company. Decree for plaintiff [23 F.(2d) 931] was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals [30 F.(2d) 67], and plaintiff brings certiorari. Affirmed. Messrs. Wm. Houston Kenyon and Henry D. Williams, both of New York City, for petitioner. *401 *Messrs. William H. Davis and Merton W. Sage, both of New York City, for respondent. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit for the infringement of Letters Patent, No. 962678, Claims 1 and 2, brought by the petitioner in the District Court of Maine, where the petitioner prevailed (23 F.(2d) 931), the Court acting partly in deference to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Miami Copper Co. v. Minerals Separation, Ltd., 244 F. 752. The decision of the District Court was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 30 F.(2d) 67, and because of the conflict with the Third Circuit, a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 279 U. S. 832, 49 S. Ct. 481, 73 L. Ed. 982. [1] The claims are (1) for a "process of concentrating ores which consists in mixing the powdered ore with water containing in solution a small quantity of a mineral frothing agent, agitating the mixture to form a froth and separating the froth," and (2) the same as (1) except that it inserts the word "organic" before "mineral frothing agent." The only defence that it is necessary to consider is that the disclosure is anticipated by the earlier patent, No. 835120, which has been before this Court in Minerals Separation Ltd., v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 37 S. Ct. 82, 61 L. Ed. 286, and Minerals Separation, Ltd., v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U. S. 336, 39 S. Ct. 496, 63 L. Ed. 1019. It is enough to refer to those cases without repeating them. The process described in 835120 "consists in mixing the powdered ore with water, adding a small proportion of an oily liquid having a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter (amounting to a fraction of one per cent. on the ore), agitating the mixture until the oil coated mineral matter forms into a froth, and separating the froth from the remainder by flotation." The specification describes the object as being to separate metalliferous matter, &c., 402 from gangue by means of oils, *fatty acids, "or The petitioners, admitting that both patents are for processes, says that they are fundamentally different in their respective principles of action; that in the present patent, 962678, the mineral frothing agent is dis For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexer solved in the water and produces the metal bearing bubbles, no one knows exactly how, by "modifying the water"; whereas in the earlier, 835120, oil is used which does not dissolve in the water but coats the particles of metal with a thin coating of oil, which it could not do if it were soluble, and thus shows its preferential affinity when shaken up with the metal pulp. [2] The question is not what is the precise scope of the claims in 835120, but what is disclosed in the specification and made known to the world. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U. S. 390, 46 S. Ct. 324, 70 L. Ed. 651. Therefore we are relieved of the inquiry whether the words "oily liquid" in Claim (1) can be read as a shorthand expression for the previously mentioned oils "and other substances which have a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter over gangue," as "oil" was expressly interpreted in earlier patents, including one to Cattermole referred to at some length in 835120, and as there is evidence that it thus was understood by men skilled in the art. It is disclosed that it was well known there were other substances besides oil that had the preferential *403 The discovery was that a very minute por-tion of the oil worked in an unexpectedly different way from that familiar with larger quantities-not in the matter of coating the particles, but in helping to produce a froth that floated instead of granules that sank, and thus in preserving the slime made by the smaller particles with the water, and so sav *404 ing a large proportion of metal that *otherwise would have been lost. The fact was a general one. No particular oil was mentioned and the fact was not confined to oils. The public was directed to make a "simple preliminary test to determine which oily substance yields the proportion of froth or scum desired." The patent having been held good as to the oils although experiment was necessary to find out what oil would work best with a given ore the disclosure was an anticipation although experiment might be necessary to chose among the substances having the required affinity the one that would produce the best result. The petitioner adverts to the success that has attended the later patent and to the fact that the world waited until it appeared. But interlopers naturally would be slow to venture into the field occupied by a powerful company armed with patent No. 835120 and supported by a subtle ingenuity that we cannot doubt would have been exercised with even more effect to show that a process like that in No. 962678 was an infringement than it now is to prove that the later patent was a revelation that transformed the art. Decree affirmed. affinity and *that could be used. The nature of ter of reasoning rather than of observation (280 U. S. 500) WHITE et al. v. SPARKILL REALTY COR- Decided Feb. 24, 1930. 1. Injunction 75-Bill by owner and lessee out of possession to restrain defendants from continuing possession cannot be maintained in equity, plaintiffs having adequate law remedy (Conservation Law N. Y. §§ 59, 761). In suit by owner and lessee of land in New York against board of commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park to enjoin defendants from continuing possession, which they had held for five months under claim of right and in pursuance of Conservation Law N. Y. (Laws 1928, c. 242), §§ 59, 761, which gave color of title, notwithstanding challenge of constitutionality, bill should have been dismissed on ground that plaintiffs had adequate remedy at law. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 50 S.Ct. 2. Courts 352(2)-Statutes and equity rule contemplating transfer from equity to law side authorize transfer only of cases of which law court would have jurisdiction (Jud. Code § 274a [28 USCA § 397]; Equity Rule 22 [28 USCA § 723, p. 16]). Judicial Code § 274a (28 USCA § 397) and Equity Rule 22 (28 USCA § 723, p. 16) contemplate that, where action at law is erroneously begun as suit in equity, it may be transferred to law side, and after appropriate amendments may be prosecuted to judgment as if originally begun there, but such statute and rule refer only to cases where court would have jurisdiction if they were brought on its law side. 3. Courts 352 (2)-Federal Court was without jurisdiction of law action to enjoin continued possession of plaintiffs' land, and therefore such action, brought as equity suit, could not be transferred to law side (Jud. Code, § 274a [28 USCA § 397]; Equity Rule 22 [28 USCA § 723, p. 16]). Federal Court did not have jurisdiction of law action by owner and lessee of land against board of commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park, appointed pursuant to New York statutes, to enjoin defendants from continuing in possession of plaintiffs' property, where parties were citizens of same state, since complaint in ejectment without anticipating possible defenses would not present case arising under Constitution or treaty or law of United States, and therefore such action, when brought as suit in equity, could not be transferred to law side under Judicial Code § 274a (28 USCA § 397) and Equity Rule 22 (28 USCA § 723, p. 16). Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Suit by the Sparkill Realty Corporation and another against J. Du Pratt White and others. A motion to dismiss was denied, and an interlocutory injunction was granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and defendants appeal. Reversed. *501 *Mr. Walter H. Pollak, of New York City, for appellants. *504 *Mr. Jackson A. Dykman, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellees. *506 *Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. This in form is a suit in equity against the members of the board of commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park, appointed pursuant to a statute of the state of New York, the Attorney General, and the commissioner of the conservation department of the state. The bill was filed March 19, 1929, and alleges that the Sparkill Realty Corporation is the owner in fee of lands lying within the southern district of New York, of which the Standard Trap Rock Corporation is lessee. The lands contain valuable deposits of "trap rock"; and the Standard Trap Rock Corpora tion, in preparing to develop the deposits, contracted for the erection and equipment of a plant, not adapted for use elsewhere, thereby subjecting itself to liabilities exceeding $1,000,000. While this work was in progress, estimates and maps, as required by state law, for the acquisition of these and other lands for a state park, were approved by the board and certain state officers. Notice was served on *507 appellees *that a description of the lands, certified as correct, has been filed with the secretary of state; and that the lands had been appropriated by the people of the state for public and state park purposes, pursuant to the state statutes. Thereupon, the bill alleges, the board of commissioners, on October 11, 1928, "wrongfully entered upon the said real property of plaintiffs [appellees] and converted the personal property thereon to their own use, and have since remained in possession of said real and personal property and prevented its use, enjoyment, occupation, and operation by plaintiffs for any purpose to plaintiffs' great and continuing damage." It is further averred that the sum of $500,000 was allocated to the acquisition of the property, but that the value of the property exceeds $3,000,000; that appellees are suffering daily loss from the "continued unlawful occupation of their property," the aggregate sum of which will be such that the damage will be irreparable and destructive of appellees' property; and that, therefore, they are without adequate remedy at law. The prayer is that the acts of the board and state officers, and the statutes of the state purporting to authorize them, be declared invalid as violating the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the federal Constitution, as well as a provision of the state Constitution; and that appellants be enjoined from attempting to enforce the provisions of the statute, notice, description, or certificate, or proceeding against appellees at law or in equity to compel compliance with, or inflicting or recovering any penalty, forfeiture, or damage for noncompliance by appellees with the statute, notice, description, or certificate, or "from continuing in possession of plaintiffs' said property." The statutory provisions assailed as unconstitutional are found in sections 59 and *508 761 of the New York Conservation *Law (Laws 1928, c. 242). Section 761 confers upon the commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park power to acquire lands by entry and appropriation in the manner provided for in section 59. Section 59 authorizes the conservation department to enter upon and take possession of lands, etc., which, in the judgment of the department, shall be necessary for public park purposes, or for the protec For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes tion and conservation of the lands, forests, and waters within the state. A description of the property to be entered upon must be made and certified, which, together with a notice indorsed thereon that the property described is appropriated by the people of the state, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. A duplicate must be served on the owner or owners of the lands, etc., and "thereupon such property shall become, and be, the property of the people of the state." Provision is made for an adjustment of compensation for the property and legal damages, and the issue of a certificate stating the amount due; which amount shall be paid out of the state treasury upon the audit and warrant of the Comptroller. It is further provided that any owner may present to the state Court of Claims a claim for the value of the land and damages; and the court is authorized to hear and determine such claim and render judgment thereon. The Comp troller is directed to issue his warrant for the payment of the amount, with interest from the date of the judgment until the 30th day after the entry of final judgment; and such amount shall be paid out of the state treasury. *509 Upon filing the bill it was ordered that appellants show cause before a court of three judges, constituted under section 266 of the Judicial Code (U. S. C. tit. 28, § 380 [28 USCA § 380]), why an interlocutory injunction should not issue. A hearing was had upon affidavits submitted by both parties. The affidavit of James G. Shaw, on behalf of appellees, contains the statement that, acting under the statutory provisions above set forth, the property in question was "appropriated by the people of the state of New York for public and state park purposes with the approval of the Governor"; and that the commissioners "thereafter entered upon and took possession of said property, of which they have since retained possession to the exclusion of the plaintiffs." The affidavit of J. Du Pratt White, president of the board of commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park, sets forth that, after the appropriation papers were served, appellees ceased doing any work on the property; that the contractors and other persons engaged in doing work left, taking their machinery and tools with them, and certain movable property and equipment used or for use in connection therewith was likewise removed from the premises; and that the state, through the commission, had, since October 11, 1928, been in exclusive possession of the property as a state park. These excerpts from the affidavits are not controverted. [1] Appellants submitted a motion to dismiss the bill on the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action in equity against the defendants. The court below denied the motion to dismiss, and granted an interlocutory injunction in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The state statute was held invalid, for the reason that it authorized the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or making adequate provision for payment thereof. In respect of its denial of the motion to dismiss, the court simply said that the action was not one for ejectment, and cited Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636, 31 S. Ct. 654, 55 L. Ed. 890, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243; United States Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos (C. C. A.) 89 F. 769. We do not consider the question of the constitutionality of the state legislation, be *510 cause it is apparent from the *bill and affidavits that the bill should have been dismissed on the ground that appellees had an adequate remedy at law. The board of commissioners, acting for the state, entered upon the lands and had been in the exclusive possession thereof for several months before the filing of the bill, effectively preventing appellees from using, enjoying, or occupying the property. The relief sought was to enjoin appellants "from continuing in possession," that is to say, to oust appellants so as to restore the lands to the possession of appellees. It is plain that this is not the office of an injunction. Entry and possession of the lands by appellants and all alleged wrongful acts and proceedings preliminary thereto and in aid thereof had been consummated long before suit was brought, and preventive relief by injunction, consequently, had ceased to be ap propriate. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 П. S. 146, 11 S. Ct. 276, 34 L. Ed. 873, was a suit in equity to quiet title to real property. Plaintiff was the owner in fee, holding title as trustee. Defendants claimed title and were in possession, openly and adversely. Plaintiff averred that defendants' claim of title was made in fraud of his rights; that the patent under which they claimed was fraudulently made, the land not being subject to entry and patent. Upon these facts, this court held that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, and that a suit in equity could not be sustained, saying (page 151 of 138 U. S., 11 S. Ct. 276, 277): “** * Where an action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific, real, or personal property, or for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is one at law. An action for the recovery of real property, including damages for withholding it, has always been of that class. The right which in this case the plaintiff wishes to assert is his title to certain real property; the remedy which he wishes to obtain is its possession |