*108 constitutionality of these statutory *provisions has been sustained by this court. R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U. S. 371, 44 S. Ct. 548, 68 L. Ed. 1061, 35 A. L. R. 1056; New York State Railways v. Shuler, 265 U. S. 379, 44 S. Ct. 551, 68 L. Ed. 1064. These provisions were an appropriate part of the plan of the Workmen's Compensation Law. It was not considered that the due process clause was violated because the additional compensation, to be made in the described classes of cases, was not paid to the injured employees by their immediate employers or because payment was to be made out of public funds established for the purpose. R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, supra. Thus, the respondent is in no proper sense a stranger to the wrongful act of the appellant. The respondent under the law of the state insured the employer of the deceased, and, as insurer, was required by the statute to make the payments in question to the state treas ury. As these payments became obligatory because of the death caused by appellant's wrongful act, the indemnification of the respondent was a natural and reasonable requirement in consequence of that act. In creating the cause of action in order to obtain this indemnification, there was no lack of due process of law, as there was none in the means afforded by the state for enforcing the liability. In the action to enforce it, the appellant could, as the state court has held in the present case, "avail itself of any defense which it has or ever had. It has a right to establish, if it can, that there could have been no recov ery in the negligence action which it settled, and may test the validity of the awards against the insurance carrier by any defense which the carrier could have interposed, as it was not a party to that proceeding and is not bound thereby." .109 Nor do we find any sufficient ground for the contention that the statutory provisions in question denied the equal protection of the laws. The classification is attacked as arbitrary because it is said to rest on the circumstance *whether or not there are persons entitled to compensation under the statute in the particular case, and that this depends on the further circumstance whether there are de pendents, and, if there are, whether they recover at least as much as the compensation for which the act provides. But this is the classification with respect to the requirement of the payments by the employer or his insurer for the maintenance of the special funds. That cannot be said to be an unreasonable classification, as it provides for those cases where there are no persons entitled to compensation under the act, and thus the immediate employer and his insurer are relieved of the obligation to pay compensation. And, in view of the decisions of this court, above cited, the validity of subdivisions 8 and 9 of section 15 of the statute, as construed by the state court, requiring the payments by the employer and the insured in this instance, have not been questioned. So far as the provision of section all wrongdoers in like circumstances; that is, 29 is concerned, it operates uniformly against 8 and 9 of section 15 have been made against whenever awards as required by subdivisions the employer, or his insurer, and such awards have been paid to the state treasurer. Judgment affirmed. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1929 (281 U. S. 693) No. original. Ex parte H. D. SMITH and J. V. Smith, petitioners. March 12, 1930. The motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. (281 U. S. 693) 2 No. 300. QUAPAW LAND COMPANY, Inc., petitioner, v. S. H. BOLINGER. March 12, 1930. On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For opinion below, see 32 F. (2d) 627. Messrs. F. W. Clements, of Washington, D. C., and S. L. Herold, of Shreveport, La., for petitioner. Messrs. Frank J. Looney and J. M. Grimmet, both of Shreveport, La., for respondent. PER CURIAM. The judgment herein is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Dis 50 S.Ct. nied. 5 (281 U. S. 728) PER CURIAM. The appeal herein is dis- cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit demissed for the want of a substantial Federal question. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Flannigan, 192 U. S. 29, 24 S. Ct. 224, 48 L. Ed. 328; Erie R. R. Co. v. Solomon, 237 U. S. 427, 35 S. Ct. 648, 59 L. Ed. 1033; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 S. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550; C. A. King & Co. v. Horton, 276 U. S. 600, 48 S. Ct. 322, 72 L. Ed. 725; Bank of Indianola v. Miller, 276 U. S. 605, 48 S. Ct. 337. 72 L. Ed. 727; Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191, 49 S. Ct. 160, 73 L. Ed. 259. No. 336. J. Du Pratt WHITE et al., appellants. v. SPARKILL REALTY CORPORATION et al. March 12, 1930. See, also, 280 U. S. 500, 50 S. Ct. 186, 74 L. Ed. 578. Mr. Walter H. Pollak, of New York City, for appellants. Mr. Jackson A. Dykman, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellees. Mandate granted on motion of Mr. Adrian Sizer in behalf of Mr. Jackson A. Dykman for the appellee. 2 No. 583. Harold J. COOLIDGE and Augustus P. Loring, Trustees, appellants, v. Henry F. LONG, Commissioner, etc.; and No. 584. Harold J. COOLIDGE and Augustus P. Loring, Trustees, appellants, v. Henry F. LONG, Commissioner, etc. March 12, 1930. Mr. For opinion below, see 167 N. E. 757. Robert G. Dodge, of Boston, Mass., for appellants. Messrs. Joseph E. Warner, of Boston, Mass., and James S. Eastham, of Lawrence, Mass., for appellee. In these cases the Court finds that probable jurisdiction has been shown. No. 592. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. Fred H. DAVIS, as Attorney General, et al. March 12, 1930. For opinions below, see 116 So. 48; 122 So. 256; 124 So. 429. Messrs. F. B. Grier, of Greenwood, S. C., and W. E. Kay, of Jacksonville, Fla., for petitioner. Messrs. Fred H. Davis and Theo T. Turnbull, both of Tallahassee, Fla., for respondents. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida denied. No. 595. HENDERSON COUNTY, STATE OF KENTUCKY, retitioner, v. STATE BANK OF NEW YORK and George A. Eyer, doing business under the name of Eyer & Company; and No. 596. HENDERSON COUNTY, STATE OF KENTUCKY, petitioner, v. STATE BANK OF NEW YORK and George A. Eyer, doing business under the name of Eyer & Company. March 12, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F. (2d) 859. Mr. James W. Henson, of Henderson, Ky., for petitioner. Mr. Edmund F. Trabue, of Louisville, Ky., for respondents. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 602. George A. GASTON and J. W. Redmond, as Receivers of Central Vermont Railway Company, petitioners, v. RUTLAND RAILROAD COMPANY. March 12, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F. (2d) 685. Messrs. J. W. Redmond, of Newport, Vt., and Horace H. Powers, of St. Albans, Vt., for petitioners. Mr. Edwin W. Lawrence, of Rutland, Vt., for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. low, see 35 F.(2d) 467. Messrs. Francis C. 12, 1930. For opinion below, see 34 F. (2d) 436. Mr. H. M. Brackney, of Sioux City, Iowa, for petitioners. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Downey, of Kansas City, Mo., and Fred L. Chappell, of Kalamazoo, Mich., for petitioners. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. FACTURING COMPANY, petitioner, v. Geza No. 619. MCCORD RADIATOR & MANUHORVATH. March 12, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F. (2d) 640. Messrs. James M. Beck, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner. Messrs. Merlin of Washington, D. C., and Charles E. Lewis, of and Robert Crosser, of Cleveland, Ohio, for reWiley and O. L. Smith, both of Detroit, Mich., spondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. 50 S.Ct. No. 655. Edna Ellis HILTON, petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; No. 656. Edith W. ELY, petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; No. 657. Flora G. STEINBERG, petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; No. 658. Marian A. NEWMAN, petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; No. 659. Laskey W. JOHNSON, petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. March 12, 1930. No. 660. Evva M. HERRON, petitioner, v. Messrs. Paul E. Lesh and Stanton C. Peelle, For opinions below, see 37 F. (2d) 444, 448. both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. vener. March 17, 1930. *On consideration of the report dated July 15, 1929, of Samuel S. Gannett, commissioner, heretofore designated to run, locate, and mark the boundary between the State of Oklahoma and the State of Texas along the true one hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich as determined by the decree of January 3, 1927 (273 U. S. 93, 47 S. Ct. 307, 71 L. Ed. 555), modified by the decree of March 5, 1928 (276 U. S. 596, 48 S. Ct. 205, 297, 72 L. Ed. 723), showing that he has run, located, and marked such boundary; And no objection or exception to such report being presented, and the time therefor having expired; It is now adjudged, ordered, and decreed as follows: 1. The said report is in all things confirmed. 2. The boundary line delineated and set forth in said report and on the accompanying maps is established and declared to be the true boundary between the States of Texas and Oklahoma along said meridian. 3. The clerk of this Court shall transmit to the chief magistrates of the States of Texas and Oklahoma and the Secretary of the Interior, copies of this decree, duly authenticated under the seal of this Court, together with copies of said report and of the accompanying maps. 4. As it appears that the said commissioner has completed his work conformably to said decrees, he is hereby discharged. 5. The clerk of this Court shall distribute and deliver to the chief magistrates of the States of Texas and Oklahoma and the Secretary of the Interior all copies of the said report made by *111 the commissioner, with the accom*panying maps, now in the clerk's hands, save that he shall retain 20 copies of each for purposes of certifica tion and other needs that may arise in his office. Decree announced by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. (281 U. S. 695) GREENVILLE No. 339. COLUMBUS & RAILWAY COMPANY, appellant, v. Mrs. Lorena S. BUFORD, in her own behalf and as next friend of and for Lucile Buford, et al., minors, et al. March 17, 1930. For decision below, see 122 So. 501. Mr. William H. Watkins, of Jackson, Miss., for appellant. Mr. John A. Tyson, of Greenwood, Miss., for appellees. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. PER CURIAM. The appeal herein is dismissed for the want of a properly presented substantial Federal question. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Flannigan, 192 U. S. 29, 24 S. Ct. 224, 48 L. Ed. 328; Erie R. R. Co. v. Solomon, 237 U. S. 427, 35 S. Ct. 648, 59 L. Ed. 1033; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 S. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550; C. A. King & Co. v. Horton, 276 U. S. 600, 48 S. Ct. 322, 72 L. Ed. 725; Bank of Indianola v. Miller, 276 U. S. 605, 48 S. Ct. 337, 72 L. Ed. 727; Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191, 49 S. Ct. 160, 73 L. Ed. 259; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, 184, 15 S. Ct. 777, 39 L. Ed. 941; Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk & Ocean View Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 326, 334, 33 S. Ct. 605, 57 L. Ed. 982. No. 590. Mack C. DAVIS, appellant, v. The odore Dewitt TEAGUE. March 17, 1930. For opinion below, see 125 So. 51. Mr. Mack C. Davis, pro se. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. PER CURIAM. The appeal herein is dismissed for the want of a substantial Federal question. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Flannigan, 192 U. S. 29, 24 S. Ct. 224, 48 L. Ed. 328; Erie R. R. Co. v. Solomon, 237 U. S. 427, 35 S. Ct. 648, 59 L. Ed. 1033; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 S. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550; C. A. King & Co. v. Horton, 276 U. S. 600, 48 S. Ct. 322, 72 L. Ed. 725; Bank of Indianola v. Miller, 276 U. S. 605, 48 S. Ct. 337, 72 L. Ed. 727; Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191, 49 S. Ct. 160, 73 L. Ed. 259. No. 632. The UNITED STATES of America, petitioner, v. BOSTON BUICK COMPANY; and No. 633. The UNITED STATES of America, petitioner, v. IRON CAP COPPER COMPANY. March 17, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F. (2d) 560. The Attorney General, for the United States. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted. 10 (281 U. S. 734) No. 634. Henry R. TYROLER, Rena Rae Tyroler, et al., petitioners, v. Carl F. ROUTZAHN, Collector of Internal Revenue. March 17, 1930. For opinion below, see. 36 F. (2d) 208. Messrs. Leon F. Cooper, of Washington, D. C., and M. S. Farmer, of Cleveland, Ohio, for |