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us.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice STONE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

(281 U. S. 389)

But war had been approaching and large stand. These are not open to question before additions had been made without question until after war was declared, April 6, 1917. A little later the present structure was placed in a separate building erected for it by the United States. The understanding of the parties is shown by the fact that a contract with similar terms was made for the next year on September 25, 1918. The plaintiff sent in and was paid bills for rental at the old rate, for increased rates for the lines and stations, and other unquestioned bills, without any attempt to charge for the expenses of the new structure. The explanation of the slight charges for rentals is simple and makes the whole business clear. The settled policy of the Company was to rely for its chief revenue on mileage charges upon station lines, charges for telephone stations, and local messages. Had the war gone on another year probably it would have made a good deal of money. The American Telegraph and Telephone Company regarded the problem of increased telephone service at the War Depart*388

ment as largely its own, and in fact *has more than reimbursed the plaintiff for its loss. When the plaintiff's district manager told his superior officer that the installation ought to be held up until they got a written order, he was told that they wanted to do everything possible for the Government and would take their chances of getting paid.

[2] There is nothing upon which the Company can found a claim except that in January, 1918, it advised the person who was in charge of the telephone service of the War Department, but whose salary the plaintiff paid, and another under whose general direction the service was, that it expected the Government to pay the cost of the new switchboard, less salvage. There was no assent to this expectation, nor did these officers have any authority to give such assent, and as we have said there was neither assent nor knowledge on the part of those higher up. The fact that plans of the building to be erected by the Government showing the switchboard and equipment proposed were submitted to the Secretary of War is no help to the plaintiff. Of course they were, whichever was to pay the bills. Neither was the continued use of the structure after the plaintiff had made its claims. The Government had to use it, and had the right to use it, whether the Government was bound to pay, or whether, as the plaintiff's engineer said to its district manager, the Telephone Company took the chances of getting paid. The Government had the plaintiff's contract and would have had the right to rely upon it even if it had been informed that the plaintiff

was dissatisfied. It seems to us that the dissent of two of the Judges of the Court below is directed rather to the findings than to the statement of the law upon the findings as they

DANOVITZ v. UNITED STATES.
No. 424.

Argued April 23, 1930.
Decided May 5, 1930.

I. Intoxicating liquors 246 Forfeiture Property designed for "manufacture" — Containers Corks Labels.

Containers, corks, labels, and cartons, held forfeitable as designed for "manufacture" of liquor, if offered for sale in mode purposely attracting purchasers wanting them for unlawful manufacture (National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, §§ 3, 25 [27 USCA §§ 12, 39]).

The argument was that empty containers and the other apparatus described cannot be used in, or designed for, the manufacture of liquor because the "manufacture" is completed before that apparatus comes into play.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions of "Manufacture," see Words and Phrases.] 2. Criminal law 1134(2) - Certiorari - Extent of review - Trial without waiver of jury.

In absence of written waiver of jury, sufficiency and effect of evidence were not reviewable on certiorari.

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*Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

50 S.Ct.

[1, 2] This is a libel for the forfeiture of alleged contraband liquors, property and material designed for the manufacture of contraband liquors, specifically described, and alleged to have been unlawfully held in violation of section 25, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 39). The District Court found that the allegations of fact contained in the libel were sustained and ordered a decree of forfeiture. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 F.

*396

(2d) 30. A writ of certiorari was granted *by this Court but confined to the single question whether the property seized is forfeitable under section 25, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 39). 280 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 69, 74 L. Ed.

the manufacture is completed before that ap paratus comes into play. There is a further argument that the containers were not designed in fact for the manufacture of liquor even if they could be, but the objection to this is that if the terms in which the writ was granted do not exclude it, the case having been tried without written waiver of jury, the sufficiency and effect of evidence are not open. Commissioner of Road District No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 257 U. S. 547, 562, 42 S. Ct. 250, 66 L. Ed. 364.

*397

The argument for the petitioner cannot be helped by amplification. It is obviously correct if the word "manufacture" be taken in But the the strictest and most exact sense. word may be used in a looser way to express the whole process by which an article is made *ready for sale on the open market. P. Lorrilard Co. v. Ross, 183 Ky. 217, 223, 209 S. W. 39. As the purpose of the Prohibition Act was to "suppress the entire traffic" condemned by the act, United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357, 46 S. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986; Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505, 513, 48 S. Ct. 400, 72 L. Ed. 676, it should be liberally construed to the end of this suppression, and so directs. Title 2, § 3, of the Act, Code, title 27, § 12 (27 USCA § 12). The decisions under the revenue acts have little weight as against legislation under the afflatus of the Eighteenth Amendment. We are of opinion

The property in question was containers, barrels, bottles, corks, labels, cartons, etc. By the statute it is "unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this chapter or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property." A search warrant may issue “and such liquor, the containers thereof, and such property so seized shall be subject to such disposition as the court may make thereof. If it is found that such liquor or property was so unlawfully held or possessed, or had been so unlawfully used, the liquor, and all property designed for the unlawful manufacture of liquor, shall be destroyed, unless the court shall otherwise order." Act of October 28, 1919, c. 85, tit. 2, § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315, U. S. Code, tit. 27, § 39 (27 USCA § 39). The argument for the petitioner, so far as it does not go beyond the limits set in granting the writ of certiorari, is that empty containers, bottles and the other apparatus described, cannot be used in or designed for the manufacture of liquor, because. Decree affirmed.

that the word was used in this looser way, and that if the empty containers and the other objects seized were offered for sale in such a mode as purposely to attract purchasers who wanted them for the unlawful manufacture, as we interpret the word, they were designed for that manufacture and could be seized.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1929

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No. 526. Harvey COX, appellant, v. The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, et al., etc. April 21, 1930. Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. No opinion filed in court below. Messrs. James H. Brown and M. W. Spaulding, both of Denver, Colo., for appellant.

PER CURIAM. Appeals dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of section 238 of the Judicial Code, as amended by

the Act of February 13, 1925 (c. 229, 43 Stat. 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 68 Ct. Cl. 938 [28 USCA § 345]).

784. Mr. J. S. Y. Ivins, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Claims granted.

No. 554. Charles H. STANGE, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES. April 21, 1930. Mr. W. W. Spalding, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. The Attorney General, for the United States. The motion to set aside limitation of order (281 U. S. 707, 50 S. Ct. 238, 74 L. Ed. —) granting writ of certiorari is denied.

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No. 563. VERMONT LOAN & TRUST COMPANY, appellant, v. W. D. GILLIS, as Attorney General of the State of Idaho; and No. 564. NEW WORLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, appellant, v. W. D. GILLIS, as Attorney General of the State of Idaho. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F.(2d) 386. Messrs. Oliver O. Haga, of Boise, Idaho, and W. G. Graves, of Spokane, Wash., for appellant. Mr. Leon M. Fisk, of Boise, Idaho, for appellee. In these cases the Court finds that probable jurisdiction has been shown.

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No. 611. UTICA KNITTING COMPANY, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 68 Ct. Cl. 77. Messrs. Harry A. Fellows and Henry M. Ward, both of Washington, D. C. (Messrs. Francis K. Kernan, Warnick J. Kernan, and Willis D. Morgan, all of Utica, N. Y., of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Rugg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and Charles R. Pollard and Erwin N. Griswold, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of

Claims denied.

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No. 636. Herbert DUPUY, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES; and

No. 637. Amy H. DUPUY, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 35 F. (2d) 990. Messrs. H. B. McCawley and Lamar Hardy, both of Washington, D. C., and Selig Edelman, of New York City, for petitioners. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Rugg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and Charles R. Pollard and W. Marvin Smith, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Court of Claims denied.

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No. 665. Lilliam R. WARREN, as executrix of the ESTATE OF James Vinson WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 68 Ct. Cl. 634. Messrs. Arthur H. Bartelt, of San Antonio, Tex., and J. Gilbert Hardgrove, of Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioner. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Rugg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., Heber H. Rice and Paul D. Miller, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Claims, denied.

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(281 U. S. 740) No. 684. Edward S. RICH, petitioner, v. NUENAMEL PAINT COMPANY et al. April 21, 1930. For judgment below, see 35 F. (2d) 1020. Messrs. Ray Van Cott and J. D. Skeen, both of Salt Lake City, Utah, and George Sergeant, of Dallas, Tex., for petitioner. Mr. John Davis, of Dallas, Tex., for respondents. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

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No. 690. CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. Calvin L. McCOY. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 227. Mr. Homer B. Aikman, of Terre Haute, Ind., for petitioner. Mr. Arthur H. Greenwood, of Washington, Ind. (Messrs. Curtis G. Shake and Joseph W. Kimmell, both of Vincennes, Ind., and George O. Dix and Floyd E. Dix, both of Terre Haute, Ind., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.

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No. 691. Maria CULLY, petitioner, v. S. D. MITCHELL, C. B. Billington et al. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 37 F. (2d) 493.

Messrs. Chester I. Long and J. D. Houston, both of Wichita, Kan., Peter Q. Nyce, of Washington, D. C., W. E. Stanley and Austin M. Cowan, both of Wichita, Kan., and Thos. H. Owen, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioner. Messrs. Thomas J. Flannelly and Paul B. Mason, both of Independence, Kan., and Nathan A. Gibson and Joseph L. Hull, both of Tulsa, Okl., for the Prairie Oil & Gas Co. Mr. R. H. Hudson, of Bartlesville, Okl., for Phillips Petroleum Co. Messrs. Benjamin C. Conner and Huntler L. Johnson, both of Tulsa, Okl., for Cortez Oil Co. Mr. G. J. Neuner, of Tulsa, Okl., for New York Petroleum Royalty Corporation. Messrs. Arrington & Evans, of Shawnee, Okl., for George

Laub and Central Valley Oil Co. Mr. W. C. Wood, of Wewoka, Okl., for E. W. Whitney and V. V. Harris. Messrs. Norvell & Norvell, of Wewoka, Okl., for Guy C. Jameson and C. B. Billington. Messrs. Goode, Dierker & Goode, of Shawnee, Okl., for C. B. Billington. Mr. C. A. Summers, of Muskogee, Okl., for S. D. Mitchell and E. A. Hassman. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

(281 U. S. 741)

No. 693. P. W. BROOKS & COMPANY, Inc., petitioner, v. NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 37 F. (2d) 220. Messrs.

5

(281 U. S. 711) OF

No. 695. CARBICE CORPORATION AMERICA, petitioner, v. AMERICAN PATENTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 38 F. (2d) 62. Mr. Samuel E. Darby, Jr., of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. Charles Neave and George C. Dean, both of New York City, for respondents. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted.

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No. 698. CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS, Inc., petitioner, v. E. MACHLETT & SON and Rainbow Light, Inc. April 21, 1930. For opinion Messrs. Edwin J. below, see 36 F. (2d) 574. Prindle, Thomas Ewing, and William Bohleber,

all of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. Dean S. Edmonds and William H. Davis, both of New York City, for respondents. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, denied.

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No. 699. The NEW HAVEN BANK, EXECUTOR OF Joseph E. HUBINGER, deceased, petitioner, v. Robert H. LUCAS, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see Hubinger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 F. (2d) 724. Messrs.

Adrian C. Humphreys and Newton K. Fox, both of Washington, D. C. (Messrs. Humphreys & Gwinn, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude

R. Branch, Sewall Key, and John Vaughan Groner, Sp. Ass'ts. to Atty. Gen., and Paul D. Miller, of Washington, D. C. (C. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, and P. S. Crewe, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

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21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 345. Messrs. J. M. McCormick, of Dallas, Tex., I. J. Ringolsky, of Kansas City, Mo., McCormick, Bromberg, Leftwich & Carrington, of Dallas, Tex., and Ringolsky, Friedman, Boatright & Jacobs, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, denied.

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No. 706. CONCORDIA LAND & TIMBER COMPANY, petitioner, v. WILLETTS WOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY et al. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 124 So. 841. Mr. G. P. Bullis, of Vidalia, La., for petitioner. Messrs. J. C. Theus, of Monroe, La., and J. W. House, of Little Rock, Ark. (Mr. Frank Bird, of Little Rock, Ark., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana denied.

(281 U. S. 741)

No. 702. Fridolin PABST, petitioner, v. Robert H. LUCAS, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 614. Messrs. Harry A. Fellows and Camden R. McAtee, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Mr. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sewall Key, and Andrew D. Sharpe, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Paul D. Miller, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied.

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No. 708. Samuel COHEN, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 461. Mr. Wm. A. Gray, of Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner. Mr. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., O. R. Luhring, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and Harry S. Ridgely and W. Marvin Smith, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

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No. 703. CORNING GLASS WORKS. petitioner, v. Robert H. LUCAS, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 37 F. (2d) 798. Mr. Laurence Graves, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Mr. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sewall Key, and Morton Poe Fisher, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Paul D. Miller, of Washington, D. C. (C. M. Charest, General Counsel, and Prew Savoy, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied.

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No. 705. BELT RAILWAY COMPANY OF CHICAGO, petitioner, v. Robert H. LUCAS, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 541. Messrs. R. Kemp Slaughter and Hugh C. Bickford, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Mr. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sewall Key, and Barham R. Gary, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and W. Marvin Smith, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied.

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No. 710. The CLEVELAND RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. Robert H. LUCAS, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. April 21, 1930. For opinion below, see 36 F. (2d) 347. Messrs. Andrew Squire, H. J. Crawford, Fielder Sanders, and Atlee Pomerene, all of Cleveland, Ohio (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, of Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. William D. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Claude R. Branch, Sewall Key, and Morton Poe Fisher, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Erwin N. Griswold, of Washington, D. C. (C. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, and Stanley Suydam, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

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